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Abstract 
This study examines the presentation and examination of DNA evidence in 
the English Criminal Courts, from the perspective of forensic experts. The 
methodology involved qualitative analysis of expert perception and opinion, 
through interview. 
Much activity has concerned the contribution of faulty expert evidence to 
miscarriages of justice, however forensic experts have been largely ignored 
as sources of valuable data. This study is original in specifically examining 
their experience. 
Criticisms of expert evidence in the English courts are commonly described 
as having their origins in detrimental effects of the adversarial trial system, 
however the position supported by this study is that many claimed 
detrimental effects are based on misunderstanding of the workings of 
adversarial procedure. 
The study examined experts’ perceptions of challenges they faced in the 
presentation and examination of DNA evidence, including their duty to offer 
objective and unbiased opinion. The study determined that whilst experts 
may give ‘unbiased’ opinion, ‘impartiality’ was practically difficult to achieve 
because of the different roles played by prosecution and defence experts. 
Furthermore, a lack of clarity regarding the responsibilities implied by the 
requirement of remaining ‘unbiased’ meant that experts put different 
interpretations on their duties in this regard. This study concludes that the 
policy objectives underlying the concept of ‘unbiased’ should be examined, 
with a view to better defining appropriate expert responsibilities. 
The study investigated experience within court. Interviewees reported similar 
experiences to those faced by forensic experts reported in previous studies. 
However, evidence in this study supports the proposition that DNA evidence 
is qualitatively different from older forensic identification techniques. First, 
the complexity of DNA evidence magnifies many known trial ‘pathologies’ in 
terms of presentation and examination. Second, it is fundamentally different 
in that its probabilistic nature means that experts are forced to present it in a 
rigorously scientific manner. In this way, not only does DNA represent a new 
paradigm in forensic identification, but it must inevitably force existing 
tensions between the law and scientific evidence into the open. 
This study found experts to be generally passive in supplying the demands 
of the judicial process. This has included passivity in the face of legal rulings 
on how complex DNA evidence should be presented. From an evidential 
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perspective, this is indubitably a judicial responsibility. This study supports 
the proposal, however, that steps must be taken to engage scientific experts 
in the scientific aspects of these determinations, if the ‘new paradigm’ of 
DNA evidence is not to be diluted.  
The Government must take a lead in co-ordinating expert bodies towards an 
integrated approach to complex evidence such as DNA, in the inevitable 
anticipation that future forensic technologies can only be more complex still. 
It may do this without infringing the over-riding interests of the adversarial 
system of justice. 
- 6 - 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... 3 
Abstract ........................................................................................................ 4 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................ 6 
Table of Cases ........................................................................................... 10 
Table of Legislation ................................................................................... 11 
List of Figures ............................................................................................ 12 
Chapter 1 Introduction .............................................................................. 13 
1.1 Objectives and Summary of Study ................................................ 13 
1.2 Study Context ................................................................................ 19 
1.3 Importance of the Study ................................................................ 27 
1.4 What we do not know and Originality ............................................ 28 
1.5 Methodology .................................................................................. 29 
1.6 Study Outline ................................................................................. 34 
Chapter 2 Literature Review ..................................................................... 37 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 37 
2.2 Forensic Expert Experience .......................................................... 39 
2.3 Medical Expert Experience ............................................................ 44 
2.4 DNA Expert Experience................................................................. 47 
2.5 Lay Witnesses ............................................................................... 49 
2.6 Forensic Evidence in the Adversarial System ............................... 53 
2.7 Is DNA Evidence Different? ........................................................... 54 
2.8 Accusations of ‘Trial Pathology’ in the Adversarial Trial ................ 56 
2.9 The Expert, Unbiased, Impartial, Objective or Independent? ........ 58 
2.10 Examination-In-Chief and the ‘Crucible’ of Cross-
Examination................................................................................. 62 
2.11 Are Judge and Jury Competent? ................................................. 64 
2.12 Cognitive Bias and the Expert Witness........................................ 70 
2.13 Equality of Arms in the Crucible? ................................................ 72 
2.14 Law and Science: Incompatible or Competing Cultures? ............ 75 
2.15 Law and Science: Engagement of Forensic Science .................. 77 
2.16 Conclusions ................................................................................. 81 
Chapter 3 The Criminal Trial and DNA Evidence .................................... 83 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 83 
3.2 The Adversarial Trial ..................................................................... 84 
- 7 - 
3.3 The Objectives of the Trial ............................................................ 88 
3.4 Trial Procedure in the Crown Court ............................................... 92 
3.5 The Creation of Competing Cases ................................................ 93 
3.6 Case Construction ......................................................................... 95 
3.7 Role of Evidence ........................................................................... 97 
3.8 Expert Evidence in the English Court ............................................ 98 
3.9 DNA Profiling ............................................................................... 104 
3.9.1 A Paradigm Shift .............................................................. 104 
3.9.2 The Structure and Location of DNA ................................. 104 
3.9.3 DNA Markers .................................................................... 105 
3.9.4 DNA Profiling .................................................................... 106 
3.9.5 Complex DNA Samples .................................................... 109 
3.9.6 DNA Profiles and the National DNA Database ................. 109 
3.10 DNA Profiling in Evidence ......................................................... 111 
3.11 Ensuring DNA Evidence Addresses the Right Question ........... 112 
3.12 Probabilistic Expression of DNA Evidence ................................ 113 
3.13 Development of DNA Evidence in the English Court ................. 115 
3.14 Doheny and Adams ................................................................... 116 
3.15 Complex DNA Evidence ............................................................ 122 
3.16 Conclusions ............................................................................... 127 
Chapter 4 Methodology .......................................................................... 129 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 129 
4.2 Qualitative Methods ..................................................................... 130 
4.3 Research Design ......................................................................... 135 
4.4 Validity and Reliability ................................................................. 137 
4.5 Interview Structure and Design ................................................... 139 
4.6 Sample Design and Implementation............................................ 140 
4.7 Interview Schedule Design .......................................................... 149 
4.8 Pilot Interview .............................................................................. 155 
4.9 The Interview Process ................................................................. 157 
4.10 Data Analysis ............................................................................ 160 
4.11 Ethical Issues ............................................................................ 166 
4.12 Informed Consent ...................................................................... 169 
4.13 Conclusions ............................................................................... 170 
- 8 - 
Chapter 5 The Unbiased Expert ............................................................. 171 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 171 
5.2 Prosecution and Defence Expert Roles ....................................... 172 
5.3 Changing Role of Prosecution Expert ......................................... 174 
5.4 Pressures for Bias towards Prosecution ...................................... 175 
5.5 Adversarial Experts ..................................................................... 178 
5.6 Evidence of Bias towards the Prosecution .................................. 179 
5.7 The Defence Experts’ View ......................................................... 182 
5.8 A Cultural Gap between Two Schools ......................................... 183 
5.9 What Experts Understand by ‘Unbiased’ ..................................... 185 
5.10 Conclusions ............................................................................... 188 
Chapter 6 The Experts’ Experiences in Court ....................................... 195 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 195 
6.2 Appearances in Court .................................................................. 196 
6.3 Pre-trial Discussions .................................................................... 200 
6.4 Engagement with Counsel and Others ........................................ 206 
6.5 The Expert’s Role ........................................................................ 209 
6.6 The Expert’s Responsibility ......................................................... 211 
6.7 Experience in the Witness Box .................................................... 212 
6.8 Interviewees’ Compensatory Behaviour ...................................... 227 
6.9 Conclusions ................................................................................. 231 
Chapter 7 Science and Law – Incompatible Discourses? .................... 243 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 243 
7.2 Flawed Presentation of DNA Evidence?...................................... 244 
7.3 Rationalising Conflicts between Science and Law in the Court 
Room ......................................................................................... 253 
7.4 Experience versus Experiment or Prosecution versus 
Defence? ................................................................................... 256 
7.5 Engagement of the Forensic Expert and the Court ..................... 261 
7.6 Conclusions ................................................................................. 267 
Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks ............................................................. 271 
8.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 271 
8.2 Importance and Originality of the Research ................................ 273 
8.3 The Unbiased Expert ................................................................... 276 
8.4 Experience in Court ..................................................................... 281 
8.5 Science and Law ......................................................................... 284 
- 9 - 
8.6 Theoretical Implications ............................................................... 288 
8.7 Policy Implications and Future Direction ..................................... 290 
8.8 Final Reflections .......................................................................... 293 
Bibliography ............................................................................................ 294 
Appendix A Information Sheet and Consent Form .............................. 309 
Appendix B Interview Schedule ............................................................. 312 
 
- 10 - 
Table of Cases 
United Kingdom 
Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467. 
Bates [2006] EWCA Crim 1395. 
Bowman [2006] EWCA Crim 417; [2006] 2 Cr App R 3. 
Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549. 
C [2010] EWCA Crim 2578, [2011] 3 All ER 509. 
C [2011] EWCA Crim 1607. 
Cannings [2004] 1 WLR 2607. 
Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020. 
Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425, CA. 
Deen (1994) The Times, 10 January. 
Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487, HL. 
Doheny [1997] Cr App R 369. 
Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2, [2013] 1 Cr App R 32. 
FNC [2015] EWCA Crim 1732. 
General Medical Council v Meadow [2006] EWCA 1390, [2007] QB 462. 
Grant [2008] EWCA Crim 1890. 
Hill (1989) The Times, 20 October. 
Hoey [2007] NICC 49 (20 December 2007). 
Lashley [2000] CA 9903890 Y3 (8 February 2000). 
Maguire (1992) 94 Cr App R 133. 
McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr App R 287. 
Ogden [2013] EWCA Crim 1294. 
Preddie [2007] EWCA Crim 2044. 
Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698, [2010] 1 Cr App R 23. 
Sampson (Albert) [2014] EWCA Crim 1968. 
Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059. 
T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439, [2011] 1 Cr App R 9. 
Toth v Jarman [2006] EWCA Civ 1028, [2006] 4 All ER 1276. 
Turner [1975] 1 QB 834, CA. 
Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R1. 
Weller [2010] EWCA Crim 1085. 
Woolmington v The Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 HL. 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
S and Marper v The United Kingdom - 30562/04 [2008] ECHR 1581 (4 
December 2008). 
Salov v Ukraine (app.no.65518/01), ECtHR Judgment 6 September 2005. 
United States 
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 113 S Ct 2786 (1993). 
Frye v US 293 F. 1013 (1923). 
 
South Africa 
R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45. 
 
- 11 - 
Table of Legislation 
 
Criminal Practice Directions 2014. 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2005. 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2014. 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2015. 
Criminal Practice Directions 2015. 
Theft Act 1968. 
 
- 12 - 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Example of three alleles formed by variable number of 
repeated STRs. ................................................................................ 107 
Figure 2: Example numeric individual profile. ...................................... 108 
 
- 13 - 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Objectives and Summary of Study 
This study examines the presentation and examination of DNA evidence in 
the criminal courts of England and Wales (hereafter ‘England’), from the 
perspective of the forensic experts who provide it. The methodology 
employed involves qualitative analysis of expert perception and opinion, with 
data generated by semi-structured interview with twenty-five experts with 
relevant qualifications and experience. 
Criminal courts are ever more reliant on scientific expert evidence, and yet, 
at the same time, concerns regarding such evidence have been ever 
increasing. Concerns regarding expert evidence in general have a long 
history. As long ago as 1901 it was observed that ‘… logically the expert is 
an anomaly (from which) serious practical difficulties arise’.1 These 
concerns, particularly regarding scientific expert evidence, have steadily 
increased since that time, manifesting themselves in significant academic 
activity,2 governmental reports3 and commissions,4 chartered body 
publications,5 proposed6 and actual (if secondary) legislation,7 developments 
in common law,8 and, not least, media reports. Paradoxically, these 
                                            
1 Learned Hand, 'Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony' (1901) 15 No. 1 Harvard Law Review 50, in Paul Roberts (ed), 
Expert Evidence and Scientific Proof in Criminal Trials (Ashgate, 2014). 
2 For example, Edmond, Gary and San Roque, Mehera, ‘The Cool Crucible: 
Forensic Science and the Frailty of the Criminal Trial’ (July 2012) 24 No. 1 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51. 
3 For example, Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science on 
Trial Seventh Report (HC 2004-2005) (HC Forensic Science Report).  
4 For example, HMSO, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
(Cm. 2263, 1993).  
5 For example, Royal Statistical Society, Communicating and Interpreting 
Statistical Evidence in the Administration of Criminal Justice: 1-4. 
6 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and 
Wales (Law Com No.325, 2011) Appendix A: Draft Criminal Evidence 
(Experts) Bill (Law Commission Expert Evidence Report). 
7 For example, Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19. 
8 For example, R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2. 
- 14 - 
concerns have increased as the scientific rigour of the evidence has 
increased. 
The over-arching aim of this study is to deepen understanding of the forensic 
expert’s role and experience in the adversarial criminal trial process. By 
using as its focus DNA profiling, the most scientifically rigorous forensic 
identification tool,9 this enables the spotlight to be directed at the experience 
of forensic experts themselves, and not to complicate this, more than 
necessarily, with discussion of the scientific validity of the underlying 
evidence. Despite the significant intellectual effort expended on the subject 
of expert scientific evidence, the perspective of the forensic expert has been 
largely ignored. This study sets out to demonstrate, therefore, not only a new 
perspective upon the debate, but also one which is uniquely valuable in that 
it is required, by law, to be unbiased.10 
The central aims of this thesis concern scientific, and specifically, DNA, 
evidence in the criminal court. To fully understand the expert’s position, 
however, it will be necessary to explore further than the court-room itself, 
and to look at events leading up to trial. Few cases actually go to trial, 
primarily due to lack of sufficient evidence or pre-trial guilty pleas,11 however 
it should be noted that events, pre-trial, both condition the trial, and, more 
importantly, are conditioned by the nature of the trial: although the 
investigation of crime is outside the scope of this study, prosecutors must 
ensure that DNA evidence collected during the investigation was correctly 
managed; prosecutors must gather and construct the DNA evidence based 
on common law rulings on its presentation in court; complex rules dictate 
procedures whereby prosecution counsel must disclose details of their case, 
including DNA evidence, to the defence, who may offer rebuttals, and have 
certain disclosure rules of their own; rules concerning expert evidence allow 
courts to order pre-trial meetings of experts to discuss scientific evidence, 
and to clarify issues at dispute. On the basis of these judicial conditions, the 
trial has been described as simply the ‘presentational surface’ of the entire 
underlying criminal prosecution, it being described as a ‘sociological truism’ 
                                            
9 National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National Academies 
Press, 2009) (NRC Report) 7. 
10 Law Commission Report (n 6) para 2.9; Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, 
pt 19.2. 
11 Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2011, Criminal Court 
Statistics Quarterly, England and Wales, October to December 2014. 
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that the evidence presented, and the verdict reached, is heavily dependent 
on myriad contingencies in the pre-trial process,12 and both exist within the 
context of each other.13 In any case, it may be convincingly argued that the 
trial is the judicial process ‘written small’ and the judicial process is the trial 
‘written large’. As stated by Duff, ‘[I]t is the theory of the criminal trial that 
ought to guide theoretical work on the rest of the criminal process.14 
This study is defined by the adversarial nature of the criminal trial in the 
English court. Opposing prosecution and defence parties lead and cross-
examine evidence to support their respective cases. The expert witness is in 
a special position in that they are required to provide unbiased testimony, in 
the service of the court, no matter which party has instructed them.15 Most 
concerns surrounding scientific evidence are centred on claimed detrimental 
effects of the adversarial system itself. These detrimental effects may be 
summarised as being, first, claims of bias on the part of the expert witness, 
and, second, the result of various ‘trial pathologies’, that is, individual 
‘dysfunctions’ in the presentation and examination of DNA evidence.16 
It should be noted that many proposals for reform of these purported 
detrimental effects involve circumvention of adversarialism to some 
degree.17 However, this current study does not set out to be a critique of 
adversarialism, but, instead, regards it as the context in which expert 
testimony must be understood in the English courts. 
The considerations listed above suggest a number of lines of investigation 
within this study. Regarding bias: assuming, for a moment, that experts 
intend to remain unbiased, this study aims to shed some light on the degree 
to which the environment of the adversarial trial, and assumedly partisan 
opposing parties, impact upon that intention. Furthermore, and if, such an 
                                            
12 Paul Roberts, ‘Introduction’, in Paul Roberts (ed), Expert Evidence and 
Scientific Proof in Criminal Trials (Ashgate, 2014) xiv. 
13 Antony Duff and others, ‘Introduction: Towards a Normative Theory of the 
Criminal Trial' in Antony Duff and others (eds), The Trial on Trial Volume 1: 
Truth and Due Process (Hart Publishing, 2004) 10. 
14 ibid 17. 
15 Law Commission Expert Evidence Report (n 6) para 2.9; Criminal 
Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19.2. 
16 Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University 
Press 2001) 198-205; Oriola Sallavaci, The Impact of Scientific Evidence on 
the Criminal Trial: The Case of DNA Evidence (Routledge 2014) 33. 
17 Oriola Sallavaci, The Impact of Scientific Evidence on the Criminal Trial: 
The Case of DNA Evidence (Routledge, 2014) 33. 
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adverse effect is identified, then how expert witnesses attempt to balance 
their testimony, and how effective they perceive their actions to be. Not least 
is what experts understand by the term ‘unbiased’. It should not be forgotten, 
too, that the assumption that an expert’s testimony must be unbiased in 
order to effect a just outcome, has been challenged.18 This study will attempt 
to draw some conclusions as to whether any adverse impacts of the 
adversarial system on the expert’s attempts to give unbiased testimony do 
indeed have an adverse impact on justice. 
A second strand of investigation within this study concerns the various ‘trial 
pathologies’ referenced above. This term refers specifically to a model, 
defined by Nelken, which attempts to classify philosophies regarding the 
inter-relationship between law and science.19 As an example, the trial 
pathology approach might suggest that a hypothetical problem, caused by 
the current presentation method for DNA evidence, could be resolved simply 
by altering that presentation method. The current study seeks to identify 
experts’ perceptions of pathologies that may distort their ability to testify as 
to DNA evidence, strategies that they use to attempt to overcome the 
challenges presented by such pathologies, and whether they believe these 
to be effective. 
In his model, Nelken described alternative models to describe the inter-
relationship between science and law. In addition to ‘trial pathology’, he also 
described the models of ‘competing institutions’ and ‘incompatible 
discourses’.20 The ‘competing institutions’ model suggests legal and 
scientific systems to be equally powerful institutions in battle, each using 
their own methodologies to discredit the other. The ‘incompatible discourses’ 
approach describes science and law as parallel, but incompatible, 
knowledge and communication systems, in which law harnesses science to 
its needs within court, but only succeeds in generating ‘hybrid artefacts… 
with ambiguous epistemic status’, meanwhile outside of court must give way 
to a greater general credibility of the scientific method.21 
These models suggest both a caveat on the lines of investigation described 
above, and an additional line of investigation. First, regarding a caveat: 
                                            
18 Redmayne, Expert Evidence (n 16) 198-220. 
19 David Nelken, ‘A Just Measure of Science’ in Michael Freeman, Helen 
Reece (eds), Science In Court (Ashgate, 1998) 14-18. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid 16. 
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simple analysis of findings, along the lines of the ‘trial pathology’ model, 
might temptingly suggest simple ‘fixes’ to any problems identified. The 
‘competing institutions’ and ‘incompatible discourses’ philosophies might 
suggest, however, that such problems might be structural, and more deeply 
rooted. 
The third line of investigation suggested by the above, is the question of how 
science and law interact in the adversarial trial, whether they are indeed 
‘competing’ or ‘incompatible’ according to Nelken’s models, and, if conflicts 
arise, how these are accommodated. 
On the one hand it has been argued that the science-law relationship has 
failed,22 that courts have ‘privileged the wrong type of heuristics in their 
attempts to engage with scientific… knowledge’,23 and even that the forensic 
community should retrench to their own positions of strength.24 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that forensic science has a special 
status on the basis that it is applied form of science subservient to the law, 
and cannot succeed unless it can adapt scientific knowledge to legal 
requirements.25 Although, somewhat extremely, it has been suggested that 
‘most scientists view the legal system much as humans view reptiles, with 
about equal parts horrified fascination and profound disgust’,26 others have 
argued that the discourses of law and science are less incompatible than 
popularly supposed (or, at least, less simplistically distinguished).27 
                                            
22 Edmond, Cool Crucible (n 2); Edmond and others, ‘Admissibility 
Compared: The Reception of Incriminating Expert Evidence (i.e., Forensic 
Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions’ (2014) 3 University of Denver 
Criminal Law Review 31-109. 
23 Edmond G, ‘Legal Versus Non-Legal Approaches to Forensic Science 
Evidence’ (2016) 20.1 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 3, 3-5. 
24 Gary Edmond, Mehera San Roque, ‘Actual Innocents? Legal Limitations 
and their Implications for Forensic Science and Medicine’ (2011) 43 Issue 2-
3 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 177. 
25 Paul Roberts, ‘Paradigms of Forensic Science and Legal Process: a 
Critical Diagnosis’ (2015) 370 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B 1, 3 (Paradigms). 
26 Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (Basic 
Books, 1993). 
27 Paul Roberts, ‘Renegotiating Forensic Cultures: Between Law, Science 
and Criminal Justice’ (2013) 44 Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 47. 
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The landmark case of R v Doheny,28 in which the so-called ‘Doheny 
direction’ as to the way in which DNA evidence should be presented was 
prescribed, has been represented as a victory of common sense and sound 
legal principles over the statistical approach, that is to say law over 
science.29 Indeed Evett described some commentary on Doheny30 as 
‘having an air of triumphalism’ on the part of the ‘legal establishment’.31 On 
the other hand, Redmayne commented that the zealous scientific view of the 
same case could have been described as ‘Bayesianity’ (a reference to the 
specific statistical approach unsuccessfully attempted by the defence).32 
Interestingly, it has been suggested that a central ground be steered, and 
that it would be a ‘hasty and excessively pessimistic conclusion’ by those of 
a Bayesian disposition to interpret Doheny as a ‘victory for the dark forces of 
ignorance over the light of science’, given the jury’s responsibility of injecting 
common sense.33 
It might be argued that, notwithstanding philosophical arguments regarding 
the similarity or otherwise of the fields of law and science, the actual players 
within these fields do not generally suffer any doubts as to the nature of their 
discipline: the viewpoint of the law is that DNA evidence is like any other 
expert evidence, and its admission as evidence and evaluation in court will 
be conducted according to common law precedent and statute, with the 
objective of reaching a just determination; the viewpoint of the forensic 
scientist is that what they report is ‘fact’, even if the fact that they report is 
qualified in terms of a probability and stated error rates (these are still 
‘factual’). Conflicts between these approaches are evident (for example, the 
question of what probability constitutes ‘reasonable doubt’). 
Commentary such as that described above, does, at least, suggest 
competition between legal and scientific discourses. 
                                            
28 R v Doheny [1997] Cr App R 369. 
29 For example, M Lynch and others, Truth Machine: The Contentious 
History of DNA Fingerprinting (The University of Chicago Press, 2008) ch 6: 
‘Science, Common Sense and DNA Evidence’. 
30 Doheny (n 28). 
31 IW Evett, 'DNA Profiling: a Discussion of Issues Relating to the Reporting 
of Very Small Match Probabilities' (2000) Criminal Law Review 341, 354-
355. 
32 Redmayne, Expert Evidence (n 16) ch 4. 
33 Roberto Puch-Solis and others, ‘Assessing the Probative Value of DNA 
Evidence: Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert 
Witnesses’ (Royal Statistical Society, 2012) para 7.17 (RSS Report 2). 
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DNA evidence has been heralded as a new paradigm. In addition to the 
strands of investigation detailed above, this study also aims to draw some 
conclusions as to whether DNA evidence does indeed provide a special 
case.  
This study aims to shed some light upon how forensic experts see the 
relationship between their forensic evidence and the strictures of the trial 
process. It aims to draw conclusions as to whether any trial pathologies, as 
discussed above, might be more plausibly understood as caused by 
fundamental incompatibilities between law and science in the court room. It 
aims to understand the degree to which forensic scientists ‘are willing to 
adapt scientific knowledge to legal requirements’.34 Not least, it also aims to 
determine whether DNA profiling does indeed form a special case. 
Although the aims of this study are modest, in that they seek to open a new 
perspective on the debate regarding scientific evidence in court, the 
consequences of unresolved challenges may be serious: erroneous DNA 
evidence has been implicated in miscarriage of justice, and has the potential 
to cause further miscarriage of justice in the future. 
1.2 Study Context 
Two major contexts define this study. The first is the fact of the adversarial 
trial system exercised in the criminal courts of England, and the second is 
the focus on DNA profiling evidence. These will be briefly outlined here, and 
the relevance to this study detailed. 
Damaska defines the pure adversarial trial as proceedings structured as a 
dispute between two sides in a position of theoretical equality before a court 
which must decide the outcome of the contest; the parties themselves 
should establish that a contest exists, and its boundaries; evidence is 
exclusive to the party adducing it; the adjudicator’s role is to ensure that the 
parties abide by the established rules, and would intervene only if one party 
objected to conduct by the other party; only the parties themselves are 
interested in the outcome of the trial.35 
                                            
34 Roberts, Paradigms (n 25). 
35 MR Damaska, ‘Evidentiary barriers to conviction and two models of 
criminal procedure: A comparative study’ (1973) 121 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 506. 
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In contrast to the adversarial system, most of continental Europe has 
historically adopted an ‘inquisitorial’ approach to trial,36 in which (for 
example, in France) a ‘juge d’instruction’, is appointed, whose responsibility 
is to carry out an investigation of the case, to include both prosecution and 
defence cases, and culminating in a trial, also seen as part of the 
investigation. They are therefore expected to arrive at a determination by 
their own efforts, rather than by the arguments of opposing parties.37 This is 
in contrast to the adversarial system in which it is argued that the truth is 
more effectively discovered by having two prejudiced researchers starting 
from opposite points of view, and so less likely to miss anything than the 
impartial researcher starting from some point between.38 In its purest sense 
the inquisitorial trial itself is a final examination of documentary evidence 
(seen as being more reliable than oral evidence), and not a confrontation 
between the accused and the prosecution. 
It has been noted that, although adversarial and inquisitorial systems remain 
distinct, ‘the borrowings between the two have been so extensive that it is no 
longer possible to classify any of the criminal justice systems in Western 
Europe as wholly adversarial or wholly inquisitorial’.39 The English 
adversarial system differs from Damaska’s paradigm in many ways, not least 
in that an outside party, in the form of the state, has a key interest in the trial, 
however, it has been suggested that the modern English criminal trial 
system represents the most adversarial of trial systems.40 
In the English trial, witnesses are called by prosecution and defence counsel 
to answer questions, and are subsequently cross-examined by opposing 
parties. It is the role of the judge to rule on questions of law, and a jury to 
draw inferences from the evidence placed before the court. The principle of 
oral testimony, regarding events directly experienced by witnesses, is central 
to the English criminal trial, being described as having ‘taken deep root in 
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the common law psyche’,41 partly being a natural product of the process of 
live examination and cross-examination,42 but also underlying a belief in the 
greater reliability of oral evidence from witnesses of fact.43 The laws of 
evidence render inadmissible ‘hearsay’ evidence (that is, testimony 
regarding facts not directly observed by the witness),44 and, generally, 
opinion evidence.45 However, although opinion evidence offered by ordinary 
witnesses is inadmissible, experts may assist the court in drawing inferences 
by offering their opinion.46 
Criticisms of expert evidence in the English courts are commonly described 
as having their origins in detrimental effects of the adversarial trial system.47 
It will be appreciated, therefore, that the adversarial process forms a defining 
context for the role and perceptions of the expert witnesses in this study. 
Criminal Procedure Rules state that the court may order the appointment of 
a single joint expert at court,48 however, whether this happens in practice or 
not, prior to the trial, experts are instructed by prosecution or defence 
parties, and are associated exclusively with that party. It will be recalled that, 
despite this, experts, by law, must remain unbiased, this duty over-riding any 
obligation to party by whom they are paid.49 As stated above, a main line of 
investigation within this study is the nature of adversarial pressures that 
experts perceive to impact upon them, however it should also be 
emphasised that the very nature of the adversarial environment conditions 
all the findings within the study, from which it is inseparable. 
It is important to briefly address the question of how the courts treat expert 
evidence. It may not be surprising that, given the concerns regarding expert 
evidence mentioned at the outset, there has been significant legislative 
consideration regarding its admissibility and use. Proposed primary 
legislation codifying the admission of expert evidence, drafted as part of the 
Law Commission’s Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in 
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2011,50 was rejected by the Government, however, amendments to part 19 
of the Criminal Procedure Rules51 effectively incorporated some of its main 
provisions.52 (It should be noted that during the empirical part of the current 
study, the part of the Criminal Procedure Rules dealing with expert evidence 
was part 33. As part of the redrafting of the 2015 Criminal Procedure rules, 
renumbering resulted in this part becoming part 19. Unless the distinction is 
significant, all references in the current study use the numbering in the 2015 
Criminal Procedure Rules). It has been suggested that ‘judicial tendency 
might be converging with the Law Commission’s preferred approach’, even 
in the absence of legislation.53 However, even given part 19’s claimed 
‘codification’ of that approach into secondary legislation, it has been 
suggested that trial judges may not be willing to become "gatekeepers" for 
expert evidence, and (the judges): 
… confronted say with complex scientific evidence 
contested by experts on both sides, will prefer to 
take the traditional path of leaving the jury to 
decide between them.54 
In summary, the common law approach to admissibility of expert evidence 
remains, arguably, in its pre- Law Commission Report state, one of laissez-
faire.55 This is a significant, but, arguably, simplifying, contextual aspect of 
this study: stated perhaps over-simplistically, parties are free to adduce DNA 
evidence to their own advantage unfettered by exceptional legislative hurdle. 
The other key defining context of this study is the use of DNA profiling 
evidence. DNA evidence has a special significance when compared to older 
forensic techniques, such as fibre, ear print and shoe mark analysis, and has 
been described as the ‘gold standard’ of scientific evidence.56 For, unlike 
older techniques, DNA profiling is soundly rooted in rigorous scientific 
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discipline.57 It is undisputed, scientifically, that a complete DNA profile (that 
is, an entire individual’s genome) is unique to an individual (except for 
identical twins), and that, even though only a selection of DNA ‘markers’ are 
forensically analysed, this still enables individual identification at a very high 
resolution (with statistically accepted ‘match probabilities’ of many billions to 
one).58 Even the established standard of fingerprinting has never been 
scientifically shown to provide individual identification, even on a probabilistic 
basis.59 On this basis, DNA profiling has been described as a ‘new 
paradigm’ in forensic science.60 
DNA evidence provides a sharp tool for examining the role of expert 
evidence in the judicial process because, on the one hand, it is the only 
forensic identification technique to epitomise scientific proof within the 
court,61 but, on the other, it does not epitomise legal proof.62 It is therefore 
potentially possible in this study to separate the admission and evaluation of 
scientific evidence in the court, from considerations regarding the reliability 
of the underlying science itself. 
DNA does not offer legal proof for the simple reason that, like all evidence it, 
must be examined within the context of the case, and, for this reason, there 
are many ways in which DNA evidence may be (and is) challenged. 
Not least of the challenges is that, because of the rigorous scientific basis for 
DNA evidence, it is explicitly probabilistic. Some of the legal challenges 
caused by this probabilistic nature will be outlined below, however, at the 
outset, it should be noted that earlier identification techniques (including 
fingerprinting) were significantly different in that they purported 
individualisation. DNA profiling, perhaps paradoxically, cannot do that. 
As mentioned above, despite its solid basis, DNA evidence in the criminal 
trial has been the cause of much controversy and research, forensic, legal, 
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scientific, philosophical and empirical.63 Forensic, for example, regarding the 
way in which potential errors in collection and analysis are controlled and 
allowed for; legal, for example, regarding common law requirements as to 
how DNA evidence should be presented, and the extent to which the expert 
witness may offer an opinion as to the meaning of the evidence; scientific, 
for example, regarding the way in which DNA evidence should be accurately 
presented; philosophical, for example, regarding what level of probability 
corresponds with guilt beyond reasonable doubt; empirical, for example, 
regarding whether the judge, prosecution and defence counsel, and jury do 
indeed understand statistical evidence ‘correctly’, particularly where other, 
non-statistical (even contradictory) evidence must be weighed alongside it. 
Note, however, that the basic science underlying DNA individualisation is not 
challenged. 
Regarding the general understanding of DNA evidence: studies have 
consistently shown that people make systematic (indeed, predictable) logical 
and mathematical errors when evaluating quantitative data, as well as errors 
based on their subjective expectancy.64 Not least of the problems that have 
faced the court are the very low ‘random match probabilities’ (currently 1 in a 
billion as standard) quoted for DNA matches. This has led to major 
challenges in the form of fallacious reasoning – a match probability of 1 in 3 
million does not indicate that the chances of innocence are 1 in 3 million – 
the so-called ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’.65  
Despite the fact that this erroneous thinking was the cause of a number of 
successful appeals in the early days of DNA, such as R v Deen66 and R v 
Doheny67 (in which both judge and expert made such an error), the 
transposed conditional may appear in many subtle forms, and has continued 
to be identified in recent cases.68 In any case, despite the fact that the judge, 
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counsel, and indeed forensic expert are cognisant of this fallacy, and, 
presumably, ensure that it is not explicitly stated within court, arguably, there 
seems little reason not to believe that a jury may still apply this erroneous 
thinking implicitly.69 
The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2005 Report, 
Forensic Science on Trial (hereafter ‘Forensic Science on Trial Report’), 
highlighted the continuing lack of knowledge and training on both the part of 
lawyers and judges.70 In practice, judge, expert witness, defence and 
prosecution counsel have all been shown to make errors, variously scientific, 
logical and legal. For example, in R v Hoey,71 criticisms were made variously 
of the defence,72 and prosecution (in the case itself). In R v Deen, both judge 
and expert were criticised for erroneous reasoning in the form of the 
‘prosecutor’s fallacy’.73 . 
As described in the next chapter, many studies have been done on the way 
in which judges, jurors, counsel, and indeed experts, understand and 
process probabilistic evidence. Erroneous modes of thinking (distinct from 
logical errors such as the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’) are known as cognitive 
biases and may be complex and far reaching. A particularly important source 
of irrational thinking has been identified as ‘confirmation bias’, a well-
documented fallacious mode of thinking in which there is a tendency to seek 
evidence supporting the investigator’s initial pre-conception.74 In a report by 
the UK Forensic Regulator into the wrongful arrest, charge with rape, and 
detention of Adam Scott, it was determined that a forensic test result 
pointing away from Scott’s guilt was ignored as being an error.75 In the 
Australian case of Jama,76 Farah Jama was convicted on a charge of rape. 
This was despite the fact that Mr Jama had not visited the city in which the 
crime took place, and had alibi witnesses to say that he was elsewhere. He 
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did not appear on CCTV at the crime scene location (a nightclub), nor were 
his fingerprints found anywhere there. All this evidence was discounted in 
the jury’s mind in favour of positive DNA evidence, which, in fact, had been 
caused by laboratory contamination. Professor Gill characterised this case 
as one in which: 
‘The errors were compounded by scientists, police 
investigators, lawyers, and the judge to such an extent 
that there was manifest failure at all levels of the 
criminal justice system.’77 
‘Trial pathologies’ affect evidence of all types, however by concentrating on 
DNA evidence, the current study aims to shed light on those pathologies 
specifically caused by the admission and use of scientific evidence, as 
opposed to the reliability of the science upon which that evidence is based. 
As noted above, truly scientific evidence is necessarily complex. This study 
aims to draw some conclusions as to the challenges courts may face as this 
type of evidence becomes inevitably more complex. 
Recent cases have thrown up fresh areas of controversy, notably expert 
testimony as to advanced DNA techniques, in which probabilistic evidence 
can no longer be reliably produced, and expert evidence comes back to, 
arguably, subjective opinion. Professor Gill has raised concerns regarding 
recent cases such as R v Weller,78 in which the court apparently approved 
expert subjective opinion regarding DNA evidence, unsupported by scientific 
assessment,79 and R v Dlugosz,80 in which the subjective opinions of the 
expert were ruled even to take precedence over scientific method.81 
These developments are significant, as they would imply that even the most 
rigorous scientific method has boundaries, beyond which reversion to 
potentially fallible subjective belief must occur. This would appear to be a 
retrograde step in the development of any ‘gold-standard’ forensic test, such 
as DNA profiling. The view of those closest to this potential legal 
development, that is, the forensic experts, will be addressed in this study. 
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1.3 Importance of the Study 
Although the aims of this study are modest, the objective is to contribute in a 
small way to a much more important issue. At a procedural level, the issue is 
the admissibility of expert evidence in court; at a practical level, the issue is 
the way in which DNA evidence is presented and examined in court; but, at 
a much more important level, erroneous scientific evidence has been a 
contributing factor to, indeed, on occasion, a cause of, miscarriage of justice. 
This study does not address miscarriage of justice directly, however, it is 
pertinent to consider the bigger picture to which this study aspires to 
contribute in a small way. 
In the 1970s, there were a series of high profile miscarriages of justice, 
including those known popularly as the Birmingham six,82 the Maguire 
seven,83 the Guildford four,84 as well as the case of Judith Ward.85 The 
Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, set up in up in March 
1991 to investigate the causes of a number of these, and other, 
miscarriages,86 identified many factors contributing towards miscarriage of 
justice in these high profile cases, however, they had at their heart 
undisclosed, flawed or misrepresented forensic evidence.87 Specifically, 
convictions were based on erroneous expert opinion, presented by 
‘impressive’ scientists, whilst at the same time doubts by defence experts 
were discounted.88 
In a number of more recent cases, the expert evidence itself was directly the 
cause of miscarriage of justice. The Law Commission Report into expert 
evidence of 2011, took, as its start point, four cases in which the jury 
apparently relied on expert testimony which later turned out to be 
erroneous.89 The report opined that these cases may be the tip of a larger 
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iceberg,90 and concluded that expert evidence of doubtful reliability is too 
readily placed before the jury, is too often trusted and deferred to by the jury, 
and is not effectively challenged at cross-examination.91 The Criminal Bar 
Association, quoted within the report, went further, stating: 
‘…that the current treatment of expert evidence in 
criminal proceedings has contributed to a 
significant number of miscarriages of justice, risks 
continuing to do so, and requires urgent reform.’92 
The Forensic Science on Trial Report suggested that flaws in expert 
evidence were unlikely to have led in isolation to miscarriage of justice, as 
the legal system was such that serious cases would eventually come to light. 
However, it added that there was no way of knowing just how many cases 
overall had been adversely affected, especially given that more minor cases 
were unlikely to have come to appeal. It also drew attention to the human 
cost and damage that must be associated with this.93 
1.4 What we do not know and Originality 
In its introductory comments, the Forensic Science on Trial Report stated 
that flaws in expert evidence were unlikely to have led in isolation to 
miscarriage of justice, but where there had been problems with expert 
evidence, this reflected a systems failure, rather than a failure on the sole 
part of the expert. If it is accepted, for the moment, that systems failure is 
responsible for the admission and reliance on erroneous expert evidence, 
then what is not known in certain terms is the nature of that systems failure. 
As identified in the Forensic Science on Trial Report, and indeed, the 
Runciman Report,94 many different aspects of the judicial process converge 
to form, what in some cases may be, erroneous conclusions based on 
erroneous understanding or use of scientific evidence. What is true to say, 
however, is that, whatever the flow of that information, it finds a focus with 
and converges upon, the expert witness. This study takes as an assumption 
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that the forensic experts witnesses themselves are an important source of 
data in addressing this question. 
It is possible to conceptualise the nature of the ‘systems failure’, however, 
examination of each of the sub-systems of the trial process offers a practical 
and structured line of investigation.95 Any dysfunctions identified would 
equate to Nelken’s concept of ‘trial pathologies’.96 On this basis it is possible 
to be specific about what is not known, or at least, what is not known from 
the point of view of forensic expert perception and opinion. It is not known 
how experts for both the prosecution and defence, respectively, become 
involved in the case; the experts’ experience of the interaction between 
prosecution and defence pre-trial; the experts’ observations regarding the 
use of DNA evidence by opposing counsel; the experts’ experience in the 
court-room, including experiences and observations whilst being examined 
and cross-examined. It is not known, where experts identify particular 
challenges in their involvement, whether, and how, experts attempt to 
compensate, and the degree to which they perceive these behaviours to be 
successful. Additionally, the adversarial nature of the proceedings, and its 
influence on avowedly unbiased testimony, forms an unknown factor which 
may influence all the elements listed above. 
At a more conceptual level, much has been written about whether, and how, 
law and science engage, or whether they are indeed competing or 
incompatible discourses. What can be said is that we simply do not entirely 
know. This study, in a small way, hopes to add valuable knowledge to that 
debate. 
As detailed in the literature review in the next chapter, little research has 
been done into the forensic expert’s perspective of the criminal trial process, 
from either the legal or scientific perspective. To a large degree, then, this 
study is original, and has the ambition of providing a valuable, if modest, 
contribution to debate within the area. 
1.5 Methodology 
It is generally accepted that there is inherent subjectivity within qualitative 
research, and no observer may assume that they can remain objective.97 
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Some commentators see this as a potential weakness, however, it has been 
argued that the very presence of, and interaction with, the researcher, is 
where much of the richness of the data generated lies.98 Approaches to 
assuring the validity of qualitative research include, on the one hand, 
attempting to build controls into the study, and, on the other, to explicitly 
address the viewpoint and perspective of the researcher, and so to 
understand the study within that context. Before outlining this study’s 
methodology, therefore, this study’s perspective and position will be 
considered. 
Briefly, this study is motivated by a curiosity as to the relationship between 
law and science. Specifically, the study may be characterised as putting a 
magnifying glass to a single instance in which law meets science, that is, the 
forensic scientist presenting probabilistic DNA evidence in a criminal court. 
The aims of the study, in understanding the experience and perceptions of 
the unbiased forensic expert testifying in an adversarial court, may be 
understood in two competing languages, those of law and science, and it is 
hoped that some small contribution may be made to the debate as to 
whether science and law find an accommodation, or whether they are 
indeed ‘competing’ or ‘incompatible’ discourses. 
It is worth expanding, albeit briefly, upon the radically differing 
epistemological bases of science and law. Science seeks to describe and 
predict the natural world, ‘discovering’ data, the significance of which is 
determined by researchers, which are then identified, described and 
analysed. Law, as a discipline, on the other hand, collects events, 
judgments, statutes, and administrative enactments which have been 
created by judges, legislators and so forth, and whose significance is 
determined by its originators.99 Science progresses, building on previous 
knowledge, having at its heart a notion of a universal causality. In contrast, 
although law may develop to reflect the nature of the society to which it 
pertains, it cannot be said to develop, in a cumulative sense, in terms of a 
closer understanding of a legal ‘universal causality’,100 (although legal 
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‘naturalists’ have sought to claim (or at least ‘adopted a metaphor’) that the 
law exists as a natural phenomenon to be discovered).101 
Pertinent to this study are the different perspectives on evidence exhibited 
within legal and scientific epistemologies. Consider the following exchange, 
regarding the reliability of evidence. This was in a US case, during the so-
called ‘DNA wars’ of the early 1990s.102 
Expert: … when a paper is published… labs don’t normally 
go out and repeat that work just to show that it is correct… 
One assumes that the scientists publishing their work have 
been accurate and honest. 
Judge: So there isn’t any objective testing of what a person 
says he’s done, it’s only based on what he says occurred 
(?)…. 
Expert: Yes, that’s correct.103 
Later, when the judge asked how the expert could be certain of the data 
relied upon, the expert replied that he felt that he could trust the company 
publishing the results because they employed ‘reputable scientists’. 
Perhaps scientists do have problems with the legal concept of evidence, 
however, more important from a judicial point of view is the problem that the 
law may have in addressing scientific evidence. In this regard it is faced with 
the fact that science is not just another type of evidence, but an internally 
rational and powerful epistemology of its own. 
The law’s objectives are pragmatic, in that they seek to impose an order on 
the social complexities of the real world, and to determine a certain verdict, 
within a limited timeframe, at a reasonable cost, in a way that the court can 
manage, and, at the same time, to demonstrate due process.104 Its 
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objectives are not intended as an ‘exhaustive search for cosmic 
understanding, but the particularised realities of legal disputes’.105 
The rules of evidence and procedure are an apparently rational response to 
the judicial system’s objective of legal fact finding given these constraints.106 
Whereas ‘substantial truth’ (that is, what actually happened, were that 
possible to determine) may be reached more readily under a ‘principle of 
free proof’, in which any logically relevant evidence may be admitted, 
exclusionary rules of evidence act to countermand certain types of evidence 
on a policy basis.107 The rules are complex, however, by these means, they 
attempt to achieve judicial integrity. 
From a practical point of view, admissibility of legal evidence, in the 
adversarial system, is in fundamental conflict with the way in which evidence 
in the scientific world would be ‘admitted’. The law excludes evidence which 
may be perfectly scientifically valid, for example, evidence is excluded where 
it is judged excessively prejudicial; evidence is not adduced as a whole, but 
selected by individual parties, who may choose for tactical reasons to 
emphasise or understate significance, further controlled by the parties’ 
approach in cross-examination; procedural rules aimed at fairness control 
disclosure and timing of evidence introduction; lay juries make the final 
decision, with an explicit requirement not to justify or explain this and, 
further, unexpected and illogical decisions are accepted; the burden of proof 
is placed on one party, with a particular standard to be achieved. The 
outcome of the trial is the legal ‘truth’, of which the court is certain, and the 
fate of the defendant depends. On the one hand, a scientific truth may differ 
from this: given enough time, complete evidence and a completely rational 
analysis process, arguably the ‘real’ truth may be uncovered; however, on 
the other, it is widely accepted that substantial truth cannot be found, but 
only re-constructed by subjective judgment and interpretation of evidence.108 
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A curiosity was mentioned above, as to whether science and law find an 
accommodation, or whether they are indeed ‘competing’ or ‘incompatible’ 
discourses. It must be observed, however, that, as far as is possible, this 
study is about the practical application of DNA evidence in the judicial 
process. In this regard law and science are not ‘equals’, for the simple 
reason that within the trial, the law is in charge: it dictates the process, uses 
scientific evidence as it sees fit, and decides the ultimate issue on its own 
terms. Perhaps the question to be addressed, then, is not exactly ‘how do 
law and science work together’, but rather ‘how does law use science’. 
It is important, too, to state this study’s ‘position’. From the foregoing, it might 
be assumed that science is somehow ‘right’, sacrificed in some way to meet 
the exigencies of the judicial process. However, experience has shown that 
not only are ‘simple’ errors possible in science (for example contamination 
error), but, more fundamentally, commentators have pointed out that many 
developments of science can be shown to be constructed,109 or, more 
radically, even erroneous.110 Rather, the perhaps ‘neutral’, position taken by 
this study is that both the law and science are different, but equally powerful, 
epistemologies, each with internal rationality. 
Moving on to the methodology itself. The methodology applied in this study 
involved generating data by interviewing experienced and qualified expert 
witnesses. It has been observed that if one wants to find out something 
about people’s activities, then the best way is to ask them.111 This study 
used semi-structured interviews, designed to generate data regarding the 
research questions of interest. Not only was this practical and effective, but, 
as detailed in Chapter Three, was designed against a rigorous theoretical 
stance. The method was not chosen for originality, but rather its sound 
basis. 
The data source chosen, that is, appropriate experts, does display significant 
originality however, experts appearing to be a largely untapped source of 
data. Not only is there little literature addressing the expert’s point of view, 
but there has been little academic activity on the part of forensic experts 
regarding legal aspects of DNA evidence (as opposed to technical aspects). 
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For example, in a survey by Walsh of over 6000 articles in international 
forensic journals between 1990 and 2003, only 0.9 percent of articles looked 
at legal issues, and only 0.4 percent considered legal aspects of DNA 
evidence.112 This is in great contrast to the considerable debate around 
evidential aspects of DNA evidence seen in legal and criminological journals. 
Walsh suggested ideological reasons why the forensic expert might actively 
disassociate themselves from legal aspects of scientific evidence, 
suggesting that these are best left to legal and sociological experts. It is 
possible that things have changed since the publication of Walsh’s study, 
however Walsh’s figures certainly indicate that the scientific community has 
shown little interest in the judicial aspects of DNA evidence (aside from, as 
detailed in the literature review section, a small pool of academic scientific 
commentators). Perhaps, simplistically, this is to say that the forensic 
community expects the legal system to engage with the science, but it is not 
clear that this has happened. In any case, there is little doubt that the expert 
community provides a source of rich data, both facts and opinion, relevant to 
the questions of interest to this study. It was stated, above, that, where there 
are systems failures in the presentation and examination of DNA evidence, 
then these focus on, and ‘converge’ upon, the expert witness. This data 
source has apparently been overlooked to date in this respect. It is worth 
underlining: not only do experts apparently not publish regarding their 
observations and opinions on the presentation of DNA expert evidence, but 
neither have they been asked to share their views to any great extent. 
1.6 Study Outline 
Chapter Two contains a review of existing literature. Previous studies of 
expert witnesses testifying as to DNA evidence are limited. However, of 
importance as a comparator to the current study, are studies of forensic 
expert witnesses, and other expert witnesses in general. Brief review is also 
made of the general experience of other witnesses in court. The chapter 
reviews commentary regarding the examination of expert evidence, and the 
presumed ‘adversarial safeguard’ of cross-examination, and also describes 
literature concerning special considerations applying to DNA evidence in this 
regard. The chapter moves on to describe commentary concerning 
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competence of the judicial players, including judge, jury, counsel, and the 
position of the expert witness, and describes concerns regarding the 
potential for cognitive bias. The chapter reviews comment regarding the 
‘equality of arms’ between prosecution and defence in the court room, and 
concludes by reviewing literature concerning the ‘engagement’ of the 
forensic community with the judicial system.  
Chapter Three reviews a number of contextual topics forming the basis for 
the study. It describes the objectives and nature of the adversarial trial, and 
explains how the opposing parties of prosecution and defence construct their 
cases based on evidence. The chapter will explain the rules regarding 
evidence, its admissibility and disclosure rules. It will go on to explain the 
specific rules relating to expert evidence, and current relevant controversies 
surrounding its admissibility. The chapter explains DNA profiling, both from a 
scientific point of view, and from the point of view of its statistical 
presentation. Relevant to this are a number of fallacious modes of 
reasoning, highly relevant to the presentation of DNA evidence at trial. 
Common law and statutory provisions regarding DNA evidence are outlined, 
including recent cases which have, arguably, threatened DNA evidence’s 
status as a new paradigm in forensic identification. 
Chapter Four contains a detailed explanation of the methodology employed 
within the study. Specifically, it explains how the methodology was 
developed in order to address the questions informing the study, and to 
ensure that the study was rooted in a sound ontological and epistemological 
stance. The development of the detailed method (semi-structured interview) 
is described, including the design of the interview schedule, the interview 
process, data analysis, and assurance of methodological quality. The 
chapter also describes how ethical considerations regarding the study were 
addressed. 
Chapter Five addresses the first of the key questions addressed by this 
study, that is, the potential conflicts arising from the expert’s requirement of 
remaining unbiased in an adversarial environment. It examines the different 
ways in which prosecution and defence experts enter the process, and their 
perceptions of the different pressures acting upon them. The chapter 
describes the ways in which experts responded to such pressures, in order 
to satisfy their duty to remain unbiased, and last, but not least, examines the 
meaning that interviewees placed on the meaning of ‘unbiased’. 
Chapter Six addresses the experience of the expert in the trial process itself, 
looking at events in the run up to the trial, and in the trial itself. The chapter 
- 36 - 
describes both prosecution and defence experts’ perception of their roles 
and responsibilities through the process. It goes on to describe interviewees’ 
perceptions of the challenges that they faced in their assumed objective of 
presenting DNA in an effective way so as to ensure that it is correctly 
examined. It reports interviewees’ descriptions of strategies that they applied 
in order to counter any such challenges, and the degree to which they felt 
that these strategies were effective. 
Chapter Seven addresses a number of issues linked by the common fact 
that each concerns the interface of science with the law in court. The chapter 
describes interviewees’ reports of the way that DNA evidence is presented in 
court, and their opinions regarding controversies regarding common law 
precedents. These precedents include the so-called ‘Doheny direction’, 
widely regarded as flawed since its inception,113 and more recent cases in 
which subjective opinion regarding DNA has been admitted.114 The chapter 
moves on to examine interviewees’ perceptions of recent challenges within 
the courtroom concerning the precedence of forensic experience and the 
scientific method. Significantly, the chapter concludes by reporting the 
overall ‘engagement’ of the forensic scientist with the legal system, from the 
viewpoint of the interviewees. 
Chapter Eight describes findings and conclusions regarding each of the 
study’s objectives and lines of investigation, and aims to draw conclusions 
as to the impact of the findings. 
                                            
113 For example, Evett, Small Match Probabilities (n 31); Redmayne (n 16) 
71-74; Semikhodskii, (n 65) 135. 
114 For example, Dlugosz (n 8). 




This study concerns the perceptions of the forensic expert testifying as to 
DNA evidence in the adversarial court. The adversarial system has been 
described as the ‘main cause of problems for the reception and use of 
scientific evidence’.1 The key lines of investigation include potential 
pressures for bias on the expert in the adversarial system, trial ‘pathologies’, 
in terms of individual challenges in the way in which DNA evidence is 
presented by the expert and examined, and the question of whether, taken 
as a whole, law and science are able to communicate effectively, or whether 
they remain, to any degree, incompatible, or competing discourses. This 
study aims to contribute to knowledge by investigating the perception of the 
forensic expert throughout this process. To that degree, the literature 
informing this study specifically concerns the experiences and perceptions of 
the forensic expert navigating the adversarial system pre-trial, the perception 
and experience of the expert navigating the presentation of DNA evidence in 
the adversarial court, and the overall perception and experience of the 
forensic expert in addressing scientific testimony to a legal world. This 
conflict has been characterised, from the expert witness perspective as 
being between the scientific world of collaboration and the legal world of 
adversarialism,2 and, at a practical judicial level, a conflict between science, 
the law, and common sense.3 
No previous study has been identified which involves in depth interviews 
with forensic experts in order to generate data regarding their experiences 
and perceptions in testifying as to DNA evidence. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
views of forensic scientists on testifying as to DNA evidence, or, indeed, 
scientific evidence in general, have not been widely sought. Rather 
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interestingly, consulting the experts themselves has not even been widely 
considered: as an example, Coen and Heffernan, in an article discussing 
juror comprehension of expert evidence, when considering research on 
juries and expert testimony, bemoan the lack of reference to empirical jury 
research in the Law Commission Report on Expert Evidence (Law 
Commission Report),4 but do not mention the dearth of empirical research 
on the experts’ viewpoint.5 Similarly, Findlay, in his review of studies on juror 
comprehension, lists prosecutors, defenders, judicial officers, and other 
stakeholders such as ‘police, judges and magistrates, advocates of all types, 
community workers, corrections officers, legislators etc.,’ but, strikingly, 
again, not expert witnesses as potential sources of data.6 
Although the current study focusses exclusively on the courts of England, 
relevant literature comes additionally from the wider adversarial jurisdictions 
of USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It is certainly not possible to 
assume that experience within these jurisdictions is directly applicable to the 
English judicial system, however it has been observed that similar types of 
scientific evidence are routinely admitted across all these jurisdictions, 
notwithstanding differences in admissibility rules.7 Further it may be noted 
that experience within these jurisdictions has frequently been considered 
(and on a generally equal footing) in official reports such as the Law 
Commission Consultation on Expert Evidence (Law Commission 
Consultation),8 and the Forensic Science Regulator’s Information concerning 
Legal Obligations for forensic scientists.9 Moreover, commentators within the 
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field commonly, if not routinely, consider research across the adversarial 
jurisdictions as being equivalent and comparable.10 
Relevant findings from analogous studies are described below. Although 
each study has different objectives, the aspect that they have in common is 
the requirement of an expert witness to navigate an adversarial arena. The 
common elements that arise from this are, first, the perceived effectiveness 
of the adversarial system in eliciting relevant evidence, including the 
perceived effectiveness of adversarial safeguards, and, second, the 
perceived effectiveness of any behaviours described by the experts in order 
to navigate the process. In terms of comparison, of interest to this study is 
whether experience reported by experts in the current study is specific to 
DNA forensic experts, or whether this experience is common to all experts, 
or indeed to all witnesses. 
2.2 Forensic Expert Experience 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice of 1993 (Runciman Report), was 
precipitated by a series of miscarriages of justice centring on faulty forensic 
evidence.11 It had a specific mandate: 
… in particular to consider whether changes are 
needed in … 
(iii) the role of experts in criminal proceedings, their 
responsibilities to the court, prosecution and defence, 
and the relationship between the forensic science 
services and the police;12 
It was informed by a number of studies including a 1991 study by Roberts 
and Willmore specifically on forensic science evidence in criminal 
proceedings.13 This study aimed to provide an ‘in-depth account of the 
collection and presentation of forensic science evidence in criminal 
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proceedings’, and included in depth interviews with a large number of 
‘relevant actors’ across twenty-seven ‘run-of-the-mill’ criminal cases, 
including twenty-three interviews with forensic experts. The Roberts study 
informs the current investigation in a significant way in that not only did it 
precede current criminal procedure rules on expert evidence, but also 
essentially the use of DNA evidence. To be exact, one case did contain DNA 
evidence, but it was used to establish that body parts came from the same 
source, and was not used for identification of the perpetrator. The study 
predated all currently relevant case law on the presentation of DNA. This 
study therefore presents an important benchmark for forensic expert 
perceptions of the judicial process, when compared to the current study, 
given DNA’s acceptance as a new probabilistic paradigm in scientific 
evidence, and concomitant developments in the law regarding expert 
evidence. 
In assessing the challenge of delivering unbiased testimony in an adversarial 
system, the study reported observations regarding the experts’ experiences 
and behaviours both pre-trial and in the court room. The study determined 
that scientists displayed the highest integrity regarding their responsibilities 
to be unbiased, however subtle biases could not be eliminated.14 Experts, 
however, found themselves falling into distinctly different roles, for the 
prosecution providing scientific support for the prosecution story, and for the 
defence, testing that science.15 Nevertheless, the study pointed out that 
experts were, on occasion, drawn into counsel’s confusion strategies within 
the court room itself.16 
The study determined that forensic experts found themselves subordinate to 
investigators, and required to examine evidence selected by the 
investigators to support the prosecution case. Some experts had developed 
strategies to obtain further exhibits as they thought appropriate. Having said 
this, prosecution scientists felt themselves to be working in the dark as they 
did not have access to the defence ‘story’.17  
In terms of cases coming to trial, the study determined that prosecution 
experts actually gave oral testimony in relatively few cases, reflecting FSS 
official figures, albeit reported in 1988 of less than one in twenty cases 
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necessitating oral testimony.18 They reported that defence experts appeared 
in court even less often. 
The study predated the provision for a discussion between opposing experts 
contained within the Criminal Procedure Rules,19 however it did describe a 
number of interactions between opposing experts prior to trial. These 
appeared mainly to take the form of defence examinations (that is, meetings 
at which the prosecution expert disclosed prosecution expert evidence to the 
defence expert), although it also described informal discussions between 
experts, who were generally associated professionally.20 The study reported 
that experts felt themselves constrained in these discussion by adversarial 
practices, and were, therefore unwilling to commit to discussion of issues at 
dispute.21 Specifically, from the prosecution expert point of view, counsel 
were found to closely control such meetings, and the CPS expected a report 
on the meeting.22 It was not surprising that the report found that the defence 
were very cautious about expert discussions, as they believed it assisted the 
prosecution to prepare a better case.23 The finding was supported by an 
example of ‘leakage’ of a defence argument to the prosecution, and 
subsequent additional forensic work ordered by the prosecution to counter 
the argument.24 
The study discovered that pre-trial conferences between prosecution expert 
and lawyer were infrequent, so that lawyers were not always able to fully 
comprehend the evidence, and were consequently unable to present it 
properly in court.25 Also, because of a lack of information, the experts 
sometimes used unofficial strategies to determine more about the case 
before the trial.26 
From a defence point of view, the study determined that defence experts 
were immediately at a disadvantage as they were in a reactive position 
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relative to the prosecution’s framing of the debate.27 They suffered 
practically because of lack of access to crime scene materials that would be 
of use to them, and time pressure because of slow prosecution disclosure.28 
From the positive side, however, the study noted that the defence expert had 
more information about the case.29 Illuminatingly, the study described the 
defence as ‘individuals working together, exchanging information with 
freedom’, whereas the prosecution was built on institutions working together, 
with the inevitable administrative difficulties.30 
Pre-trial, experts reported a tension between the collaborative scientific 
approach and adversarialism, (‘the perverse desire of British justice to 
obscure the truth’).31 This continued into the court, where experts reported 
discomfort in the fact that were constrained by counsel’s questions in that 
everything was passed through a ‘legal filter’, preventing them presenting 
evidence as they would like.32 This was exacerbated by the lack of pre-trial 
communication with ‘their own side’.33 Evidently, whilst both lawyers and 
experts considered themselves as assistants to the court, each regarded this 
in a different way.34 
During cross-examination, experts described a ‘conflict-confusion’ strategy 
on the part of the defence, in attacking the science.35 Experts reported that 
they had developed their own strategies for protecting their integrity and 
resisting these tactics, but these were dependent on experience and 
personal authority and confidence.36 Some experts felt that it was not their 
duty to be proactive within the witness box, and that they were serving the 
court by simply answering their questions.37 The conclusion was that the 
picture was very variable across courts, and that ‘whilst some experts play 
the system, others are played by it’.38 
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In a 2008 study in Australia by Wheate, 132 forensic scientists were 
canvassed upon their experiences in court.39 Despite the fact that the 
methodology involved the use of written surveys (albeit with some free text 
fields), and only thirteen percent of respondents were specialists in DNA, the 
findings remain relevant in informing the current study. 
Whilst interviewees stated that they had a responsibility to remain unbiased, 
they also pointed out that they naturally fell into roles depending on who 
instructed them.40 The prosecution asserts the strength of scientific evidence 
in support of the case, and the defence looks for flaws. 
Within this study, most were concerned at the lack of competence amongst 
lawyers, with the majority stating that there was either no pre-trial 
conference with the lawyer, or that the right questions were not asked.41 This 
resulted in poor court performance, in their collective view. 
Interviewees indicated that they were often not able to state their evidence 
correctly, due to the prosecution lawyer’s questions, stating that this had a 
detrimental effect on the evidence. Interviewees explained this as 
incompetence, however it is not clear whether this behaviour was 
deliberate.42  
Regarding cross-examination, half of interviewees (presumably for the 
prosecution) stated that they were badly affected by their interaction with 
defence lawyers, specifically regarding accusations that their evidence was 
fabricated.43 They described the defence behaviour as ‘gleeful, rude, 
sarcastic and offensive’.44 Some also felt let down by prosecutors who did 
not use re-examination to object to unfounded personal attacks,45 and clarify 
issues where they felt that the defence’s cross-examination had raised 
unwarranted doubts in the jury’s mind.46 Interviewees were frustrated by the 
way defence lawyers were able to create confusion in the minds of the 
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jurors, by their tactics, although they placed the blame equally on the 
prosecution for not recovering the initiative.47 
Interestingly, most interviewees stated that, (in contrast to other empirical 
studies48) judges understood expert evidence,49 and lay juries are capable of 
comprehending and utilising forensic science.50 In all of these studies, 
however, interviewees had no objective way of knowing whether this was 
true, and certainly not for DNA evidence. 
2.3 Medical Expert Experience 
A study published in 2013 by Henderson and Seymour included semi-
structured interviews with 27 expert witnesses involved in child abuse cases 
in New Zealand.51 The purpose of the study was not only to examine how 
experts experience testifying in an adversarial court, but also, and 
particularly, whether anecdotal reports of experts mistrusting the courts so 
much that they refuse to give evidence, were true.52 On the one hand, the 
data source was different to that in this study: experts interviewed were 
medical practitioners giving evidence in both criminal courts and family 
courts. On the other, the specific lines of investigation were similar to this 
study, that is, the challenges of presenting evidence within an adversarial 
system. Of specific interest is the fact that interviewees were asked how they 
adapted their behaviour to meet those challenges, a line of investigation 
taken within the current study. This forms an important comparator: it will be 
possible to determine which strategies employed by the expert are common 
to experts in general, and which are specific to the expert presenting 
probabilistic DNA evidence. A key distinction between the Henderson study 
and the current study must be underlined however: whilst ‘expert’, medical 
evidence is not ‘scientific’ in the same way as DNA evidence, is presented 
as an opinion, and is not presented probabilistically. It does not, therefore, 
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allow examination of the interface of law and science in the same way as is 
possible in the current study. 
Regarding ethical responsibility, experts were clear as to their independent 
responsibility to the court, even though some stated that they felt an 
additional responsibility to the victim (here, a child).53 Despite this, some 
experts stated that the system of appointment, that is, acting for one party, 
exerted pressure to become partisan, and in some cases there had been 
direct pressure by counsel.54 A general feeling amongst experts was that the 
adversarial system encouraged partisanship, and that counsel did nothing to 
lessen the advantage this might give them.55 
Most of the experts interviewed disliked appearing in court, and described 
the experience in strong terms, including ‘very, very threatening’, 
‘intimidating’, and ‘distressing’.56 This was especially in their early 
experience. Many felt that this affected the quality of their evidence.57 Many 
interviewees stated that they knew colleagues who were reluctant to appear 
in court or who had ceased to appear.58 It should be noted that the special 
factor of professional reputation is a key influencing factor applying to 
medical witnesses, especially after the case of General Medical Council v 
Meadow in which a medical practitioner was struck off the medical register 
for negligent expert opinion.59 
Interviewees reported perceived barriers to presenting evidence caused by 
lack of competence of jurors and judges, however the value of this is 
qualified by the authors on the basis that their opportunity to assess jury 
competence was limited to observing them, and the judge on the basis that 
they had limited exposure to them.60 The fact that they almost never 
attended court after their appearance added to their limited ability to 
comment on such aspects.61 
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Although the competence of barristers was variable, in some cases lack of 
competence in counsel meant that important evidence was not elicited.62 
Interviewees stated also that it was difficult to correct or fill an omission left 
by the prosecutor.63 They also perceived barriers in terms of poor interaction 
with lawyers.64 Specifically, they felt that it was essential for the lawyer to be 
briefed by the expert in order for the evidence to be elicited in court, however 
reported that this was rarely adequate, and was the major source of 
complaint.65 Several mentioned that defence spent more time with their 
experts.66 This is an interesting observation: in terms of meta-analysis, this 
study will look at indicators of a possible ‘them and us’ mentality, of which 
this is arguably an example. 
Interviewees reported strong views on cross-examination, which they 
regarded as sometimes obstructive, confusing and misleading, and involving 
trickery.67 They described instances of being prevented from giving 
evidence.68 Although they described sophisticated behaviours on their part 
to counter such tactics (including even looking like a witness), generally the 
interviewees reported lack of control, and powerlessness to correct what 
they felt were misunderstandings.69 Interviewees reported that judicial 
intervention sometimes assisted, however this was variable and sometimes 
unhelpful.70 
Interviewees had strong views on ‘defence experts’, who either fell into the 
category of respected expert, or ‘hired gun’.71 Interestingly, although some 
experts bemoaned the fact that some lawyers discouraged contact with the 
opposing expert, an opportunity they would welcome, others stated that 
some defence experts, ‘particularly these ones who come from overseas’ will 
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not ‘change their view, because they have a financial incentive’, further that 
‘[T]here are a lot of nutters out there, certainly in the UK and the USA. ’(!)72 
In addition to expert medical witnesses, a number of other studies confirm 
the general unwillingness of doctors to appear as witnesses. For example, in 
the US paper ‘Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners’ Experiences Providing 
Expert Witness Court Testimony’, Campbell and others reported that 
medical practitioners were sometimes unwilling to examine rape 
complainants because they did not want to appear in court.73 The study 
polled 110 specialist nurse examiners and found that 58% had experienced 
problems in court. These included attacks on their qualifications and 
experience as well as the evidence itself.74 Some were also frustrated at not 
being able to express the evidence in the way that they would like because 
of only being able to respond to questions and a perceived lack of 
competence by counsel in asking the right questions.75 
2.4 DNA Expert Experience 
A study by Sallavaci in 2014 comprised a review of literary sources, 
including case reports and commentary, supported by a small number (four) 
of interviews with prosecution forensic experts, and specifically looking at 
DNA evidence.76 Interviewee comments supported the experiences reported 
within the studies outlined above. Specifically, they reported a lack of 
communication, with the judicial process in terms of court appearance,77 with 
the defence, preventing them from properly assessing the prosecution 
case,78 and with their own counsel.79 In terms of the latter, they reported that 
sometimes they had no contact with their own counsel until they entered the 
witness box, and often did not understand the reason for questions, and so 
did not know what was expected of them in answer.80 They attributed this to 
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lack of counsel understanding, but their comments do not exclude a 
deliberate strategic intent,81 as suggested in the Roberts study.82 They felt 
that they sometimes appeared biased because of the questions that they 
were asked.83 They also felt that the jury had a real risk of misunderstanding 
the DNA evidence, and that there was insufficient opportunity to explain it 
(for example, they quoted the perceived value of being allowed to give a 
visual presentation).84 The study suggested that forensic experts are just like 
any other witness in that they felt at the mercy of the adversarial system and 
‘the courtroom drama’, variously reporting lack of understanding by 
prosecution and defence counsel and the judge, and feeling, on the one 
hand, powerless to explain the evidence in the face of the ‘wrong’ questions, 
but on the other feeling that they appeared unhelpful if trying to answer 
correctly in the face of these.85 These comments were particularly relevant 
because they were specifically reporting their experience whilst reporting 
DNA evidence.86 Interestingly, whilst commenting that improved contact 
between counsel and experts would be of value, no interviewee was 
reported as having stated that pre-trial discussion with the opposing expert, 
as envisaged by the Criminal Procedure Rules,87 would be of value. 
Whilst the study reported that experts sometimes felt they were perceived as 
biased, a meta-analysis of expert quotations does, at least, suggest, 
association of the interviewees with instructing counsel: one interviewee 
reported that they felt that they should not be seen to criticise their 
barrister,88 and another stated that, if they were to ‘successfully’ present 
evidence on behalf of their counsel, then they needed to know what their 
counsel’s strategy was.89 Sallavaci did not comment on, or analyse further, 
these limited comments. 
It is worth making one qualification: whereas the current study’s sample 
population did not overlap the sample populations in the other studies 
detailed in this chapter, it was possible that some of the limited number of 
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interviewees in the Sallavaci study were represented also in the current 
study. It may, therefore, not be assumed that any common findings within 
the current and Sallavaci studies show consistency between groups.  
2.5 Lay Witnesses 
To take the concept of benchmarking and comparison further: in considering 
the findings of the current study, it is important to know which experiences of 
the expert are specific to their situation, and which are, in fact, common to all 
witnesses. 
Appearing as a lay witness is generally regarded as being a trying 
experience, with witnesses variously describing the process as ‘terrifying’, 
‘intimidating’, ‘confusing’ and ‘stressful’.90 However, the historical adversarial 
principle of orality (despite its defence as allowing the court to observe 
witnesses’ demeanour in confrontation with the accused) has been claimed 
to adversely affect the witness’s ability to recall or present evidence.91 
Additionally, the requirement to answer questions, and not simply present 
evidence in their own way, has similarly been seen as negatively impacting 
accuracy of recall (for example, leading to omissions or exaggerations).92 
Despite the different status of lay witnesses, empirical studies of their 
experiences inform the current study in an important way: it seems safe to 
assume that, despite their professional training, experts face the same type 
of challenges as those faced by lay witnesses. The importance of studies 
relating to lay witnesses are, therefore, important in that they allow a 
baseline against which expert witnesses’ experiences may be understood. 
As an example, Emson stated that the stress and general unpleasantness of 
being examined in open court may discourage the lay witness from giving 
evidence.93 If this were to be identified as an experience of expert witnesses, 
then it will be important to consider that this may not be a special effect of 
expert testimony, but rather a general experience. 
Empirical studies of the experience of lay witnesses (including victims) have 
focussed mainly on special categories of witness, for example child 
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witnesses, others with special needs and victims of sexual assault.94 
However, a substantial body of indirect data concerning witnesses as a 
whole exists in the form of the Witness and Victim Experience Survey 
conducted from 2005-06 to 2009-2010.95 The survey interviewed all victims 
and prosecution witnesses in every case in which a charge was laid, within 
the categories of: violence against the person, robbery, burglary, theft and 
handling stolen goods, and criminal damage (although excluding crimes that 
resulted in a fatality, domestic violence and sexual offences). A total of 
37,779 interviews was conducted, all with witnesses 18 years of age or 
older, approximately half of whom were victims and the others prosecution 
witnesses. Just over half of those surveyed were called to the stand. 
Some qualification must be given to the relevance of the findings within this 
study: these witnesses were interviewed using a standard questionnaire, 
and the key objective of the study was to ascertain general satisfaction with 
the trial process, and specifically CJS Witness Services. However, the 
interview did include specific questions on witness satisfaction both before, 
after and during the trial, including their treatment when giving evidence. 
This, and the large sample size, makes the findings relevant. 
Regarding witness experience of the adversarial system, although 
interviewees were not asked whether they felt they had been able to present 
the evidence that they would have liked, under examination, 85% reported 
that they were satisfied with the Criminal Justice System.96 60% of witnesses 
reported that they met with the lawyer before entering the court,97 and 85% 
were satisfied by the way they were treated by the prosecution lawyer.98 
Interviewees were also asked about their concerns regarding testifying: 45% 
were concerned about coming into contact with the defendant, and 32% 
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about being cross-examined.99 24% felt intimidated by the trial process, and 
5% of those by the lawyer.100 
Regarding engagement with the process, unsurprisingly, witnesses 
displayed great engagement with the process, with 91% of witnesses 
knowing what the outcome of the case was.101 Regarding the engagement of 
the judicial process with them, interviewees generally reported a high level of 
engagement before (for example by communication and preparatory 
materials), during (for example communication regarding expectations), and 
after (for example follow up).102 Again, this provides some benchmark 
against which engagement by the expert with the trial, and trial with the 
expert may be gauged. 
To expand upon the earlier qualification, despite the fact that a large number 
of witnesses expressed ‘satisfaction’ with the process, the only possible 
answers were satisfied, dissatisfied, or neither. On this basis, therefore, the 
question simply tested the question of overall, was the witness more 
satisfied than dissatisfied. This arguably leaves many potential areas of 
dissatisfaction untested. The fact that defence witnesses are omitted, 
similarly leaves a significant data gap. 
A more informative study regarding the experience of witnesses in the court 
room is given by the Home Office Research Study, ‘Are special measures 
working?: Evidence from surveys of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses’, in 
which a lower overall rate of satisfaction was reported (69%).103 Although 
this study looked at a special sub-set of witnesses (including, for example, 
victims of sexual assault, children, intimidated witnesses), and, again, the 
study was done using a standard survey, specific questions were asked 
about interviewees’ experiences in the witness box. This study interviewed 
just over 1000 witnesses, most of whom were victims, and looked at 
experiences pre- and post- measures designed to facilitate the judicial 
process. About 50% of cases involved Magistrates’ courts, and it is not 
possible to determine from the study whether experiences were different 
between these and the Crown Court. 
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Only a third of witnesses reported having contact with the lawyer before 
appearing in the courtroom.104 Regarding their experience in the witness 
box, 95% felt that the prosecution lawyer had been courteous to them, 
however only 75% felt that they had had the opportunity to say everything 
that they would have liked.105 
Less than 66% of interviewees felt that the defence lawyer had been 
courteous to them during cross-examination.106 57% of interviewees stated 
that they had not been able to say everything that they would have wanted, 
either because the lawyer interrupted or cut them off, or did not get a chance 
to explain.107 70% said that cross-examination upset them. Whilst the 
biggest specific reason given was that they felt that the lawyer tried to 
suggest they were lying, other factors mentioned included the lawyer trying 
to confuse the witness, making the witness feel like they were on trial, 
interrupting, being aggressive, and trying to twist words.108 
In a study of 65 Crown Court trials by Fielding, relating to violence, all the 
significant judicial players were interviewed, including witnesses.109 The 
starting hypothesis was that the natural human mode of giving evidence was 
in narrative format, and the aim of the study was to see how this mode 
coped with the challenge of testimony within the adversarial environment. 
Fielding interviewed both prosecution and defence witnesses and reports 
similar findings for both parties.110 Interestingly, all parties recognised the 
legitimacy of sometimes hostile cross-examination, but demonstrated 
difficulty in practice in communicating evidence as they thought proper.111 
Fielding reported that because of counsel’s control of questioning, frequently 
witnesses were unable to give the evidence that they would like. He gives an 
example of a doctor who was repeatedly cut-off, however the barrister 
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accused him of not answering the question. When he asked to finish his 
point, he was answered with an accusation of telling lies.112 
Another witness view was that they felt that there was important evidence 
that they were not able to give, because they felt that it was not their place to 
talk, or that they were guided down a route.113 
Fielding makes the interesting proposal that the adversarial mode of 
questioning is at odds with the cognitive mode with which most people 
provide accounts, and that the impact of this is to impede the validity and 
reliability of testimony. He suggests that expert witnesses are able to avoid 
these challenges by training and ‘briefing by the legal team advising 
them’.114 
2.6 Forensic Evidence in the Adversarial System 
The studies reviewed above report strikingly similar findings for witnesses at 
the ‘mercy’ of the adversarial system. Both expert and lay witnesses are 
stressed and intimidated by the process, in which they feel powerless. Their 
experience is that they are often not able to state the evidence that they’d 
like to state because counsel do not ask them the right questions. Expert 
witnesses state that this is partly because of a lack of competence, but more 
importantly, a lack of contact between the expert and the scientist before the 
trial. A large number of witnesses state that cross-examination is very 
stressful, even upsetting, with opposing counsel using aggressive and 
sometimes abusive tactics with the apparent intention of sowing doubt with, 
and confusing, the jury. Experience of judicial intervention indicated that this 
was variable and sometimes unhelpful. 
Some professional witnesses report that they have developed sometimes 
sophisticated methods to respond to what they perceive as unhelpful cross-
examination tactics, in an effort to retain their professional integrity and 
present the evidence in the way that they believed was right. This 
responsive behaviour appears to be variable, by experience, but 
interestingly, also by individual experts’ perception of their role. Some 
experts report that they believe their responsibility is simply to respond to 
questions. By this they discharge their responsibilities. 
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Expert witnesses state that they attempt to remain unbiased, but that it can 
be difficult to do because of indirect pressures (for example being fed 
selective information), and the fact that they naturally fall into different roles 
depending on whether they are instructed by prosecution or defence. 
Prosecution naturally fall into the role of providing support for scientific 
evidence supporting the prosecution case; defence fall into the role of finding 
weaknesses with this. Despite assertions that they remained unbiased, 
simplistic meta-analysis of interviewee comments uncover some examples 
of ‘us and them’ perception. None of the studies described, however, 
explicitly considered the question of whether the generated data suggested 
actual bias, or at least party association, by experts. 
The studies above offer strikingly consistent reports of experience of 
witnesses in court, but stop short of the specific knowledge necessary to 
understand how expert witnesses fare when testifying as to the 
‘revolution’115 of DNA identification in the adversarial court. Before 
concluding this review, it is necessary to consider the nature of the arena in 
which the evidence is to be examined, as well as special considerations 
regarding the evidence itself. The experience and perceptions of forensic 
experts cannot be clearly discerned, without understanding the competence 
of the examining environment. 
2.7 Is DNA Evidence Different? 
The special nature of DNA evidence, both in substantive terms and in terms 
of importance to the approach taken in this study, was considered in the 
Introduction (1.2 Study Context). It will be recalled that the position taken 
within the current study is that DNA evidence provides a unique lens through 
which expert evidence may be examined because of its rigorous scientific 
basis. 
This literature review has described studies in which witnesses have 
described similar experiences, whether they be lay, expert, scientific or 
medical. Even those reporting scientific results have largely testified as to 
their opinions regarding evidence. The current study aims to shed some light 
on whether the ‘paradigmatic’ nature of DNA evidence forms a different 
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category of expert evidence, and, if so, if there are differing challenges that 
the expert witness must face. 
The argument that DNA evidence is different has not been without criticism. 
Strong arguments have been made that DNA profiling evidence is no 
different from any other evidence, on the basis that the value and quality of 
forensic evidence is always contextually variable.116 In the case of DNA, 
challenges have been made to admissibility, technical and interpretation 
issues,117 As examples, laboratory or other error is uncommon but 
possible;118 although there might be a DNA match, this might be undisputed, 
with expert evidence consisting of opinion evidence regarding, for example, 
how the sample came to be at the crime scene; for complex samples, expert 
analyses may be disputed. 
The question, even, of whether scientific evidence may be considered to be 
different from non-scientific evidence has been debated. The Law 
Commission, in its consultation paper on the admissibility of expert evidence 
in criminal proceedings, suggested that different guidelines might apply to 
scientific and ‘experience-based’ evidence,119 however this distinction was 
not followed in their subsequent report.120 Other commentators have also 
pointed out the theoretical and practical difficulties in the separation of 
scientific versus non-scientific evidence on the question of assessing expert 
evidence reliability.121 
The position that DNA evidence is no different from other evidence (at least, 
in the court’s view) has also been supported by recent cases in which, 
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controversially,122 where statistical analyses have not been attainable (for 
example, because of poor quality or low quantity DNA sample), experts have 
testified as to their subjective opinion on a DNA match.123 Furthermore, 
courts have judged that subjective expert opinion may take precedence over 
scientific argument. Certainly, these developments would appear to erode 
the concept of a new paradigm in forensics.  
However, Sallavaci makes a strong (and, perhaps, paradoxical) argument in 
support of the proposition that DNA evidence is different on the basis that, 
by its very nature, DNA evidence cannot provide positive individual 
identification.124 Forensic experts are therefore forced into providing truly 
scientific evidence (both by scientific rigour and law). Interestingly she 
suggests that this has been challenging for the experts themselves because 
they have ‘nurtured’ expectations ‘proclaiming individualisation as their 
fundamental raison d’ệtre’.125 She also suggests that, because of their claim 
to individual identification, experts have been able to strongly influence 
determination of the ultimate issue. However, the scientific and legal rigour 
with which DNA evidence must be presented has meant that they are now 
prohibited from doing this.126 In other words, they are forced to present the 
evidence according to legal principles (of the jury as ultimate arbiter of fact), 
because not to do so would be unscientific. 
The current study seeks to determine forensic experts’ perceptions of the 
‘new paradigm’ of DNA profiling and how they are influenced by this. 
2.8 Accusations of ‘Trial Pathology’ in the Adversarial Trial 
It has been mentioned, above, that failings in scientific evidence have 
frequently been placed at the door of adversarialism. Roberts usefully 
summarised a ‘top 20’ frequently mentioned pathologies, including ignorance 
or manipulation by lawyers, communication failures, adversarial deficit (lower 
resource available to defence), testimonial silencing (process not allowing 
experts to give desired evidence), and number blindness, amongst others.127 
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It should be said, however, that these are not universally regarded as 
‘pathologies’. Roberts makes a strong case that many of the ‘pathologies’ 
are based on misapprehensions about either the legal process, or the nature 
of forensic science.128 As a simple example, the adversarial system is strong 
on party autonomy, each party free to use or not use evidence within certain 
constraints. However it may not be obvious to a non-legal person why 
relevant and probative evidence (in an act of ‘testimonial silencing’) might 
not have been used. Roberts suggests that many of these perceived 
‘pathologies’ might better be described as necessary and desirable features 
of the adversarial system.129 To circumvent any of these pathologies would 
destroy a strength of the adversarial system. This argument sees the 
strengths and weaknesses of the features of the adversarial and inquisitorial 
process as mirror images of each other.130 
It is practically unthinkable that, in England, we would change wholesale to 
an inquisitorial criminal adjudication system. Adversarialism has been 
described as ‘an incomparably efficient way of narrowing down the issues 
and getting to the heart of factual disputes’, with the ‘self-serving 
partisanship which adversarial lawyers are expected to display… (being) the 
motor that drives adversarial truth-seeking… ‘.131 
However, proposed reforms in the area of expert testimony seek to introduce 
many inquisitorial elements. These include reforms to rules on expert 
testimony, court-appointed experts, bifurcated trials, specialist juries, no 
juries in some cases, science courts, and a move to reduction of litigation.132 
Damaska has suggested that the such reforms have already weakened the 
adversarial process by diminishing the power of independent party action.133 
So, too, it has been pointed out that the adversarialism can only be effective 
if it is rigorously, and conscientiously applied by all parties. Lawyers must 
recognise their foremost position as ‘ministers of justice’ and experts must 
respect their position as ‘unbiased and objective servants of the court’. 
Otherwise ‘pathologies’ may become manifest. Below is discussed 
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commentary on some aspects of adversarialism relevant to this study, 
including the effectiveness of examination and cross-examination, the 
competence of judicial players to understand complex (and, specifically, 
here, probabilistic evidence), the effect of various cognitive biases on judicial 
players and the relative equality of resource of prosecution and defence. 
2.9 The Expert, Unbiased, Impartial, Objective or 
Independent? 
It has been claimed that a danger to expert testimony is bias on the part of 
the expert witness.134 Redmayne suggests that this is because each party 
may choose experts with an opinion most strongly in their favour, and may 
further bias the expert during preparation for trial.135 On the other hand, 
however, he suggests that, despite the fact that it is inevitable that 
adversarial expertise will produce biased experts, this may not be as big a 
problem as it might first appear to be.136 
It is worth considering the degree to which, in agreement with established 
thinking and law, just how important it is that the expert remained unbiased. 
On the one hand, Redmayne suggested that criticisms of adversarial 
expertise might be better seen as criticisms of adversarialism in general,137 
and that, whilst adversarial expertise ‘is bound to’ produce biased experts, 
there are reasons why this may not be a significant problem.138 The 
reasoning he gives is that, firstly, no system short of compromising 
adversarialism (through, for example, single court-appointed experts) could 
eliminate the situation, but also that the very fact of ‘adversarialism’ 
motivates the expert researcher to redouble their efforts to uncover evidence 
and advance theories to support their employer’s case (despite 
countervailing arguments concerning cognitive bias that may be 
engendered).139 
Strong theoretical arguments have been, however, that not only expert 
evidence, but the position of the expert themselves is anomalous,  and leads 
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to serious difficulties.140 Specifically, the criticism has been that if both 
experts testify as to opposing partisan opinion, then the jury has no way of 
knowing which is right. In fact, they now fail in the essential contribution 
supposed to be provided by the expert, which is assistance to the jury in 
matters beyond their everyday knowledge. In this way, the expert has 
become useless to the trial.141 
The question of expert bias is a major strand of investigation within the 
current research, however it is important to be clear about the meaning of 
‘bias’. The terms ‘unbiased’ and ‘impartial’ are used in different ways by 
different authors, commentators, reports and legislation, sometimes 
synonymously, and sometimes implying a difference in meaning. Similarly, 
the terms ‘objective’ and ‘independent’ have specific meanings, but are used 
in different ways by different authors, and sometimes interchangeably. 
As examples, the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 state that an expert’s 
opinion must be ‘objective and unbiased’ but do not use the word 
‘impartial’.142 In their report on the admissibility of expert evidence, the Law 
Commission state the law to be that expert evidence must be ‘impartial’ and 
‘objective’, but then go on to cite common law stating that the evidence must 
be ‘objective’ and ‘unbiased’.143 In the case of R v Bowman, it was stated 
that the expert must give ‘… independent assistance by way of objective 
unbiased opinion… ’.144 in R v Henderson, the court suggested that the 
expert should not ‘assume the role of an advocate, influenced by the side 
whose cause he seeks to advance.’, although it was not suggested that such 
evidence would necessarily be excluded.145 
The Oxford English Dictionary, whilst suggesting that a synonym of ‘impartial 
is ‘unbiased’, gives its primary definition as ‘not partial; not favouring one 
party or side more than another’. Whilst suggesting that a synonym of 
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‘unbiased’ is ‘impartial’, gives its primary definition as ‘not unduly or 
improperly influenced or inclined’.146  
There are subtle differences in meanings between the terms, which may be 
significant. The specific meanings defined above will be used in evaluation 
of the current research’s findings. Of course, of primary interest to the 
current study is the experts’ understanding of these terms, and how they 
seek to comply with their associated responsibilities. It should also be 
understood that the words used by interviewees may not correspond exactly 
with their intended meaning: although an apparently trivial observation, it 
should be noted that whilst the opposite of ‘unbiased’ is ‘biased’, when 
referring to the opposite of ‘impartial’, an interviewee may not use the word 
‘partial’, on the basis that this commonly has a different meaning. Similarly 
authors may use the term ‘expert impartiality’ as convenient shorthand for 
‘expert responsibility to remain unbiased’, although it is not exactly 
synonymous. 
The extent of the expert’s responsibility to remain ‘unbiased’ should also be 
defined. Whilst the Criminal Procedure Rules state that the expert must help 
the court by giving opinion which is objective and unbiased, this does not 
mean that the expert does not have specific responsibilities to their 
instructing counsel. Defence case preparations (and prosecution 
preparations, so far as they concern strategy rather than evidence) are 
privileged and non-disclosable under common law and this extends to 
strategizing about the use and/or presentation of expert evidence. Common 
law overrides the Criminal Procedure Rules in this regard, adopting the 
position that legal professional privilege is absolute (R v Derby Magistrates’ 
Court ex parte B147), precisely for the reason that anything less would 
prejudice a full and proper defence. 
It seems evident that the expert is subject to a number of potentially 
conflicting pressures: in R v Ward,148 it was stated that it was ‘the clear duty 
of government forensic scientists is to assist in a neutral and impartial way’ 
in the investigation itself, and not assuming that their ‘task was to help the 
police’, but rather to ‘act in the cause of justice’. 
Disclosure of scientific evidence takes place during a defence examination, 
during which the defence expert visits the prosecution expert to carry out an 
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examination of the evidence. CPS guidelines state that disclosure is not a 
responsibility of the expert, but rather the prosecution legal team, who make 
a decision on whether data should be disclosed.149 Furthermore the CPS 
expectation placed on both prosecution and defence expert that the 
examination could not be a ‘fishing trip’. 150 On the one hand, therefore open 
discussion about issues in the case is highly constrained. Meanwhile, the 
Forensic Regulator’s Information on Legal Obligations for forensic experts, 
whilst confirming that disclosure is a responsibility of counsel, states that, 
under common law, the expert has a personal duty to disclose scientific 
evidence which might cast doubt on the prosecution case.151 
Despite the fact that there might be inconsistent terminology within legal 
rules, official guidelines and common law, it might be argued, that there was 
less inconsistency of intention: each of these sources states that the 
intention regarding directions imposed upon the expert are to achieve the 
over-riding objective, that is, the cause of justice.152 
Although a number of previous studies ascertained that experts claimed to 
be able to remain unbiased, no previous study drew any conclusions 
regarding potential actual bias. Indeed, as described above (2.4 DNA Expert 
Evidence), in the Sallavaci study there was some indication that an expert 
tried to help their counsel in court by not being seen to criticise their own 
barrister. 
In summary, these findings support Redmayne’s proposition that adversarial 
expertise is bound to produce biased experts, based on the finding that 
prosecution and defence experts found themselves very much to be the 
victims of adversarially and organisationally defined roles. 
It may be argued that some bias may also enter the system by virtue of an 
individual expert’s customary role. On the one hand, the defence expert has 
anecdotally been described as a ‘hired gun’ willing to say anything, but on 
the other, prosecution experts have been described as making unconvincing 
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expert witnesses for the defence, unwilling to shake off a prosecutor 
instinct.153 
Of course, as stated above, the expert is retained by their respective counsel 
and must observe confidential privilege, however a question of interest is 
how experts see their duty in this respect, whether do feel biased in any way 
because of their customary role, whether they see conflicts within this, and 
how they aim to resolve any such conflicts. 
2.10 Examination-In-Chief and the ‘Crucible’ of Cross-
Examination 
A common finding in the studies outlined above concerns lawyers’ 
understanding and handling of evidence, and specifically scientific evidence. 
There are few empirical studies that look directly at this, however, a number 
of commentators have expressed doubts as to their competence.154 Both the 
NAS Report and the Law Commission Report place responsibility for juror 
comprehension on the lawyers (along with appropriate judicial guidance).155 
From a practical point of view, their competence is manifested in their 
handling of examination-in-chief, and the presumed adversarial safeguard of 
cross-examination. Concerns regarding examination and cross-examination 
fundamentally inform the current study, as this is the ‘crucible’ in which the 
study participants are examined as to their testimony. Regarding preparation 
by lawyers, a study by Young gave further weight to the complaints voiced in 
the studies described above, stating that juries described the problems they 
had as being due to, or exacerbated by, poor presentation (for example, dry, 
ponderous, unduly complicated) and explanation of evidence.156 
As part of its case for enhanced admissibility rules, the Law Commission 
suggested that cross-examination was an insufficient guard against 
unreliable scientific evidence.157 The Report quoted the UK Register of 
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Expert Witnesses, stating that internal consultation indicated that cross-
examining advocates tended not to probe, test or challenge the underlying 
basis of an expert’s opinion evidence but instead adopted the simpler 
approach of trying to undermine the expert’s credibility.158 It also cited 
evidence from US criminal cases illustrating that the advocate’s objective in 
cross-examination is typically to ‘impeach the character of the witness and to 
convey to judge and jury that the witness is not only scientifically 
incompetent, but also morally deficient’.159 It has been suggested that this 
reflects the assumption that juries are incapable of assessing scientific 
methodology, however the House of Commons Report on Forensic Science 
(HC Forensic Science Report) suggested other tactical motives: ‘when 
cross-examining expert witnesses, any questioning of that witness’s 
reputation instantly damages their credibility, even when the accusations are 
without foundation’.160 
This concern reflected similar concerns regarding cross-examination as a 
safeguard expressed by the NRC Report quoting Neufeld’s comments after 
reviewing criminal cases in the US since Daubert: 
For years in the forensic science community, the dominant 
argument against regulating experts was that every time a 
forensic scientist steps into a courtroom, his work is 
vigorously peer reviewed and scrutinized by opposing 
counsel. A forensic scientist might occasionally make an 
error in the crime laboratory, but the crucible of courtroom 
cross-examination would expose it at trial. This ‘crucible,’ 
however, turned out to be utterly ineffective.161 
It should be noted that arguments regarding the effectiveness of cross-
examination are primarily aimed at the defence. Although, of, course, 
prosecution and defence may cross-examine opposing experts, the ‘natural 
order’ is that defence cross-examines to find gaps within the prosecution 
‘story’. Edmond suggested that limitations by the defence in their cross-
examination was a product of limited resources and a strategical approach 
based on impressions of jury and judge capabilities and beliefs. This was the 
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reason why the greater part of the cross-examination of experts tended to be 
superficial, and aimed at undermining credibility or chain of custody rather 
than technical issues.162 
2.11 Are Judge and Jury Competent? 
The fact that ‘common sense’ reasoning tends to operate by means of 
stereotypical generalisations has been stated to be both ‘necessary’ but 
‘dangerous’. They are necessary because some order has to be extracted 
from a mass of confusing data, but dangerous because they may contain 
false assumptions, reasoning fallacies, and illogical conclusions.163 The 
inclusion of scientific evidence, particularly if it is probabilistic in nature, can 
only further compound the challenge faced in determining the facts in a 
case. 
Coen and Heffernan, citing a substantial meta-analysis of jury studies by 18 
leading jury scholars in the US, suggested that jurors genuinely attempt to 
engage with expert evidence, but their success in doing so is limited.164 In 
any case, expert concerns regarding the jury’s competence to understand 
DNA evidence have strong empirical support from a wide range of studies. 
These have ranged from large studies using individuals summoned for jury 
service,165 down to smaller studies using university students as ‘mock’ 
jurors.166 
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It has been suggested that jurors without a scientific or technical training are 
ill-equipped to deal with complex statistical evidence.167 It has been shown 
that probabilistic thinking does not closely coincide with intuitive thinking.168 
In some situations we undervalue statistical evidence, and in others we 
overvalue it.169 Although people with existing statistical knowledge have 
been found to be better at logical reasoning, the level of statistical 
knowledge in the jury-eligible population is low.170 The problem is, arguably, 
more acute in the case of DNA evidence, because it is explicitly stated in the 
form of a probability. 
A number of inter-related modes of fallacious reasoning have concerned 
commentators regarding the jury’s ability to evaluate DNA evidence. These 
are probabilistic errors of reasoning, for example, the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’, 
addressed in the next chapter, errors of reasoning through cognitive bias, 
and, lastly, errors in combining statistical DNA evidence with other evidence. 
These concerns have a firm basis in evidence: the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ has 
been a cause of appeal in a number of cases,171 and continues to be of 
concern;172 reasoning errors have been demonstrated in many empirical 
studies, for example, in which subjects treat evidence differently according to 
how it is presented to them.173 Other empirical studies have demonstrated a 
‘misaggregation’ error, shown to occur when subjects combine traditional 
evidence with DNA evidence, varying as to whether DNA is over- or under-
weighted. 174 This is highly significant: combining traditional with probabilistic 
DNA evidence is what happens in every trial involving DNA. 
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The term ‘cognitive bias’, mentioned above, refers to the way in which 
human decisions are made, and the biases that may skew these. 
Psychologists describe human-decision making in terms of heuristics (‘rules-
of-thumb’) that are commonly employed to simplify decision making. These 
heuristics provide a resource-effective, rapid, decision-making process, often 
with only incomplete information, and which prevent the paralysis of 
indecision which could be caused by over analysis of any given situation.175 
Furthermore it is an approach that generally works.176 Heuristics can be 
continuously updated in the light of new experience and without excessive 
effort. In both physical and relationship terms, people use these tools 
continuously in their daily lives to interpret and predict behaviour. 
Unsurprisingly, much consideration has been given to the way in which 
jurors process DNA evidence as part of their decision-making process, 
especially given the complex, probability-based, nature of this type of 
evidence.177 The problem arises in that, although such heuristics are 
undoubtedly useful for making day-to-day decisions, the use of heuristic 
shortcuts may lead to irrational results. The literature documents many 
examples of types of cognitive bias which have been shown experimentally 
and observed in practice.178 
An example of cognitive bias relevant to the trial is ‘anchoring’. The basic 
concept of the anchor is that, even for simple decision-making models, an 
initial opinion must be held, or formed, and then subsequently adjusted 
according to the evidence presented, along with other factors, to reach a 
final decision.179 Where the fact-finders anchor their story incorrectly, they 
may only see evidence to support this rather than consider any other, 
equally plausible, versions. Studies have shown that, whilst stories cannot 
lose touch with reality, by virtue of the evidence, the most important anchor 
was in fact common sense and heuristical belief.180 The danger is that a 
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story could become anchored by virtue of common sense and experience, 
despite the fact that an equally plausible, and possibly true, story be ignored. 
An example is that of a person found dead. The murder weapon, bearing 
DNA that matches John’s DNA profile, is found beside the body. Without 
additional evidence this would not be enough to prove beyond doubt that 
John was the murderer, however this may become an anchor for a possibly 
erroneous story. 
Empirical studies have shown that juries may base their decisions, 
particularly in complex cases, partly on external cues, such as the 
appearance and credibility of the expert witness.181 The HOC Forensic 
Science on Trial Report of 2005 was disappointed to discover widespread 
acknowledgement that the demeanour of the expert witness had a significant 
bearing on juries’ response to their evidence.182 However, studies have 
shown that the situation is complex: in some situations, despite the 
complexity of the case, there is evidence that an expert’s testimony has 
been dismissed on the basis of him appearing to be a ‘hired gun’,183 
especially in the case of defence experts.184 Interviewees in some of the 
studies described above stated that ‘looking like an expert’ was a tool they 
used within court to assess the evidence. Certainly, expert witness bodies 
believe that these factors count: advice to experts underlines the importance 
of demeanour, appearance and emotional behaviour in court.185 
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Studies have suggested that jurors are not overwhelmed by experts just 
because they are experts,186 however this does not, unfortunately, mean that 
they understand the expert. There is empirical evidence that juries cannot 
distinguish between flawed and good science.187  
A related effect, known as the ‘CSI Effect’ has been claimed by some judicial 
officers and researchers. The ‘CSI Effect’ refers to a purported influence of 
dramatic portrayals in the media of forensic science (and particularly DNA 
evidence) in crime investigation.188 The portrayal of DNA evidence as 
‘common, swift, reliable, and instrumental in solving cases’ has led to the 
suggestion that the jurors’ view of this type of evidence may be distorted.189 
Specifically it has been suggested that jurors may be unwilling to convict in 
the absence of DNA evidence, and a willingness to convict in the presence 
of such evidence, whether probative or not.190 
There have been many studies, mostly based on mock jury studies, aimed at 
identifying whether such an effect exists, and its nature. Generally speaking, 
such studies have shown that there is a relationship between exposure to 
such media and juror expectations for forensic evidence,191 but that there did 
not appear to be an association with the verdict delivered.192 It should be 
noted that such an effect, even if not determined as experimentally influential 
on the verdict, may certainly have an effect in conjunction with the other 
factors, detailed above, that influence jury consideration of DNA evidence. 
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It has been assumed by many commentators that judges are better 
equipped to assess expert evidence than jurors.193 Concerns have been 
raised at two levels, however. First, many consultees to the Law 
Commission Report expressed concerns as to the ability of judges to act as 
gatekeepers against unreliable evidence, stating that there might be a 
‘culture of acceptance’ in relation to evidence of a scientific nature.194 
Second, concerns were voiced as to the acceptance of such evidence when 
admitted, that is to say, evidence was weakly challenged and then accepted 
too easily by judge and jury.195 Indeed the Report not only argues for more 
scientific training for judges,196 but also proposes that specialist assistance 
should be available to them in judging the reliability of such evidence.197 
Empirical evidence regarding judges’ comprehension of scientific evidence 
has shown no differences with that of jurors. Specifically, studies have 
looked at judges’ ability to disregard inadmissible evidence, falling into the 
trap of cognitive bias, drawing false inferences from probabilistic data, 
focusing on central aspects rather than peripheral indicators, distinguishing 
features that make research sound.198 
Edmond suggests that judicial summings-up are ineffective: 
There is little evidence that they help to make trials 
substantially fair or have any salutary or empirically 
discernible effect in mitigating misleading expert opinion 
evidence or unfairness to the accused. In many cases where 
directions or cautionary warnings about expert evidence are 
provided, including where they are ‘tailored to the facts of 
the case’, the warnings rarely provide sufficient information 
to enable a useful assessment of the expert opinion 
evidence.199 
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Other empirical studies have focussed on adherence to judicial directions 
regarding specific aspects of evidence. Worryingly, studies indicate that 
jurors sometimes disregard judicial warnings regarding unreliability of 
evidence, they are prejudiced if they discover bad character or previous 
record of the defendant, they are biased where more than one count against 
the defendant is joined, they were unable to discount inadmissible (for 
example, illegally obtained) evidence, and they were negatively biased 
where the defendant maintained a right to silence.200 In other studies, jurors 
have misunderstood significant aspects of judicial opening and closing 
remarks, and instructions as to the law. Remarkably, jurors have also been 
shown to ignore judicial directions, and directions that they found boring.201 
Studies looking at the effectiveness of judicial direction on the jury’s ability to 
combine scientific evidence with other evidence have shown variable results, 
however a study by Rowe indicated that judicial direction did improve a jury’s 
ability to combine moderately probative DNA evidence with non-scientific 
evidence.202 
2.12 Cognitive Bias and the Expert Witness 
The previous paragraphs have focused on the competence of the judge and 
the jury, particularly regarding their reasoning ability concerning complex 
scientific evidence. Unfortunately, experts themselves have not been shown 
to be immune from either simple cognitive biases, nor errors in probabilistic 
reasoning.203 Of particular concern has been so-called confirmation bias, 
that is, the tendency to look for confirmatory evidence and to ignore 
contradictory evidence.204 Worse, our beliefs persevere even after they have 
been shown to be false.205 It might be imagined that the very scientific nature 
of forensic evidence offered some safeguard against this bias, with its 
                                            
200 McEwan (n 175) 127-133. 
201 Henderson Report (n 48) reviewing literature at para 2.3.1. 
202 Rowe, B I, ‘A Possible Solution for the Problem of Juries Slighting 
Nonscientific Evidence: A Bayesian-like Judicial Instruction’ (1997) 24 
American Journal of Criminal Law 541. 
203 For example, R v Deen (1994) The Times, 10 January; R v Doheny 
[1997] Cr App R 369. 
204 T Gilovich, How We Know What Isn't So: The Infallibility of Human 
Reason in Everyday Life (The Free Press, 1991) 30-37. 
205 CA Anderson, MR Lepper, L Ross, ‘Perseverance of Social Theories: 
The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information’ (1980) 
39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology, 1037. 
- 71 - 
rigorous development of hypotheses, testing and controls, offering a 
safeguard against such bias, however there have been a plethora of cases 
in which this has been insufficient. The Australian case of Jama, reported in 
Chapter One, was one in which: 
The errors were compounded by scientists, police 
investigators, lawyers, and the judge to such an extent 
that there was manifest failure at all levels of the 
criminal justice system.206 
(To be specific, the official report stated that DNA evidence appeared to 
have been viewed as possessing ‘an almost mystical infallibility’.207 
Professor Gill suggested that this, coupled with a ‘CSI effect’ and 
confirmation bias affecting every level of the legal process, led to this 
failure.208) 
This was despite significant ‘common-sense’ evidence excluding the 
defendant. Edmond suggested that, because the analyst is not protected 
from irrelevant information regarding the context of the case, a ‘biasing 
snowball effect’ may take place where ‘cross-contaminated’ interpretations 
and opinions may bounce back and forth between lay and expert witnesses, 
converging as apparently independent lines of evidence corroborating each 
other.209 
Worse, it has been suggested that such a lack of objectivity has, at least 
bordered on, deliberate intent. From the Court of Appeal in R v Ward in 
1993: 
For the future is it important to consider why the scientists 
acted as they did. For lawyers, jurors and judges a forensic 
scientist conjures up the image of a man in a white coat 
working in a laboratory, approaching his task with cold 
neutrality, and dedicated only to the pursuit of scientific truth. 
It is a sombre thought that the reality is sometimes different. 
Forensic scientists may become partisan. The very fact that 
the police seek their assistance may create a relationship 
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between the police and the forensic scientists. And the 
adversarial character of the proceedings tends to promote 
this process. Forensic scientists employed by the 
government may come to see their function as helping the 
police. They may lose their objectivity. That is what must 
have happened in this case. It is illustrated by the catalogue 
of non-disclosures which we have set out.210 
The factors described above, concerning competence in reasoning, in the 
face of known fallacious modes of thinking, therefore informs this study in 
two ways. Firstly, forensic experts’ views on the competence of the judge 
and jury might be assumed to influence the expert’s behaviour in testifying. 
Second, the expert themselves, assuming an understanding of such factors, 
must behave in such a way as to minimise effects of bias on their own part. 
Interviewees’ perceptions in both these areas are of importance. 
2.13 Equality of Arms in the Crucible? 
Informing this study is not only narrowly the relative ability of the defence to 
resource their case, but also the broader relative ‘institutional resource’ of 
prosecution and defence. 
One of the broader principles of the fair trial is that there be an equality of 
arms between parties. As Edmond pointed out, however: 
…a symmetrical commitment: the idea of ‘a level playing 
field’… The trial and its shadowlands are not, however, finely 
balanced. Not only is the state far better resourced, but the 
state has a near monopoly on many types of expertise and 
often is the only party able to test or analyse the evidence 
(and any crime scene) … The collection and testing of traces 
is often oriented to the suspicions of … investigators, and 
not necessarily (or only serendipitously) oriented to 
examining versions of events consistent with non-guilt. The 
state has access to vastly greater resources… (and) at 
earlier stages.211 
Edmond goes on to point out that the defence enters proceedings in very 
different circumstances, without the ability to carry out tests for themselves, 
and dependent on the actions of prosecution experts.212 It has been pointed 
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out, also, that the defence function is typically diffused among private 
practitioners, and who are not necessarily ‘repeat players’ within the relevant 
types of cases, and may be limited in availability and quality.213 
Commentators,214 and official reports215 have pointed out that this unbalance 
in resource has further implications for the development of the case, and the 
trial. Even though a case may not go to trial, in the absence of informed 
evaluation of the scientific evidence, defence lawyers are is unable to give 
appropriate advice. 
At a simple level too, the narrow ability of the defence to ‘afford’ an effective 
defence is critical. The Law Commission Report acknowledged that there 
are deficiencies in the position regarding the limited resources of the 
defence party, however, at the same time, acknowledged that the resources 
required by each party need not necessarily be equal: the prosecution needs 
to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the defence simply aims to 
rebut this.216 
The prosecution arguably has another advantage: it is commonly accepted 
that jurors evaluate cases by the construction of competing ‘narratives’, that 
is literal development of a rationale to provide a logical explanation for the 
evidence observed.217 Naturally, prosecution counsel seeks to promote a 
convincing story, and defence to rebut it. Edmond made the point, however, 
that the prosecution has an advantage, in that its ‘tightly-woven narrative’ 
presents a rather easy to accept story.218 At the same time, supporting 
evidence of unknown probative value may be overvalued by the jury as it 
seeks to construct the most convincing narrative. Defence may often involve 
rather subtle and convoluted critiques of the prosecution story, which may 
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not only be hard to understand but have been shown to appear negatively to 
jurors.219 
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of defence cross-examination give 
cause for concern. McQuiston and Saks describe two experiments, albeit not 
on identification evidence, in which the researchers adjusted the quality of 
cross-examination designed to demonstrate shortcomings in the evidence. 
The weight placed by the jury on the prosecution expert’s testimony was not 
affected by sound and sophisticated cross-examination, even though the 
underlying evidence was weak.220  
Furthermore, Edmond suggested that the defence is disadvantaged in that 
prosecution witnesses are ‘portrayed’ as ‘state’-employed, ‘disinterested’ 
and therefore more likely to be unbiased individuals, in comparison to the 
evidently interested and forensically inexperienced defence witness, the 
former is likely to gain greater credibility.221 
Although referring specifically to admissibility of scientific evidence using the 
US Daubert admissibility rule, the NRC report, quoting a review by Neufeld 
of criminal cases in the US stated that: 
The criminal defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory … 
Defense lawyers generally fail to build a challenge with 
appropriate witnesses and new data. Thus, even if inclined 
to mount a Daubert (admissibility) challenge, they lack the 
requisite knowledge and skills, as well as the funds, to 
succeed.222 
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2.14 Law and Science: Incompatible or Competing Cultures? 
The cultures of science and law have been described as being in a ‘marriage 
of opposites’,223 one that is ‘troubled’ and ‘irreconcilable’.224 Haack, although 
describing specifically the US legal system, summarised these purported 
opposites in the following terms: 
[T]here are deep tensions between the goals and values of 
the scientific enterprise and the culture of the law… : 
between the investigative character of science and the 
adversarial culture of our legal system; between the 
scientific search for general principles and the legal focus on 
particular cases; between the pervasive fallibilism of the 
sciences—its openness to revision in the light of new 
evidence—and the concern of the law for prompt and final 
resolutions; between the scientific push for innovation and 
the legal system’s concern for precedent; between the 
informal, problem-oriented pragmatism of scientific 
investigation and the reliance of the legal system on formal 
rules and procedures; and between the essentially 
theoretical aspirations of science and the legal system’s 
inevitable orientation to policy.225 
Certainly, law and science represent two internally rational, but different, 
epistemologies. The question that arises is how law and science work 
together. The ‘competing culture’ model suggests that science and law 
collaborate in an unstable compromise,226 playing a positive role by 
constructing and deconstructing each other’s credibility.227 
Certainly in terms of competition, the influential NAS report identified poor 
‘scientific’ culture as one of the problems at the root of what it identified as 
‘serious deficiencies’ in U.S. forensic science.228 This has been echoed more 
generally by a number of commentators. For example, Edmonds, in a review 
comparing admissibility jurisprudence with best practice as recommended by 
what he termed ‘peak scientific and technical organisations’ reported 
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substantial differences in the indicia that each body used to evaluate the 
reliability of expert evidence.  
He went on to state that, whilst he did not suggest that courts should simply 
defer to science, the courts should be engaged with scientists and scientific 
knowledge.229 
The (judicial)… version of reliability… is a peculiar legal 
construction that excuses the failure to have undertaken 
appropriate research and testing because of the confidence 
vested in adversarial forensic techniques. 
In a rational system of evidence and proof, it does not make 
sense to admit opinion evidence and allow the jury to 
attribute whatever value they deem appropriate depending 
on what may transpire in a particular trial. The jury should 
not be entitled to assign a probative value in excess of what 
formal evaluation demonstrates (or would demonstrate) is 
possible.230 
There is little doubt, therefore, that at least some ‘actors’ within the fields of 
law and science regard their disciplines as competitive. 
Roberts describes the notion of an ‘elementary disciplinary divide’ as 
plausible, but somewhat hackneyed, especially when it is applied to forensic 
science.231 He points out that, because forensic science is an applied 
science, it is, in fact, engaged in the application of the law, and, whilst 
investigative forensics might share many of the characteristics of ‘scientific 
enquiry’, prosecutory forensics normatively shares its characteristics with the 
law.232 
Concurring with this view, Cole has suggested that the finding of ‘serious 
deficiencies’ in U.S. forensic science is overly general and naïve, and that 
few of the empirical findings accumulated by sociologists of science about 
research science seem to apply to forensic science. Instead, forensic 
science seems to have developed a distinct culture for which a sociological 
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analysis will require new explanatory tools, if any proposed reform is to be 
effective.233 
The question of whether science and law are ‘incompatible’ harks back to 
the question addressed above (2.8 ‘Accusations of ‘Trial Pathology’), that is, 
are ‘trial pathologies’ a symptom of the weakness of the adversarial system 
(as suggested by Haack’s quote above), or, as suggested by Roberts, 
simply manifestations of the adversarial system. Under the latter argument, 
any perceived weaknesses are caused by inadequate operation of the 
adversarial system, rather than the system itself.234 
This study aims to identify expert witnesses’ views on the compatability or 
otherwise of science and law. 
2.15 Law and Science: Engagement of Forensic Science 
Sallavaci described the meetings of science, law and common sense in the 
adversarial trial as a ‘hybrid form of languages’.235 A key line of investigation 
within the current study is the degree to which forensic experts ‘engaged 
with’ the judicial process.  
A number of studies and commentary have raised concerns regarding 
whether and how forensic experts engage with the judicial process. For 
example, in a survey by Walsh of over 6000 articles in international forensic 
journals between 1990 and 2003, only 0.9 percent of articles looked at legal 
issues, and only 0.4 percent considered legal aspects of DNA evidence.236 
This is in great contrast to the considerable debate around evidential 
aspects of DNA evidence seen in legal and criminological journals. 
Furthermore, a review of those 0.4 percent of articles suggest that these 
originate largely from a small pool of academically active commentators. 
Perhaps the failure to engage academically cannot be translated into a 
general conclusion that forensic scientists do not engage with the trial 
process, however the degree to which this may happen is an area of 
investigation within this study. 
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Walsh suggested ideological reasons why the forensic expert might actively 
disassociate themselves from legal aspects of scientific evidence, 
suggesting that these are more the domain of legal and sociological experts. 
He goes on to quote a model developed by Corns,237 in which science is 
described as ‘appropriating’ the criminal justice process, by its apparent 
neutrality and infallibility lending justification to repressive legal practices. On 
that basis he underlines the onus which should be apparent to forensic 
scientists in terms of the perceptions of such neutrality and infallibility.238 
Interestingly, Edmond suggests that forensics should disengage from the 
judicial process not because of any ideological reason, but rather because of 
a legal failure on the part of judges and lawyers to deal with expert evidence 
and ‘serious and endemic problems with many forensic sciences’.239 In other 
words, judges and lawyers have failed, and forensic science has abased 
itself in an attempt to cater to what it believes the court needs. Rather than 
compromise sound science in this misguided aim, Edmond suggests that 
forensic science should ‘develop socio-epistemic legitimacy through greater 
autonomy from (crime) investigators’.240 He goes on to propose that ‘forensic 
science… should not look to courts (or law) for guidance, leadership, 
credibility or legitimacy’ adding that: 
…the historically cosy relationship with the courts, along with 
a certain shared comfort in lax admissibility standards for 
incriminating expert opinion, has diverted attention from 
research and interest in the reliability of evidence.241 
Until (forensic science) address(es) the identity issue… (it 
will) struggle to fulfil the very real needs of surprisingly frail 
adversarial legal processes.242 
As a counterpart to this, he suggested that it is for the courts to engage with 
science and scientists, as, until now, they have ‘privileged the wrong type of 
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heuristics in their attempts to engage with scientific and technical forms of 
knowledge’.243 
As was pointed out in the NAS Report, ‘(t)he adversarial process relating to 
the admission and exclusion of scientific evidence is not suited to the task of 
finding ‘”scientific truth”’.244 
As a counter balance, Roberts has challenged the ‘stereotypical conceptions 
of law and science as cultural opposites’, arguing that ‘English criminal trial 
practice is fundamentally congruent with modern science’s basic 
epistemological assumptions, values and methods of inquiry.’ However he 
goes on to state that, whilst practical tensions exist, and may be explained, it 
is for the scientist to neutralise these tensions by ‘paying close attention to 
criminal adjudication’s normative ideals and their institutional expression in 
familiar aspects of common law trial procedure, including evidentiary rules of 
admissibility, trial by jury, adversarial fact-finding, cross-examination’.245 In 
other words, on the law’s terms. Whether forensic scientists are willing to do 
this is a subject of enquiry here. Indeed, Roberts pointed out (in a ‘doubtless 
impertinent, but necessary, question… ’), that, despite the fact that 
professional and ethical duties for expert witnesses had been widely 
advertised, including provisions within delegated statutory instruments, it 
was not clear how widely the message had been received and understood. 
Forensic science is in the law business, and is necessarily subservient to the 
legally defined concept of justice.246 
It has been pointed out that the engagement of forensic science and the 
judicial process is first and foremost a social process, and yet forensic 
research has centred on scientific aspects rather than judicial.247 
Robertson, the Director General of the Australian National Centre for 
Forensic Studies, suggests that forensics should move (back) to adopt the 
characteristics of a profession, rather than attempt to simply demonstrate 
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independence in a system compromised by the need to provide the judicial 
system with what it asks for,248 a point echoed by Edmond: 
Forensic scientists should be appealing to techniques that 
have been studied and validated rather than whether a 
technically incompetent (legal) profession finds their 
opinions useful in the disposition of busy dockets.249 
Before leaving the subject of forensic evidence in a ‘frail’ legal process, it is 
worth pointing out that Edmond’s suggestion that some forensic science may 
compromise scientific standards is echoed by the NAS Report.250 In the 
report, whilst not stating that forensic science was ‘unscientific’, they do say 
that much of it lacked ‘adequate validation, certification, accreditation, 
oversight, and basic research, amongst other things’.251 They also suggest 
that aspects of forensics do not exhibit scientific ‘culture’.252 
Lastly, some indirect, however, arguably powerful, evidence informs a 
hypothesis that forensic scientists do not engage with the judicial process. 
Two recent commissions invited submissions from forensic scientists, but 
with limited success. The recent Law Commission Consultation invited 
submissions from any interested parties.253 There were only two 
submissions from individual forensic witnesses, both of whom were active 
commentators with a special interest. There were submissions from 
corporate suppliers of forensic services, however, arguably this does not 
demonstrate engagement at a scientific level, but rather at a management 
level. Similarly, a report on the effects of the closure of the Forensic Science 
Service, although it invited witnesses, rather than invited open contribution, 
only examined forensic scientists’ view on the effect of the closure on the 
judicial process as a whole. On the one hand these witnesses were not 
asked specifically about their experiences in court, however on the other, 
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witnesses from the legal profession lost no opportunity in expounding their 
views on the use of scientific evidence in court.254 
2.16 Conclusions 
This study is informed both by earlier studies on witness experience in court, 
and by the adversarial crucible in which the expert finds himself. Reported 
experience of witnesses across a broad spectrum, from lay witnesses 
through to medical experts, through to forensic experts, show a striking 
similarity: witnesses feel at the mercy of the adversarial system. Of concern 
is that, almost without exception, witnesses feel that they have not been able 
to give the evidence that they wanted to, or that they felt presented a true 
picture. They explain the reasons for this as being lack of opportunity to 
explain the evidence to counsel pre-trial, and a perceived lack of 
competence. Particularly, prosecution experts feel that they have not been 
given enough information to properly frame their case, and suspect that 
sometimes information is withheld from them. Perceived adversarial 
safeguards, particularly regarding challenge by the defence, have been 
criticised as weak, within the studies, and by eminent commentators. 
Meanwhile, expert witnesses, whilst attempting to remain unbiased, find 
themselves affected by subtle pressures to take sides, not least because 
they fall into naturally differing roles of prosecution or defence. 
Previous studies have not specifically looked at DNA testimony. As 
explained above, this provides a uniquely clear ‘lens’ through which the 
interaction between rigorous science and the judicial system may be 
examined. It was also noted above that, however close to a ‘gold standard’ 
DNA profiling is, it is not beyond challenge: recent cases have allowed 
expert opinion on DNA matches based on subjective judgment and not 
scientific knowledge. Rather than dilute the value of this study (after all, the 
study claims value in examining a ‘purely scientific’ forensic technique), this 
fact enhances the value: the study attempts to draw some conclusions 
regarding the argument that however rigorous the science, it can never, on 
its own, provide the legal truth. In this way, the view through the ‘lens’ is 
even clearer. 
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Lastly, and, perhaps, most fundamentally, this study aims to examine how 
science and the law communicate. Although Sallavaci described the 
interface between science, law and common sense as a ‘hybrid’, others 
have described the interface as competing or incompatible. Certainly the 
studies outlined above seem consistent in their reports that accommodation 
has not been found. The implications for the findings of this study are great: 
a very pessimistic hypothesis would be that the greater the degree of 
scientific rigour on the part of forensics (and nothing can be more rigorous 
than DNA evidence), the greater the gulf between the worlds of law and 
science. The current study may say something about the engagement of the 
judicial system with the forensic scientist, however, for our purposes, the 
most important findings will be the degree of engagement of the forensic 
scientist with the judicial system. The current study aims to form some 
conclusions in this area. 
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Chapter 3 
The Criminal Trial and DNA Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
A central context of this study is the adversarial nature of the criminal trial in 
the English Crown court. Opposing prosecution and defence parties present 
and cross-examine evidence to support their respective cases, with the 
judge acting as neutral arbiter. Whilst lay witnesses may testify only as to 
evidence directly witnessed, experts may assist with evidence of specialist 
opinion. The decision as to the ultimate issue, that is, a decision of guilty or 
not guilty, is made by a lay jury, on the basis of the evidence presented. 
It might be stated, more accurately, that the adversarial system not only 
provided a context, but defined this study. The forensic expert’s actions 
throughout the investigative and prosecution process are dictated by the 
English adversarial system and concerns regarding expert evidence have 
centred on claimed detrimental effects of that adversarial process.1 The 
objectives of the study, and the associated methodology, focussed 
specifically on those claimed detrimental effects. To that end, the reported 
findings and conclusions relate solely to expert evidence within the 
adversarial system. To support understanding of the study, including its 
objectives, methodology, and findings, this chapter explains pertinent areas 
of the adversarial trial, and the use of expert, and, particularly, scientific, 
evidence within it. 
As discussed within Chapter One, the other key context of this study is the 
use of DNA evidence. Although, to a degree, DNA evidence may be said to 
‘define’ this study, concerns relating to expert evidence extend to all types of 
expert evidence. To that degree, the general lines of investigation within this 
study do not exclude application of some of the findings to non-DNA forensic 
evidence. Having said that, the focus on DNA identification evidence within 
this study provided a special context, by virtue of its exceptional, if not 
unique, degree of scientific rigour. This chapter aims to support 
understanding of the study’s objectives, methodology, and findings by 
explaining relevant aspects of, not only DNA evidence, but also supporting 
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scientific principles. Important amongst these is a description of the 
probabilistic aspects of DNA evidence, which, perhaps unsurprisingly, have 
caused difficulties in relation to the certainty required of the trial process. 
The chapter also contains a description of the specific law relevant to the 
use of DNA evidence, and brief discussion regarding its latest 
developments. 
3.2 The Adversarial Trial 
Approximately 1.6 million defendants are proceeded against annually in 
criminal cases.2 Trial before judge and jury in the adversarial arena of the 
English Crown court is frequently held up as representing the epitome of due 
process.3 It might be regarded as strange, therefore, that trial before a jury 
happens in only between 0.5% and 1% of these cases.4 This is because 
more than 97% of prosecutions are dealt with in the lower courts, and in 
those proceeding to the Crown Court, approximately 70% of defendants 
plead guilty.5 Additionally, in a large number of cases of investigation of 
crime, there may not be sufficient evidence to proceed with a prosecution, 
an offence may be diverted through an alternative judicial process, or it may 
be judged not to be in the public interest to prosecute.6 
It could be, perhaps naively, argued that, on that basis, the classic trial is of 
little relevance to the majority of investigated crime, and therefore to the 
criminal justice process. However, it may be convincingly argued that, not 
only does the trial have symbolic importance in underpinning societal 
confidence in the judicial process, but that the trial forms the ‘presentational 
surface’ of the entire underlying judicial process, and, in this way, both 
reflects and defines it.7 
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Damaska defined the pure adversarial trial as proceedings structured as a 
dispute, between two sides in a position of theoretical equality, before a 
court which must decide the outcome of the contest; the parties themselves 
should establish that a contest exists, and its boundaries; evidence is 
exclusive to the party adducing it; an adjudicator’s role is to ensure that the 
parties abide by the established rules, and would intervene only if one party 
objected to conduct by the other party; and only the parties themselves are 
interested in the outcome of the trial.8 Although not a defining characteristic 
of the adversarial trial, a practical consequence of the adversarial trial is the 
principle of orality, that is, the principle that evidence presented by witnesses 
in person is superior to documentary evidence.9 Damaska argued that this 
was because, where two parties are attacking each other’s evidence, this 
can best be done orally. Associated with this is the belief that the truth of a 
witness’s evidence may be assisted by an assessment of their demeanour,10 
and that cross-examination by the opposing party’s counsel is sufficient to 
uncover weaknesses in that evidence.11 Given the centrality of evidence to 
the trial, and for reasons of policy that the dispute be on a level of equality, 
the admissibility of the evidence is closely regulated and controlled. Whilst, 
again, not a defining factor of adversarial trials, the philosophy, at least, of 
trial by one’s peers in the form of a jury, also sits at the heart of the 
adversarial trial.12 
In contrast to the adversarial system, most of continental Europe has 
historically adopted an ‘inquisitorial’ approach to trial.13 The inquisitorial 
system involves the appointment of (for example, in France, often presented 
as a classical inquisitorial system) a juge d’instruction, whose responsibility 
is to carry out an investigation of the case, to include both prosecution and 
defence cases, and culminating in a trial, which is also seen as part of the 
investigation. They are therefore expected to arrive at the truth by their own 
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efforts.14 This is in contrast to the adversarial system, in which it is argued 
that the truth is more effectively discovered by having two self-interested 
researchers starting from opposite points of view, and so less likely to miss 
anything than the impartial researcher starting from some point between.15 
Indeed, regarding expert witnesses, Damaska suggested an advantage for 
adversarialism in that ‘(r)egularly subjected to duelling experts, adjudicators 
need not surrender to the authority of science as blindly as those confronted 
with a single opinion of their chosen expert’.16 In its purest sense the 
inquisitorial trial itself is a final examination of documentary evidence, or 
dossier, (seen as being more reliable than oral evidence), and not a 
confrontation between the accused and the prosecution. 
It should be noted, however, that, although adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems remain distinct, as Professor John Spencer has said, ‘the 
borrowings between the two have been so extensive that it is no longer 
possible to classify any of the criminal justice systems in Western Europe as 
wholly adversarial or wholly inquisitorial’.17 Additionally, although the English 
legal system is often held to be the paradigm of adversarial tradition,18 the 
modern reality, in practice, deviates in a number of respects from these 
paradigmatic characteristics. This, if for no other reason than that, as 
opposed to the concept of a neutral state in a pure adversarial process, the 
state does indeed have a central interest in the prosecution of crime.19 
Regarding the first of the arguments mentioned above, that the trial has 
symbolic importance. Even if trial by judge and jury does not constitute the 
major form of trial in England, this should not be seen as undermining the 
fundamental importance of the tradition of trial before jury to the English 
legal system. As Auld LJ pointed out in the Review of the Criminal Courts of 
England and Wales of 2001, until the middle of the 18th century almost all 
trials were before a jury;20 not only are its principles at the heart of the entire 
judicial process, but the structure and many features of the modern system 
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are based on the same principles. It has been said by the historian, EP 
Thompson, that ‘The English common law rests upon a bargain between the 
law and the people. … A jury is the place where the bargain is struck’.21 The 
rationale underlying this contention is that it allows not only the active 
participation of the layman, but assigns them the role of decision maker. As 
such it acts as a counter to the power of the judiciary, and, as Michael 
Mansfield QC has argued, ‘is the most democratic element of our judicial 
system’ and the one which poses ‘the biggest threat to the authorities’.22 As 
such the jury is central to public confidence in the criminal justice system, at 
least. 
To explore the concept of trial as symbolic statement of judicial authority 
further: it has been pointed out that society places serious import on the 
attachment of blame to an individual (that is, a guilty verdict), but at the 
same time it is difficult to convincingly justify the substance of a decision, 
especially given the need for finality, and the fact that charges may be 
denied. It has been argued that, this being the case, a fundamental objective 
of the trial is to establish public confidence by justifying, at least, the manner 
in which judicial decisions have been made, thereby stamping a seal of 
legitimacy over the court’s decision.23 Interestingly, it has been suggested 
that many of the ‘vestigial’ symbolic aspects of the modern trial, have as an 
underlying objective, the reinforcement of authority and ‘a solemn search for 
truth’.24 
The second argument supporting the importance of the trial, briefly, that the 
trial forms a ‘microcosm’ of the judicial process, may be viewed in two ways. 
First, and, at first sight, simplistically, the argument is that, because an 
investigation may eventually become a trial, then every step of the process, 
from scene of crime, to detection, to prosecution, to trial, must reflect the 
requirements of the trial, if it is not to fail at that stage. That is to say, 
investigative and pre-trial processes depend on the trial rather than vice-
versa. Ashworth suggested that the trial, of over-emphasised importance, be 
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viewed as the tip of a judicial iceberg, protruding above an under-
emphasised pre-trial process: 
‘A full-dress trial may be less of a centrepiece than a 
monument to the failure of the many pre-trial 
machinations to produce a guilty plea’25 
‘… or dismissal’, should, perhaps, be added. 
Second, and persuasively, it has been pointed out that, if close scrutiny is 
made of the essential defining elements of a trial, then, in many ways, the 
investigation and pre-trial process may actually conform with and contain the 
minimum elements of a trial, and therefore itself be seen as a form of trial.26 
Examples of this would include the accused being informed about the 
evidence against them; the exclusion of inadmissible evidence; having the 
right to challenge the evidence and advance their own case; the ability to 
plead guilty without trial or, indeed, the ability of prosecutors to drop the 
prosecution; the existence of the ‘caution’, which, arguably, could not exist in 
the absence of a potential future trial. 
3.3 The Objectives of the Trial 
The foregoing says little about the objectives of the trial. It has been written 
that ‘the greatest of all fallacies entertained by lay people about the law is… 
that it is the business of the court of justice to discover the truth’.27 Prima 
facie this may be a rather cynical view of the function of the court, however it 
serves to draw attention to the fact that, although a simple analysis must 
draw a conclusion that the primary objective of the trial is to discover the 
‘substantive truth’, this may indeed differ from the ‘legal truth’ on which the 
verdict is based. 
As Auld LJ stated in his ‘Review of the Criminal Courts’, 
Once the courts are considered in the context of the 
criminal justice system as a whole, including the 
community at large and the various agencies and 
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others involved in the process, it is obvious that their 
purpose and function are not confined to the forensic 
practicalities of convicting and sentencing the guilty 
and acquitting others.28 
It might be assumed that, in the ideal world, substantive and legal truth 
coincide, however this is arguably a naïve view. Whether a substantive truth 
actually exists in any case is indeed a question of debate: it is widely 
accepted that ‘truth’ concerning narrative accounts cannot be found, but only 
re-constructed by subjective judgment and interpretation of evidence.29 
Where substantive truth and legal truth diverge in practice, it is the legal truth 
that is sought by the trial. 
There are sound policy and practical reasons for this to be the case: it has 
been pointed out that ‘notions of legality and due process are central to the 
very definition of a trial’,30 and that its purpose is not only to reach an 
‘accurate’ judgment, but, as mentioned in the previous section, to 
communicate the justice of this to the defendant and to society.31 The 
Government’s explicit objectives for the criminal justice system (presumably 
including the trial itself), is that criminal cases be dealt with justly.32 This 
includes acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty, dealing with 
prosecution and defence parties fairly, recognising the defendant’s rights , 
particularly those under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, respecting the interests of witnesses, victims and jurors and keeping 
them informed, dealing with cases efficiently and expeditiously, and ensuring 
that the correct information, including other relevant factors, is taken into 
account when considering the disposition of case.33 They do not explicitly 
require the determination of substantive truth. 
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Other constraints upon the adversarial trial lie in the principles of finality of 
decision, as required by common law,34 and the interest of public 
confidence. 
This requirement of finality in an environment of uncertainty means that the 
courts must operate an ‘error preference’ policy. In practical terms this 
means that wrongful acquittals are preferable to wrongful convictions.35 For 
this reason, English law has been described as having a ‘principled 
asymmetry’ in favour of innocence.36 For example, the burden of proof is 
placed on the prosecution to prove their case, at a standard of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’, against a defendant who is assumed to be innocent until 
proven guilty. The verdict may be ‘guilty’, or ‘not guilty’, that is, not shown to 
be guilty, rather than ‘innocent’. (It should be noted that judicial guidance 
states that the judge should simply direct the jury that they should be ‘sure’ 
of the defendant’s guilt, even though the term is considered to be legally 
synonymous.37) 
Whereas substantial truth may be reached more readily under a ‘principle of 
free proof’, whereby any logically relevant evidence may be admitted, it is, 
arguably, self-evident that this would not be compatible with the objectives 
and constraints described above. This being the case, specific rules 
involving various and complex (largely exclusionary) rules of evidence act to 
countermand certain types of evidence on a policy basis,38 and evidence a 
rational response to the judicial system’s objective of legal fact finding given 
the constraints placed upon it.39 
As an example, and relevant to this study, was the question of admissibility 
of certain types of DNA evidence. In Hoey it was claimed that Low Copy 
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Number DNA evidence should have been excluded on the basis that it was 
unproven, therefore inadmissible, and therefore excessively prejudicial to the 
defendant’s case.40 
Almost every aspect of the principles, procedures and rules discussed 
above, governing the judicial process and trial, have suffered significant 
challenges regarding their impact on the ability to reach a ‘just’ verdict with 
regard to considerations of public policy.41 An interesting observation has 
been made that, despite these challenges, and despite ongoing statutory 
reform, the elements of the trial outlined above still exist; this being the case, 
perhaps these elements could be said to form the essential defining factors 
of the trial in the English criminal legal system.42 
Before leaving the discussion of the objectives of the adversarial trial, it is 
worth considering the degree to which its procedures and rules aim to 
provide a level playing field for the prosecution and the defence. In his 
Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales, Auld LJ gave an 
interesting account of the history of judicial thinking regarding the balance of 
society’s rights and those of the defendant. Whilst evidently a balance has 
always been a consideration, this has apparently not always been envisaged 
as an equal balance.43 Arguably, this may not have been intended as a 
policy decision, but rather as a statement of fact, given the different 
resources and competing interests. Nevertheless, whilst the concept of 
‘equality of arms’ is not mentioned specifically in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it has nevertheless become accepted as a 
central tenet of the right to a fair trial,44 and is therefore implicit in English 
law. Specifically the rights described in Article 6 include that of the defendant 
to know the evidence against them, to challenge it, and to advance their own 
case. It has been suggested, however, that any expectation of such equality 
in the English courts is ‘hardly any more than a transparent and potentially 
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pernicious, fiction’.45 The issue of the ‘equality of arms’ necessary for a fair 
trial is relevant to this thesis, given the assumption that significant technical 
resource is required to advance and defend DNA evidence. 
In summary, it may be argued that the objectives of the criminal justice 
system, and the trial, as part of this, assuredly aim to pronounce on the 
substantive truth of each case but within a dominant framework of due 
process. Arguably, a ‘just’ outcome may be said to be most closely aligned 
with the achievement of the latter. Before leaving this subject, it is worth 
mentioning that, given the highly technical nature of DNA evidence, and the 
inevitable interaction of, on the one hand, ‘scientific reality’ with, on the other 
hand, ‘legal reality’, as described above, there is significant scope for 
conflict. 
3.4 Trial Procedure in the Crown Court 
The decision to prosecute is made by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), 
after receiving a case file from the police, and based on official criteria (such 
as being in the public interest and having a realistic prospect of conviction).46 
In practice, however, the police have significant (and arguably over-riding) 
discretion as to whether to ignore, caution, or pursue a prosecution, and if 
the decision is prosecution, then the specific charges to be laid.47 It may be 
remarked that the CPS cannot prosecute a case of which they are not 
aware. The Criminal Law Act 1977 determines where the case will be heard, 
depending on offence type. 
The procedure followed in the Crown Court for a single defendant is briefly 
summarised below.48 
The charge is read and the defendant asked for their plea. In the event of a 
not guilty plea, a jury of 12 is sworn in. The opening of the Crown case is 
made by counsel for the prosecution, stating the basic elements of the law 
that must be proved, and the evidence on which they will rely. Witnesses for 
the Crown will be called and asked by prosecution counsel to give their 
evidence. This is known as ‘evidence-in-chief’. They will be cross-examined 
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by defence counsel and then re-examined by prosecution counsel on any 
matters arising during defence’s cross-examination. If evidence is not 
contested, then it may be read in court rather than presented in person. It 
should be noted that expert witnesses, for prosecution and defence, are 
permitted to be present in court while they are not presenting evidence, 
unless counsel makes successful application that they may be excluded. 
This concludes the first part of the prosecution case. 
If the defence is calling witnesses other than the defendant themselves, then 
they make an opening speech, outlining the defence case. This is usually 
reserved until after the defendant has been examined, if there are no other 
witnesses. The defendant is the first to give evidence. They will then be 
cross-examined by the prosecution, and then re-examined by the defence. 
At the end of the defendant’s evidence, counsel for the prosecution makes 
their closing speech, followed by that of the defence. 
After both prosecution and defence cases have been so concluded, the 
judge delivers a summing up to the jury, summarising points of law and the 
evidence presented, after which the jury retires to consider its verdict.  This 
must initially be unanimous. After two hours however, the judge may direct 
that a majority verdict of at least 10 to 2 will be accepted. The jury returns 
and delivers its verdict, upon which the defendant is released or sentenced. 
3.5 The Creation of Competing Cases 
The case against a suspect is not a self-evident construct, but may better be 
described as a narrative, or ‘story’, constructed by investigators and 
developed by the prosecution, that both bears critical examination in the light 
of all the evidence, and, is most likely to lead to a successful prosecution.49 
Within an incident may lie the basis for more than one type of case.50 
Whether the jury choose to believe the prosecution or defence story defines 
the verdict, however it might be noted that the story in a juror’s mind is not 
necessarily exactly the same as that proposed by counsel, but one 
constructed from their own perception of the presented case, and evidence, 
with any gaps filled by inferences. 
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The mode of thinking known as the ‘story model’, was first described by 
Pennington and Hastie, and proposed the literal development of a rational 
story by the fact-finder to provide a logical explanation for the evidence 
observed.51 Pennington and Hastie’s model described the process engaged 
in by the fact-finder as consisting of three steps: first, to construct a ‘value-
free’ (that is, objective) account of what happened, second, to apply the 
categories of law that apply, as given within judicial instructions, and, third, 
to determine a verdict.52 The model is held to determine the verdict, rather 
than justifying a decision after the fact.  
Of course the construction of the ‘objective account of what happened’ is not 
a mechanical process: it has been suggested that the stories expounded in 
court create tensions reflecting those encountered in everyday life, including 
common experiences, common sense, social norms and ordering. The more 
‘engrossing’ the story that is constructed, the better the judgment that may 
be made.53 Additionally, Pennington and Hastie made the point that the third 
stage of the story development process, making a final decision by 
comparing the ‘coverage, coherence, uniqueness and goodness-of-fit’ 
between the preferred story and the hierarchy of legal decisions, is assisted 
by the fact that the development of the law has reflected socially acceptable 
behaviour. It is therefore no coincidence that the hierarchy of legal 
definitions closely parallel observed human motives, intentions and 
actions.54 An interesting example of this is that it has been shown that whilst 
juries may not understand the complexities of hearsay rules, they do follow 
the rules; it has been suggested because they intuitively distrust ‘second-
hand’ evidence.55 
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Many questions have been raised regarding the jurors’ ability to construct a 
rational account. 56 As Auld LJ said in his review of the Criminal Courts 
report: 
And, at the end of the trial, the judge orally gives them 
complex directions on the law and a summarised 
regurgitation of the evidence, much of which must become a 
blur for many of them by the time they are considering their 
verdict.57 
3.6 Case Construction 
The start point for the narrative presented in court occurs at an early stage, 
with the police investigation, and a subsequent prosecution decision to 
pursue a particular version of the facts. The story so created depends 
heavily on the lines of enquiry pursued by the police, the evidence, both 
physical and in the form of witness statements (including suspect 
statements), and the strength of the resulting case that the police and 
prosecution are able to construct. 
The very interaction between investigator and suspect and other witnesses 
involves classifications by which the suspect and witnesses may understand 
their actions or what they have observed. So terms such as recklessness, 
consent, trespass, may not only be suggested, but also adopted by the 
suspect and witness in their responses to questioning.58 Case narratives 
thus become progressively ‘fixed’ as the behaviours and observations of 
suspect and witnesses (and physical evidence) become, arguably, 
progressively constrained within such definitions. Professor Redmayne has 
suggested that a certain ‘reification’ surrounds the process – as the story is 
built, the assumptions, interpretations and decisions made by the 
investigator, become progressively hidden and difficult to access or 
challenge. This, too, then has the effect of constraining and entrenching a 
particular line of reasoning and construction of a particular case.59 
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The subject of case ‘construction’ has received considerable attention,60 
particularly in the wake of a number of high-profile miscarriages of justice. 
Professor Redmayne has pointed out that case construction has become a 
‘widely used metaphor’, but that relatively little attention has been paid to the 
precise ways in which cases can be said to be constructed.61 The somewhat 
‘sinister’ tone adopted by some ‘constructionist’ literature implies that the 
early adoption of a ‘story’ is fraught with perils and biases, as positive 
evidence and lines of enquiry are selectively used to build the case and 
alternative lines side-lined.62 Professor Redmayne’s view is that, as a whole, 
the constructionist literature does not support such a general finding, and 
that we should simply regard the construction of cases as being 
synonymous with building of cases. Further we should not abandon 
seemingly naïve assumptions that there are facts, and careful examination 
of the evidence can say what the facts are.63 
Redmayne presents some caveats, however, in the form of cognitive biases 
and what he terms ‘interaction’ and ‘reification’ during the police 
investigation, initiation of a case story and building of evidence to support 
that story. Of particular importance to this thesis is the fact that forensic 
experts (who may later provide testimony as ‘unbiased’ experts) may play an 
important role in the investigation, and contribute significantly to lines of 
enquiry that may eventually become a prosecution case. 
Neither is the expert neutral in the investigation process: experts may be 
called to the crime scene by police officers, who they work alongside. They 
may each, therefore form the context within which the other acts.64 Indeed, 
in many cases it is the expert who will determine whether a crime has been 
committed.65 For example, from the earliest stage the expert does not only 
collect scientific evidence from the crime scene, but may also have a pivotal 
role in deciding which evidence to collect (for example advising investigators 
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as to whether it is worth profiling DNA from a cigarette butt found outside the 
direct crime scene), assisting investigators with creating hypotheses (for 
example whether a particular DNA profile was a mix from two perpetrators or 
from a single perpetrator) and otherwise having a direct effect on lines of 
enquiry. 
The central importance of the narrative construct has been recognised by 
counsel. In order to present a convincing narrative, they must provide 
evidence which may not be strictly relevant, but provides the context against 
which a juror may create a narrative. To underline this, the trial has been 
described as a type of drama, progressing in time, and presented largely by 
voice, each having a rhetorical significance.66 
The opening statements by prosecution and defence have been described 
as a ‘battle for the imagination’ of the jury, with counsel commencing to 
‘perform’ their ‘factual theory’ of the case.67 It has been suggested further 
that, jurors are unable to compare both prosecution and defence counsel’s 
accounts on a point-by-point basis, but rather construct their own accounts 
based on both.68 
3.7 Role of Evidence 
The ‘Facts in Issue’ or ‘Ultimate Issues’ in a case are those that the 
prosecution must finally prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defence 
raise a doubt in order to succeed in court.69 For example the prosecution 
may adduce admissible evidence in an attempt to prove the ultimate issue of 
whether the accused (D) was guilty of stealing property. Unless D pleads 
guilty then the prosecution must show that (i) D appropriated property; (ii) 
that the property belonged to someone else; (iii) D intended to deprive the 
owner permanently of the property;  and(iv) that D acted dishonestly.70 
The party bearing the burden of proof (the prosecution in criminal cases71), 
must set evidence before the court, as ‘trier of fact’, that disputed facts have 
been proved to a level of probability set by law. Within criminal cases this 
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must be proved ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.72 Only the court may make the 
determination of whether facts at issue have been proved to this level. 
Evidence may be direct, such as a statement from witness 1 (W1) that he 
saw D take the property in question, or may be indirect (also known as 
‘circumstantial’), such as the fact that the stolen property was found in the 
possession of D. Facts can be proved only inferentially through 
circumstantial evidence. 
3.8 Expert Evidence in the English Court 
The presentation of expert testimony, itself, presents a challenge. It has long 
been acknowledged that experts with a relevant degree of expertise may 
testify as to factual matters within their specialisation, in order to assist the 
jury with its resolution of disputed facts.73 This may appear to be a self-
evident necessity, however it should be recalled that an expert witness is not 
an ordinary witness: they did not witness the alleged crime, but rather 
examined objects presented to them, their testimony consisting of their 
specialist judgment or opinion on this. A fundamental principle of evidence in 
the adversarial court is that witnesses may testify only as to fact, and not 
opinion, so it is only under rules of exception that the expert may testify.74 
Indeed, the use of an expert in court has been described as ‘… logically … 
an anomaly (from which) serious practical difficulties arise’.75 
In modern times, the exception regarding expert evidence has, perhaps, 
been best summarised by Lawton LJ in the leading case of R v Turner: 
An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with 
scientific information which is likely to be outside the 
experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.76 
It is commonly stated that the exception whereby experts may testify allows 
experts, unlike ordinary witnesses, to testify as to ‘opinion’. Of course, much 
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expert medical evidence (such as cases of baby shaking) does, indeed, 
consist largely of opinion, however, it may not be obvious how a DNA expert, 
reporting on the output of a scientific instrument, and explaining the 
principles of DNA match probability is reporting an opinion. Simple reports 
such as this may indeed be factual, and indeed it has been described as 
‘trite law’ that witnesses with relevant expertise may assist the court within 
their area of expertise.77 However, further to this, testimony of expert opinion 
would be needed, for example, as to how a DNA sample was deposited at a 
crime scene, or, for more complex DNA evidence (for example, a complex 
mixture)  for which no standard analysis was possible, the nature and 
meaning of that DNA evidence. 
Whilst the common law governing the admissibility of expert evidence has 
developed significantly over the years, there has been significant debate 
regarding its application. There have been proposals to make it the subject 
of statutory control, most notably in the Law Commission Report on Expert 
Evidence in 2011.78 The position remains that it is governed by common law, 
although, as described below, there have been claims that recent 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Rules have somewhat ‘codified’ 
some of the Law Commission’s recommendations.79 Common law provisions 
regarding the admission of expert evidence have often been described with 
reference to the Australian case of Bonython,80 which, it has been claimed, 
has been cited in English courts, and correctly summarised the position 
regarding admissibility of expert evidence.81 Bonython82 stated that, to be 
admissible, expert evidence must pass the tests of ‘assistance’, that is, 
whether a juror would be able to reach a conclusion without the aid of the 
expert; ‘reliability’, that is, whether the subject matter of the evidence forms 
part of a body of knowledge accepted as reliable; and ‘relevant expertise’, 
that is, that the expert must have sufficient expertise in the area of special 
knowledge.83 The evidence given must also be unbiased, that is, the expert’s 
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duty must be primarily to the court, and not to the calling party.84  It should 
be noted that reference to Bonython85 as a definition of admissibility has not 
been uncontroversial,86 and it has been suggested that the true single test of 
admissibility in English courts was that given in Turner,87 quoted above, that 
is to say, a simple test of helpfulness.88 
None of the foregoing, however, should be taken to mean that the judge 
does not have a responsibility of ensuring that scientific evidence is reliable, 
according to the basic rules for the admission of evidence.89 The question 
arises, however, as to whether an enhanced reliability test exists for 
scientific evidence, as has been suggested, either in common law, or as a 
result of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Rules.90 
Reliability of expert evidence may, arguably, be of greater concern from a 
policy perspective, than general evidence. It is widely acknowledged that 
jurors may place great emphasis and reliance on expert witness testimony: 
the Criminal Bar Association, quoted in the Law Commission Report on 
Expert Evidence, stated that: ‘…rightly or wrongly, [expert evidence] is often 
‘trusted’ like no other category of evidence’.91 The Law Commission report 
noted that this statement is echoed by both the London Criminal Court 
Solicitors’ Association and the Association of Forensic Science Providers.92 
Given that expert evidence forms an exception to the fundamental 
adversarial tradition of directly witnessed factual evidence, it is unsurprising 
that such evidentiary hurdles exist, and continue to cause debate. It should 
be noted that the Law Commission Consultation on Expert Evidence took, as 
one of its starting positions, the fact that there had been a number of high 
profile miscarriages of justice caused by admission of erroneous expert 
evidence.93 Concerningly, they also pointed out that these cases may be the 
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‘tip of a larger iceberg’, given that little is known about forensic error rates.94 
Arguably, this is particularly concerning for DNA forensics, given known error 
rates that have a significant effect on the strength of the DNA evidence but 
have not always been taken into account.95 
The term ‘reliable’ itself has been the subject of debate, however as a 
working definition here, it is proposed that the definition given by Professor 
Redmayne is adopted, when he stated that despite the fact that attempts to 
define the term are often found to ‘collapse into other evidentiary terms’ such 
as ‘probative value’ or ‘relevance’, the ‘reliability’ does have a ‘coherent, if 
unarticulated, meaning, which treats ‘reliable’ as a synonym of ‘dependable’ 
or ‘trustworthy’.96 
Discussion of ‘enhanced reliability’ tests often make reference to the Frye 
standard, a US case in which it was stated that ‘…for an expert to be 
competent to give an opinion based on a scientific theory, that theory “must 
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs”’.97 Although this has been superseded 
now by Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702,98 Rule 702 stated enhanced 
criteria of its own, which included relevance and reliability, this to be 
determined by reference to whether the technique can and has been tested, 
whether it has been the subject of peer review, the technique’s error rate, 
and whether the technique is generally accepted. Furthermore the court 
pointed out that these were guidelines only and were not exhaustive.99 On 
the one hand the application of Rule 702 was seen as being a relaxation of 
admissibility rules, but, on the other, was seen as imposing a requirement on 
the judge to screen evidence before admission. 
Although admission of expert evidence is (and, arguably, remains) governed 
by common law, there have been ongoing proposals for reform. For 
example, proposals by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice focused 
upon enabling the resolution of disputes before the trial, by requiring defence 
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disclosure of its case, and a pre-trial meeting of experts.100 More recently, 
the Law Commission Report on Expert Evidence101 proposed statutory 
reform, to include an enhanced admissibility test for expert evidence. 
The Criminal Procedure Rules came into being in 2005,102 by provision of 
the Courts Act 2003, reproducing the substance of the rules they replaced. 
From November 2006, until the end of the empirical part of this study, the 
provisions regarding expert evidence remained, (with some exceptions) 
largely unchanged. Briefly, regarding expert evidence, they stated the 
expert’s overriding duty to the court,103 the contents of the expert’s report 
(including the scientific basis for the opinion reached),104 the requirement for 
disclosure, upon request, to the opposing party of scientific data upon which 
opinion was based,105 the provision for a court-ordered pre-trial meeting of 
experts to identify areas of agreement and dispute,106 and provisions for the 
court to appoint a single joint expert.107 
Although the Government did not proceed with the primary legislation 
recommended by the Law Commission, including its recommendation of the 
introduction of an enhanced admissibility test, it has been suggested that 
judicial tendency has been progressively converging with the Law 
Commission’s preferred approach.108 This was first explicitly stated in the 
Criminal Practice Directions associated with Criminal Procedure Rules 
2014.109 These directions draw the court’s attention to the Law 
Commission’s proposals for an enhanced expert evidence admissibility test, 
however, they point out that there are common law provisions that already 
apply to these.110 The Directions cite R v Dlugosz, which stated that: 
… the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently 
reliable scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted. If 
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there is then the court leaves the opposing views to be 
tested before the jury.111 
The Directions go on to state that common law does not preclude the court 
from taking into account, when determining reliability, factors such as those 
proposed by the Law Commission, before listing a wide range of criteria.112 It 
should be noted that the common law does not simply seek to admit or 
exclude expert evidence. The judge also has a role in ensuring that evidence 
admitted is not unduly strongly expressed. This was recognised in R v Reed, 
in which it was stated that: 
… care must be taken to guard against the dangers of that 
evaluation being tainted with the verisimilitude of scientific 
certainty.113 
It should be noted that the empirical (interview) stage of this study was 
completed before publication of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015. The 
amendments discussed above remain highly relevant however, because 
they illustrate the judicial tendency towards the greater control of scientific 
evidence evident over the last few years.  
On the one hand, therefore, there has been powerful direction towards an 
enhanced admissibility standard for expert, and, specifically, scientific 
evidence, however the courts are reminded that the guidelines remain those 
within common law. Having said all this, and as quoted in Chapter One, it 
has been suggested that trial judges may not be willing to become 
‘gatekeepers’ for expert evidence, and: 
…confronted say with complex scientific evidence contested 
by experts on both sides, will prefer to take the traditional 
path of leaving the jury to decide between them.114 
This sentiment reflects earlier judicial comment in R v Clarke115 regarding, 
particularly new or advanced, scientific evidence, in which it was stated that: 
…it would be wrong to deny to the law of evidence the 
advances to be gained from new techniques and advances 
in science.116 
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It has been suggested that the path is open to the rigorous application of 
common law regarding the admission of expert evidence, but it is yet to be 
seen whether this path is taken.117 
3.9 DNA Profiling 
3.9.1 A Paradigm Shift 
The advent of DNA profiling has been described as a ‘paradigm shift’ in 
forensic identification.118 Following intense scientific debate as to the use of 
correct analytical methods, the correct population databases, the statistical 
models used, the quantification of error rates and how to quantify 
increasingly low match probabilities, DNA profiling is regarded as the only 
forensic identification technique based on largely undisputed scientific 
rigour.119 The term ‘paradigm shift’ refers to the increasing pressure on older 
identification techniques, such as fingerprint analysis, to prove their reliability 
according to the same rigorous scientific principles.120 
3.9.2 The Structure and Location of DNA 
All higher living things consist of cells, each of which contains a number of 
smaller bodies known as organelles. These include a nucleus and 
mitochondria. Both the nucleus and mitochondria contain DNA, however 
nuclear DNA, contained within the chromosomes, is most commonly thought 
of when referring to an individual’s genome, and, specifically, DNA profiling. 
With the exception of the sex cells, each nucleus contains 23 pairs of 
chromosomes, one of each pair having been inherited from one of the 
parents. Sex chromosomes may be of X or Y type. Individuals with two X 
chromosomes are female and those with one X and one Y are male.121 
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The DNA molecule takes the form of a double-helix with two complementary 
strands running in opposite directions. Each strand consists of a chain of 
chemical units known as nucleotides, each of which carries an extending 
organic base.122 There are four types of base:  Adenosine (‘A’), Guanine 
(‘G’), Cytosine (‘C’) and Thymine (‘T’). A always links to T and C always links 
to G, so that the sequence of one strand can be derived from the other. It is 
the sequence of bases that form genes, collectively forming the individual’s 
genome, or, more popularly, the ‘genetic code’.123 Only 1-2% of the human 
genome contains coding regions. The other regions comprise control regions 
and regions of unknown function. The human genome contains 
approximately 3.2 billion base pairs and contains about 30,000 coding 
sequences (‘genes’). It is these genes that control the specific characteristics 
of the individual, and are passed on through reproduction.124 
3.9.3 DNA Markers 
Mutations are alterations in the DNA sequence, caused by errors in 
reproduction or environmental effects. They may comprise inversions, 
duplications, deletions or substitutions of DNA sequences. Mutations 
typically have little effect on the individual because more than 98% of human 
DNA is non-coding. Where mutations have occurred, there will be a number 
of variations of the gene, known as ‘alleles’, present in the population. It is 
this genetic variation that gives each individual their particular 
characteristics. Mutations occurring in non-coding regions are much less 
likely to be deleterious to the individual and so, in practice, variations in 
these areas are far more common.125 
It should be remembered that each individual inherits one of each 
homologous (paired) chromosome from each of their parents. This being the 
case then it is possible that the individual has different alleles on the different 
homologous chromosomes. Homozygous describes the situation where the 
same allele is inherited from both parents, and heterozygous where they are 
different. Certain alleles have natural precedence over others, however, and 
the ‘dominant’ allele takes precedence over the ‘recessive’. The importance 
from a DNA profiling point of view is that where the individual is 
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heterozygous, two alleles will appear on their DNA profile (representing one 
from each parent). The combination of an individual’s alleles comprises his 
or her genotype.126 The terms ‘marker’ or ‘locus’ are commonly used for 
profiling purposes, to refer to a site occupied by a particular gene on a 
particular chromosome.127 
It might be noted that there is a proportion of genetic material common 
between relatives. From a criminal justice perspective, this is important 
because it allows the possibility of familial searching, that is, even if the DNA 
profile found at the crime scene does not match a specific individual on the 
database, then it may be possible to identify possible family members, useful 
as an intelligence lead. 
3.9.4 DNA Profiling 
The question that DNA profiling aims to answer is how likely it is that a 
profile (obtained, for example, from the crime scene) could belong to an 
individual other than the suspect. The key factor therefore in the DNA 
profiling technique is discriminatory power. It is impossible from a practical 
point of view to routinely sequence an individual’s entire genome, and in any 
case more than 97% of human DNA is identical between individuals. The 
approach taken, therefore, is to analyse a limited number of markers where 
variations in sequence are known to occur and to create a profile of the 
allele variants found at these loci. The loci analysed in the modern test are 
mostly in non-coding areas which has the advantage that they have 
selective neutrality and are, therefore relatively frequent in the population. 
This may be seen as somewhat counter-intuitive, however, if rare alleles 
were chosen then most criminals would not have them and they would not 
be present at the crime scene.128 
An additional feature of the chosen markers is that with the exception of 
Amelogenin on the sex chromosomes they represent sequences called 
tandem repeats. These are mutations in which a sequence of DNA repeats a 
number of times. A simple example may be seen at Figure 1. This is 
important for the technique, because different alleles have different 
molecular masses and can therefore be easily separated and identified.129 
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The first DNA profiling system was known as VNTR (Variable Number 
Tandem Repeat (mutation)). VNTRs contain units (the result of mutations) 
containing between 6 and 100 bases, repeated up to 100 times. Enzymatic 
‘probes’ were used to cut the DNA sequence at known points, after which 
they were radioactively labelled, and separated by gel electrophoresis. The 
gel plate was then photographically developed to visualize it, and a 
characteristic banding pattern was produced. Interpretation of a VNTR 
profile was by visual comparison of the pattern produced by the suspect 
sample with that of the crime scene sample. From a legal standpoint VNTR 
remains significant because it was the method of analysis used in a number 
of important cases, and both the method of analysis and the interpretation of 
the evidence was at issue in each case.130 
The modern technique is based on STRs (Simple Tandem Repeats). These 
are similar to VNTRs except that the sequences are much shorter. The use 
of shorter sequences reduces so-called ‘stutter’ (faulty ‘ghost’ peaks), as 
they can be amplified with fewer errors. The technique relies on the 
technique of PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction)131 to amplify the sample 
level. PCR involves a DNA polymerase enzyme that binds itself to the DNA 
strand and then synthesizes a duplicate copy using free nucleotides (A, T, C 
& G) that have been added to the mixture. The process is then repeated 
through a total of 28 cycles, thereby multiplying the amount of DNA present 
exponentially and so producing large sample quantities for analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Example of three alleles formed by variable number of repeated 
STRs. 
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The modern test is highly automated, with separation achieved by capillary 
electrophoresis and a laser detector used to identify the retention time for 
each DNA fragment. This is used to automatically identify each allele by its 
size (smaller fragments have lower retention times), and so produce a profile 
of allele identities for the sample.132 
During the empirical stage of this study, the standard test used in the UK 
was AmpFl STR®SGM Plus™ (Applied Biosystems), hereafter referred to as 
‘SGM+’. SGM+ analysed 11 different markers including one on the sex 
chromosome (to identify gender). These are all on different chromosomes 
and assumed to be independent. The estimated probability of a match 
between two unrelated individuals with a full profile (all 10 loci plus gender 
marker) using SGM+ was 1 in 10 billion, however to be conservative this 
was quoted as less than 1 in 1 billion. 
After a DNA sample has been profiled, a numeric code is produced 
indicating the genotype at each locus. A simple example of a report 
identifying alleles at all loci may be seen at Figure 2. This is presented along 
with an analysis of the expected frequency of this particular profile within the 



























































































15,17 18,18 11,12 19,19 14,14 28,29 15,16 14, 16 5,9.3 19,21 X,Y 
Figure 2: Example numeric individual profile. 
From summer 2015, a new 16 loci test started to be introduced. The new 
test adds an additional 5 loci to the existing SGM+ test. In practice the 
advantage of the new test is not an increase in the statistical match 
probability number (which remains at 1 in a billion), but increased reliability 
when testing degraded samples. It achieves this by a reduction in amplicon 
(DNA fragment) size, so increasing resolution.133 This means that when 
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applied to mixtures of DNA it will be possible to detect more components 
(that is, it will be able to separate DNA fragments inseparable by the older 
tests because of similar retention times). 
3.9.5 Complex DNA Samples 
The majority of forensic DNA samples contain DNA from two individuals. In 
this case more than two alleles may be identified at each locus. Where one 
of the contributors is known, then the profile of the other may be deduced, 
however where both are unknown special analytical approaches are 
required.134 A mixture from two contributors is known as a ‘simple mixture’. 
Where the sample containing DNA is very small, or where it is degraded, it 
may not be possible to produce a full profile. This is often the situation in the 
case of a minor contributor to a mixed sample. It may be possible to obtain a 
more full profile by using LTDNA analysis, or otherwise the discriminatory 
power of the test may be compromised.135 Note that ‘partial’ does not mean 
that only some markers match – in the case of any markers not matching, 
then an exclusion is established. 
LTDNA Analysis refers to a range of techniques (originally involving an 
increased number of PCR replication cycles, but now also including other 
techniques) allowing analysis of DNA from extremely small samples. This 
might be from a surface with no visible biological stain, to which a very small 
number of human cells may have been transferred by touch.136 The 
technique is so sensitive that it has raised issues about the greater risk of 
contamination by DNA coincidentally present from other sources.137 
Forensic samples may comprise complex mixtures of DNA, including low 
template and partial components. Such samples cannot be analysed entirely 
automatically but require operator interpretation. 
3.9.6 DNA Profiles and the National DNA Database 
DNA profiling relies on the existence of the National DNA database 
(‘NDNAD’). The NDNAD of England and Wales was established on 10th April 
1995 and was the first of its kind in the world. Scotland and Northern Ireland 
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have their own databases with their entries being submitted to the NDNAD 
on a daily basis. Police powers to obtain samples from arrestees, and retain 
information derived from them, as well as cross-check against profiles from 
unsolved crime scenes were established in the Police and Criminal Evidence 
(‘PACE’) Act 1984, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 and the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.138 
It is worth noting that, after challenges in the European Court of Human 
Rights,139 and with only limited exceptions, DNA profiles from innocent 
people and children are now not retained on the database.140 Additionally, 
only digital profiles are now held, and not the original biological samples.141 
Despite this, with approximately 9.3% of the UK population on the database, 
this is the largest in the world by proportion of population.142 
Many different types of biological evidence collected at the crime scene are 
suitable for DNA analysis, the most common of which are blood, semen and 
saliva. These may be direct, for example in the form of semen or drops of 
blood, or may be indirect, for example from a cigarette butt or chewing 
gum.143 Within the laboratory, the DNA is quantified and analysed.144 Profiles 
obtained (for simple profiles, a series of digits indicating the alleles found) 
are then compared with other samples to identify matches. It will be recalled 
that a match does not mean that the samples come from the same source, 
only that this possibility may not be excluded. However, the overall 
frequency of the DNA profile is calculated. This is based on known allelic 
frequencies within the population and application of correction factors based 
on population genetics (this includes correction factors for such things as 
known racial sub-populations).145 Reports of interpretation results are then 
submitted to investigators. 
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The NDNAD contains DNA profiles from three sources: Scene of Crime 
(‘SOC’) samples from unknown persons and derived from biological samples 
taken from the crime scene or victims, Criminal Justice (‘CJ’) samples taken 
from known people arrested on suspicion of involvement in a criminal case, 
and elimination or volunteer samples taken for example as part of an 
intelligence-led mass screening of a particular population. 
Every day, all the profiles in the NDNAD are checked against each other in a 
process called speculative searching. The objective is to obtain full or partial 
matches between CJ and/or SOC records. A number of possible matches 
may be obtained which are then reported back to the designated officer 
within the relevant Police Force.146 Four types of matches are possible: a 
loaded CJ profile matches another CJ profile: this would indicate a duplicate, 
or that the individual had an alias, or, although of low probability, there is a 
coincidental match. A loaded CJ profile matches a SOC profile possibly from 
an unsolved or ‘cold’ case: in this case the individual matched would 
become a suspect. A loaded SOC profile matches another SOC profile: this 
indicates that the same individual may have been present at both crime 
scenes, providing an intelligence lead; the individual cannot be identified 
however. A loaded SOC profile matches a CJ profile: again the individual 
would become a suspect for the crime. 
3.10 DNA Profiling in Evidence 
The use of DNA identification evidence in court presents a greater challenge 
than may be assumed from the foregoing. Whilst fingerprint evidence is 
simply presented as a ‘match’, and DNA evidence in the form of a probability 
statement, the situation is more complex. Specifically, DNA evidence 
presents two areas of complication. First, the particular challenge for DNA 
evidence is that it must be probative, that is, it must assist in determining 
facts at issue. As an example, evidence of a DNA match in a rape case 
investigation or trial has no probative value if the defendant’s defence is one 
of consent. Below, the ‘framework of propositions’ used by forensic experts 
is outlined. 
Second, the presentation of DNA evidence is constrained by common law. 
Notably, and somewhat paradoxically, experts are constrained from using 
some well-accepted scientific principles that are acceptable for less rigorous 
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scientific evidence. Unsurprisingly, this has been the subject of intense 
scrutiny and debate. Linked to this is the complicating factor of fallacious 
modes of thinking regarding probabilistic evidence. This is linked because 
probabilistically erroneous presentation of evidence has been challenged in 
case law. 
There is a vast literature on these aspects. The following review seeks to 
outline only to a sufficient degree those aspects necessary to follow the 
subsequent empirical study. 
3.11 Ensuring DNA Evidence Addresses the Right Question 
Evidence may be addressed to four different levels of issue: Source, Sub-
source, Activity and Offence. These have been referred to as the hierarchy 
of propositions.147 Forensic scientists may be asked to address questions at 
each of these levels. Examples of these questions are as follows: 
Source Level: Is the defendant the source of the semen found at the scene? 
Sub-source: Does the DNA come from the semen found at the scene (or 
from other cellular material)? The distinction between this level and source 
level is important if, for example, the accused claims that his DNA is present 
because of simply touching the victim. Interestingly although match 
probabilities for DNA may be in the range of 1 in a billion, tests to determine 
cell type (for example, semen or blood), are nowhere near as sensitive, a 
point that may not be clear to a jury. 
Activity: Did the defendant have intercourse with the victim? 
Offence: Did the defendant rape the victim? 
It is for the forensic expert to determine the sub-source question, however 
may also be able to assist with opinion regarding the significance of the 
evidence (subject to Doheny restrictions in the trial itself148). This might 
include source or even activity level, but the ability of the scientist to offer 
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opinion on these has, as described below, been controversial. Offence level 
questions are strictly for the jury.149 
Confusion between questions addressed has been identified as a potential 
and actual cause of miscarriage of justice. In the case of Scott, the reporting 
scientist reported that the crime scene DNA sample matched Scott’s profile 
with a match probability of one in a billion (sub-source question). The expert 
stated, in the next sentence, that it was his opinion that the DNA ‘most likely’ 
originated from sperm (source question).150 
The association of the one in a billion statistic with the opinion that the 
sample came from sperm has been termed the ‘association error’. In Scott 
there was poor scientific basis for the latter claim, and yet the investigators 
associated the small match probability figure with that claim. In fact, the 
source of the DNA was Scott’s saliva, and he was innocent of the 
charges.151 
As described below, it will not be found surprising that there has been 
controversy as to the level to which experts may testify, especially when they 
have given their opinion as to activity level questions (for example, whether 
the defendant was holding the weapon).  
3.12 Probabilistic Expression of DNA Evidence 
A distinctive feature of DNA profiling is that it is explicitly probabilistic. A 
match between the DNA of the defendant, and that found at the crime 
scene, is expressed in the form of a ‘match probability’. For example, in R v 
Deen this was stated as 1 in 3 million.152 This did not mean that it was 3 
million to one that Deen was guilty (an example of the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ 
discussed below), but rather, the fact that 1 in 3 million of the population 
would be expected to have the same profile. The question, then, arises as to 
what, exactly, the match probability means. In fact, it may be regarded as 
the probability of finding that evidence assuming that the defendant was 
innocent. In Deen, that probability was 1 in 3 million. However, 
hypothetically, if there was no other evidence against Deen, then 10 males 
(assuming a 30 million male population) could equally likely be the 
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perpetrator, theoretically making him only 10% likely to have carried out the 
crime. One common way to regard this is as a statement of ‘strength of 
evidence’, with the higher the number, the greater the strength of the 
evidence. The modern test states a match probability conservatively as 1 in 
a billion. 
In summary, the expert thus may only state the probability of the evidence 
given the proposition, and not the probability of the proposition given the 
evidence. The latter would be an example of the prosecutor’s fallacy. 
In fact, the strength of evidence is a relative construction, and is generally 
only meaningful when constructed according to competing sets of 
propositions. For example, what is the probability of seeing the evidence 
given the prosecution hypothesis, compared to the probability of seeing the 
evidence given the defence hypothesis.153 This is known as the ‘likelihood 
ratio’. In the above example, if the defence hypothesis was that the DNA did 
not belong to the defendant, then the likelihood ratio would be 3 million to 
one (i.e. the probability of a match if the prosecution hypothesis was correct 
(1) divided by the probability of a match if the defence hypothesis was 
correct (1 in 3 million)). However, if the defence hypothesis was that there 
had been consent, then the ratio would be 1 to 1, i.e. there would be a DNA 
match in any case. In this case the evidence would have no probative 
value.154 
At an investigative stage, forensic experts may calculate likelihood ratios for 
use by investigators, in order to allow assessment of various hypotheses, 
and determine an investigative strategy. In addition, they may attach 
adjectival indicators of evidence strength, usually according to a standard 
scale (for example, a likelihood ratio of 1 to 1000 would be labelled as 
‘moderately strong support’ for the proposition that it related to.155 
As will be described below, common law prevents the scientist from using 
likelihood ratios for DNA evidence in court, nor adjectival indicators of 
evidential strength. For simple cases, that is, where the defendant is simply 
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disputing that the DNA is theirs, the likelihood ratio is effectively the same as 
the match probability, however, where the match probability is lower (for 
example in the case of a partial profile), the jury may not understand that, 
say, a 1 in a million match, may not offer a high evidentiary strength. For 
more complex DNA cases, for example low template or mixed DNA profiles, 
the evidence can only be expressed in the form of likelihood ratios, and is 
accepted as such in court. 
Many forensic commentators have argued a case for the adoption of 
‘Bayesian’ analysis of evidence.156 Bayes’ Theorem provides a mathematical 
formula that allows the updating of the probabilities of issues in light of new 
evidence. Specifically, the prior probability of an issue is multiplied by the 
likelihood ratio of the new evidence. This results in a posterior probability of 
the issue conditioned on both the prior probability of the issue and the 
likelihood ratio of the new evidence. This posterior probability may then be 
used as a prior probability in subsequent new calculations, each taking 
additional evidence into account. The end result is a final posterior 
probability conditioned on all the evidence in the case.157 
 
It should be noted that both objectively quantitative evidence (for example, 
DNA profiling) and subjective evidence (for example a fact-finder’s 
estimation of the probability of an alibi being false) may be combined using 
the method. As will be seen below, however, attempts to use this in court 
have failed. 
3.13 Development of DNA Evidence in the English Court 
Despite the fact that DNA evidence was first placed before in a jury in 
1987,158 its first substantial challenge in the English courts was in the case of 
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R v Deen in 1994.159 This was in stark contrast to the so-called ‘DNA wars’ 
in the US, which saw considerable effort expended in challenging and 
defending the technique’s reliability.160 
Deen had been convicted in 1990 of rape, the main evidence against him 
being a DNA match. Importantly, Deen’s grounds for appeal pre-figured a 
number of the challenges which not only concerned commentators over the 
following period but also a number of subsequent test cases (and continue 
to so so). The first grounds of appeal were whether there was a match at all. 
It should be noted that in these early days of DNA profiling, matches were 
assessed by visual examination of bands in a gel. In Deen, discrepant bands 
had been explained away, whilst normally the presence of any such bands 
would exclude the defendant. Arguably this was not only an example of 
‘confirmation bias’, but also one of a presumption of guilt. Second was how 
the match probability was calculated – in this case the DNA statistic was 
combined with a blood stain statistic, Deen claimed erroneously. Also, the 
population against which the statistics were calculated was challenged. 
Thirdly, Deen provided the classically quoted example of the ‘prosecutor’s 
fallacy’, with the expert stating that the sample, in his judgment, came from 
Deen, and the judge stating that this proved guilt ‘pretty well to certainty’. 
Although not highlighted within the appeal it is worth pointing out that both 
expert and judge were possibly guilty of jury usurpation: it is for the jury to 
decide on the ultimate issue. 
During the appeal, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, made the much-
quoted comment: ‘(i)t makes it very difficult, even if the scientist gets it right, 
and the judge gets it right – if this is what is right – what on earth does the 
ordinary jury make of it?’161 
3.14 Doheny and Adams 
In a set of three inter-related cases, the Court of Appeal set out important 
principles which have impacted all subsequent cases involving DNA. The 
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cases involved that of R v Denis Adams,162 and his subsequent appeal.163 
Between these two cases, the conjoined appeals of Doheny and Gary 
Adams were heard (note that these are different Adamses).164 The cases 
were interdependent in that they considered similar points of law, 
significantly including those related to DNA evidence, and each case 
considered precedent determined in the earlier cases in the set. These 
cases determined the current common law direction for presenting DNA 
evidence in court (sometimes referred to as the ‘Doheny Direction’), and 
rejected the use of probabilistic approaches to non-statistical evidence. 
The Doheny and Adams appeals were joined in R v Doheny & Adams165 
mainly because of common ground that the court (both expert witness, and 
the judge, in their summing-up) had fallen foul of the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’, 
more accurately described as the ‘transposed conditional’.166 The court 
described the fallacy as follows: 
It is easy, if one eschews rigorous analysis, to draw the 
following conclusion: 
1. Only one person in a million will have a DNA profile which 
matches that of the crime stain. 
2. The defendant has a DNA profile which matches the 
crime stain. 
3. Ergo there is a million to one probability that the 
defendant left the crime stain and is guilty of the crime. 
Such reasoning has been commended to juries in a number 
of cases by prosecuting counsel, by judges and sometimes 
by expert witnesses. It is fallacious and it has earned the title 
of ‘The Prosecutor's Fallacy’.167 
A simple example exposes the fallacious nature of this reasoning: if a cow 
has four legs, then it does not follow that anything with four legs is a cow. In 
the quoted example above, if a population of 25 million men was assumed in 
England, then, assuming no other evidence against the defendant, there 
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would be 25 other potential offenders. On that simple basis, the defendant 
would only have a 1 in 25 chance of being that offender. 
It should be noted that, as in Doheny,168 and in Deen,169 the perpetration of 
the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ in court did not automatically make the conviction 
unsound, however, it did, and does continue to be, a basis for appeal, due to 
the potentially prejudicial fallacious evidence presented to the court. In R v 
C170 the judge at the initial trial employed the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ in his 
summing up, but this was not sufficient to overturn the conviction. Note that 
in Deen, both the expert witness and judge were guilty of fallacious thinking. 
It is worth bearing in mind that, despite the fact that judge, expert and 
counsel now have a greater understanding of the fallacy and are able to 
avoid or to give direction concerning it, it has been suggested that this might 
not stop the jury (nor anyone else) falling into the trap of their own accord.171 
However, the court discussed at length the presentation of DNA evidence 
and issued specific guidance as to how this type of evidence should be 
presented. Specifically, they stated that experts should confine their 
testimony to the ‘random occurrence ratio’ (more accurately known as the 
‘random match probability’). They also laid down a textual template for 
judicial direction that they stated ‘may be appropriate, tailored to the 
particular facts of the case’: 
Members of the jury, if you accept the scientific evidence 
called by the Crown, that indicates that there are probably 
only four or five white males in the United Kingdom from 
whom that semen stain could have come. The defendant 
was one of them. If that was the position, the decision you 
have to reach, on all the evidence, was whether you are 
sure that it was the defendant who left that stain or whether 
it was one of that small group of men who share the same 
DNA characteristics.172 
The court stated, also, that the expert ‘should not be asked his opinion on 
the likelihood that it was the defendant who left the crime stain, nor when 
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giving evidence should he use terminology which may lead the jury to 
believe that he is expressing such an opinion.’173 
This is highly significant, as it means that the forensic expert is truly confined 
to the statement of random match probability: they may not, for example, 
express their opinion as to how likely it was that the defendant was at the 
crime scene, nor attach any adjectival description of how strong the 
numerical evidence might be. It might be noted that within investigative work, 
DNA match reports might be accompanied by standard adjectival 
descriptions, such as ‘very strong’ (evidence).174 Such descriptions must be 
removed from expert reports if they are to be presented in court.175 
Somewhat paradoxically, DNA evidence, the most rigorous of forensic 
identification methods, is the only form of such evidence in which the expert 
is barred from presenting his opinion in this way. The question might arise as 
to why this bar exists. It might be explained on the basis that, arguably, 
given that DNA evidence is probabilistic, the expert, having simply 
determined the match probability for the DNA, is in no better position to state 
whether the accused is the source of that DNA than the jury. On that basis, 
such a decision is within the domain of the jury. It has been suggested, also, 
that such a policy also assists in preventing the jury falling into making faulty 
inferences, such as the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’.176 On the other hand, it has 
been pointed out that this leaves the jury with little assistance in 
understanding the interaction of DNA with other evidence.177 
Turning to the case of Adams178 and his appeals:179 Adams was the first 
case in which the prosecution relied solely on DNA identification.180 In fact, 
all the other evidence (including an alibi, not matching a description, and not 
being picked out in an identity parade) pointed against guilt. Indeed, the 
Adams cases have been portrayed as a battle between science and 
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common sense.181 A novel defence was attempted, which involved an 
eminent team of expert statisticians, and used Bayesian statistics to 
combine DNA evidence with ‘ordinary evidence’. Briefly, and explained 
somewhat simply, the Bayesian approach involves assessing a prior 
probability, and some pertinent item of evidence (expressed as a likelihood 
ratio). A posterior probability for the issue, conditioned on the combined 
value of the prior probability and the likelihood ratio, is calculated, which then 
becomes the prior probability for additional pieces of evidence.182 
Significantly, these elements of evidence may be subjective (for example, 
the likelihood of a witness lying), or objective (for example a DNA match). 
The jury were issued with a questionnaire and instructions, that invited them 
to estimate probabilities of non-statistical evidence to be true, for example, 
how likely would Adams have been to be able to call an alibi. It is not known 
whether the jury used the questionnaire or not, but in any case the court took 
a hard line on the use of such mathematical techniques, stating that the 
expert should not expound a statistical approach to evaluate whether the 
defendant left the crime scene stain, and that the Bayesian procedure 
‘plunges the jury into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory and 
complexity deflecting them from their proper task’.183 
Further that: ‘[W]e have very grave doubt as to whether that evidence was 
properly admissible, because it trespasses on an area peculiarly and 
exclusively within the province of the jury, namely the way in which they 
evaluate the relationship between one piece of evidence and another.’184 
Also that the application of mathematical formulae to separate pieces of 
evidence was simply inappropriate to the jury’s task, which should be ‘by the 
joint application of their individual common sense and knowledge of the 
world to the evidence before them.’.185 
Significantly, these rulings have been taken to mean not only that use of the 
Bayes formula was not permitted, but neither could likelihood ratios be used 
to present DNA evidence in court. 
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These common law rulings have been described by some scientists as 
flawed and out of date,186 with scientifically and logically better ways of 
presenting the evidence,187 Indeed, as described above, likelihood ratios are 
the scientifically accepted method of expressing such forensic data, and are 
used generally during investigation of crime.188 
These rulings are important to this study, as, in principle, they still apply to 
the way that DNA evidence is presented at the time of this study. On the one 
hand, Professor Redmayne described the Doheny direction as being a 
‘rough and ready solution to a difficult problem, rather than… a perfect one’ 
(if for no other reason than fact-finders may find it hard to understand 
likelihood ratios).189 On the other, it has been suggested that the more 
general use of likelihood ratios has crept in by the back door.190 
Beyond its value as a ‘rough and ready solution’, Redmayne pointed a’ 
perhaps more useful, view of the Doheny direction, and how it might be 
applied additionally to non-DNA evidence. What the direction states is that 
the defendant is merely one of a number of suspects (the others 
unidentified) who may have carried out the crime. Now, the jury must take 
into account any other evidence that might make the suspect more likely to 
be the offender.191 Interestingly this is Bayesian analysis(!). 
It is, arguably, possible to convict solely on the basis of DNA evidence.192 
The Court of Appeal has recently ruled that DNA evidence alone may 
provide evidence of possession of a firearm.193 Additionally, they have ruled 
that the absence of evidence other than a full DNA match is not sufficient to 
declare that there is no case to answer.194 
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Reliance simply on DNA evidence has, however, led to a number of 
miscarriages of justice.195 On that basis the Crown Prosecution Service: 
Guidance on Expert Evidence recommends that prosecutors regard this 
evidence cautiously, and aim to identify supporting evidence.196 Even if the 
accused accepts that the DNA is his, this, too, on its own may not be 
sufficient. For example, in R v Grant the defendant did not dispute that the 
sample on the balaclava was his DNA, or that it had been found at the crime 
scene, but stated that the balaclava was deposited at the scene 
innocently.197 
3.15 Complex DNA Evidence 
It should be noted that the Doheny direction applies only to simple DNA 
matches. In cases where the profile is partial, low quantity, or mixed, DNA 
evidence can only be presented in the form of a likelihood ratio. A number of 
recent cases have considered the position where the DNA sample is 
insufficient in quantity or quality for the forensic expert to calculate a full 
profile, where the crime DNA sample is mixed, or both. Special analytical 
techniques must be used for these analyses (for example a LTDNA 
technique where the sample is low in quantity), as well as sophisticated 
statistical methods. For complex samples, the analysis cannot be fully 
automated, and requires expert judgment. 
In R v Bates,198 the defence claimed that, because of the ‘impossibility of 
ascribing any statistical value to the potential exculpatory effect of the voids 
in a partial profile’, then the evidence did not, under Doheny,199 satisfy the 
requirement that only a probabilistic statement may be made in the case of 
DNA evidence. Further, that, the bands missing from the profile could have 
exculpated the defendant. Per Moore-Bick LJ, the court dismissed the 
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appeal, stating that it would be impractical in every case to take account of 
exculpatory evidence ‘that may exist’, and, further, that as long as the expert 
explained the basis and limitations of the evidence, it was probative, in that it 
assisted in determining the facts of the case, albeit in a less perfect way than 
for a full profile. 
The very reliability, and therefore admissibility, of the LTDNA technique was 
challenged in R v Hoey,200 leading to a temporary suspension of its use, and 
a subsequent review by Professor Caddy which confirmed its reliability.201 In 
R v Reed,202 however, the level below which it was possible to analyse DNA 
and calculate a reliable match probability was challenged. The court 
determined (arguably, somewhat arbitrarily), that, at the current state of 
science, there was an absolute level (100-200 pg of DNA sample) above 
which a reliable statistic could be calculated, and that where samples were 
above this level, the reliability of the LTDNA technique should not be 
challenged. The court referred to this level as the ‘stochastic level’ (a 
reference to a statistical term meaning that below this level, random effects 
might outweigh the ‘signal’). 
In R v Broughton,203 the defence challenged the admissibility of LTDNA 
where the sample size was below this ‘stochastic threshold’. The court, 
supported in R v C [2010],204 ruled that nothing in Bates205 precluded the 
admission of such evidence, so long as its limitations were clearly laid out by 
the forensic expert. 
The courts have considered, too, the question of transfer of DNA. For 
example, in R v Weller,206 the defendant, accused of sexual assault, was 
found to have the victim’s DNA under his fingernails. The prosecution’s case 
was that this was through vaginal penetration, however the defence case 
was that the DNA had been innocently transferred. The defence’s specific 
case was that the DNA transfer evidence was inadmissible because there 
was insufficient scientific basis to evaluate the mode of DNA transfer. 
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However, the appeal was dismissed, the court ruling that the expert witness 
was permitted to express conclusions about source, transfer, and 
persistence of genetic material based partly upon experience and upon 
unpublished research.207 Similarly, in Reed,208 the court stated that the 
expert may (indeed, it was ‘…essential to do so…’,209) evaluate the 
possibilities for DNA transfer, so long as there was a sufficiently reliable 
basis to do that.210 However, this opinion must not be speculative, and, in 
any case, should be careful to ‘guard against the dangers of that evaluation 
being tainted with the verisimilitude of scientific certainty…’.211 
The court in Weller212 was critical of the appellant’s witness, stating that ‘if 
one tries to question science purely by reference to published papers and 
without the practical day-to-day experience upon which others have reached 
a judgment, that attack is likely to fail, as it did in this case.’213 This was 
significant to the current study in that a central line of investigation was the 
relationship between science and law. In Weller,214 the prosecution expert 
was an FSS employee, whereas the defence expert was an academic expert 
with no field forensic experience. The defence expert in Reed215 came in for 
similar criticism.216 The significance of ‘experience’ taking precedence over 
‘science’ in court is examined and discussed in Chapter Seven. 
In Reed,217 the Court of Appeal had advised that the forensic expert may 
give opinion on how a DNA crime scene sample may have been transferred, 
despite the fact that no data other than expert subjective opinion. That is, no 
database existed, as for judging DNA matches. In Dlugosz,218 the question 
arose as to whether the expert could give a subjective opinion on the DNA 
match itself. There was no dispute that the DNA crime scene sample was of 
too low quantity and quality in order to reliably state a match probability, and 
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the defence’s case was that this made the DNA evidence too unreliable to 
admit. However, the Court of Appeal ruled that, as long as the true nature of 
the evidence was made clear to the jury, and the court was satisfied that 
(again) the witness had sufficient forensic experience, then the evidence 
passed the test of ‘assistance’. 
… it does seem to us that provided it is made clear to the 
jury the very limited basis upon which an evaluation can be 
made without a statistical database, a jury can be assisted in 
its consideration of the evidence by an expression of an 
evaluative opinion by the experts. … provided the expert has 
sufficient experience… it must then be made very clear to 
the jury that the evaluation has no statistical basis. It must 
be emphasised that the opinion expressed is quite different 
to the usual DNA evidence based on statistical match 
probability. It must be spelt out that the evaluative opinion is 
no more than an opinion based upon [the expert’s] 
experience which should then be explained. It must be 
stressed that, in contrast to the usual type of DNA evidence, 
it is only of more limited assistance.219 
This is highly significant to the use of DNA evidence in court. It will be 
recalled that the ‘new paradigm’ of forensics that is DNA analysis, referred to 
the ability to objectively state match probability in the form of a scientifically 
robust probability statement. But cases such as Bates,220 Broughton,221 
Reed,222 and Dlugosz223 involve once again (subjective) opinion evidence. In 
the case of Dlugosz,224 this was subjective evidence as to the DNA match 
itself (as opposed to, for example, mode of transfer), the heart of the ‘new 
paradigm’. 
This approach has been criticised by both the legal community, describing 
the ruling as ‘potentially a retrograde step… lower(ing the bar) in the most 
difficult of cases, which are exactly the cases that should demand the 
highest level of statistical analysis’,225 and the scientific community: 
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The ruling assumes that a scientist who has quantitatively 
evaluated a large number of mixtures cases will have the 
knowledge to assign a reliable qualitative opinion of weight 
of evidence in a case that is too complex for a quantitative 
assessment. However, there is no scientific basis for this 
belief — no scientific literature provides a reliable 
methodology, scientists are not trained to make such 
assessments and there is no body of standards to support 
them. Casework experience is not a substitute. The true 
composition of the DNA result in any given case cannot be 
known so it does not provide a reliable control for learning 
purposes.226 
Professor Gill described this decision, to admit subjective opinion, as 
‘retrograde’, counter to established scientific method, and, indeed, based on 
a test that has been shown experimentally to be non-generalisable, stating 
that, for DNA, there is no real alternative to probabilistic calculations.227 
The apparent ‘reversion’ to a simple admission test of basic reliability and 
assistance has arguably been underlined in the most recent Criminal 
Procedure Rules,228 in which Dlugosz229 is explicitly cited as precedent for 
this proposition: 
It is essential to recall the principle which is applicable, 
namely in determining the issue of admissibility, the court 
must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific 
basis for the evidence to be admitted. If there is then the 
court leaves the opposing views to be tested before the 
jury.230 
However, as noted above, there is strong scientific reservation regarding the 
precedent set in Dlugosz: 
… R v Dlugosz is a prime example showing how the legal 
system can unwittingly be complicit in propagating a method 
that has no scientific basis. It is particularly dangerous, since 
the … method invites confirmation bias. As this is now 
established practice, the same errors will be repeated across 
different cases… 231  
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3.16 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the key defining factors of this study, that is, the 
nature of the adversarial trial, the role of evidence, specifically the role of 
expert evidence, and the legal framework surrounding these. 
The chapter has also reviewed the distinctive nature of DNA profiling 
evidence, explaining how it is the most rigorous of forensic identification 
methods. However, the developments in, primarily, case, law, reviewed 
above, have underlined a number of the questions at the heart of this thesis. 
The Doheny direction, despite originating eighteen years ago, has 
apparently not been challenged or over-ruled, despite significant criticism 
from commentators from the start. As part of its investigation into the 
relationship between law and science, this study will look at whether 
‘science’ has somehow ‘crept in’, or whether this somewhat historical 
precedent has been simply accepted. 
Many of the test cases described above involved, not the DNA match itself, 
but how the DNA came to be at the crime scene. This offers a potential 
answer to the question of why the Doheny direction has not been 
challenged, that is, simple DNA matches are simply accepted. Regarding 
issues such as transfer, this study investigates the degree to which the 
expert feels themselves qualified to give their opinion on this type of 
evidence, and the degree to which they feel themselves constrained in the 
courts. 
Very significantly, it may be argued that the use of DNA evidence has come 
full circle. Originally referred to as a paradigm change in forensic 
identification, and a gold-standard against which older forensic tests must 
measure themselves, the case of Dlugosz232 appears to indicate that, 
(somewhat paradoxically) for more complex and challenging DNA samples, 
the paradigm no longer strictly applies, and the expert may consider 
themselves qualified to offer their opinion based solely on their ‘experience’, 
as for any other type of expert evidence. 
This goes to the heart of the line of investigation within this study, the 
relationship between science and law in court. On the one hand, common 
law rules regarding admission of expert evidence appear (despite all the 
intellectual energy described above in terms of proposals for reform), to 
remain at the simple level of basic sufficient reliability and assistance to be 
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put before the court. On the other hand, however, prominent members of the 
scientific community have criticised the method endorsed in cases such as 
Dlugosz233 as being scientifically unreliable.234 The question of how forensic 
experts resolve this conflict in court is a crucial one to this study. 
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Whilst the broad aims of this study were to examine, as a whole, expert 
witnesses’ experience of testifying as to DNA evidence in the adversarial 
court, two central research questions underpinned this. The first involved the 
question of whether, and how, conflicts arose from the fact that the expert 
has a duty to the court to give unbiased assistance and yet is called by 
opposing parties to support their case in an adversarial criminal trial. Specific 
questions included the nature of any such conflicts, how these conflicts were 
addressed, and whether these attempts at resolution were successful. The 
second central question was whether, and how, conflicts arose between the 
rigorous scientific, and probabilistic nature of expert evidence, and the 
exigencies and need for certainty of the English legal process. 
Over seventy years ago, it was observed that if one wanted to find out 
something about people’s activities, then the best way was to ask them.1 
Whilst the philosophical underpinnings, and the scientific principles and 
caveats regarding data generation by interview have been significantly 
developed since then, interviews remain a trusted method within sociological 
studies. This study involved semi-structured interviews with twenty-five 
experts with significant experience in testifying as to DNA evidence in 
criminal trials. Subsequent analysis was then aimed at both describing, and 
offering potential explanations for, observations concerning the research 
questions described above. 
It has been suggested that researchers have sometimes assumed that 
interviews will be part of their qualitative research method, without further 
consideration.2 In order to assure, therefore, as far as possible, the internal 
validity of this study, and to, at least, make observations regarding potential 
external validity, it was critical, as a preliminary step, to confirm that this was 
indeed the optimum methodology and to root this methodology within the 
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study’s theoretical perspective, that is, to consider its epistemological 
stance. It was also important to assess known and potential limitations of 
interviews as a data generation tool. These considerations allowed creation 
of a frame of reference from which a valid and effective research 
methodology could be developed, as well as development and application of 
a detailed study design that could yield relevant data reflecting 
manifestations of the questions under study. 
This chapter commences, therefore, with a discussion of the rationale and 
limitations inherent in qualitative studies, and describes the theoretical 
underpinnings of the methodology chosen, that is, semi-structured 
interviews. It goes on to describe the detailed research design, and 
considerations regarding the sample design and implementation. Whilst the 
processes of recruitment, interviewing, transcription of recorded interviews 
and subsequent analysis were performed partially simultaneously, each is 
described and discussed in turn. Challenges experienced at each stage are 
also detailed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ethical issues 
arising within the study and how they were addressed. 
4.2 Qualitative Methods 
‘Qualitative research’ in the social sciences describes a range of research 
techniques aimed at observing and explaining human behaviour.3 Whilst 
quantitative methods concern themselves with the question of ‘how many’, 
qualitative methods concern themselves with the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’.4 
The volume and richness of qualitative data has been highlighted as a factor 
differentiating it from quantitative research, in that it is concerned with 
concepts, meanings, metaphors, symbols, and qualitative descriptions,5 and 
unlike (arguably) the case for quantitative research, within qualitative 
methods, consideration of the data is inseparable from considerations of the 
subjective viewpoint of researchers, aiming to explain the world that they 
observe.6 
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It has been argued that most quantitative research, with its well-established 
concepts of null hypotheses and statistical method, pays scant regard to the 
theoretical underpinnings of the method itself, however, for the qualitative 
researcher ‘swim(ming) against the tide of cultural heritage of how science is 
done’, an understanding of the philosophy underpinning such research is of 
central importance.7 Within qualitative research it is critically important to 
ensure that the methodology chosen is rooted in the theoretical stance taken 
within the study and particularly its view of its epistemology.8  
Theoretical examination of the philosophical framework underlying the 
proposed methodology provides a frame of reference from which a valid and 
effective research design may be developed. Put specifically, unless this 
study’s ontological position was that interviewees’ knowledge, 
understandings, perceptions and interpretations provided meaningful 
evidence of the social reality under study, and its epistemological position 
was that qualitative semi-structured interviews were a valid method of 
generating such data, then the outputs of the study would have little or no 
validity or further usefulness.9 At a more practical level, without a robust 
theoretical understanding, whilst surface shortcomings arising from the 
difference between quantitative and qualitative methods may have been 
easily identified and resolved, more fundamental shortcomings in design 
may have gone undetected. Particularly, design errors may have been built 
in, or accepted, because of false assumptions engendered by familiarity with 
more established quantitative techniques.10 It is, therefore, important to be 
clear about the theoretical standpoint taken within this study, particularly 
regarding its ontological and epistemological positions. 
In general terms, discussion of ontology in sociological studies has been 
framed as a choice between the two opposing perspectives of positivism, 
and interpretivism.11 Briefly, positivism argues that reality consists of what 
may be sensed, through sight and touch, for example, with both natural and 
social worlds operating within a strict set of laws. Reality may therefore be 
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studied by the same methods as applied to scientific enquiry.12 By contrast, 
interpretivism looks for ‘culturally derived and historically situated 
interpretations of the social life-world’,13 that is to say, the scientific reality is 
different from the social reality, and indeed even that no external reality 
exists independent of people’s beliefs. As will be detailed below, this study 
took the well-established stance of ‘critical reality’, which rejects outright 
positivism or constructivism in favour of an arguably more practical approach 
to using qualitative tools to study the social world, briefly, that data 
generated may be used to provide evidence that may be critically used to 
draw conclusions about the phenomena studied.14 
Considerations of epistemology have been broadly framed under two 
opposing standpoints, those of inductive logic and deductive logic. Briefly 
inductive logic involves building knowledge bottom-up from evidence, in 
order to derive explanatory theories. By contract, deductive logic (associated 
with the ‘scientific method’) involves development of a theory, framing a 
testable hypothesis, and then assessing the evidence in order to test that 
hypothesis.15 Positivism implies a deductive approach, in which the truth of a 
hypothesis may be deduced (or, to be exact, falsity of a null hypothesis), 
however, interpretivism implies an inductive approach, in that a number of 
alternative conclusions may be inducted, all with validity.16 
A purely positivist approach might envisage an interview in which the data 
generated represented a perfect representation of (social) reality, however 
the pure constructivist might state that any interview simply represented a 
narrative view of the world constructed by the interviewer and interviewee 
within the context of that interview, and representative of no external 
meaning.17 In the former such reality might be deduced, and in the latter, 
possible realities inducted. Such polarisation appears challenging from a 
social research point of view: it might realistically be assumed that positivist 
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‘pure data’ might be unattainable through interview within the sociological 
study, given the complexity of the social world, however, to accept the 
constructivist view that no useful data may be generated would deny the 
validity of the substantial research, apparently empirically sound, based on 
data generation using qualitative methods, for example, interview.18 Indeed 
the constructivist approach has been critiqued on the basis that ‘there is a 
considerable difference between being sceptical about the bases of truth 
claims, … and denying that truth…’.19 
It has been argued that there can be no truly pure inductive or deductive 
approach: the former cannot proceed without being informed by questions 
arising from previous work in the field, and the latter can only proceed on the 
basis of hypotheses based on inductions from earlier evidence.20 This 
study’s epistemological approach lies strongly within the deductivist tradition, 
in that it was based on a number of specific research questions, but at the 
same time it was accepted that there was a strong need for inductive 
methods in terms of interpreting the personal experiences of the 
interviewees. After all, it was judged likely that different perceptions and 
opinions, sometimes conflicting, would be generated from the study 
subjects. Taking the above considerations into account it was proposed here 
that, by taking into account the critiques and objectives of both positivist and 
constructivist schools, valuable data concerning the social world under study 
could be generated by the application of rigorous interview methodological 
construction, application and analysis. 
As briefly mentioned above, the ontological approach taken within this study 
belonged to the school of ‘critical realism’, the best known statement of this 
being that of Bhaskar.21 Bhaskar argued, in ‘The Possibility of Naturalism’, 
that, in many ways, the social sciences, and specifically human behaviour, 
could be studied in the same way as natural systems, that is, in a scientific 
fashion.22 Critics proposed that, whilst natural systems could be reduced to 
universal laws, human behaviour could only be ‘roughly patterned’ rather 
than conforming with defined laws. In response to this, Bhaskar argued that 
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even within systems considered to be natural, proof of cause and effect was 
not possible, only the ability to show associations of certain conditions with 
certain effects. It was the scientist’s job to continually refine definitions of 
such associations. Bhaskar argued that this was no different from social 
systems, albeit generally somewhat less complex.23 The practical 
methodological approach associated with this philosophy, and the approach 
taken in this study, is commonly referred to as ‘critical realism’.24 This 
approach is based on the position that there is a reality independent of 
human thinking, which may, at least, be discerned up to a point.25 This 
reality is not directly accessible, but may be indirectly accessed intellectually 
and through human experience and perception.26 This has been described 
as a ‘post-positive’ approach in that it rejects outright objectivist and 
constructivist ontologies. It suggests that ‘the social world is produced and 
transformed in daily life’.27 
It would be mistaken, however, to describe the approach of critical realism 
as simply existing in between the constructivist and positivist schools of 
thought. In fact, it rejects both these approaches, constructivism on the basis 
that there is indeed a reality, and positivism, on the basis that, although 
there is a reality, it can only be accessed indirectly. All that can be done is to 
attempt to express, in thought, the structures and ways of acting of things 
that exist independently of thought’.28 
As an example of how these approaches were combined within this study, 
one key research question topic was how, and how well, DNA evidence was 
presented and examined. Theoretically, in the world of the ‘realist’, this is a 
known fact, which could be determined empirically. On that basis, 
hypotheses could be determined, and then tested, using deductive 
reasoning. In this study, however, the question of how well DNA evidence 
was presented and tested was determined through personal reflection and 
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opinion, an interpretative process using inductive reasoning, and likely to 
generate multiple possible conclusions. Usefully, researchers have been 
reminded that qualitative interviewing creates but a reconstruction of reality, 
through the interviewee’s (and interviewer’s) eyes, rather than a faithful 
reproduction of ‘reality’.29 
4.3 Research Design 
It has been proposed, in the interests of defining, positioning and generally 
creating a framework for, qualitative studies, that, prior to consideration of 
specific methodology and detailed method, consideration should be given to 
the nature of the social reality to be investigated, what may represent 
knowledge or evidence of that social reality, consideration of the data 
source, and the method of generating that data.30 It should be noted that, 
because of the necessarily subjective nature of qualitative research, it has 
been argued that it is more accurate to regard such research as data 
‘generation’ rather than ‘collection’, as might be the case in quantitative 
research.31 These considerations will now be looked at in turn. 
In sociological terms, the social reality may be said to be the fact that the 
English criminal trial process manifests the high level principle of an 
adversarial mode of trial, legally mandated procedures in terms of the trial 
process, scientific principles in the form of the evidence (and, here, 
specifically DNA evidence), legal principles regarding admissibility and 
presentation of that evidence, and judgment on the part of all the human 
players involved, both objective and subjective. It is the interaction of these 
factors, particularly as regards human judgment under constraints of legal 
and scientific origin, which is under consideration in this thesis. 
Of course, many approaches have the potential to yield data representing 
knowledge or evidence of that social reality. A recent paper usefully 
summarised the main methods by which ‘knowledge or evidence’ of the 
adversarial process may be determined. These included interviewing 
prosecutors or defenders involved in forensic cases, free-ranging 
discussions with judicial officers who specialised in forensic trials, observing 
jury trials in which DNA evidence was contested, interviewing juries at the 
conclusion of these and other ‘DNA trials’, analysing the transcript narrative 
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of the relevant trials, and facilitating focus groups with the main stakeholders 
in the obtaining, analysis and presentation of forensic evidence.’32 Examples 
of such stakeholders included police, judges and magistrates, advocates of 
all types, community workers, corrections officers and legislators. 
Whilst the ability of expert witness interviews to provide valuable data 
supporting the investigation of the social reality of interest will be discussed 
below, it should be noted that, although not intended by Findlay, above, to 
be an exhaustive list, the omission of expert witness interviews supports the 
proposition that not only does this study offer a novel viewpoint, but that it 
also provides a so far missing perspective on the reality under study. 
Regarding data source: the subject population comprised experts with 
experience in DNA evidence. They offered a rich source of data because 
they had expert knowledge of DNA evidence vastly superior to judge, 
prosecution, defence or jury, albeit on a scientific rather than legal basis, and 
they had a specific interest in this area. In addition their view was assumed 
to be unbiased. Although judge and jury are assumedly unbiased in judicial 
terms, they are unable to view the trial process in an unbiased way, because 
they are key players within it. The expert witness stood outside of this 
process and was not required to direct court proceedings and rule on law (as 
for the judge), or find fact (as for the jury). The expert was therefore, to this 
extent, an unbiased observer. The expert was required also to be judicially 
unbiased under law. In addition, as professional scientists and trained expert 
witnesses, it was judged that subjects were able to offer rational, 
professionally-informed and well-argued opinions. Additionally, the subjects 
selected had experience of a large number of relevant trials. This may not 
have been the case for judges or counsel, and was certainly not the case for 
jurors.  
It should be noted that, although interviewing of expert witnesses was 
apparently a novel approach, that is not to say that the expert witness (or 
more specifically the forensic science) community has not been highly active 
in terms of scientific and statistical comment regarding the presentation and 
examination of DNA evidence. Significantly, however, much of that 
commentary has been largely centred on technical comment, rather than on 
experience of DNA evidence in court. One additional observation flowing 
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from this was that such commentary had largely come from a sub-set of 
academically active commentators, rather than from a wider pool of all 
experts active in testifying as to DNA evidence in court. The approach taken 
in this study therefore targeted a largely untapped source of knowledge and 
opinion. 
Regarding interviews as a data generation method: interviewing offered a 
highly effective method of generating data for a number of reasons: the 
researcher was likely to ‘hear’ much more than the researcher  was ‘told’; 
subjects were likely to use the opportunity to clearly state their views; 
generally large amounts of data were likely to be generated for analysis; 
because, in this case, the subject interviewees were, by nature and training, 
highly literate, they were able to clearly vocalise and communicate their 
viewpoint.33 Additionally, interviews offered a highly flexible method of data 
generation, because, in contrast to, for example, questionnaires, the 
interviewer could ask complex questions, adapt to the interviewee, correct 
misunderstandings and generally control generation of data.34 These 
advantages would not all be realised with any other method of generating 
data from such subjects (for example using questionnaires). 
4.4 Validity and Reliability 
One objective of qualitative (indeed, any) research should be that it may be 
possible to draw generalisations from the data that may be applied to other 
settings in which similar conditions exist.35 The degree to which this may be 
done depends on a number of factors, including the validity of the study. 
Validity has been described as having three components, measurement 
validity, internal validity and external validity.36 
Measurement validity relates to the degree that the method measures and 
captures the data under consideration. In the current study, and as 
described below (4.7 Interview Schedule Design), this was assured by 
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rigorous alignment of the interview schedule with the questions under 
consideration. This was further controlled by assessment of the schedule at 
pilot interview. 
Internal validation relates to the degree to which causal statements are 
supported by the data. It also relates to the reliability of the data generated, 
that is, whether it consistently measures (or ‘generates’ data). 
As will be described below in the respective sections, internal validity may be 
assured by systematic design of the interview schedule, and rigorous use of 
best practice in the interview process itself.37 
External validation relates to the degree to which the study’s findings can be 
generalized to situations outside of the study. There are limits to what may 
be generalised in any study, and careful consideration must be given during 
the design. and analysis and interpretation of the data as to the degree to 
which findings may be generalised. Generalisation is possible in terms of the 
whole population of which the sample is a part, in other settings with similar 
conditions, and in terms of theoretical constructs.38 A number of questions 
have been suggested that may be used to assess the credibility of a 
qualitative study’s wider inferences.39 These include whether the study was 
carried out systematically, whether interpretations are well supported by the 
data, whether the interpretation has developed appropriate theoretical 
models, and whether the findings are corroborated by other sources.40 
These factors were taken into account in the current study during both 
analysis and interpretation of the data generated. 
Regarding corroboration, it has been suggested that data may be 
‘triangulated’, that is, looked at from diverse points of view. This might 
include comparison with other studies, or other methods of generating the 
data from the same source, the use of different observers using the same 
data generation method or looking at the data from different theoretical 
perspectives.41 In the Roberts study, for example, findings were triangulated 
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by interviewing both expert witnesses and barristers, regarding specific 
cases.42 
Due to the limited size of the current study, it was judged that any practical 
attempt at triangulation (for example, by interviewing counsel), would have 
been counter-productive in that it would have limited the overall breadth of 
data (that is to say, in this study twenty-five experts were interviewed, 
however a ‘triangulated’ method would have involved approximately ten 
interviews with experts and twelve with counsel. This was felt to be too low a 
sample size of either). Instead, the quality of the study was assured by, as 
described above, rigorous experimental design and implementation, as well 
as rigorous and reflective analysis and interpretation. 
4.5 Interview Structure and Design 
Interviews may be structured, semi-structured, non-directive, focussed, or 
informal conversational in nature, progressing from the formal to the 
informal.43 It could be argued that no interview schedule could be fully 
structured (or it would simply be a questionnaire), or could be completely 
unstructured (or how would the researcher even begin to ask questions). On 
that basis most qualitative research using interviews could be described as 
being somewhere on the formal – informal continuum (indeed, it may be 
noted that the terms ‘qualitative interviewing’ and ‘semi-structured 
interviewing’ are frequently used synonymously44). Because of the relative 
specificity of the research questions within this study, the decision was made 
to utilise a relatively structured approach, designed so that the interview 
would remain within boundaries of the topic areas. Additionally, by using this 
structured approach, it would have the advantages of consistency and 
reproducibility and could be more easily demonstrated to be free of bias. 
Having said this, certain strengths of the less structured interview were 
drawn upon, both in the design and the implementation. From a design point 
of view, optional probe questions were built in, and from an implementation 
point of view, an open style of interview was applied. These points will be 
discussed further below. It was judged that this structure would allow the 
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interviewer to ‘shape the flow of information’, but, at the same time, allow 
interviewees the scope to express themselves and to illustrate and expand 
on initial responses. Additionally it was judged that this method had the 
potential to generate ‘richer’ data. 
Exponents of a more flexible style recommend the use of simple bullet 
pointed guides within a high-level question structure.45 However, the main 
advantage given for this method, that it allows the generation of data to be 
framed by participants rather than dictated by the terms of the study, were 
judged to be a disadvantage to this study, in which specific questions were 
to be addressed. Further, whilst flexible interviews might have satisfied purist 
ideals of qualitative research, the principle that ‘all methods must be open, 
consistently applied and replicable by others’46 was deemed to take 
precedence in this study. 
Interviews were to be recorded unless the participant objected. They were 
then to be subsequently transcribed. The primary advantage of recording 
was that a vastly greater amount of data could be generated. Additionally, 
this data was ‘rich’ in that it was later possible to analyse ‘meta-data’ such as 
nuances, frequency of statements, relationships between items and 
emphases, where judged useful. 
4.6 Sample Design and Implementation 
The sampling strategy and design is of central importance in qualitative 
studies, as it affects the usefulness of the data generated, the type of 
analysis that may be applied, and the value of broader inferences made from 
those analyses.47 This will now be discussed in detail. For clarity, within this 
discussion, the term ‘research population’ is taken to mean the entire 
population of expert witnesses in the UK with experience of DNA testimony 
in court and the term ‘study population’ is taken to mean the subset of the 
research population who participated as interview subjects within this study. 
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In this study the research population of interest had already been broadly 
defined by the nature of the research objectives (that is, expert witnesses 
with experience in DNA testimony within adversarial courts). A detailed 
sampling strategy was defined. This strategy included development of 
sample selection criteria to confirm and bound the study population; 
consideration of appropriate sample size and of required quotas of specific 
sample sub-types; development of an appropriate sampling strategy; 
identification of an appropriate sample frame (that is, information source) 
from which the study sample could be selected. A detailed discussion 
follows of these components, and how they were built into the sample 
design. 
In contrast to quantitative studies, non-probability sampling methods are 
used in qualitative studies, and the sample is not designed to be 
representative of the subject population as a whole. The sampling approach 
taken in this study was ‘purposive’ in that it sought to select a sample of the 
subject population that displayed features of interest.48 Whilst this meant that 
the sample could not be taken to be representative of the population as a 
whole, this approach did allow a broader investigation of features of interest 
across the population than would have been possible if a quantitative 
method were to have been used.49 Such a purposive sampling approach 
aimed to ensure that the greatest number of types of characteristics relevant 
to the research questions were represented, and with sufficient, if not 
necessarily exhaustive, diversity. Details of the criteria applied are discussed 
below, however at the outset it should be stated that the sampling approach 
may be defined as having been homogeneous in that it aimed to include only 
subjects conforming to a certain characteristic (briefly, here, DNA expert 
witnesses),50 but within this sample, a heterogeneous sampling approach51 
was taken in which the aim was to represent every sub-type (for example, 
here, experts with background and experience in prosecution, defence, 
police, public, and private providers). By aiming to include as diverse a 
sample range as possible within the boundaries of the defined subject 
population, the aim was that the contributions of each element could be 
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considered in light of each other, not just in terms of the interplay between 
them, but also in terms of relative importance. 
A number of entry criteria were applied, in order to eliminate any members of 
the research (parent) population who were not deemed to be relevant for 
inclusion within the study population. It was judged that it was not possible to 
define a formal minimal academic qualification for inclusion because of the 
fact that many different disciplines have actively contributed to the debate 
regarding DNA evidence in court, and have given testimony in criminal 
cases. These disciplines have included sociologists, psychologists, 
criminologists, information scientists, molecular biologists, geneticists, 
medical researchers, mathematicians, statisticians, forensic scientists, 
lawyers, epidemiologists and public health specialists.52 
Three specific criteria were applied. Firstly the subject had to be experienced 
as an expert witness in the presentation of DNA evidence in criminal courts. 
Secondly they had to be based within the United Kingdom. Although the 
scope of this research was within the jurisdiction of England and Wales, 
there was great commonality of most aspects of the handling of DNA 
evidence, both legally and scientifically, with Scotland, and a decision to 
exclude the opinion of Scottish experts would limit the availability of valuable 
data. Additionally it was known that a number of experts based in Scotland 
were active also in the courts of England. It should be noted that, although 
some experts with experience in the English courts are based outside of the 
UK, these were excluded because of ethical issues concerning research 
outside of the UK. It was judged that this did not exclude a significant sample 
base. Lastly, the subjects had to possess significant volume and quality of 
experience. Because it was perceived that experts may have had very 
different qualities of experience (for example, in terms of specific expertise, 
interests and job role), it was judged unnecessarily restrictive to pre-empt 
minimum experience level, for example in terms of numbers of cases they 
had been involved in. Sufficient experience was therefore to be judged 
during interview. In the event, potential subjects without such experience 
were eliminated, or eliminated themselves during initial recruitment, so that 
no interviewees were judged at interview to possess insufficient experience 
to be included within the sample. 
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We turn now to consideration of sample size. Sample size in qualitative 
studies is generally small.53 There are a number of reasons for this:54 firstly, 
with proper analysis, larger sample sizes may not yield additional data; 
secondly qualitative studies are not concerned with quantity, so there is not 
a minimum sample required for statistical significance; thirdly, because 
qualitative data is rich in detail, sufficient data can be generated from a 
relatively small number of samples; fourthly, because each sample (that is, 
interview) requires significant resource, logistical practicality may limit 
numbers sampled. 
It was judged important, however, that in this study the sample size was not 
too small, and it was clearly borne in mind that, although sample size may 
remain relatively low, a rigorous purposive approach had to be maintained 
for it to retain validity. In this study it was judged that a sample size in the 
range twenty to thirty would allow generation of sufficient data across the 
target sub-set quotas, taking into account the above considerations. This 
was based on the heterogeneity of the population (the population was 
relatively homogenous, although with some sub-sets), the nature and 
number of selection criteria (as discussed below, clear, not numerous, and 
no requirement for complex sampling, such as control groups, comparisons 
between groups or nested criteria), and lastly the practicality of recruitment 
and interviewing. The chosen sample size was also assessed by 
comparison with established standards. As an example, a recent survey of 
interview-based sociological research papers within Great Britain and Ireland 
indicated a sample range between one and ninety-five with a median of 
twenty-eight.55 Additionally in a recent review of expert opinion on sample 
sizes in sociological studies, thirteen renowned experts gave their 
observations and opinion.56 In this review, experts were agreed that the 
absolute number depended on a range of factors, and was critically 
dependent on the detailed methodological design of the study. However, 
examples of specific sample number ranges recommended by the authors 
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included between twenty and fifty,57 and twelve and sixty.58 Indeed, the 
authors of the latter suggested that, where criticism of sample sizes of 
greater than thirty arose, such critics misunderstood the principles of 
inductive research.59 It should be noted that the authors were generally 
agreed, also, that sample numbers within studies may have been limited as 
much by the logistical limitations necessarily impinging on them, however did 
not believe that this, by itself, necessarily acted to the detriment of the 
studies. With regard to these benchmarks, and to a critical evaluation of the 
sample base within the overall methodological design, it was judged that the 
chosen sample size assured the internal validity of the study. In the event a 
sample size of twenty-five was achieved. 
The purposive approach adopted sought to sample as wide a range of 
relevant experience as possible within the court. In conjunction, therefore, 
with the determination of appropriately sized sample frame, consideration 
was made of minimum quotas required for specific sub-sets of sample 
types.60 
During the design phase, some basic assumptions were made regarding the 
research population. From the point of view of the prosecution expert, prior 
to the break-up of the Forensic Science Service (‘FSS’) it would have been 
desirable to ensure that both subjects working for the FSS and working for 
private companies were represented. Such a distinction did not exist for 
defence experts. Post-FSS break up, no such distinction applied, although 
there was still a distinction between large and small prosecution providers. 
The decision therefore was simply to ensure that significant (although not 
necessarily equal) numbers of experts with primary prosecution or defence 
expertise were interviewed. In order to ensure that the final sample satisfied 
these rather basic criteria, a matrix was constructed and ongoing 
assessment of sample types was carried out throughout the interview 
process. Data logged included interviewee name, study code, amount of 
prosecution and/ or defence experience, qualifications, employer, job title, 
years of experience in DNA evidence. 
Although it might be noted that the definition of sample quotas for the sub-
populations of prosecution, defence, large and small providers was relatively 
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simplistic, justification for this was provided by the fact that many 
interviewees did not exactly fit into any one sub-set, but had a wide range of 
experience throughout their career (for example a significant number of 
experts working for defence consultancies had spent most of their career 
within prosecution within the FSS; some experts working with big private 
providers had similarly spent part of their career with the FSS). 
The ‘sample frame’ refers to the pool of potential subject samples from 
whom a cohort of participants can be selected and recruited.61 In this study 
the sample frame was created initially by identification of existing sources of 
information. In this phase of this process, potential participants were 
identified from existing contacts, attendance lists from professional seminars 
and conferences, and web searches. As described above, a purposive 
approach was taken, in that a range of potential interviewees (samples) 
were sought ,in order that the sample contained the widest range of relevant 
attributes.62 Ethical considerations regarding use of such lists were taken 
fully into account and are discussed in detail at the end of this chapter. After 
this initial phase, the sample frame was expanded by a process of 
generation, by asking for recommendations from the initial participants. This 
is sometimes referred to as ‘snowball’ sampling.63 
A number of considerations were identified that were taken into account in 
both phases of this process. Firstly it was necessary that the sample frame 
provided enough information to inform the necessary selection.64 It was 
assessed that initial identification of participants, followed by generation of 
further participants did not in itself provide sufficient information to filter and 
select on the chosen sample criteria, however it was judged that unsuitable 
participants could be eliminated from the sample during the recruitment 
phase. 
Secondly it was necessary that the sample frame provided comprehensive 
coverage of the overall population of interest, and did not omit any significant 
groups.65 It was judged less important to ensure that any sub-sets were not 
over-represented: as discussed above, qualitative factors were of interest 
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rather than quantitative factors. This second consideration was important in 
this study: until the final closure of the FSS in March 2012, the research 
population was structured in a relatively stable way. This was no longer the 
case at the start of this study, with many relevant personnel either 
redeploying, variously to private providers, Police laboratories, private 
consultancies, academia, or leaving the profession. The fact that there was 
no methodical redeployment of capacity by the Government meant that there 
was no systematic route to ensuring that all new sub-sets of research 
population had been identified. The approach taken within this study was to 
define initial quotas of study population sub-sets, and to maintain this under 
review during the entirety of the fieldwork. 
A third consideration was whether the sampling frame could yield a 
sufficiently large sample size, not simply in terms of available subjects, but 
also in terms of their willingness to participate.66 Sample size was discussed 
above, however it was judged that, not only would there be sufficient willing 
participants, but that it would not be difficult to expand the sample frame 
were numbers to be short. 
The last consideration regarded the logistical practicality (including time, 
resource and cost) of applying the sample frame.67 With reference to the 
designed sample size, it was judged practical to interview the required 
sample within a reasonable timescale. 
It will have been noted that, because the second phase of sample 
generation involved asking initial participants to suggest further interview 
subjects, then the creation of the sample frame, and conduct of initial 
fieldwork (that is, interviews) were carried out simultaneously, to a degree. 
This was not considered a disadvantage as it allowed active monitoring of 
sample quotas.  
An additional challenge may have arisen during the generation of samples, 
in that by asking existing participants to suggest new interview subjects, then 
it might be likely that they would suggest participants very similar to 
themselves, thus introducing bias.68 This was not considered to be a major 
disadvantage as the overall approach was a purposive one, and did not seek 
to demonstrate representativeness. Additionally, the fact that sub-set quotas 
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were identified and managed, meant that bias through snowball sampling 
was minimised. This is discussed below. 
Generating new potential participants, whilst interviewing initially identified 
participants, had the significant advantage of allowing monitoring and 
adjustment of sub-set quotas within the sample frame. A potential challenge 
existed in that, by not strictly separating creation of the sample frame with 
fieldwork, there would be a temptation to adjust other aspects of the 
fieldwork in the light of an emerging sample frame. An example of this would 
have been adjusting interview questions outside the scope of the interview 
schedule. Although this might have yielded additional data of interest, it 
might potentially have degraded the value of the overall data set because of 
lack of consistency across the whole study population. Because of this, 
rigour was applied during the interview process in order to remain within the 
scope of the original interview schedule. 
In the first phase (that is initial identification and recruitment of participants), 
approximately thirty potential participants were approached by e-mail with a 
brief explanation of the study objectives and a request for an expression of 
interest. Of these thirty people, eighteen responded positively and 
subsequently took part in the study. Each confirmed subject was sent further 
information and an Information Sheet and Consent Form (See Appendix A). 
Of the remaining potential subjects approached, two responded that they 
preferred not to take part, and no response was received from the other 
invitees. Seven more participants took part in the study after 
recommendation from initial interviewees, so that the total number of 
interviewees was twenty-five, in line with the original target regarding final 
sample size (between twenty and thirty). 
Regarding monitoring of quotas, it will be recalled that it was planned to 
simply ensure that there was an adequate representation of prosecution and 
defence experience, but also to regularly assess the sample database in 
order to identify whether sub-sets with relevant experience had been 
omitted. A significant number of earlier interviewees mentioned ‘police 
laboratories’ as providers of DNA expert witness services. It was ascertained 
that, although police laboratories had always had some DNA capability 
(although was assumed to be generally reducing because of centralisation to 
the FSS and other providers), in fact, with the demise of the FSS, it was now 
apparent that police laboratories were increasing their capacity. This being 
the case, the decision was made to identify, and involve in the study a 
number of police employed experts. In the event two additional subjects 
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were enrolled (included in the twenty-five total). Reflecting on the achieved 
sample of twenty-five participants, fourteen female and eleven male subjects 
participated, with a median experience of eighteen years of working with 
DNA forensic evidence (in a range six to twenty-six years). The ratio of 
subjects with mainly prosecution experience to those with substantial 
defence experience was approximately two to one. Regarding employer, six 
worked with large forensic suppliers, and fourteen with small consultancies. 
Of the latter, seven had, until recently, worked within the FSS for most of 
their careers. Two further interviewees worked within police laboratories and 
three within academia, although still with substantial experience in court. In 
terms of qualifications, all were qualified to Bachelor’s Degree, with five of 
these qualified further to Masters, and ten to Doctorate level. 
Whilst not considering the achieved sample representative, it was judged 
that significant breadth of attributes of interest within the study population 
had been addressed. 
A number of additional challenges presented themselves during recruitment. 
Firstly, because of the recent demise of the FSS, many potential 
interviewees were no longer contactable through existing contact details. 
New addresses were sometimes difficult to track down as experts had 
variously moved to other employers or out of the professional area 
completely. Whether this significantly altered the ‘mix’ of eventual study 
population is unknown, however, arguably, this may have provided a more 
heterogeneous sample (rather than possibly a homogenous group with 
similar experience), as a wider sample frame had to be applied. 
Regarding the willingness of participants to take part: as mentioned above, 
only two potential participants preferred not to take part (and gave no 
reason), however others did not respond to an introductory or follow up e-
mail. These tended to be experts working within private companies for whom 
individual e-mail addresses could not be identified. Whether these invitations 
reached individuals, or were filtered by administration departments or 
management, is unknown. This did potentially reduce the desirable scope of 
potential participants: these were mainly from ‘medium’-sized companies 
who may have had different experiences to the experts employed within 
largely big or small private providers (and who comprised most of the 
achieved sample). 
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4.7 Interview Schedule Design  
The ‘Interview Schedule’ provides the framework for semi-structured 
interviews.69 At a simple descriptive level, the schedule comprises 
formalised questions designed to contribute answers to research questions, 
and appropriate subsidiary questions.70 At a more detailed level, the 
interview schedule had to satisfy a complex requirement: specifically it 
represented and mediated the physical manifestation of the overall study 
design, in that it linked and controlled the study design with the 
implementation of the interviews themselves. 
Interview schedules structure the layout, the breadth, the depth and the 
consistency of the data to be generated, as well as informing, if not driving, 
the later analytical aspects of the research.71 The design of the schedule 
was therefore critical in this regard. 
The decision to use a semi-structured approach dictated the design of the 
interview schedule: an overall structural ‘map’ and key questions formed the 
backbone of the schedule, designed to assure consistency and coverage. 
Within each structured question, optional prompt questions were designed to 
allow the researcher to probe further within certain boundaries. It should be 
noted that, not only had the schedule to reflect the substantial content of the 
research, but it also had to reflect the philosophy regarding the proposed 
interview structure (that is, the planned degree of flexibility, decisions on 
open or closed questions and areas to probe), and accommodate 
considerations regarding desired interview style (for example ensuring that 
bias was not introduced, either by interview style or by the nature of 
questions asked). 
It is worth underlining that design of the interview schedule was a very 
challenging part of the study. A number of iterations were drafted before it 
was judged that the schedule achieved the objectives outlined above. 
Although it had already been decided to carry out a pilot interview to assure 
a number of aspects of the study (for example flow of questions and timing), 
it was judged that the pilot would be of particular value in terms of assessing 
the ‘fitness for purpose’ of the interview schedule itself. 
                                            
69 Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists: An 
Introductory Resource with Examples (Sage Publications, 1999) 96-97. 
70 ibid 97. 
71 Arthur (n 45)149. 
- 150 - 
A number of critical areas had to be considered during the detailed 
construction. Firstly, that the interview questions provided a reliable basis for 
generating data relevant to the research questions.72 Secondly, that its 
structure and style allowed the desired control of the flow of the interview 
and generation of the data, so that all relevant areas were properly 
investigated.73 Thirdly, to ensure that good style was adopted within the 
questions, for example, by ensuring that questions did not introduce bias, by, 
for example, by leading an answer.74 Each of these considerations will be 
considered in turn. 
The substantial content was directly informed by the central research 
questions of the thesis, namely, on the one hand, the potential conflicts 
between the expert’s duty to remain unbiased and the adversarial English 
legal system, and on the other, between the demands of scientific rigour and 
both the adversarial system and the procedural requirements of the judicial 
process. 
In the late 1990s, a spotlight fell on the use of expert evidence in court, 
generated to a large degree by a number of high profile miscarriages of 
justice. The 2007 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
Report, ‘Forensic Science on Trial’ (HC Forensic Science Report),75 
highlighted the special position of the expert witness in that, unlike other 
witnesses, they may testify as to their opinion. They went on to describe a 
major concern, that experts were frequently regarded as ‘hired guns’, citing 
evidence that both prosecution and defence sometimes ‘shopped around’ for 
the expert with most influence in the court-room.76 On the one hand, it is not 
difficult to accept that, in an adversarial arena, each party sought to 
maximise the strength of their own case, however, the report underlined that 
the decisions in high profile miscarriages of justice such as those of Sally 
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Clark,77 Angela Cannings78 and Damilola Taylor,79 could be directly traced to 
the issues highlighted above.80 
Recognising the somewhat anomalous position of unbiased expert evidence 
in an adversarial arena, the HC Forensic Science Report made a number of 
recommendations to ‘regularise’ the use of experts and expert evidence. 
These included recommendations for pre-trial meetings of ‘opposing experts’ 
to identify areas of agreement and contention: this to reduce the burden on 
jurors by focusing their attention solely on areas of contention, and also to 
prevent collapse of trials where one party might be ambushed by new 
evidence during trial.81 It also discussed the possibility of single joint 
experts,82 and current proposals regarding disclosure.83 
Many of the Report’s concerns were echoed in the Law Commission’s 2011 
report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings,84 with similar 
recommendations, as well as a draft bill, which, if it had been adopted, would 
have enshrined such recommendations within statute. 
Although few of either parties’ recommendations have become enshrined in 
primary legislation, most of the general recommendations were included in 
the Criminal Procedure Rules, particularly part 33 (now part 19).85 In 
addition, although the draft Expert Evidence bill was not adopted, part 33, 
and particularly the Criminal Practice Directions 2014,86 sought to enshrine 
the principles espoused by the draft bill into practice.87 Significantly, the rules 
and practice guidelines mandated few requirements, but rather restated 
various, mostly recent, developments in common law, and recommended 
that courts took these factors into account.  
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Without restating the common law position described in the previous 
chapter, it will be recalled that developments in recent cases have been far 
from clear in terms of their scope, and have courted much controversy as to 
their exact meaning and applicability. 
Returning to the first of the key research questions: there are some statutory 
rules and many non-mandatory guidelines. It is worth reiterating that the 
prime objective of these rules was to promote and maintain unbiased expert 
evidence, concentrating solely on areas of contention. Many of these rules 
and guidelines would arguably be more at home in an inquisitorial arena, yet 
the fact remains that the arena in this case remains not just adversarial in 
nature, but driven by adversarial parties and controlled by a judge used to 
presiding over adversarial proceedings. 
The first major strand of questioning, therefore, had at its heart the question 
of the degree to which the above listed rules and guidelines achieved their 
objectives in practice. Associated with this was the question of if, and how, 
elements of the system attempted to compensate, and how successful they 
have been in this. 
The HC Forensic Science Report also underlined concerns regarding the 
science presented in court. These concerns included the admissibility of 
certain evidence, but also the way it was presented in court. The report 
pointed out particularly the difficulties in presenting DNA evidence, because 
of its probabilistic nature.88 It is worth noting that, since the HC Forensic 
Science Report, there has been no change to the common law position 
regarding how simple DNA evidence is presented. With the vast advances in 
DNA technology, as well as subtleties regarding which questions are being 
asked by the court, and how the evidence provides answers, there has been 
a huge amount of commentary. Concerningly, HC Forensic Science Report 
pointed out that there was evidence that the weight that the jury placed on 
expert evidence was unjustifiably weighted by the way that it was presented 
by the expert (particularly, the expert’s ‘demeanour’).89 Meanwhile the expert 
community has, on occasion, been outraged by (to their mind) nonsensical 
proclamations on expert evidence by the courts.  Indeed an entire issue of 
the Criminal Law Journal was dedicated to critique on an example of this in 
R v T90. Also, whilst not considered nonsensical, recent cases such as R v 
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Dlugosz91 have thrown into question how complex DNA evidence (not 
subject to simple DNA match rules and the Doheny direction) should be 
presented. 
The second major strand of questioning, therefore, was how the 
complexities of DNA evidence, with its scientific rigour, stood up to the very 
different objectives of the adversarial trial, with its desire for legal certainty. 
In a similar fashion to the earlier research question, the question also arises 
as to how elements of the system reacted in an attempt to compensate 
where there were conflicts. 
From a data generation point of view, therefore, two distinct areas of interest 
arose. One complicating factor that was evident, was that many aspects of 
these two research questions overlapped. For example, and, hypothetically, 
the expert may judge that their instructing counsel has inculcated within the 
court fallacious thinking, for example, the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’. From the 
point of view of responsibility to remain unbiased, the expert may be 
challenged as to whether they should, or indeed can, bring this to the 
attention of the court, as it might damage ‘their’ party’s case. On the other 
hand, from the point of view of science, the expert may judge that however 
careful counsel has been not to fall into the trap of the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’, 
the court has indeed fallen into this trap. The expert should therefore bring 
this to the attention of the court. 
The two central research questions may thus be seen as ‘cross-cutting’ the 
experience of the expert. Added to this, an additional factor that had to be 
taken into account was that, although it was the trial itself that was of central 
interest, many formative aspects of this were informed by events pre-trial. 
This issue, too, could be seen to cross-cut the factors discussed above. 
Although it might have been possible to structure interviews around these 
central research questions, that is, synchronically, it was judged that this 
would have a number of disadvantages. These were that, not only might the 
direction and structure of the interview seem somewhat ‘artificial’ from the 
participants’ viewpoint, but also that the process might have become 
inefficient in that ground might have been duplicated – if not in the questions, 
then certainly in the answers. This being the case, the interview schedule 
was structured diachronically, taking the interviewee through the pre-trial 
and then the trial process. This was not intended to place any constraint on 
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the final analysis of data collected, but was judged to provide a more intuitive 
basis for the interview structure, thus improving rapport and richness of data 
generated. Of course it was anticipated that the data generated would cross-
cut key areas of interest, however it was anticipated that these different 
types of data could be adequately separated during analysis. 
We now move on to the structure and style of the interview schedule. The 
interview schedule itself may be examined in Appendix B. The initial part of 
the schedule was designed to provide a brief introduction and recap of 
research objectives and to provide participants with a high level view of the 
structure of the interview. The first substantial section of the schedule asked 
interviewees a number of mandatory questions about their background and 
their experience. These were structured as closed questions designed 
simply to generate essential data regarding subject ‘type’. It will be recalled 
that an essential component of the sample design was that the different sub-
sets of subject samples would be monitored to ensure adequate coverage of 
the research population. This section was also designed to ease the 
interviewee (and researcher) towards the main body of the interview, and to 
build essential rapport. 
The next two parts of the interview schedule comprised the main body. 
These were separated into the main sections of Pre-trial and Trial. At the 
start of each section, a concise and standard introductory statement was 
made, delineating the scope of this section and data required. As an 
example, the Pre-trial section commenced as follows: 
I’d like to ask you now about your experiences of the pre-trial 
process. The scope of my research is the use of DNA 
evidence in Crown Court trials, however I want to 
understand how the cases presented by both prosecution 
and defence counsel have been developed, and the various 
flows of information that lead to this point. 
After the introduction, a number of questions were posed. Whilst these were 
‘open’ in style, they were designed to limit the interviewee to the specific 
area questioned. For example, the first question within the Pre-trial section 
read as follows: 
When you appear for the prosecution, at what stage in the 
pre-trial process do you become involved, and how are you 
involved in the development of the prosecution case? 
A number of prompts then followed, for use by the researcher in the case 
that it was judged that the area had not been sufficiently explored. As an 
example of prompts accompanying the above question: 
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Prompts if necessary 
Could you tell me about your involvement with other parties 
relevant to the development of the prosecution case? 
For example, Police, CPS 
In total seven questions were asked in the Pre-trial stage, and eighteen 
within the Trial stage. 
As a final section, interviewees were then asked five questions regarding 
potential improvements in the process that they could identify. A formal 
thanks for their participation was then made before termination of each 
interview. 
The third major consideration within the interview schedule was to ensure 
that good style was adopted within the questions. This was so that both 
breadth and depth of the interviewees’ experience could be properly 
explored.92 This involved careful ‘mapping’ of the interview schedule as 
described in the previous sections, however it also involved effective 
question style.93 Most questions were designed as open, that is, inviting 
something other than a yes or no answer. The challenge with these 
questions was to encourage the right breadth and depth of response. Good 
phraseology was needed to limit the questioned area, and various prompts, 
as described above, were designed to further probe if necessary. 
Questions were carefully constructed so as not to lead an answer. An 
example of a leading question would be ‘what problems have you seen in 
the presentation of DNA evidence?’. This could have suggested to the 
interviewee that there were indeed problems, when in fact they may not 
have thought that that was the case. It could be argued that almost any 
question has the potential to lead an answer, however care was taken to 
minimise this as much as possible. 
Lastly it was necessary that the questions were clear, and gave the 
interviewees a clear idea about what was being asked, and the scope of this. 
4.8 Pilot Interview 
It was important to ensure that the interview schedule achieved its objective 
of providing a platform for the generation of data of interest and 
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usefulness.94 Whilst a ‘pre-test’ would have the objective of assessing a 
small portion of the interview (for example, a subset of questions) and a ‘pilot 
study’ would have the objective of assessing whether the whole study would 
be likely to be effective (for example, by running an entire study with limited 
numbers), the objective in this case was limited to the effectiveness of the 
interview itself, the administration of the interview, and the subsequent 
coding and analysis.95 These objectives are now detailed, along with an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the interview design in achieving these 
objectives. 
A single interviewee was identified and processed in line with the detailed 
design method. After interview the data generated were recorded, 
transcribed and coded in line with the research design. 
There were three primary objectives for the pilot interview. The first of these 
was to assess the substantial content and structure of the interview 
schedule, specifically its ability to generate the required quality and quantity 
of data within the constraints of the interview. This included an assessment 
of whether the interview had allowed the identification of new aspects of the 
research area. These could have been at a fundamental level (for example 
additional main elements of the overall structure) or detailed level (for 
example an improvement or missing question could be identified). This 
objective also included an assessment of the estimated timing required for 
the interview, and the practical flow through the individual elements of the 
interview. In fact no changes were judged to be necessary to the interview 
schedule, or to the timing and flow after the pilot interview. 
The second objective was to assess the ‘administrative’ aspects of the 
process. This included recruitment, obtaining informed consent, recording, 
transcription, data recording and storage. Although no changes were made 
to any of these after the pilot interview, one detail of the informed consent 
form was changed after a query from the seventh interviewee: the 
interviewee pointed out that although an existing element of the form was 
technically unambiguous, its meaning might not be clear to all signatories. 
The third objective was to assess whether the transcribed interviews 
provided data that was suitable for analysis by the planned method. No 
change was made to the analysis process after the pilot interview. 
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It was intended also to use data generated from the pilot interview as part of 
the overall data generated for analysis, unless for any reason (for example 
significant reworking of the schedule or method after the pilot interview) it 
was judged to be incompatible with the full study sample data generated. As 
there was no significant modifications made to the interview schedule or its 
implementation, the data generated was integrated as part of the study 
population data, with no exceptional treatment. This interview is included in 
the total of twenty-five subjects interviewed. 
4.9 The Interview Process 
Although the interview has been defined as a ‘conversation with a 
purpose’,96 it has been pointed out that any conversation in which one 
participant has an explicit or implicit script, and yet the other does not, is an 
‘extraordinary (if not unnatural)’ one.97 Indeed the interview has been likened 
more to a dramatic production, with elements of symbolic language, 
stagecraft and stage management, in the creation of a ‘social 
performance’.98 Within this representation, it may be seen that the 
interviewer cannot easily be regarded as an independent, unbiased, agent, 
and it has been argued that, therefore, however much the interviewer resists 
involvement, all interviews result in ‘interactional’ rather than ‘neutral’ 
communication flowing from interviewee to interviewer.99 
Having said this, the fact that the interview process has many symbolic 
elements, does not mean that valuable data may not be generated. As has 
been stated, ‘the primary issue is to generate data which give an authentic 
insight into people’s experiences’.100 The interviewer should act as a 
facilitator in this process, and should endeavour to ensure that the interview 
process (as well as the design, discussed earlier) does not introduce bias 
into the data.101 
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Challenges also lie at other levels. It has been suggested that interviewees 
sometimes respond to questions using well-rehearsed, culturally accepted, 
narrative constructs, rather than provide deep insights into their view.102 
Somewhat similarly, the ‘availability heuristic’ may mean that interviewees 
might erroneously assess the frequency of any particular event. The 
‘availability heuristic’ describes the psychological preference for easily 
recalled facts. For example, if a person vividly recalls an experience, then 
their assessment of that event’s frequency is irrationally large. In the same 
way, lack of experience of any particular event may mean that an 
interviewee falsely assesses that event as being less likely than it actually 
is.103 
Again, rigorous design and implementation was judged to minimise and 
contain the effect of such heuristics. For example, whereas an interviewee 
might well give a ‘rehearsed’ answer to a simple question, the interview 
schedule was designed so that, where judged necessary, open questions 
with appropriate prompts were used. Along with a rigorous interview 
technique, (for example, active listening), this meant that any superficiality 
within answers could be explored and assessed.  
Regarding other challenges, it has been pointed out that the very interview 
itself further fragments (beyond the fact that it already comprises a 
fragmented story in the interviewee’s mind, given that it can only be of finite 
length) the story in the way it is understood by the interviewee.104 
It has been suggested that a key factor in maintaining validity of, and 
minimising bias in, such studies is the strong use of relevant interview 
techniques.105 To that end, not only was care taken to remain within the 
scope of the interview schedule design, but also to be actively aware of, and 
apply best practice in such regard. This included ensuring that questions 
were asked according to the design (that is, not rephrased), and not altering 
the order of the questions.106 A number of specific guidelines were borne in 
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mind. It was important to ‘actively listen’ to responses (and to things that 
were not said), so that the interview could be steered correctly.107 Failure to 
do this, by, for example, assuming that a certain response would be 
forthcoming, would potentially have led to important missed data. It was 
important to build and maintain rapport, but at the same time not to proffer 
opinion, or to comment on, the interviewee’s response: the danger arose of 
leading the interviewee’s responses (for example by appearing to approve a 
certain response), and thereby potentially building in bias.108 Lastly it was 
important to maintain an awareness of the need to actively manage the 
overall interview process, simultaneously bearing in mind all the above 
points. As an example, it was important not to be tempted, during the 
interview, to start to think about implications or potential analytical 
constructs, at least until the interview was complete. 
It was important also to be ready to probe for further information where 
necessary, asking, as appropriate, for clarification, amplification, 
explanation, and perceived impacts, also to challenge contradictions, all 
whilst being careful to remain within the scope dictated by the interview 
schedule.109 Bias may creep into data generation through careless probing, 
or careless use of the interview schedule. A number of specific sources of 
this type of such bias have been suggested, including, altering factual 
questions, rephrasing of attitude questions, careless prompting, biased 
probes, asking questions out of sequence, or indeed poor maintenance of 
rapport with the interviewee.110 Such errors have the potential to lead to 
generation of inconsistent data, or more subtle bias, such as a differently 
worded probe question leading an interviewee to proffer an example, where 
another might not have thought so to do. As a control mechanism, it was 
borne in mind that, because the interviews were recorded, it was possible to 
make an assessment during analysis as to whether any part of the interview 
had fallen into this trap. 
The majority of interviews were carried out at the subject’s place of work. 
Although, in one case, four participants were interviewed on the same day, 
in the majority of cases a single interview took place each day. After 
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confirming the subjects’ understanding of the study, and obtaining signature 
against participants’ informed consent, the interview took place. The 
interviews were recorded, with only two exceptions. In one of these the 
environment was not conducive to recording. The second instance was the 
only interview not carried out face to face. This interview was carried out by 
videoconference, and the interviewee preferred that the interview not be 
recorded. 
In these cases, comprehensive notes were taken during the interview, 
however it should be noted that the quality of data generated during these 
two interviews was subsequently judged to be of a lower standard than for 
recorded interviews, and was processed with this in mind. 
Some additional notes were taken during and after the interviews. The main 
content of these concerned sometimes additional information submitted by 
the interviewee after the close of the recording. These were assessed 
against ethical considerations before making use of such data within 
subsequent analysis. No use of such material was made where it was 
judged that the subject had believed that the comments were outside of their 
informed consent. 
4.10 Data Analysis 
The storage and the processing of data generated from interviews had to 
take into account legal (data protection) and security considerations. The 
data were in the form of digital recordings and handwritten notes. It was 
ascertained that, having incorporated the data security recommendations of 
the University (including appropriate physical security, digital security and 
data backup steps), the study was compliant with the University Of Leeds 
Data Protection Policy, which in turn was compliant with the requirements of 
the Data Protection Act 1988.111 Digital recordings were transcribed into 
word-processed format, and handwritten notes were appended to such files. 
The names of participants were associated with code numbers in a secure 
file, and using these code numbers, anonymity of participants was 
maintained throughout. 
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It should be remembered that a transcription of a recording is necessarily 
partial, in that it does not capture surrounding data such as body language 
or the way that things are said.112 In many other ways, too, it is simply one 
interpretation of the interview. For example a transcriber makes a judgment 
as to how to represent pauses, punctuation, non-language utterances (such 
as ‘errr’ or ‘um’), the placement of paragraphs, and how to treat 
incomprehensible words.113 
The first interview was transcribed by the researcher, however the time 
taken to do this was considerable, given that very high accuracy was 
required. In light of this, subsequent interviews were transcribed by a 
professional service. The specific professional service was chosen for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the transcriber had worked previously within the police 
service. This meant that they were already familiar with common acronyms 
mentioned by the interviewees. They also understood that the content of the 
interviews may be occasionally distressing, and also the necessity of 
confidentiality. Secondly, the accuracy of the transcripts was confirmed by 
the researcher after the first three transcripts had been checked. 
Transcription was done under signed confidentiality agreement, and all data 
held by the service were subsequently destroyed. 
Regarding the accuracy of the transcripts, and the question of how the 
transcripts interpreted the recorded interviews, approximately fifty percent of 
the transcripts were listened to during the analysis whilst reading the 
transcripts. A very high degree of accuracy was determined regarding the 
capturing of recorded words within the transcriptions (in fact no errors were 
detected – the transcriber had flagged any passages which they deemed 
uncertain). In addition, it was judged that the layout and style of the 
transcription (including representations of non-language sounds) provided 
an acceptable realisation of the recorded interviews, and sufficient for 
analysis. Due to the professional nature of the interviewees, and the 
professional environment, it was judged that no additional value could have 
been achieved through any type of textual or other meta-analysis. Within the 
findings chapters, interviewee quotations are reproduced exactly as 
recorded, without any ‘neatening’ correction of grammar. Punctuation 
designates the transcriber’s and researcher’s perception of the flow of the 
recorded interviewee verbal responses. 
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It must be recognised that analysis did not start at the point at which all the 
data had been generated. Rather, it had to be recognised that analytical 
thinking informed the whole of the study.114 For example, during the design 
of the research instrument (the interview schedule), the analytical 
implications of, for example, the scope of the questions asked, had to be 
considered. Similarly, the analysis itself, whilst linear in principle (for 
example, sorting then analysing), in practice happened, to a degree, in 
parallel. A number of aspects of the analysis must therefore be regarded as 
having been both iterative and, at the same time, simultaneous.  
Analysis of collected textual data allows the significance and meaning of the 
information contained within the collected data to be elicited, through a 
process of abstraction and interpretation.115 This overall process has been 
described in terms of starting with data in the form of: 
… a ‘seamless sequence… (which) we ourselves must cut 
the bits of the puzzle… in ways which correspond with the 
separate facets of the social reality we are investigating, but 
will also allow us to pull them together again to produce an 
overall picture.116 
Before describing the specific analysis approach used, it is worth underlining 
the over-riding basis, and objectives of the analysis. Three modes of 
analysis have been described in terms of organizing and analyzing data: 
literal (substantive), interpretative and reflexive.117 Following this approach, 
the approach taken in this study was to initially assess the data from a direct 
(literal) point of view (that is, what was actually said), but at the same time to 
take an interpretative view, where, for example, common themes repeating 
could indicate a particular area of issue. It was also important to regularly 
take the ‘reflexive’ view, in which consideration was given to the relative 
positions of the researcher, interviewee and the generated data, in order to 
be sure that pre-conceptions did not introduce bias into the analysis, and to 
identify any indirect patterns.118 This reflexive analysis was critically 
important in the analysis of the data and conclusions made: in an interview 
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many things may become apparent but may be unsaid. An example of this 
(discussed in detail in the findings and discussion chapters) was an apparent 
distrust by a number of experts regarding the ‘opposing’ expert. 
A number of different specific objectives have been described in qualitative 
analysis. In this study these objectives could be best described as 
‘contextual’ in that a description of participants’ experiences were to be 
captured, ‘explanatory’ in that explanations for behaviours and other events 
were to be proposed where possible, and ‘evaluative’ in that it was sought to 
evaluate how effectively, in this case, DNA evidence was presented in 
court.119 An important point that was borne in mind throughout the analysis 
was that the danger of bias was not restricted to the creation of the interview 
schedule and interview process. It remained of importance throughout the 
analysis. It was critical that conclusions reached were shown to be valid, and 
objective, and not falling into the trap of building a pre-conceived case using 
convenient evidence. 
A number of different analysis traditions have been described in qualitative 
research.120 A description of the approach used in this study would be 
‘thematic analysis’ in which patterns in the data are first identified, indexed 
and sorted, and then abstraction and interpretation is carried out. These are 
distinct processes, although, as mentioned above, may happen 
simultaneously in practice.121 
For both the processes of identifying and sorting, and then interpreting data, 
labels must be created. These have variously been referred to as ‘labels’, 
‘themes’, ‘categories’ and ‘codes’. In this study no distinction is made 
between these different concepts, and the term ‘code’ is used to signify 
headings of data. To be specific, a ‘code’ has been defined as a ‘short word 
or phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing 
and/ or evocative attribute for a portion of language based… data’122, in 
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other words classifying things that seem alike together. Similarly, the 
process of applying code to the data may be referred to as ‘coding’ or 
‘indexing’. The term ‘coding’ is used during this discussion, as it has a wider 
implication than ‘indexing’. 
QSR International NVivo10 software was used to assist with both indexing 
and interpretation phases of the analysis. This enabled flexible, consistent 
and reproducible coding, indexing, searching and cross-referencing. 
A truly ‘constructive’ approach to coding would have meant that themes and 
concepts, and then descriptive codes could only be created from the data 
set, and need not pre-exist,123 however it was acknowledged that the 
research design itself, informed by the research questions, already 
suggested key themes of interest, and therefore codes. Examples of codes 
pre-created on this basis before commencement of analysis were 
‘Adversarial’, ‘Disclosure’ and ‘Pre-trial Conference’. 
Broad approaches to coding the data include ‘categorical’, ‘cross-sectional’ 
and ‘non-cross-sectional’ coding.124 Firstly, data were coded from a 
categorical perspective using the predefined codes described above. This 
included many central research questions (for example, as noted above 
‘Pre-trial Conference’). Secondly (and in practice largely in parallel), cross-
sectional coding was carried out, this time coding for themes cutting across 
areas (for example ‘Fragmentation and Dysfunction’, and ‘Don’t trust other 
side’). Many themes required new codes to be created as they arose, and 
analysis included splitting, redefinition and merging of codes as the analysis 
progressed. Lastly (and again, somewhat in parallel), data were coded from 
a non-cross-sectional perspective. This applied to specific and usually 
unpredictable data that sometimes arose, for example, data regarding a 
specific case, or comments regarding an exceptional policy. This type of 
data was neither categorical nor cross-sectional, and always required a new 
code to be created. An example of this was ‘New New Paradigm’ (briefly an 
unexpected reaction to some recent legal rulings). Usefully, descriptions 
were produced for each coding ‘node’ (referred to as ‘memos’ in NVivo). It 
was discovered that it was easy to allow the meaning and scope of nodes to 
‘drift’, particularly those with significant, yet not well-defined meanings, and 
this process controlled such drift. Such descriptions allowed close fit of the 
codes with the data. These descriptions were regularly refined (but not 
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changed), however this regularly meant that codes needed to be split or 
merged to maintain cohesion and close association between the data and 
the coding. 
A number of criticisms of computer-aided analysis have been made, 
including the suggestion that the software may dictate or at least limit the 
approach taken to analysis.125 Of course no software package is capable of 
actually performing data analysis of itself, despite the availability of 
‘automatic-coding’ tools within the software,126 and the use of software 
cannot, of itself, ensure rigour of analysis, or sound interpretation.127 
However, critics have claimed that computers may lead to the 
‘mechanisation’ of the analytic process, making it similar to a quantitative 
approach.128 More subtly, it has been suggested also that bias may be 
introduced by the software itself, for example in the way it presents different 
types of information, or the way in which the researcher uses the software, 
for example, simpler routines may be preferred over more complex 
routines.129 
These risks were mitigated, firstly, by ensuring that the methodological 
details of the study were fully elucidated before considering how software 
would or could be used to assist with the analysis. Secondly, it was ensured 
that the researcher was very familiar indeed with the use of the software, by 
the study of a method-free instruction manual,130 and practice upon sample 
data. Lastly, it should be stated that an important overall mitigation was 
simply to be aware of the potential limitations just discussed and, throughout 
the analysis, to regularly reflect upon the use of the tool and the ongoing 
analysis. 
In practice, it was judged that substantial advantage could be gained by the 
use of the software, allowing both closeness to, and distance from, the data 
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as appropriate, allowing the researcher to remain rooted in the data. Despite 
the potential weaknesses described above, it was judged that the practical 
tools allowed by computer-assisted analysis vastly increased the rigour of 
analysis compared to manual methods. Specifically, NVivo allowed highly 
flexible coding, which was able to cope with multiple layers of code (this was 
a significant advantage, as many passages were relevant to multiple, 
overlapping and non-overlapping themes); it was able to support dynamic 
merging and splitting of codes; it allowed easy search, where, for example, it 
was desired to find a previously analysed passage; it was able to support 
production of graphics aimed at understanding the linkage between ideas; it 
was able to flexibly capture text around coded areas, in order to ensure that 
passages were not taken out of context; it was able to organise and store 
complete data and the basis of analysis, allowing transparency, in that such 
information potentially remained open and accessible after the study (subject 
to data protection requirements).  
4.11 Ethical Issues 
Research ethics inform all types of research, and ethical principles should be 
taken into account at all stages of any research study. Ethics is ‘a generic 
term for various ways of understanding and examining the moral life’.131 
Ethical principles include concepts such as moral right and wrong, fairness 
and justice, and offer norms against which actions or intended actions may 
be compared. The philosophical basis of ethics includes principles properly 
within the realms of philosophy, however within any individual area, 
researchers are supported by existing and accepted best practices and 
accepted codes of practice, supported by appropriate regulation. 
Most academic legal research remains text-based,132 and the ‘Law in the 
Real World’ report in 2006 by the Nuffield Foundation pointed out that whilst 
the law was becoming more important in day to day life, there was a 
decreasing ability to keep it under empirical examination.133 In addition legal 
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academics do not generally receive training in empirical studies.134 Perhaps 
for these reasons, the development of an accepted ethical approach within 
legal empirical studies has lagged behind that of scientific research, where 
ethical principles, processes and regulation are highly developed. 
Whilst empirical research undertaken under the auspices of any academic 
institution must be approved through an ethical review process, it is 
important that this is not simply regarded as a ‘gate’, through which, after 
passing through, the researcher gives no more consideration to ethical 
issues. Rather, ethical issues must be taken into account right from the initial 
planning of the research project, through design to reporting and after.135 
Ethics should therefore inform the entirety of the project. 
Ethical responsibilities to society, the research community, colleagues and 
participants, were of fundamental importance to this study and on that basis 
these responsibilities were analysed and actions taken to ensure that this 
study was compliant with relevant ethical and mandatory requirements. 
A basic primary assumption was made that it was ethical to carry out 
research on the judicial process, by view of the precedent set by similar 
studies. Relevant ethical considerations were identified and prioritised. 
Ethical issues dictated by law took precedence, for example obligations 
under data protection legislation. University of Leeds, and School of Law 
ethical requirements took precedence after the above. Subsidiary to these 
mandatory requirements, best practices were identified. The considerations 
so identified were incorporated and tested during all stages of the research, 
taking place as a parallel activity to research study methodological design 
and implementation, with continuous assessment as to ethical compliance. 
Ethical risks, that is to say, events that were possible, but not certain, but 
may have had ethical implications, were identified, and if assessed as of 
high impact and/ or probability were planned for within the method. A 
hypothetical example would have been if an interviewee had identified an 
unreported criminal act. In the event no such event arose. Even if not directly 
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legally applicable, equality legislation was taken account of at all stages of 
the study. 
Regarding legal requirements, it was ascertained that, having incorporated 
the data security recommendations of the University, the study was 
compliant with the University Of Leeds Data Protection Policy,136 which, in 
turn, was compliant with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 
1988.137 
University of Leeds guidelines were applied in determining ethical issues 
within the study.138 It was ascertained that, because the study did not 
contain any high risk ethical issues, then the University of Leeds light touch 
ethical review process was applicable. An application was made on 8th April 
2011, and approval was granted on 18th April 2011. 
A number of sources of best practice were identified, including ‘Code of 
Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology’, (February 2006), 
published by the British Society of Criminology,139 ‘Ethical Guidelines’, 
(December 2003) published by the Social Research Association,140 
‘Statement Of Principles Of Ethical Research Practice’, (January 2009), 
published by UK Socio-Legal Studies Association,141 and the ‘Framework for 
Research Ethics (FRE)’, (2009), published by the Economic & Social 
Research Council (ESRC).142 
A number of specific considerations were drawn from the above guidelines 
and taken into account in the study. Firstly, general responsibilities towards 
advancement of knowledge in the field, and the integrity thereof.143 
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Secondly, responsibilities to ensure the physical, social and psychological 
well-being of participants and their interests, sensitivity and privacy.144 
Thirdly, responsibility to ensure anonymity and, where applicable, 
confidentiality and to protect identities.145 Fourthly, responsibility to ensure 
freely given informed consent, to ensure that participants understood their 
right to withdraw at any stage from the research without reason given or 
penalty, and to ensure that participants understood the extent of anonymity 
and confidentiality.146 
4.12 Informed Consent 
Information sheets and consent forms were produced based on University of 
Leeds guidelines and templates.147 These documents may be examined at 
Appendix A. Participating (and potentially participating) interviewees were 
given information sheets before the day of the interview detailing the 
objectives of the research, expectations regarding the interview process 
itself, the processing of the data generated, and the uses to which it would 
be put. The information sheet also informed participants that their 
participation in the research would remain confidential, and any opinions 
quoted would be anonymous. They were also made aware of the fact, 
however, that it might be possible to identify their contribution at a later stage 
where their particular opinion was well known within the expert community. 
(It should be noted also that during the process of writing up the findings, 
diligence was maintained to ensure that the content of quotes could not have 
led to identification of the interviewee, for example where it contained 
reference to a situation or case). Participants were made aware of the fact 
that they could withdraw from the interview process, or at any stage before 
submission of the final thesis, upon which any data generated from their 
interview would be deleted. 
Participants were asked to initial to confirm their understanding of the 
information sheet detailing the above considerations, that they could ask 
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questions, that they were willing to participate on that basis, that they agreed 
that an audio recording was made of the interview, and that the data 
collected were analysed and used as part of the final research publication. 
One copy of the information and consent form was left with the interviewee 
after the interview, and another retained by the researcher. This was filed 
and stored in a locked cabinet. 
Regarding other ethical issues, consideration was given to the possibility 
that interviewees may feel pressured in some way to agree to all the terms 
of research involvement. This risk was mitigated in two ways. Firstly, 
potential interviewees were supplied with the information sheet and consent 
form before the day of the interview, and asked to read the information: it 
was assumed that this would give the interviewee ample opportunity to 
formulate queries as to their involvement, or withdraw their involvement. 
Secondly it was known that all interviewees were trained experts 
experienced in asserting their views in court. It was therefore judged unlikely 
that they would have been willing to be involved unless completely willing. 
4.13 Conclusions 
As described above, the concept of ‘validity’ within qualitative studies has 
been widely debated. From a methodological point of view, the objective in 
this study was to develop and apply a methodology and detailed study 
design that would accurately reflect the reality studied. This chapter has 
described the theoretical foundations of the methodology chosen, as well as 
the design considerations at each stage of the design development process 
required to achieve the methodological objectives. 
The chapter has also described how these theoretical foundations have 
informed all aspects of the fieldwork itself, from recruitment through to the 
practical implementation of the interviews themselves. It has further 
described implications of these principles for processing and analysis of the 
data generated. 
Finally, it has described ethical issues informing methodological and detailed 
design development, and shown how the study has identified and addressed 
such issues. 
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Chapter 5 
The Unbiased Expert 
5.1 Introduction 
Most concerns regarding scientific evidence in court centre on claimed 
detrimental effects of the adversarial system.1 The critical danger has 
generally been held to be bias on the part of the expert in favour of the party 
who instructed them.2 This chapter examines this issue from the perspective 
of the experts themselves. 
The study examined the basic assumption that experts had the intention of 
remaining unbiased, and investigated interviewees’ perceptions as to how 
the adversarial system impacted upon that intention. The study also 
addressed whether, and how, experts attempted to counter any adverse 
pressures upon them in this regard, and how effective any such measures 
were perceived to be. Significant to these questions were exactly what 
interviewees understood to be the meaning of, and obligations relating to, 
their responsibility of remaining ‘unbiased’. 
Whilst experts should remain unbiased, and not obliged to the person 
instructing them, they are (unless appointed by the court as a joint expert), 
nevertheless, instructed by either prosecution or defence. For clarity and 
brevity in the following findings and discussion, experts are referred to 
simply as ‘prosecution experts’ and ‘defence experts’. Most interviewees 
who had worked with the Forensic Science Service (‘FSS’), or were working 
with the police, only had experience of working from the prosecution point of 
view, although in some cases they now worked within consultancies with a 
mixed load of defence and prosecution instructed work. Despite this, and as 
detailed below, two clear and distinct ‘schools’ were recognised, with few, if 
any, experts setting out from a point of true ‘neutrality’ between prosecution 
and defence, in terms of background or workload. 
It was not felt to be an over-generalisation to state that prosecution and 
defence ‘schools’ each conformed to commonly held experiences and 
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perceptions. Additionally, they each held strong views about the other. 
Examination, therefore, of each of these viewpoints, gave valuable insights 
into the potential pressures within each school for association with, and bias 
towards, that party’s perspective. 
This chapter first reports the very different roles in which prosecution and 
defence experts found themselves. It describes a ‘schizophrenia’ reported by 
prosecution experts in moving from the investigation phase to the trial 
phase, and the pressures that they felt for association with the prosecution 
within the trial. The chapter moves on to report the viewpoint of defence 
experts, and the interplay between prosecution and defence in the judicial 
process. Importantly, the chapter examines whether there was any evidence 
for biased behaviour on the part of experts, and what experts understood the 
meaning of ‘unbiased’ to be, in practice. 
5.2 Prosecution and Defence Expert Roles 
Not only do prosecution and defence come from different ‘schools’, but, have 
significantly different roles within the judicial process. It is important to 
understand the practical differences between these roles, as each provides 
the context from which the respective experts’ responsibility to give objective 
and unbiased opinion arises. In principle, the objective of the prosecution is 
to build a case that shows guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the objective 
of the defence is to cast reasonable doubt upon that. From the point of view 
of DNA evidence, interviewees stated that the fact of a simple match was 
rarely disputed, the case revolving around explanations for the crime-scene 
sample being present. 
Int7: DNA is still seen as the Holy Grail if you like, because if 
you have got a full DNA profile it is incredibly powerful… The 
prosecution’s case is hinging on the fact that it came from 
him. From a defence point of view (what we are) looking at 
(is) what does that DNA actually mean, and is it pivotal to my 
case, or is it actually inconsequential?… the defence… 
acknowledge it came from him, what we want to know is 
what does it actually mean? 
The prosecution expert generally became involved early in the investigative 
process: 
Int7: You are working alongside the police, very much a part 
of the police team and looking at the investigation as a 
whole… You quickly identify somebody, they are charged, 
that work is done urgently, so you are working to very tight 
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timescales, quick results… then obviously the CPS system 
kicks in, things are slowed down. 
Prosecution interviewees described significant delay before any appearance 
in court, with various other activities continuing: 
Int19: (After I write my statement) I will hear nothing for ages 
and ages then probably just before the case I will then get 
notified that Joe Bloggs wants to come and do a defence 
examination… they (opposing counsel) might disclose the 
report to you because the prosecution or defence are now 
contesting some element… they might ask you to produce 
another statement, which, sometimes you do, answering 
some of the questions (this sometimes requires additional 
forensic tests). 
It should be noted that ‘defence examination’ referred to an apparently 
standard procedure in which, as part of a disclosure requirement, the 
defence expert met with the prosecution expert to view the evidence and ask 
questions about it. This was distinct from any pre-trial discussion, whose 
intention was to identify issues at dispute. 
Interviewees stated that there was a high attrition rate during this entire 
process, so that, often, they simply did not hear any more about a case after 
a certain point. They assumed this was because the CPS had decided not to 
proceed, or because there had been a guilty plea: 
Int10: But there are quite a lot of cases that you deal with 
and you write a statement, and it disappears and you never 
see it again and you don’t know what has happened. 
Interviewees were generally describing serious crime: in the case of, for 
example, burglary, or vehicle crime, they were not involved. In these cases, 
DNA samples were collected by scene of crime officers, who submitted 
these to a private or police laboratory. If a match was obtained, then this was 
passed to the investigating officer and, if necessary, to the CPS. Forensic 
experts were not generally involved in these routine DNA tests. 
If the impression was given above that the prosecution expert was at the 
heart of the development of the case, then this was far from their reported 
experience. Whilst this may have been the situation in high profile and/ or 
cold cases, experts in general reported an ongoing lack of information, for 
example of why a particular sample was ordered for testing (for example, a 
number of experts commented that DNA tests are sometimes, indeed often, 
ordered when the activity is not denied by the defendant, and a DNA result 
therefore meaningless), what the circumstances surrounding the sample 
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were, and what related evidence there was. An example given of the latter 
was where an expert had provided evidence that DNA from the scene 
matched that of a suspect. The expert was not given, or asked to comment 
on, additional evidence in the form of a blood spatter pattern, which pointed 
against the suspect’s account of events. 
Defence experts reported being involved in a very different way. Although, 
again, in high profile cases they may have been involved significantly in the 
development of the defence case (sometimes, but infrequently, carrying out 
additional forensic work), most experts reported that they were typically 
engaged by the defendant’s solicitor, at the stage where the solicitor 
understood that the prosecution intended to adduce forensic evidence. At 
this stage the expert was typically asked to answer questions on the DNA 
evidence. As reported in Chapter Six, defence experts reported being called 
to give evidence very seldom within the trial itself (often, they deduced, 
because their evidence was not incompatible with the prosecution case), 
but, rather, assisted counsel in their cross-examination of the prosecution 
expert. 
Interviewees were asked about pressures that they perceived might 
compromise their duty of remaining unbiased. Without exception, all 
interviewees stated that this duty was fundamental to them, and whilst there 
were pressures, they felt that they were able to overcome them: 
Int15: I would say without exception people go about their 
work trying to be clear and unbiased in the way they carry 
out their work. 
The nature of these pressures, and, perhaps more importantly, the meaning 
that interviewees put to acting in an unbiased way are discussed below. 
In summary, expert responsibility to offer objective and unbiased advice can 
only be understood in the context of the role played by that expert in the 
judicial process. The roles of prosecution and defence experts are not only 
very different, but evolve in different ways throughout the process. 
5.3 Changing Role of Prosecution Expert 
One particular pressure that was mentioned was the changing role, 
throughout the case, on the part of prosecution scientists. A number of 
interviewees used the term ‘schizophrenic’ to describe their feelings on 
moving from the investigation to the prosecution phase: 
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Int19: Well, you’ve got schizophrenia as a DNA expert… 
instructed by the Crown. For quite a while in a (bigger) case, 
you may be working alongside investigators helping direct, 
helping build cases and helping identify a particular suspect. 
At the moment that person is kind of charged and goes for 
trial you are supposed to take that cap off and put this other 
cap on which just says neutral servant of the court, with no 
vested interest one way or the other. 
Int21: … this is where I say it is schizophrenic, because the 
client switches, it might be police there and court there. So 
as an expert witness my primary duty is to the court, but 
prior to it going to court, my primary duty might be to assist 
an investigation, with technical expertise, scientific expertise, 
conversations, whatever it happens to be. 
Experts described these two stages as the ‘investigative’ stage (when no-
one had been charged), and the ‘evaluative’ stage (when there had been a 
charge, and the expert was assessing the forensic evidence from the 
prosecution and defence points of view prior to trial). Interviewees stated 
that their duty to be unbiased arose when the evaluative stage commenced, 
although this line was not always clear: 
Int22: I mean obviously the scientist has to decide at any 
point whether what they are doing is helping with the 
investigation or helping with the evaluation and they are very 
different roles. Investigation, you are trying to help direct, but 
once you have moved away from that… . 
In summary, one particular challenge for prosecution experts was their 
changing role from investigation to evaluation and trial, and the different 
duties associated with each. 
5.4 Pressures for Bias towards Prosecution 
In principle, the line between investigation and evaluation/ prosecution may 
have been a simple one: after all, the suspect has been prosecuted. The 
question arose, however, as to whether experts felt that they were able to 
overcome the ‘schizophrenia’, described above, in order to be of objective 
and unbiased assistant to the court. 
By way of definition, once a prosecution has occurred, the prosecution 
expert identifies, and is associated, with the prosecution, because it is by 
them that they have been consulted, with a view to building a prosecution 
case (indeed, they have probably already been associated with the case 
during investigation). The question arises, however, as to whether the 
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expert’s position may be biased, that is ‘unduly or improperly influenced or 
inclined’.  
Comments from some interviewees clearly indicated an unbiased approach 
at the evaluative, pre-trial stage: 
Int7: … defence’s right is… to comment… right before the 
trial and that is when you then need to look at it, because 
they might be able to explain the evidence. 
However, other comments did, at least, suggest that they might be pre-
disposed to favour the prosecution case: 
Int11: Because especially in cold cases you may have a 
piece of evidence that you think broke or solved the case 
and then you might spend a year or two years trying to find 
things that will block off any defence avenues. 
Int14: … you don’t want to cause anybody (the prosecution) 
any problems. 
These potential conflicts applied also to the defence-appointed expert, 
however, given that the defence expert was involved in the process in a 
different way, it might be reasonable to assume that the effect was different. 
This assumption is examined separately below. 
Interviewees suggested that they were subject to a number of forms of 
adversarial pressure. Firstly, most interviewees recognised the significant 
effect that cognitive biases of various types may have had: 
Int6: There is a natural desire to please the people that you 
are working for, that I think people have. You are working as 
part of a team and you want to do as well as you can in your 
job. It is odd because you are working as part of this team 
but you are not really, you are actually an independent. And 
so I think there can be quite easily a subconscious bias that 
can sometimes creep in to any of us. What we do, our peer 
review, the way we write our statements, the way we 
consider everything should combat that, and telling yourself 
time and time again that you are an impartial witness. But I 
think it does need to be constantly drummed into us rather 
than assume that it will be. 
Secondly, many interviewees mentioned a significant source of bias in the 
system in that they were largely asked questions that would support the 
prosecution case: 
Int10: … the majority of the time we are being commissioned 
by the police, and the aim of the police at the end of the day 
is usually a prosecution, is a successful outcome as far as 
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the police are concerned. The police obviously in quite a lot 
of cases they have got a certain amount of information 
related to an individual, and you know either the scientific 
evidence is there or it is not. We can’t make it but you 
know… very often in their minds a particular person is quite 
likely to be involved, so they are looking for the scientific 
evidence that links that person. So in some ways it is biased 
because you have got that person’s clothing, so you are 
looking for the evidence, you are not looking on the clothing 
of all the other people in the country, you are looking on the 
clothing the person whom the police suspect. 
Several interviewees gave examples of cases in which selective testing 
requested by the police could be justified only as a means of building a 
specific case, and was not justified scientifically. For example, Int22 
mentioned a case in which the police wished to eliminate two suspects from 
a pool of three. They therefore commissioned DNA tests on samples from 
the two which eliminated them from enquiries. A later DNA test also 
eliminated the remaining, previously untested, suspect. 
Lastly, one ex-FSS expert with extensive experience as prosecution expert, 
but who now worked predominantly on defence cases made an interesting 
comment: 
Int22: … my role in working for the defence (is to) make sure 
that however good or bad the case is, or your opinion, if you 
have one, of the defendant or the victim or anyone, is that 
the science has been done properly and has been presented 
properly. 
Although not entirely encapsulated within the quote itself, the implication 
made by the interviewee was that they felt discomfort working for the 
defence in a case where the defendant was accused of a particularly bad 
crime. This was not a concern mentioned by any experts whose background 
was routinely defence work. This arguably supports the proposition, 
discussed below, that the cultures of prosecution and defence experts were 
very distinct and ingrained. 
In summary, prosecution experts identified sources of pressure for bias upon 
them to be the nature of the adversarial system itself (in only being asked to 
build evidence to support the prosecution case), various cognitive biases, 
and, on the part of one interviewee, an indication that the seriousness of the 
alleged crime was a pressure on the responsibility to be objective.  
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5.5 Adversarial Experts 
Naturally, experts instructed by prosecution and defence are instructed to 
help counsel build their respective cases. On that basis the experts are part 
of opposing sides. The question arises, however, as to the degree to which 
the experts themselves are ‘opposing’, that is, does the expert see the ‘other 
expert as an opponent, or as another independent expert with whom they 
may work together to identify facts at issue, and the conclusions that may be 
drawn from the evidence. This is examined in this section. 
Prosecution experts expressed frustration at the lack of a timely defence 
version of events. It should be remembered that lacking this, it was difficult 
to interpret results and create a report, because they did not know what 
question they were supposed to be answering. Interviewees stated, 
variously, that they were not given a defence version of events by 
investigators, and they were not updated by investigators where new 
information emerged, for example, at interview. Some experts said that they 
often only received this information upon demand. Further, although they 
recognised that defence experts (if one were appointed) were engaged 
typically just before trial, necessitating late exchange of information, they 
complained at being given either no defence version, or a changing defence 
version, even up until the court appearance. 
Int13: The defence scenario isn’t always, you often have 
very little information about what is happening with the 
defence, they are kind of keeping it close to their chest. 
Int7: … the defence make no comment interviews until a few 
days before the trial… you are working blind almost…. 
Defence’s right is to either make no comment or not to 
comment until right before the trial and that is when you then 
need to look at it, because they might be able to explain the 
evidence. 
However, comments from a number of interviewees regarding the interplay 
between prosecution and defence before trial, arguably suggested some 
‘adversarialism’ between experts. Specifically, they suggested that the 
defence not only provided late, and changing, innocent versions of events, 
but also ‘expert-shopped’ and did not disclose adverse expert opinion: 
Int19: If you don’t hear anything you pretty well know that the 
other expert has probably agreed with you and it has gone 
straight into the shredder they are never going to disclose 
it…. If experts are not partisan, right, and you choose to 
have an expert, my view is… you have to accept their 
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decision whether it helps you or not. And you should 
disclose that to prevent expert shopping: I don’t like your 
report, I’ll get that guy over there to come because he has 
been a bit more plastic in the past… When I floated that one 
at [UK Name] University (to the ‘legal beagles’) they nearly 
lynched me. 
It should be added, however, that such comments seemed predominantly, 
but not exclusively, directed at defence counsel, rather than the expert 
themselves. 
This desire for a ‘level playing field’ might seem reasonable in an adversarial 
contest, however it is hard to reconcile with the concept of remaining 
unbiased or neutrality. 
Int22: It is my opinion and always was that if the defence 
were to actually provide their alternative to the prosecution 
scientist, then they would consider it because they are 
looking for an alternative and if someone gives you one then 
of course you’ll use it and so it would actually speed things 
up. But I can see the reasons why it doesn’t happen… . Lack 
of trust because they see the scientist as the prosecution 
scientist. 
Having said that, interviewees did recognise that prosecution and defence 
experts’ necessary roles did restrict their actions. For example, it was 
suggested by a defence expert that it was not the responsibility of the 
prosecution to feed the defence with alternative innocent versions of events: 
Int17: … but (the prosecution expert) won’t ever pursue 
other alternatives and say if this happened that might be 
likely, if that happened that might be likely… . Which is fair 
enough I guess because otherwise you will just spend all 
day theorising options of how it could have happened. And 
one could argue giving options to the defence to say, you 
know if this happened… , then they will come back: oh that 
is exactly what happened… . 
In summary, interviewees expressed a general acceptance of the fact that 
prosecution and defence experts fulfilled different roles that constrained their 
actions. Prosecution experts bemoaned what they perceived as ‘slippery’ 
behaviour by the defence (for example, in terms of late, changing counter 
versions of events). 
5.6 Evidence of Bias towards the Prosecution 
Despite the experts’ general acceptance that potential for bias existed in the 
system, both in terms of cognitive biases and biases inherent under 
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adversarial control, in general, experts stated that they were largely able to 
act in a neutral and unbiased way within the constraints of that system. Yet, 
the language used by the interviewees sometimes suggested an implicit 
bias. Some examples are reproduced and discussed below:3 
Int9: … it is important to speak to the barrister beforehand 
because you don’t want (him) to think (why) am I saying 
this now, and this is really going to annoy him because 
he has got some strategy for leaving that out. 
Int24: And then they want… to clarify what they can and 
can’t ask, what you are likely to say. Any areas of what they 
would see as danger because clearly we are speaking for 
the prosecution. 
Int3: … that is a weak link in our case, we need to tighten 
that up before we go to court… and it may be at that stage 
in the conference you only become aware that that is 
actually a weak area that hasn’t been addressed. And it may 
be something as simple as we need such and such an item 
examining as well as what we have already done, and that 
then secures that weak link because what you don’t want 
is a case falling apart once you are in court. 
Int3: Definitely, I have definitely had cases where the 
wheel has wobbled. 
Int3: And basically what you do is you sit behind the 
barrister, whichever side you are batting for… 
Int14: You might have a bit of a chat with the defence 
scientist although there tends to be a bit of reticence (on the 
part of the prosecution counsel)… they don’t like you doing 
(it, and) you don’t want to cause anybody (the 
prosecution) any problems. 
Int9: (Counsel) need to make sure that I am not going to 
say anything that (they) are not expecting. 
Contrary to the judgment in R v Ward4 regarding expert neutrality, the above 
comments do, prima facie suggest that some experts believed that part of 
their role was to ‘help the police’. 
Disclosure of scientific evidence generally took place during a defence 
examination, during which the defence expert visited the prosecution expert 
to carry out an examination of the evidence. This is discussed in detail in the 
                                            
3 Bold emphases added. 
4 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619 [53] – [54]. 
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next chapter (6.3 Pre-trial Discussions), however, given the conflicting 
guidelines upon the expert, mentioned in the literature review (2.9 The 
Expert, Unbiased, Impartial, Objective or Independent?), it was perhaps 
unsurprising that some prosecution experts expressed caution regarding this 
meeting, especially regarding what they could divulge. Some stated that they 
needed to, for example, check with the CPS that the meeting could take 
place, or that certain exhibits could be released. Some rationalised this in 
terms of the evidence ‘belonging’ to the Crown. 
Certainly, some descriptions suggested that the prosecution expert at least 
leant towards the prosecution case: 
Int25: A colleague was just saying they had a defence expert 
here last week who has taken a bunch of additional samples 
and she said she was going to… notify the CPS… He had 
sort of agreed they weren’t of much use but… requested that 
they be taken because then they would show that there was 
an absence in other areas. But absence doesn’t necessarily 
mean that it is not there. … reminded her to check the 
statement or report if it comes out and what is challenged in 
court because the wrong meaning can totally be put in front 
of the jury. 
That is to say, the defence expert had alerted the prosecution expert to a 
tactic that the defence may use, and that the prosecution expert thought to 
be illegitimate. The expert was to warn the CPS about this and flag this tactic 
should it appear in a defence statement. 
Certainly, interviewees were clear that their role during any defence 
examination was to provide information that was disclosable, but not to 
‘assist’. 
When asked whether the expert would volunteer information to the defence 
expert, if the prosecution expert thought they had missed something, a 
typical response was: 
Int11: There is no duty to you to raise it to the defence 
because there is already a duty on you to raise it to the 
court, if you find something that actually changes what you 
thought originally… you should write another statement… . 
When they turn up… . There are certain things that are 
disclosable and certain things that aren’t disclosable. 
In summary, despite the fact that prosecution experts stated the importance 
of an unbiased position, there were a significant number of comments that 
suggested a partisan association, and ‘adversarialism’ between experts from 
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an early stage. Certainly, some comments suggested that the expert was 
‘out to win’ for their side. 
5.7 The Defence Experts’ View 
The experience of the defence expert in terms of their instructions was that 
they were required to act in a number of possible different ways, for example 
for ad hoc advice, for further forensic work or analysis, for development of 
defence case or ultimate appearance in court, either to take the stand or to 
act as advisor to defence counsel in court. However, defence experts also 
stated that frequently they would issue a report and hear nothing more about 
the case. This may be assumed to be similar to the experience of 
prosecution experts, who may have correctly assumed that the case had 
been otherwise disposed of. However, with defence experts the general 
supposition was that their evidence was not favourable to the defence and 
therefore had not been used, or disclosed. 
Int4: Yea, what I do find, we sometimes write statements 
when our evidence would be stronger for the prosecution 
than the prosecution evidence has been and that doesn’t get 
disclosed. We write the report and send the report and I 
know that doesn’t get to the prosecution for obvious 
reasons. 
Int7 mentioned a case in which during a pre-trial meeting, a defence expert 
suggested to the prosecution expert that the prosecution evidence was 
stronger than that expert had suggested: 
Int7: … as soon as he told his barrister that, he wasn’t seen 
in the courtroom again, he just disappeared. Yea, generally 
if you agree with the prosecution scientist as a defence 
scientist then you are nowhere near the court. 
Unlike the prosecution expert, whose evidence was adduced in support of a 
case that must have been showed to be beyond reasonable doubt, the 
defence expert’s role was simply to cast doubt upon that case. In some 
cases, experts described this in mirror image terms to that of the 
prosecution, proposing other explanations and sometimes commissioning 
new forensic tests, however in others, experts described simply trying to find 
gaps in the prosecution evidence: 
Int23: … for the defence they don’t have to come up with a 
coherent defence do they, and also they can run a couple of 
different ones together… . So when I write my statements I 
do point out… even a full profile is not a unique identifier. … 
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it may be a very remote possibility but there is a possibility of 
contamination and mix up… (at) times they say well we all 
know he is as guilty as hell but we have still got to just go 
with what he says… . But there is always something… (the) 
DNA profile (could have come from) saliva or something like 
that… . I put a lot of research papers in my statements to 
back up what little we do know… . I did have… an armed 
robbery… they’d sent a few latex gloves… it could be a 
glove he had worn elsewhere, somebody else had used at 
the crime, somebody else had left in the car, all that sort of 
thing… . 
One interviewee rationalised this type of conflict by saying that unbiased 
meant to them offering the defendant a fair trial, by balancing the uneven 
playing field that was in favour of the prosecution. However, such 
persistence as demonstrated by the defence expert above, in the face of 
admitted strong adverse DNA evidence, did support the prosecution vision of 
the defence expert acting like a ‘hired gun’. 
In any case defence experts frequently associated strongly with the defence 
case: 
Int13: I must admit I was absolutely flabbergasted when they 
found him guilty, I felt awful you know because I spoke to the 
solicitors afterwards and said you know if he can he needs 
to appeal because you know I will do anything I can to 
support you, but that is just not right. 
In summary, although interviewees reported examples of circumstances in 
which there had clearly been an unbiased approach (for example, in cases 
where their evidence supported the prosecution case), it was clear that 
some interviewees saw their role simply as casting reasonable doubt upon 
the prosecution case. 
5.8 A Cultural Gap between Two Schools 
The foregoing discussion describes experts’ perceptions from a ‘prosecution’ 
or ‘defence’ perspective, however, this does not simply describe the party 
who happens to have instructed the expert on any particular occasion. In 
fact, and as mentioned in the introduction, two clear ‘schools’ identified 
themselves during the course of the interviews, comprising a prosecution/ 
FSS school of experts (despite the fact that many now worked primarily 
within predominantly defence consultancies, since the break-up of the FSS) 
and defence experts from outside of the FSS system. All the prosecution 
experts interviewed (and as far as is known, most prosecution experts), 
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gained their experience in the FSS, or one of the private, largely prosecution 
orientated, providers such as LGC. As such, their training, experience and 
organisational culture had been very similar and consistent, and their views 
regarding prosecution versus defence expertise was unsurprisingly 
consistent. Historically the background of defence experts has been more 
disparate, with a number (perhaps most, prior to the break-up of the FSS) 
coming from non-forensic disciplines (also some never having worked in a 
forensic laboratory). 
A ‘cultural gap’ between prosecution and defence witnesses was apparent 
between these schools. One defence expert described prosecution experts 
as ‘Home Office scientists’ (not now literally true, however referring to the 
state origins of the FSS), and some prosecution experts described the 
defence expert as ‘hired guns’: 
Int16: And then there are people out there who will just say 
anything to do the job for the person that is paying them. 
Although there was general respect between prosecution and defence 
‘cultural’ viewpoints, this was not universal, and, particularly some 
prosecution experts expressed (sometimes, very) disparaging views 
regarding DNA defence experts. These views often conflated doubts 
concerning the reliability of the defence evidence itself, with suspicion as to 
the competence, qualifications and motives of the defence expert. 
Int15: And it may be that one has just been doing this day in 
and day out for years and is thoroughly up to date with the 
literature, and knows their stuff and so on. And (for the 
defence expert) it is a bit of an academic hobby. 
Int16: It is almost not even scientific in a lot of situations, you 
know, they reel off qualifications that actually when you drill 
down into it mean diddly squat and will say whatever they 
think is a means to an end to muddy the waters, and are 
very defence biased. 
Int16: … because you know a lot of these people have been 
almost discredited… , and then although rumours spread 
around the industry and we all know who they are… . Unless 
it is a really massive mess-up and is splashed all over the 
news and so on, people can continue to practice essentially. 
Although it was a minority comment, some prosecution experts did bemoan 
the demise of the one-time forensic practitioner register:5 
                                            
5 Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP). 
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Int16: No, I think we need regulation of the defence industry, 
and ours, I mean the CRFP was, OK it wasn’t perfect, but it 
was a register of sorts and there was some control what 
your experience and your qualifications in order to be 
registered to practice. And that was a good thing and it has 
just been completely taken away… there is no way for a 
court to check… . 
Meanwhile defence experts did not attack prosecution experts on a similar 
level, however did express frustration at attacks on their competence: 
Int2: And then other cross-examinations have been very 
persistent on you know my expertise or the way I do things, 
or have done things as a way of trying to… they may not 
have had the opportunity to question my science but if they 
can undermine my credibility… . 
… the way they justified things was totally wrong but you 
know they didn’t say I was an idiot but they just said that, 
you know, the other guy he’s been at it for years. 
Int20: I do not understand why they attack the man rather 
than his evidence. 
Whilst defence counsel did not largely hold prosecution experts in low regard 
or criticise their scientific capability, they did suggest that they were highly 
susceptible to confirmation bias. They were also perceived to be inflexibly 
aligned with the single prosecution case. 
In summary, not only were two clear schools identified, but (particularly for 
prosecution experts), they had sometimes strongly disparaging feelings 
about the other party. 
5.9 What Experts Understand by ‘Unbiased’ 
Although interviewees were not asked directly as to their definition of 
‘unbiased’, responses to various questions indirectly indicated the meanings 
that they put to this. These meanings were not identical. There were 
differences between prosecution and defence experts, which will be 
described separately. 
Many prosecution interviewees seemed to mean ‘good and objective 
science’, when describing acting in an unbiased way: 
Int22: … (if) the science has been done properly and has 
been presented properly… . Now I have no problem in 
thinking that that went well, the questions were reasonable, I 
think I answered them well, then that is a success and the 
verdict is irrelevant to that. If I think that went badly, I don’t 
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think I got my points across clearly… that would be a failure 
regardless of the verdict. 
It may be noted that this view does not require the expert to have been 
‘impartial’ in terms of association with the prosecution case. 
Interestingly, one interviewee suggested that prosecution experts may 
appear to be biased in court simply because they were put in the position of 
defending attacks on what they felt was good scientific work: 
Int15: The tricky bit then is you get to court having tried to be 
entirely clear, scientific and unbiased, and the nature of the 
adversarial system is that then your work is necessarily 
impugned by someone standing there trying to knock it 
down. … almost the work at being unbiased has gone on 
before court, you get to court and then you have to basically 
defend that what you have done is appropriate. And it is very 
difficult to come across as very clearly unbiased when you 
are being asked extremely biased questions because that is 
the nature of the adversarial system. 
Regarding ‘good science’, interviewees specifically mentioned their training 
(particularly within the FSS), their procedures, and quality assurance, 
including the value of ‘peer review’. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 
Seven where some experts expressed criticism of such review on a scientific 
basis, as often it involved no more than informal discussion with colleagues. 
Other interviewees implied that their responsibility was better defined as 
ensuring that there was a ‘level playing field’, for the prosecution and 
defence: 
Int19: … it can be very easy both ways… for a defence to 
suggest outrageously unlikely (versions)… and equally you 
could end up with the opposite, which is the prosecution 
massively over-egging the pudding… . So I see us as a 
check in the balance in that respect. 
Int19: … if I feel that the prosecution barrister is eliciting from 
me unbalanced testimony, I will often rectify it myself rather 
than wait for the defence to pick up on the point because I 
don’t see myself as a puppet to be played to get the 
prosecution-only story over. And if the defence is inept, 
sometimes I will try and rectify the balance myself… . 
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Critics could, however, argue that this approach implied acting as advocate, 
a role explicitly prohibited by the expert’s duty of remaining unbiased.6 
Some interviewees felt that such a playing field should be level, despite the 
fact that English law defines different rules for prosecution and defence, for 
example, in terms of disclosure, and burden and standard of proof: 
Int19: Whether you are a defence scientist or a prosecution 
scientist your cards should be on the table. 
Int4: There is a bit of me that would think… everything 
should be disclosed to everybody for a fair trial. 
Int16: It is a bit unfair really when the prosecution have to 
disclose absolutely everything. 
Defence experts were in a different position to prosecution, as they were not 
involved in the pre-charge phase. Where they were asked to give advice on 
the prosecution’s case, then they did not believe that it was hard to make an 
objective case, stating that sometimes their report made a stronger case for 
guilt than that proposed by the prosecution, even though they knew that this 
would probably not be disclosed: 
Int4: … [W]e sometimes write statements when our evidence 
would be stronger for the prosecution than the prosecution 
evidence has been, and that doesn’t get disclosed. 
However, the very position that most defence experts found themselves in, 
meant that, rather than being asked to assess prosecution versus defence 
cases, they simply aimed to cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution case: 
Int23: Yes, I mean there is a lot of cases where really there 
is very overwhelming evidence against the defendant but 
they still want to plead not guilty… sometimes (counsel) are 
fighting tooth and nail and they won’t admit their man is 
guilty. … And you just do your best really… there is always 
something (to challenge). I mean things like attribution… 
(tissue type, transfer etc). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the terms ‘unbiased’ and ‘impartial’ are 
frequently used as synonyms,7 this thesis takes the position that these terms 
(as well as ‘neutral’, ‘independent’ and ‘objective’) have distinct meanings. It 
                                            
6 Forensic Science Regulator, ‘Legal Obligations’ (FSR-I-400, Issue 3, 2015) 
para 5.3.4. 
7 For example, Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings 
in England and Wales (Law Com No.325, 2011) para 4.9. 
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seems safe to say that experts are, of course, not driven by dictionary 
definitions, but it is apparent that, whatever words they use, they understand 
that they have a duty to the court, and to ‘justice’ rather than directly to the 
instructing counsel. 
Most interviewees appeared to equate their responsibility to be the  
‘objective science’, although some felt that the duty equated most closely 
with ensuring that the defendant had a fair hearing. Arguably, neither of 
these could be held to equate to true lack of bias. 
5.10 Conclusions 
Reflecting long-established common law, the ‘Expert’s duty to the court’, as 
described by The Criminal Procedure Rules, commence by stating that ‘An 
expert must help the court to achieve the overriding objective by giving 
objective, unbiased opinion’. 
As detailed in the literature review, although there is much inconsistency 
regarding how the expert’s duty of being ‘unbiased’ is described (‘impartial’, 
‘unbiased’, ‘independent’, ‘objective’, ‘neutral’, ‘overriding obligation to the 
court’), sources are consistent in stating that the expert’s ultimate 
responsibility in this regard involves working in the interest of the overriding 
objective,8 that is, that ‘criminal cases be dealt with justly’.9 
With such fundamental statements of mandatory requirements, and the 
weight of the explicit policy considerations underlying these, it would be 
tempting to assume that the expert was seen by themselves, and by others 
in the criminal prosecution process, as a truly independent individual. A 
purist might even suggest that an external observer might not be able to 
determine whether an expert had been instructed by prosecution or defence, 
other than from their procedural position within the trial. Indeed, as long ago 
as 1901, it was suggested that, in order to be truly unbiased, experts should 
be drawn by both prosecution and defence counsel from a constituted pool 
of qualified expert witnesses.10 As such, they would reside outside of the cut 
and thrust of the adversarial process and be able to offer unbiased expertise 
                                            
8 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19.2 (1). 
9 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 1.1. (1). 
10 Learned Hand, 'Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony' (1901) 15 No. 1 Harvard Law Review 40, 56 – 58. 
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in the service of the court. The findings reported in this chapter suggest that. 
experts found many challenges in this regard within the adversarial process,  
The key questions posed in the current study were whether and how experts 
believed that the adversarial system impacted upon the performance of their 
responsibility to be unbiased, and how exactly experts understood that 
responsibility. Questions also arose concerning whether and how experts 
attempted to compensate for any adverse effects that they perceived, and 
how effective they believed those compensatory actions to be. 
Experiences of experts reported in this chapter were consistent with findings 
described in earlier studies. As reported in Chapter Two, earlier studies have 
reported consistent findings regarding the way in which expert witnesses 
addressed the challenge of remaining unbiased within an adversarial 
environment. Characterising these findings, the Roberts study reported that 
experts displayed the highest integrity from a scientific point of view, 
however, accepted that this brought them into conflict with criminal process 
values.11 Specifically, the Roberts study reported that lawyers sometimes 
briefed experts on selective facts, then pressed them to come up with 
definite conclusions in their reports and in their testimony.12 The more 
recent, but limited, study by Sallavaci, including forensic experts testifying as 
to DNA evidence, reported similar findings, describing feelings of 
powerlessness on the part of expert witnesses, for example in the face of 
trying to explain evidence in the face of the ‘wrong’ questions.13 In this way, 
they felt frustrated that they might have been seen to be biased simply as a 
result of answering the questions that they were asked, and, further, felt 
themselves drawn into abetting counsel strategies. Supporting this, previous 
studies, such as the Henderson and Wheate studies, also reported that 
experts found themselves subordinate to investigators, unable to do 
anything other than support the investigator-chosen case,14 and, again, 
                                            
11 Paul Roberts and Chris Willmore, The Role of Forensic Science Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings (Runciman Report CM2263, Research Study No. 
11, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 1993) 107 – 108 (Roberts Study). 
12 ibid paras 2.3 – 2.4, 2.6(b), 2.8, 3.5, 3.6 and chs 4-5. 
13 ibid. 
14 Emily Henderson and Fred Seymour, ‘Expert Witnesses under 
Examination in the New Zealand Criminal and Family Courts’ (The Law 
Foundation, New Zealand 2013) para 2.1.3; Rhonda Wheate, ‘Australian 
Forensic Scientists: A View from the Witness Box’ (2008) 40:2 Australian 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 130-139. 
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consequently feeling powerless in appearing to be biased for that side.15 A 
general feeling of lack of information, common across all reported literature 
concerning expert witnesses, including from their ‘own side’ (perhaps 
through ‘selective briefing’), exacerbated the situation. 
It should be noted that reports of experience in the current study (specifically 
examining DNA testimony) showed no exception from experiences reported 
in previous studies of expert witness reports, whatever their specialist 
testimony area. As discussed within the Chapter One, although DNA 
epitomises scientific proof, it is still dependent, as evidence, on its context 
within the trial. It may, therefore, not be found surprising that DNA experts 
reported themselves to be under similar pressures as previously reported. 
A significant qualification regarding previous studies was that, in those 
studies, there was little, if any, investigation of any apparent actual bias 
towards ‘their side’. Put bluntly, and perhaps simplistically, the question 
arose as to whether any experts appeared to be ‘out to win’. This lack of 
investigation was surprising, as there appeared clear indirect indications of, 
at least, association of experts within previous reports with ‘their side’. For 
example, in the Sallavaci study, an interviewee mentioned the need to 
‘understand’ their counsel’s strategy, impliedly so that the expert could assist 
with it;16 in the Wheate study, interviewees expressed frustration that their 
prosecution counsel had not made the strongest case that was possible;17 in 
the Henderson study, interviewees talked about ‘the other side’.18 Instead, 
most, if not all, previous studies reported that witnesses claimed to be 
unbiased, and then, given this, now assumed lack of bias, investigated how 
interviewees attempted to achieve this. 
This study discovered a more fundamental cultural difference between 
prosecution and defence roles than reported in previous studies. This 
manifested itself as a deeper association between experts and ‘their side’, 
and one that appeared to exist beyond individual cases, existing as 
prosecution and defence ‘schools of thought’. Not only did, particularly 
prosecution, experts sometimes imply a strong association with the 
                                            
15 Henderson (n 14) para 3.4.1. 
16 Oriola Sallavaci, The Impact of Scientific Evidence on the Criminal Trial: 
The Case of DNA Evidence (Routledge 2014) 121. 
17 Wheate (n 14) 133. 
18 Henderson (n 14) ch 3 para 3.4.2. 
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prosecution case, but expressed somewhat disparaging views about experts 
from the other school. 
The finding of this study, that there appeared to be a cultural gap between 
opposing experts, not only in terms of their role within the adversarial 
process, but also in terms of their objectives, and even view of what it meant 
to be ‘unbiased’ (discussed below), may, arguably, be seen to be logically 
inevitable, given the role and responsibilities thrust upon the expert by the 
English legal system, and the fact that they enter the process, and continue 
within the process, instructed by ‘one side’. 
Exploring cultural differences between prosecution and defence experts 
further for a moment, although most criticisms of prosecution and defence of 
each other were of a minor nature, and were explicable in terms of the 
judicial process, a significant number of prosecution experts expressed 
strong and disparaging views of defence witnesses, conflating criticisms of 
their competency, their evidence and their motives. These criticisms were 
specifically aimed at ‘defence’ experts, rather than ‘other experts’. One might 
expect there to be generally criticisms in any profession about professionals 
who were felt to fall below the desired standard, however, these criticisms 
were about ‘the other side’. The strength of these views was surprising and 
can only underline the vastly different cultures described as being 
discovered in the above findings. 
In this study, the prosecution and defence cultures identified could be 
characterised as ‘FSS/ Institutional’ (prosecution) and ‘independent non-
forensic consultancy’ (defence), and this showed no exception compared to 
previous studies, even in non-forensic areas of testimony. In Henderson, for 
example, a medical expert for the prosecution described defence experts in 
highly disparaging terms.19 As reported above, one (ex-FSS) interviewee, 
with significant prosecution experience, implied that they found it a particular 
challenge to act in defence of serious cases. This reflected a comment made 
by one defence barrister in testifying to the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee when he stated that: 
I will not use an FSS expert when I am defending because I 
believe—whether I am right or not is not the point— there is 
                                            
19 Henderson (n 14) ch 3 para 4.1. 
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a corporate spirit that will mean an expert from the FSS will 
not go against the party line.20 
As reported above, although interviewees were not asked directly as to their 
definition of ‘unbiased’, responses to various questions indirectly indicated 
the meanings that they put to this. 
Although interviewees unanimously stated the importance of their duty to 
remain unbiased and felt that they managed to achieve this despite the 
pressures upon them, they did not generally describe situations in which 
they were ‘not favouring one party or side more than another’,21 that is, 
‘impartiality’. Further, it was hard to align either prosecution or defence 
experts’ views with the requirement of their duty being to override ‘any 
obligation to the person from whom he receives instructions or by whom he 
is paid’.22 Rather, they tended to describe their duty in terms of objectivity 
and ‘good’ and ‘defendable’ science. 
There was also evidence that some interviewees understood a duty to ‘act in 
the interest of justice’, even if they did not explicitly state this. As examples, 
several interviewees stated that they believed that they should ensure that 
their testimony was ‘balanced’, and would look for ways to put in counter-
arguments (against ‘their side’s’ case if necessary), where they felt that they 
could achieve such balance. 
Perhaps mirroring this, a small number of defence experts described 
situations in which they believed the defendant to be guilty (or, to be very 
specific, ‘had a very strong case against them but refused to plead guilty’), 
however, considered that their role in this situation was to attempt to 
‘balance the playing field’ and give the defendant a fair trial by putting 
forward as strong a scientific challenge to the prosecution as possible. One 
interviewee stated that, given their role was simply to cast reasonable doubt 
‘there was always something’ they could bring up scientifically to try to do 
this. It is hard to argue that such an approach represented ‘neutrality’ and 
not an attempt to win for their client. 
Both prosecution and defence experts’ attempts to ‘contribute towards the 
justice of the hearing’ might be well-intentioned, however do not apparently 
                                            
20 Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science on Trial Seventh 
Report (HC 2004-2005) para 155. 
21 Oxford English Dictionary, December 2015. 
22 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19.2. (2). 
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operate in the interests of adversarial procedure and the explicit rule that 
experts should not act as advocates for their instructing party. 
Such actions on the part of some interviewees did suggest that experts saw 
some difficulties with discharging their responsibility to be unbiased. Having 
said this, all experts stated the importance of remaining unbiased, and 
believed that they achieved this, as far as possible, within the constraints of 
the adversarial process, and the limits of their involvement within it. 
As an example, experts accepted that they were simply required to answer 
evidential questions that supported a single prosecution case, and it was 
accepted by the defence that prosecution experts had no reason or duty to 
‘feed’ them potential defence hypotheses. Prosecution experts accepted that 
they faced challenges of confirmation bias, possibly, and significantly, 
exacerbated where the crime had been serious, but felt that their knowledge 
of this effect allowed them to compensate for this. 
The question might arise as to whether any expert had a duty to raise points 
to the ‘opposing’ expert, or indeed the opposing party. On the one hand 
experts indicated criminal procedure limited their actions. For example, 
although guidelines concerning disclosure state that prosecution experts 
should ‘make evidence available’ to the defence,23 it is also a requirement 
that this be done via prosecution counsel, and not volunteered (even if in 
discussion with the opposing expert).24 Also, during the trial they could only 
answer questions put to them, and, from their own counsel, questions in 
support of a single case. 
On the other hand, and as reported in the next chapter, interviewees 
indicated that they did suffer challenges when they had been unable to make 
a point (possibly counter to their side’s case). 
It remains hard to see how experts could be ‘impartial’ or ‘independent’ 
whilst being instructed by one party, and constrained by legal privilege, and 
only answering only questions asked of them. Most interviewees indicated 
that the most they could aim for was to testify as to good science, objectively 
produced and reported within the constraint of their adversarially dictated 
role.  
                                            
23 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidance on Expert Evidence’ (2014) 27; 
Forensic Science Regulator (n 6) para 1.4.11. 
24 Forensic Science Regulator (n 6) para 1.4.11. 
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It might be noted that the miscarriages of justice described in earlier 
chapters were, generally, attributed to bad science, rather than a lack of 
independence. On that basis, perhaps scientific objectivity is both a sufficient 
and practical objective, instead of the, arguably, hard to achieve, and 
possibly unnecessary general impartiality.  
Optimistically, perhaps it could be said that the natural association with one 
or other side engendered by adversarialism does not constitute ‘improper’ 
influence, indeed such ‘partiality’ might better be seen in terms of partiality 
towards prosecution and defence cases rather than to the state or defendant 
individually. From a practical point of view, professional, transparent and 
objective science may be all that can be achieved or is needed.
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Chapter 6 
The Experts’ Experiences in Court 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One, it was suggested that the trial could be described as the 
‘presentational surface’ of the criminal prosecution, with the evidence 
presented, and the verdict reached, heavily dependent on myriad 
contingencies in the pre-trial process.1 Having said this, it is the trial itself at 
which such contingencies become focused. As such, events at trial formed 
the heart of this study. The focus of this chapter is the forensic experts’ 
experience of the trial. 
The chapter commences by investigating the number of cases with which 
the expert witness was involved, how many of these cases resulted in a 
court appearance, and the degree to which the expert was involved. Basic 
familiarity with the English criminal process should have led one to the 
conclusion that popular media representations of the ‘forensic expert’ (for 
example in the TV programme ‘CSI’), exaggerated such involvement by the 
expert. 
In Chapter Five, it was reported that interviewees expressed some 
frustration, not necessarily at lack of involvement, but at the lack of 
information that they had prior to the trial. Of interest within this chapter, is 
the number of trials in which they were actually involved, how active their 
role was, as events moved towards a trial, and, whether their reported lack 
of information continued into the trial. Of prime importance was an 
understanding of any perceived challenges that this presented, and how 
experts addressed such challenges. 
Great store has been placed on the provisions of part 19 of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules,2 regarding expert evidence, in terms of their potential to 
improve the quality, and particularly the admission, of expert evidence.3 part 
19.6 provides for the court to order pre-trial meetings between experts, a 
                                            
1 Paul Roberts, ‘Introduction’ in P Roberts (ed) Expert Evidence and 
Scientific Proof in Criminal Trials (Ashgate, 2014), xiv. 
2 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19. 
3 T Ward, ‘Expert Evidence and the Law Commission: Implementation 
Without Legislation’ (2013) Criminal Law Review 561. 
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provision given great import by both the courts,4 and, it is indicated, by the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).5 This chapter moves on to investigate the 
nature of such pre-trial meetings, whether court ordered, or otherwise. 
Even if the popular media representation of the forensic expert as being in 
close co-operation with their ‘side’, may be, for a moment, assumed as 
exaggeration, it might still have been expected that the expert had close 
contact with their respective counsel prior to any appearance in court. This 
chapter reports experts’ experiences of such contact. 
The chapter moves on to examine interviewees’ perceptions and views 
concerning their role in court, and their responsibilities. It then goes on to 
report interviewees’ views regarding the degree to which they considered 
that they were able to discharge such responsibilities. Interviewees were 
asked to describe any challenges that they perceived, and, also, any 
strategies that they applied in order to overcome any such challenges. Also 
reported are interviewees’ perceptions as to the effectiveness of such 
strategies. 
Although observations by prosecution and defence experts were distinct, 
comments made by interviewees within each of these groups were highly 
consistent. This was true despite differing professional backgrounds, the 
types of organisation for which interviewees worked, and their experience in 
terms of the number and types of cases with which they had been involved. 
This reflects the description of the distinct ‘schools’ of prosecution and 
defence, described in Chapter Five. 
6.2 Appearances in Court 
Interviewees were asked how many times they had appeared as an expert 
witness in court, and the number of cases with which they had been 
involved. Although the main objective of this question was to ascertain the 
relative experience of interviewees, and perhaps to make some judgment as 
to the validity of each interviewee’s experience, the finding was that most 
experts appeared in court seldom. 
                                            
4 R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698, [2010] 1 Cr App R 23. 
5 Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science, Second Report 
Volume 1 (HC 610, 2013–14) Ev 31, Q172 response by Karen Squibb-
Williams (HC Forensic Science Report Evidence). 
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Different answers were obtained from prosecution and defence experts in 
response to the question of the numbers of cases with which they had been 
involved. It should be noted that ‘cases’ did not equate directly to DNA 
samples tested: a single case may have had multiple DNA samples, 
including elimination samples, and in other instances there may have been a 
number of individual offences for which a single perpetrator was suspected. 
More accurately a case could be defined as an instance in which an expert 
report was produced, containing expert opinion on the analysis of one or 
more samples concerned with a single alleged offence, and intended as 
potential expert testimony. 
Regarding prosecution, few interviewees were able to accurately estimate 
the number of cases with which they had been involved in total, however, an 
approximation was possible: one interviewee (Int1) with 10 years’ 
experience with DNA stated that she had been involved with over 1000 
cases, and an interviewee (Int3) with 18 years’ experience stated that they 
had been involved with several thousand cases. This would suggest an 
average number of two cases per week, a figure consistent with most 
interviewees’ responses. This number of cases suggested that the 
interviewees would have attended a large number of trials. This was not the 
case, however. Although only one expert was able to give an exact number 
of trials attended - 82 cases over 24 years, typical responses to this question 
indicated the number of court appearances for each interviewee to be in the 
same general low range:  
Int8: I have been on the stand once; I have been called to 
court three times… . And the other time I got called I got told 
I wasn’t needed as I was walking into the court room. 
(Note that Int8 had experience of six and a half years of 
working with DNA evidence). 
Int9: Been to court – probably not that many, I would 
probably say about thirty, something like that… but over sort 
of like twenty (years). 
Int19: In number of cases it is difficult, I mean I provide 
evidence, I will have provided evidence in thousands of 
cases. … So in actual court appearances your attrition rate 
is very very high. I would say you would be lucky if you 
appeared in one percent of the cases for which you provide 
testimony in. 
No interviewee reported significantly more court appearances than these 
examples suggested. Interestingly, Int19’s estimate of one percent of cases 
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did seem to be close to the average number of trial appearances relative to 
total cases reported over the whole pool of experts interviewed. 
Interviewees reported that it was difficult to predict in which cases they 
would be called to court, and, when there, whether they were called to give 
testimony: 
Int7: I’ve written statements quite a few times where the 
DNA evidence is crucial to the case, but I have not been 
called to give evidence… I have been to court and not got on 
and I have also just not been called at all, it has just gone 
through. 
Additionally, some interviewees reported that appearances in court had now 
reduced substantially. A number of possible reasons were given for this by 
the interviewees. Firstly because of the way in which expert reports had 
become standardised by both the FSS and other providers: 
Int3: It has changed over the years. …Historically we went to 
court more often because they wanted to ask you more 
questions about what was written in the statement and you 
know try and dig through to quite what the value of that 
statement meant. … But the FSS drove a few years ago to 
redesign the way we did statements and retrained all the 
reporting officers to do the new style statement and since 
then we have found the number of times we are called to 
court plummeted quite considerably to the extent certainly, I 
have had murders where I have never been called to court, 
you know my statement has sufficed. 
(Note that the interviewee may have been referring to ‘Streamlined 
Reporting’, or an early version of it. Streamlined Reporting is a two stage 
reporting process, introduced by early 2013, aimed at delivering 
proportionate reporting by allowing early identification of issues. Put simply, 
the objective is that minimal forensic work is done where the results are not 
at issue).6 
Secondly, several interviewees suggested that, in addition to the objective of 
improving scientific reporting, such initiatives also had a budgetary objective: 
Int3: Whereas now, and again there is probably a cost side 
as well you know, it is expensive to take people to court, you 
know the hourly charge for all the experts in a courtroom is 
actually phenomenally high. 
                                            
6 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘National Streamlined Forensic Reporting 
Guidance SFR – Section 1 - Supporting Information Version 3.0’ (2015). 
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Int19: I suspect although I don’t know this that the reason 
you are often not called is for matters of expense. If we call 
an expert to lead evidence orally right he or she will be 
billing us a grand a day. 
Int19 suggested also that trial lawyers were pressured to call experts only 
when they had something substantial to say, that is, presented value for 
money: 
Int19: So my feeling is that … the lawyers are leant on 
saying before you call these experts make sure it is to ask 
them something rather than just we don’t want people to 
rock up to court and just come in and ask a few bland 
questions and go home again. Let’s get them here for a 
reason. 
Thirdly, because, as most interviewees stated, simple DNA matches were 
now rarely challenged: 
Int19: … but it has got less and less frequent should I say 
simply because these days DNA is seen as a tried and 
tested evidence type. 
Int10: Yes, you assume that your statement is read out in 
court and you know the defence don’t have any challenge to 
it and it is just read and accepted. 
No clear picture emerged regarding the number of cases in which an expert 
was instructed by the defence team, however it was safe to say that this was 
considerably lower than for prosecution experts. This may be explained 
possibly by the very different role that the defence expert played in the 
process (detailed below), and the fact, described above, that only in 
exceptional cases were DNA matches challenged. Regarding appearances 
in court, however, defence experts were reasonably consistent in stating that 
they attended court in approximately ten percent of cases with which they 
were involved, although, counsel tended to use them for advice in court, 
rather than to ask them to testify. 
The observation that experts attended court in only a relatively low number 
of cases, underlined an important qualification of the current study. That is, 
its scope included only those trials in which the forensic expert was present. 
As one interviewee stated, in response to the question of how his written 
statement was presented in court when he was not present, he replied: 
Int19: I don’t know because I am not there … I assume that 
they just read out if it is not contested… . 
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In summary, prosecution experts stated that they reported on between 50 
and 100 cases each year, and testified in court between one and three times 
per year. Defence experts were instructed in far fewer cases, and were 
called to court in approximately ten per cent of these, although not usually 
called to the stand. Interviewees suggested that the apparently low number 
of court appearances was due to the high attrition rate (for unknown cause) 
during the time between investigation, prosecution and trial; improved 
processes; and, possibly, budgetary constraints. These findings underline a 
qualification of the study, in that it can only provide knowledge of the use of 
DNA evidence in court in cases in which a forensic expert has been called to 
testify in person. It would be tempting to assume that these represented the 
most contentious proceedings, as this would seem a logical conclusion, 
however there was no evidence to support this. Indeed, interviewees 
expressed some puzzlement at why they were not called to some cases in 
which the DNA evidence seemed contentious to them, and they were 
sometimes called to court for apparently routine cases, and either not called 
to testify in person, or called to testify as to apparently routine evidence. 
Presumably such events are explicable by contextual events outside of the 
experts’ knowledge, however I does not seem true to say that the experts’ 
experiences reported in this chapter simply represent contentious 
proceedings. 
6.3 Pre-trial Discussions 
Part 19.6 of the Criminal Procedure Rules provide that the court may order 
that a pre-hearing discussion takes place between prosecution and defence 
expert witnesses, in order to discuss the issues, identify areas of 
disagreement and prepare a joint statement.7 The importance of this early 
identification of issues in dispute has been underlined in case law,8 and by 
the Law Commission, amongst others.9 
The interviewees were asked for their experience of pre-trial meetings 
(excluding ‘defence examinations’). In response to this question, 
interviewees described many pre-trial interactions aimed at resolving 
disputes over scientific evidence. Broadly there were three major categories 
                                            
7 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19.6. 
8 For example, Reed (n 4). 
9 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and 
Wales (Law Com No.325, 2011) para 7.52 (Law Commission Report). 
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of dispute: firstly, regarding areas of seeming detail (one interviewee 
mentioned the example of dispute over the use of the phrase ‘unable to 
exclude’ written by the defence, as opposed to the phrase ‘could have’, 
written by the prosecution regarding the same scientific findings): 
Int4: Scientifically it could be very, very small, but to the 
lawyer it is a huge thing. 
Secondly, to eliminate uncontested evidence, and reduce the evidence to 
that addressing issues at dispute; thirdly, where there was significant dispute 
regarding the opinion of the other expert. In practice, there was apparently 
little difference in the experience of prosecution and defence experts 
regarding such meetings, and this analysis does not, therefore, differentiate 
between these on that basis. The only concrete difference was that in some 
cases, although there was a prosecution expert, there may have been no 
defence expert called with whom to have a meeting, so that any meetings 
were with defence counsel alone.  
Interestingly, however, almost all such interactions which the interviewees 
described, were driven by, and involved, counsel. When pressed regarding 
their experience of pre-trial discussions conforming with the requirements or 
implied intentions of part 19.6, there was a consensus that this was a rare 
occurrence: 
Int16: Not really, I wouldn’t say a pre-trial conference as 
such. In fact I don’t think I’ve… I think maybe on one 
occasion I have had to do a sort of sit down in a room with 
the defence expert and come up with a consistent opinion. 
Int13: Right, ok well my experience is that it doesn’t happen 
all that often. 
Int21: Very rarely, I would suggest. 
Int16: (Meetings) happen quite frequently, it is just that I 
have not come across… (them) that often myself. 
These comments were consistent: when asked to make an estimate of the 
total number of times that interviewees had attended such a meeting, most 
stated that they had never been in such meetings or on only one or two 
occasions. Several interviewees stated that they thought that such meetings 
happened more often, but gave no specific reason why they thought this was 
the case. 
Many of the interviewees seemed unfamiliar with the nature of the 
meetings provided for in part 19.6: 
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Int13: Well, there should be (a pre-trial discussion), and I 
think that has been recommended a few times. 
Int22 supported this with the observation that she had recently been 
receiving increased requests from other experts asking for advice on how 
such meetings should be conducted. This, of course, also suggested that 
these experts did not have much experience of such meetings to date. 
On the one hand, given that this provision has only existed since November 
2006, and that, as discussed above, actual attendance at court was 
infrequent, the number of such pre-hearing discussions may not be judged 
disproportionally low, however, even for the meetings that the experts 
considered complied with the provision of part 19.6, it was apparent that 
these were often, if not usually, driven by counsel, who, typically were also 
present at the meeting. 
Int9: The only case where that has really happened… and 
the most in-depth was that both advocates had a meeting 
with both of us experts. 
Int9: I remember being put into a room by the CPS and said 
the barristers want you to go in here and come to some sort 
of agreement. 
Int1: ... I have been to maybe three where there have been 
both sides of counsel have been there and both experts 
have been there. 
Int19: … the second time I had the lawyers wanted to be 
involved; we want to be there we want to hear everything 
you say, and I was like hang on a second, I am sorry this is 
not an area that I think you should be getting involved with… 
. 
These types of meeting failed in their compliance with part 19.6 on a number 
of bases: firstly, such pre-trial discussions should be ordered by the court 
rather than driven by counsel, secondly, that a joint statement should have 
been prepared for the court and thirdly that ‘the content of that discussion 
must not be referred to without the court’s permission’.10 These 
considerations will be examined in turn: 
Counsel have a duty to understand and isolate the facts at issue in the case, 
and meetings with opposing counsel and experts would be a method of 
achieving this. Having said this, such meetings, involving and being driven 
by counsel, appeared to substitute, in many case, for meetings of experts. 
                                            
10 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19.6. 
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This would apparently be counter to the apparent intention of the rules. The 
implied intention of rule 19.6 is that the experts come to an agreement 
regarding the nature of the uncontested evidence, and of issues regarding 
contested areas, this in the service of the court.11 Additionally, in R v 
Henderson, it was stated that it was preferable that others ‘particularly legal 
representatives’ did not attend.12 Incidentally, the rules also provide for the 
court to appoint a single joint expert, but no interviewee had ever seen or 
heard of this happening. Such an implied duty of joint service to the court 
appears to be at odds with the way in which counsel appeared to control 
such meetings. Indeed, some interviewees implied that counsel were in 
overall control and censure of such meetings: 
Int8: … the barristers were there initially, but the judge had 
said it was ok for the two of us to discuss it, because I know 
sometimes there are rules around discussing your evidence 
with another witness potentially. But in this instance I think 
the barristers had both agreed that they were happy to just 
leave the two of us experts in the room to talk. 
Int16: In that particular case it wasn’t ordered by the judge at 
all, I think, it was just that the barristers were in agreement 
and they were privy to everything that was being said, so it 
wasn’t like we were having conversations behind closed 
doors. 
These two quotes are interesting in that interviewees suggested that a 
meeting between ‘opposing’ experts would have been, in some way, 
illegitimate. 
Secondly, that a joint statement was prepared for the court: 
Int6: … there are occasions again but much more when you 
are at court that if you have met with the defence expert and 
you agree an agreed statement you may both then meet 
with your respective counsels, all of you together or you may 
each go off to speak to your counsel to inform them of your 
discussions. 
Int8: … had a meeting to discuss, to just clarify between the 
two of us, that we actually were making the same 
interpretation essentially, so that the barristers knew how 
much to question us on it, or question me on it while I was 
on the stand. … slightly different interpretation, we have 
formed slightly different conclusions, so in that instance the 
                                            
11 ibid. 
12 R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, [2010] 2 Cr App R 24 [210]. 
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barristers did want to be more involved in seeing what we 
were coming…what we were saying. 
These reports implied that any statement was certainly not simply jointly 
prepared by experts alone, and, impliedly, although a joint statement might 
have been prepared, it did not appear to be primarily for the court, but, 
appeared to be primarily for adversarial strategic purposes on the part of 
counsel. 
Indeed, there was also evidence that such meetings are sometimes 
prevented for tactical purposes: 
Int13: (I could have prevented her) say(ing) what she did in 
front of the jury. And maybe we could have agreed that and 
then there wouldn’t have been any problem but we were 
kept apart, I mean I was told not to speak to her… by the 
defence barrister. And I suppose it is just the way counsel, 
how they see the case, how they want to play it, and what 
strategy they want to use. 
Thirdly, although the provision that the content of the expert discussion must 
not be referred to without the court’s permission is seemingly more relevant 
in the case where there has truly been a discussion between experts alone, 
one interviewee indicated that pre-trial discussions involving both experts 
and counsel, might, in fact, have as its outcome an agreement between 
counsel as to what may be presented: 
Int13 …  defence counsel the prosecuting counsel had made 
some concession and said ok I won’t lead her, we will talk 
about the six confirmed and I won’t lead her through bands 
that are masked or bands that are unconfirmed. But when 
she was being cross-examined she mentioned some of the 
bands that were unconfirmed, so during re-examination 
because the cat had been let out of the bag, the prosecution 
barrister then went straight into it, I mean he wanted the 
court to hear this so he had kept his side of the bargain if 
you like by not leading her through it but because it was 
mentioned during cross-examination he could talk about it in 
re-examination and (he did so). 
In this particular example the interviewee opined that: 
Int13: And basically the last thing she said was there was 
only one band missing, one of his bands missing from the 
mixed profile which you know a jury hears that and I think it 
could potentially be prejudicial or misleading. 
Interviewees were asked, when such meetings had happened, how useful 
they found them. A typical response was: 
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Int22: … (they) have been helpful I think because either they 
have made all of the issues go away or they have focussed 
them on just a few points and so saved everyone’s time. 
Int5: And there was some major differences of view but what 
we found very quickly and bearing in mind the prosecution 
had written something like five reports, some of which were 
quite lengthy, and I had written one or two reports. So we 
are talking about fifty or sixty pages of expert evidence from 
the prosecution and perhaps ten from me. And some quite 
complex interpretations of issues around trace evidence and 
so on and so forth. This was rapidly reduced to a page of 
relevant material, and relevant I should say was matters in 
dispute, matters that ought to be in front of the jury whereas 
the other ninety per cent of it was not in dispute, it was 
process, it was methodology or it was simply agreed facts, 
whatever we’d found. 
Int7: In my experience a lot of the barristers that I have 
worked with or come across don’t want to have a scientific 
argument in the witness box, it is no advantage, and it is of 
no advantage to the court, they want it cleared up before it 
gets there, so we have the discussion beforehand. And it 
has been very useful. 
Despite the fact that few interviewees had experienced (or were even aware 
of) the provision for the court to order a pre-hearing expert conference, many 
mentioned that they were unaware of the expectations on them, and said 
that guidance was necessary: 
Int19: Right, but there is no real, I have never seen any real 
guidance about how a (19).6 is run because the second time 
one I had the lawyers wanted to be involved; we want to be 
there we want to hear everything you say, and I was like 
hang on a second, I am sorry this is not an area that I think 
you should be getting involved with… 
Int22: … I do think that because so many scientists haven’t 
been exposed to them yet some guidance for the scientists 
on what their responsibilities are would be helpful. Yes and 
for a lot of other things the Criminal Procedure Rules, the 
responsibility of experts is quite helpful and quite thorough, 
you know about the retain, reveal, record, all of these. But it 
doesn’t really give much guidance as to what is expected as 
the outcome of a pre-trial conference. 
In summary, despite the provision in part 19.6 of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules for the court to order a pre-trial discussion between experts, the 
evidence gathered here indicates that this rarely happened. Although 
meetings between experts did happen, these appeared to be driven largely 
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by counsel. Indeed, most interviewees appeared largely ignorant of any pre-
hearing discussion that did not involve counsel. Interviewees suggested that 
counsel not only drove, but also control such interactions, even prohibiting 
contact on occasion. Indeed, one interview seemed to suggest that any such 
meeting in the absence of counsel might be illegitimate in some way. The 
interviewees who had some experience of such meetings also made the 
point that there was no guidance available to them as to how such meetings 
should be organised and conducted. These findings were highly significant: 
the provisions within the Criminal Procedure Rules concerning expert 
evidence, including for pre-trial meetings between experts, have been 
heralded as a major step forward in addressing a number of key issues 
regarding expert evidence in general.13 
6.4 Engagement with Counsel and Others 
The interviewees were asked when their first contact with counsel took 
place, and the nature of that contact. Prosecution and defence experts 
reported slightly different experiences, and will be discussed separately 
below. The experience of interviewees within each group, however, was very 
consistent. 
For prosecution experts typical, and consistent, responses were as follows: 
Int25: But I would say 99% of the time there is little or no 
communication until the day you are at court and they ask 
for you to get there an hour before. You know the court 
starts at 10 o’clock they ask you to be there for 9 o’clock to 
have a discussion about your evidence and other parts to 
make sure that you have got material and you know a quick 
run through…Yea, most of the time on the day and 
sometimes you might not even speak to them beforehand at 
all, when you first walk in and start answering questions for 
them. 
Int14: I would say it would be extremely unusual to have any 
contact with the counsel until the moment you are being 
asked questions on the stand. 
Furthermore, interviewees reported (further to comments in Chapter Five), 
that, in addition to their frustrations regarding late notification of the defence 
position, they still may not be aware of the defence position by the time they 
were in the witness box: 
                                            
13 For example, HC Forensic Science Report Evidence (n 5). 
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Int14: Most of the time you just turn up and you have got no 
idea whether (the defence have submitted a case) or what 
the bones of contention are or what the main issues are, or 
what the areas they have agreed and what areas they 
haven’t agreed on, you have got no idea, you just turn up 
and give your evidence. 
In very high profile cases, interviewees reported attending: 
Int10: … two or three case conferences in chambers, with all 
the police and barristers to discuss the evidence 
beforehand. 
However, even in serious cases: 
Int10: More often on a more sort of standard case, which 
you know is probably a murder but less high profile, you will 
be called to court, told you are needed in court next week. 
And you get to court at midday and the barrister comes and 
chats to you for a quarter of an hour and then you have your 
lunch and you get on some time in the afternoon. So that is 
very often the way it will go, they will ask you to be in court a 
little while before you are needed, and they are obviously 
very very busy people, and they manage to squeeze in a 
sort of ten/ fifteen minute chat with you to say these are the 
things that I want to talk about, these are the key points of 
your evidence and I will probably ask you this question. 
Int19: Oh yea, half the cases I go to you meet them on the 
morning that you are going to do and that is even in serious 
cases, so just before I finished at the FSS you know I did a 
murder trial and you know I turn up and the first time I met 
the barrister you know I had five minutes with him and he 
said I am going to call you in and ask you these questions 
and that’s it. 
Interviewees explained one aspect of this late engagement as being due to 
the very late engagement of counsel themselves: 
Int19: … what you’ll find is lawyers are last minute, right. 
They have got a trial today and they are not interested in 
that trial next week so what you find is that your involvement 
will often be very close to the trial because all of a sudden 
everybody’s mind is focussed on this trial and then you are 
called and all the things happen at a very late date. I mean 
not in every case and so the bigger the case the less likely 
that is to happen but mostly in most run a day cases you 
probably won’t be engaged with until the morning of a trial… 
barristers will be briefed at the last possible moment. 
Int24: I don’t know how they do it but they get their head 
around these things very quickly, they are just finishing off 
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one and they are about to pick up another one next week 
and they sit up all night reading the papers. 
Some interviewees reported that the situation has improved over the years, 
and that more engagement now took place. Nevertheless a number of 
interviewees expressed frustration with late engagement: 
Int1: Sometimes you get the impression that everybody is 
very busy and they have not got time to talk to you and I get 
a bit frustrated because I want to say you need to at least, I 
need to make sure that you understand this… . 
Int9: These days more and more you do (have earlier 
contact with counsel). But years gone by you literally sat 
outside court and had your name called and went in, and it 
frustrated me so much because that’s why on occasions it is 
a case of excuse me, your honour, can I say something else. 
So that pre-trial encounter to me is essential, and once or 
twice it has given me the ability to say has anything else 
come out at court that I am not aware of; and if it has you 
can turn round and say to them I am sorry but given what 
you are saying my evidence means nothing now. 
Int21: I would love for a barrister to say let’s go through this 
case, tell me about the technique you have used, tell me 
what it means, tell me how I best explain it and let me 
explain to him what I am going to tell him and to help him 
frame his questions, that is the best way to do it.  It is not 
helpful when you have these random questions fired at you, 
nor is it helpful if you get fired questions that you can only 
answer yes or no to because it doesn’t help. 
From the defence perspective one might have expected that the ‘hired gun’ 
was closely involved with defence counsel in the development of the 
defence case, but rather surprisingly, defence interviewees (unless actually 
brought into the process by counsel with whom they had worked previously) 
again reported late engagement with counsel. Typically this might be at the 
court itself, with the defence expert asked to appear, but still not being clear 
about whether they would be called, asked to remain outside the court to 
answer questions, or to sit with counsel within the court. 
Int7 offered an additional rationale for late engagement with counsel: 
Int7: And it is not until the point that the defence team are 
instructed that they understand whether they want to have a 
look at the forensic evidence or not, so usually it is very 
quick. 
Yes, they see (the forensic evidence) as part of the evidence 
pack… they have read it, and they need assistance because 
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they don’t understand the content, or they feel it doesn’t 
cover the area. I mean typically the sort of questions we get 
are just because they don’t understand fully what has been 
presented there. 
Many of the prosecution interviewees offered the same additional rationale 
for late and seemingly superficial counsel contact, namely that the forensic 
evidence was regarded simply as part of the evidence pack, and the expert 
was only needed before the court room where the instructing counsel had 
questions about it. Very interestingly, from the prosecution experts’ point of 
view, such questions may not be directly addressed to the expert, with the 
investigating officer being seen as the point of contact with the expert: 
Int1: What sometimes happens is that they will have a case 
conference without you and come out of that with a list of 
questions and then that usually gets emailed to you, it is 
usually the investigating officer is perceived to be the point 
of contact to the expert, so you will usually get an email from 
the investigating officer saying they have had a case 
conference, CPS or whoever… . 
In this case, the lack of direct contact further frustrated the interviewee: 
Int1: Sometimes the barristers just want the answers 
verbally but they want the expert to tell the officer and the 
officer will then tell them, and I think that is a bit pointless, 
especially if it is a complex issue. 
In summary, the findings indicate that routine DNA evidence, even within 
serious cases, is regarded simply as part of the evidence pack, to be 
assimilated by counsel and incorporated into the case developed by 
prosecution and defence legal teams. The DNA expert on that basis is 
simply the resource who may advise on scientific questions and present 
evidence if and when asked. Other than in high profile cases they are not 
involved in the development of the overall case. Interviewees reported 
frustration with the lack of contact with counsel, and the lack of certainty that 
this gave them, however, most stated that they understood that this was 
inevitable, given that counsel were typically appointed at very short notice 
(for example less than one day) before the trial. 
6.5 The Expert’s Role 
Before examining interviewees’ experience in the courtroom in detail, it was 
important to examine interviewees’ perception of their overall role in the 
court. This section describes these perceptions both from the prosecution 
and defence points of view. It goes on to describe interviewees’ comments 
- 210 - 
on how they discharge their responsibilities, given the exigencies of the 
adversarial trial, and the constraints placed upon them by legal process. 
Despite evidence of apparent association with the instructing party 
discussed in the last chapter, on the part of both prosecution and defence 
experts, interviewees unanimously and unequivocally stated that their role 
within the court was as unbiased assistant in the service of the court. 
Although this was true for both prosecution and defence experts, 
interviewees did report differences in the practical role that each side played. 
Whilst in complex cases there might have been competing evidence 
regarding the validity of the science and the opinions formed on the 
evidence, in the vast majority of cases interviewees reported that there was 
little scientific disagreement on the fact of a DNA match. 
Int19: … there are four basic questions in a criminal trial: 
whose DNA is it, what biological material did it come from, 
how did it get there, and when did it get there? The first two 
now seem to have almost disappeared in terms of contested 
issues at a trial. And it nearly always now falls to three and 
four which is ‘I am not disputing that it’s my DNA; what I am 
arguing about is how and when it got there’. 
In practice, prosecution interviewees described their responsibility as 
presenting the DNA evidence supporting the prosecution case. Although 
they presented this objectively, their role throughout was only to answer the 
questions put to them by the investigator, and prosecution, and not to 
consider alternative hypotheses. One defence interviewee pointed out that 
this made logical sense: 
Int17: … the prosecution … just say … we have got a profile, 
it matches, given what (we) are alleging it does coincide with 
what we found …if there are alternative explanations then I 
will consider it. But they won’t ever pursue other alternatives 
…which is fair enough I guess because otherwise you will 
just spend all day theorising options of how it could have 
happened. And, one could argue, giving options to the 
defence to say you know if this happened then they will 
come back oh that is exactly what happened, that is exactly 
what happened. 
Defence interviewees’ description of their role mirrored this accordingly: 
Int17: I now might say I completely agree, (the DNA 
evidence) is completely consistent with what the Crown is 
alleging… But there might be an alternative explanation … 
and that would also explain how this evidence … came to 
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be. … whether they say it is more likely or less likely or 
equally likely or whatever… . 
In other words, defence experts described their role as proposing alternative 
innocent explanations for the agreed evidence. 
In summary, prosecution and defence had already reported (in Chapter Five) 
first becoming involved in cases in very different ways. Now they reported 
playing significantly different roles in the court room. The role of the 
prosecution was to testify as to evidence supporting the prosecution case, 
whilst the defence expert’s role was to support the defence case by 
presenting alternative, innocent, explanations for that same evidence. 
Given the opposing roles in which they found themselves, it was not hard to 
understand interviewees’ frustrations, reported in Chapter Five, that they 
might appear biased towards their instructing party. This chapter moves on 
to investigate how interviewees viewed their responsibilities, and, with the 
above factors in mind, how they attempted to discharge them. 
6.6 The Expert’s Responsibility 
Interviewees were clear and unanimous in their view that their responsibility 
was to ensure that they presented their evidence in an effective way, and 
ensured that the jury understood it sufficiently to be able to consider it in the 
light of the other evidence in the case. 
Int12: It is your job to make them (the jury) understand (the 
DNA evidence), without a doubt, I think it is our 
responsibility. Presentation is part of the skill of the forensic 
scientist, without presentation skill you are actually missing 
an essential component of the job description. If you can’t 
present the data then you shouldn’t be a forensic scientist, it 
is as simple as that. 
Interviewees described a number of significant challenges that they 
perceived in the discharge of such a simply described responsibility. These 
centred on two key and related areas. Firstly, conflicts between counsel’s 
line of questioning and the expert’s desire to properly explain their evidence. 
Secondly, regarding the jury’s understanding of the DNA evidence, and how 
it related to the other evidence. 
Exacerbating this, interviewees reported situations in which they perceived 
that counsel, particularly prosecution, were leading and examining DNA 
evidence in scientifically unreliable ways, in the interests of advancing the 
state’s case. 
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In response to these challenges, interviewees reported compensatory 
behaviours on their part. Whether these were effective or not, interviewees 
rationalised the adversarial environment in which they found themselves 
and, as reported in detail in Chapter Seven, ultimately appeared to 
disengage themselves from the judicial process. 
It should be noted at the outset that each of these challenges logically arose 
simply by virtue of the adversarial system. Each party presented a partisan 
case to the jury, and experts could only give evidence in response to 
counsel’s questions in support of that. Arguably, the problem arose when 
scientifically unreliable evidence was accepted as reliable, and for whatever 
reason was not challenged. It should be noted that ‘unreliable’ in this sense 
did not simply mean that the science was wrong or untested, but rather that 
the conclusions drawn from it might be unwarranted, for whatever reason. 
These reasons might include, for example, misunderstandings regarding the 
significance of the evidence, or the probabilistic implications of the match 
probability presented). The potential for miscarriage of justice became 
significant in this situation. 
In summary, all interviewees were clear that their responsibility was to 
explain the DNA evidence in a way that was accurate and allowed the jury to 
use it accurately. However, all interviewees perceived challenges deriving 
from counsel’s use of such evidence. Details of these challenges will now be 
considered. 
6.7 Experience in the Witness Box 
Before considering these key challenges in detail, it is worth noting that 
many interviewees stated that counsel almost always attempted to avoid 
scientific argument in the witness box, so that scientific issues would 
normally be identified and resolved prior to the court case. 
Int7: In my experience a lot of the barristers that I have 
worked (with) … don’t want to have a scientific argument in 
the witness box, it is no advantage, and it is of no advantage 
to the court, they want it cleared up before it gets there. 
Although interviewees stated that counsel may not want a scientific 
argument, arguably, this could have been more accurately described as the 
fact that counsel were keen to control the delivery of evidence, and did not 
want to risk adverse scientific evidence (for example, agreement by the 
prosecution expert that the DNA evidence was, at least, consistent with the 
defence case, or vice versa).  
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This apparent desire to control expert testimony was also reflected in the 
observation that the majority of the time in which defence counsel appointed 
an expert witness, interviewees reported that they were not called to the 
witness box. Instead the expert sat behind counsel, listening to testimony 
concerning the DNA evidence and passing comments and questions to 
defence counsel. 
Int23: I usually just sit behind the barrister and more often I 
have been asked to sit in all day really and listen to 
complainant’s version of events, so that I have been given 
the defendant’s account and they want me to listen to every 
detail of the complainant’s account just in order to check if 
there is anything in the findings that can tell the difference 
between the, you know that is more supportive of one 
account or the other. 
One expert suggested that this was to ‘keep the prosecution expert honest’: 
Int12: Somehow the counsel are wise enough to say I want 
you in court because I want you there to keep them 
honest…. in fact, one uses me to spook them because he 
wants me to be in their eye-line, I don’t agree with that. 
However, a significant number of interviewees stated that the reason that 
defence experts were called to court, but were often not called to give 
evidence, was that the defence counsel was concerned about how their 
testimony would stand up under cross-examination: 
Int3: The barrister has not wanted to call you to court 
because he felt that that was in danger when you were 
cross-examined, then you could be challenged and weaken 
the defence case because you are not disagreeing with what 
the Crown is saying… (if) the defendant is coming up with 
another alternative which is equally likely, then that cancels 
out your prosecution side because it is supporting the 
defence as well you know, either of them are equal… But 
what they don’t want is for you to go into court and the 
prosecution to really sort of beef up the prosecution bit. 
Int23: … you know if the Crown barrister got to me he would 
be saying but you agree it is a match, you agree it is one in a 
billion, you know then we would be just reinforcing the 
strength of their case. 
It is important to report interviewees’ general experience of appearing in 
court. Simplistic pre-suppositions concerning experiences in giving 
evidence-in-chief and under cross-examination turned out to be largely 
unreliable. For example, interviewees did not report that examination-in-chief 
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was more straightforward or less challenging than cross-examination, and 
they did not report having an easier experience with the counsel calling them 
than with opposing counsel. For these reasons experiences of examination-
in-chief and cross-examination are discussed here together, highlighting 
where there were differences between interviewees’ experiences. 
Interviewees described a wide range of experiences in the witness box, 
although these were consistent in relation to the specific circumstance 
described. 
Interviewees for whom appearance in court was a relatively new experience 
described the anticipation of appearing in court as being very stressful: 
Int8: It is quite nerve-wracking. I mean I actually found the 
whole process of making sure you get there on time, and 
knowing where to go when you get there, and things like that 
are quite nerve-wracking. … and then once you are there 
you kind of then get nervous about the giving evidence bit… 
Yeah and everybody is looking at you, and people don’t 
necessarily realise, if they are on the jury, that when there is 
twelve of you and one of the other person it can be quite 
intimidating. 
This was not the general observation of more experienced interviewees, 
however, who, despite the remark that they might be ‘a bit nervous that you 
are going to get a hard time’ (Int8), reported that the experience was not 
generally stressful: 
Int9: During evidence in chief the vast majority of cases they 
will go through your statement almost page by page, to the 
point where you get a little bit bored with yourself going: 
that’s correct, yes. It does get a little bit repetitive. You do 
get the odd barrister who might go a little bit off script and 
you are a bit like hey, hello, I didn’t say that. But I would say 
the vast majority will go through your statement. 
Regarding cross-examination, despite the assumption that cross-
examination might be more hostile, in fact, this was described as usually 
being an easier experience. This was explained as being because the point 
of questioning was clear to them, and they felt very comfortable defending 
their opinion. 
Int4: Again, I think it is easier, I think is much much easier 
because I think usually during a cross-examination they 
have a point. And you can get into a bit more of a discussion 
about things, so they are asking you questions, you are 
explaining your answers to the jury rather than just saying 
yes, no, maybe. Yeah, I personally, I don’t know about other 
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people, I personally find that much much easier to have 
something specific to talk about. 
Having said that, interviewees reported that sometimes some lines of 
questioning, particularly in cross-examination, made them anxious as to 
counsel’s objectives: 
Int10: And especially if they lead you down a certain line of 
questioning and you are always waiting for them to reach a 
conclusion and to spring that trap and for you to have a 
chance to answer it. But what is worse sometimes is when 
they lead you down a line of questioning and then they just 
stop and you don’t know what information you have given 
them, and how they will use it. 
Int4: You tend to when the defence first ask you tend to go 
oooh, right here we go and then you get half way through 
and you think oh fine, quite nerve wracking when they say 
oh we will come back to that, and you think gosh what have I 
just said. Or when they start reading if they go back to what 
you have been talking about and they start reading back to 
you what you have just said and you think please let me 
have said the right thing. 
Generally, though, interviewees reported that they did not experience 
aggressive questioning from the opposing counsel, although some 
suggested that this might be as much to do with opposing counsel making 
sure that they were seen to be reasonable. 
Int8: … (T)here is the sort of massive myth that the 
prosecutor will be lovely and the defence barrister will be 
horrible, but actually you know I found them both to be 
perfectly pleasant. 
Int2: But on the whole I think the cross-examination has 
been always respectable, respectful I should say. Some of 
them have been a bit more persistent you know and 
pressured, but they have never been you know outright rude 
or anything. And usually they are just trying to get 
clarification you know. 
Int9: Touch wood, I can honestly say I’ve never really had 
what I would consider a massively hard time in court. 
The preceding discussion described interviewees’ experience of examination 
and cross-examination in general, however interviewees were also asked 
about their perception of the efficiency of counsel in eliciting evidence. As 
will be detailed below, on the one hand, interviewees reported that they 
made a judgment on the evidence that they had ‘been allowed’ to give, and 
attempted to compensate where they felt that an incomplete picture had 
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been given. On the other hand, however, there were many examples of 
perceived ‘boundaries’ to this, that is to say, a limit to the degree to which 
the interviewee felt able to communicate or clarify their evidence. In these 
cases, interviewees described various rationalisations regarding the 
eventual outcome, or their response to the situation. 
It was mentioned in the previous chapter that, despite early pre-
suppositions, interviewees reported that they were not substantially involved 
in the development of the legal case. Despite this, it might have been 
supposed that there had been some co-ordination, or at least pre-
appearance contact with counsel regarding the direction of their case. It was 
mentioned above that most interviewees reported minimal contact with 
respective counsel before appearance in court, however we now examine 
interviewees’ views on the problems caused by that: 
Int9: … (a) pre-trial encounter to me is essential, and once 
or twice it has given me the ability to say has anything else 
come out at court that I am not aware of; and if it has you 
can turn round and say to them I am sorry but given what 
you are saying my evidence means nothing now… that’s 
why on occasions it is a case of excuse me, your honour, 
can I say something else. 
Int3: Where you know you are part way through giving 
evidence and you are asked a question where you have no 
idea of that part of the case because nobody has told you 
about it and that is the first time you are aware of it. 
Int9: I always if at all possible try to trip them up on the way 
into the court, you know hi I am here, to have at least a 
conversation with them. 
The examples above demonstrate that certainly from the interviewees’ 
perspective, lack of pre-trial contact with prosecutors presented real 
problems. As described below, interviewees reported problems with the 
‘correctness’ of presenting the DNA evidence, however, of more concern, 
they reported occasional scientific inaccuracy which they were not always 
able to correct. 
Counsel pursue legal truth, but this does not necessarily equate with 
scientific proof, for example, they may not have adduced evidence that was 
unhelpful to their case. However, it was hard to argue that confusion on the 
part of the expert, because of lack of information, was conducive to justice 
(or, indeed, necessarily furthered the respective party’s case). 
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The statement by one interviewee (Int9) that they ‘trip(ped) up counsel on 
the way to court’ could have been seen as a throwaway comment, however, 
it did accurately represent a feeling held by the majority of interviewees, that, 
although they would not have expected to have control, they did feel 
powerlessness regarding their ability to bring the scientific expertise to the 
service of the court. 
These observations went some way to explaining the general perception that 
interviewees described regarding their experience in giving evidence-in-chief 
(and indeed cross-examination). In fact, interviewees were consistent in 
describing the process in terms of both negotiating sometimes doubtful lines 
of questioning, and negotiating apparently strategic lines of questioning on 
the part of counsel. 
Int4: I think if you get simple evidence with a good barrister 
and a good scientist they will understand it. If you get really 
complex evidence with a bad scientist and a bad barrister 
they really won’t, and then you have got everything in the 
middle. 
The over-riding impression given by interviewees was that of finding a way 
of communicating their evidence whilst negotiating the constraints 
mentioned above, and placed on the process by an adversarial counsel, 
particularly by the fact that they were only allowed to answer the questions 
put to them: 
Int19: So it is a difficult thing because you are not allowed to 
make speeches… . 
Int12: We are only allowed to answer what they want us to 
answer. So in that sense the most successful trials are those 
where counsel and the expert are working well together, if 
one or the other is not good, then it is a major problem. 
Regarding counsels’ lines of questioning, some interviewees reported that 
sometimes it was straightforward to communicate the evidence to their 
satisfaction: 
Int7: Some barristers are easy to work with and it is a good 
experience; you can interact with them, you can present the 
evidence in a way that hopefully the jury can then make a 
decision which is ultimately your purpose, to present an 
unbiased view. 
However, this was not always the case: 
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Int7: … (sometimes) the barrister doesn’t seem to 
understand what information they want out of you so it’s very 
difficult. 
Int4: Whereas prosecution often… they don’t really have a 
point. Sometimes they will take you through this huge 
statement and there is only one item that is of interest, and it 
can just be a lot of yes, that is correct, yes that’s right, yes, 
and there is only so many times you can say yes without 
sounding quite odd. … sometimes it just gets a bit wishy 
washy. 
Being examined where the interviewees believed that the barrister did not 
have a clear direction was one thing, however, interviewees also described 
lines of questioning that did not make logical sense, for example, where it 
was apparent to the interviewee that the question being asked did not 
address the question of interest to the court: 
Int5: I say that because the prosecution sometimes ask you 
questions that don’t make any sense and I mean genuinely 
don’t make any sense. I mean I know that they can ask you 
questions that are relevant and you don’t understand the 
relevance, I am talking about questions that you think now 
don’t ask me that, you are going to make this more 
complicated than it needs to be… . 
Int12: …because the worst thing that can happen to you is 
you are in the box and your own counsel is … asking 
questions which are grammatically OK but they are 
meaningless. You know it is like is Tuesday married, that is 
grammatically correct but it makes no sense. 
Int7: And that was an example of being led down (the wrong 
path), in that case I did actually turn round and stop and said 
look I am not sure what your point is, but this result is 
meaningless and I can’t interpret it for these reasons, and 
therefore we shouldn’t take it any further. And he just got all 
flustered and sat down and that was it with the questioning, 
it stopped it. But that was an example of answering 
questions truthfully, being led down by the barrister who 
didn’t seem to know where he was going either, but almost 
leading you (to give) answers that were misleading in what 
you were giving, but actually didn’t mean anything at all 
anyway, and just needed just closing off. 
Defence experts did not express the same frustration, and indeed experts 
who had worked for both prosecution and defence felt that it was easier to 
give defence evidence because the direction of questioning was clear to 
them: 
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Int4: I sometimes think defence is easier because there is a 
point to it. So when you are on defence it is generally either 
the defence knows your opinion on something and they want 
to bring that out in court so you kind of know why you are 
there. Or there has been a disagreement so you have to go 
in and you just have to say what your views are, why you 
think them, the evidence behind that and to give your 
conclusions and that is it. 
In summary, interviewees identified that some lines of questioning were 
clear and relevant, and others were assumed to be so by the interviewees in 
the light of other evidence to which they were not privy. However, 
interviewees reported also that some lines of questioning betrayed either a 
lack of direction or a misunderstanding of the relevance of the evidence, or 
were simply incomprehensible to them. 
As a separate category, a number of interviewees observed that sometimes 
counsel’s line of questioning appeared be more related to a strategic 
approach than intended to be a simple method of eliciting testimony. Some 
of these strategies were regarded by interviewees as a legitimate part of the 
adversarial process with the objective of presenting the party’s best case, 
however other strategies were perceived as communicating an incomplete 
or misleading picture. The interviewees did not seem to regard these 
strategies, generally, as being ‘illegitimate’, presumably because they 
understood the adversarial nature of the process, however they did regard 
these as an additional obstacle which they had to surmount in order to 
discharge their responsibilities in terms of properly presenting their evidence. 
Some of these strategies will now be described, along with interviewees’ 
responses to these strategies. 
Regarding ‘legitimate’ strategies, experts made a number of observations 
regarding the way in which experts were used in court, as opposed to the 
elicitation of evidence from them. For example, interviewees stated that 
counsel commonly staged the timing of their witnesses: 
Int10: … they say you know I can take this witness up to 
coffee break and then I will be ready for the next witness. So 
it is very. very staged, very manipulated, and you know each 
barrister wants to use a witness to get the best of them and 
sometimes that is according to how long they’ll take, and 
how that fits in with the proceedings of the day. So you know 
you are part of that theatre and that game playing and role 
playing… . 
Many also observed that counsel sometimes called them simply to re-
energise their case and add interest for the jurors: 
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Int7: And other times I have been called literally because the 
jury are falling asleep they want to put a scientist in the box, 
and they want to try and spice the trial up a bit just to keep 
everyone awake and alert as to what is happening. 
However, a common theme mentioned by almost all interviewees was that 
they felt that frequently they had been asked to appear because of a 
presumed ‘CSI’ effect on the jury, including sometimes additionally the 
intention of underlining the strength of a case and the effort that had gone 
into building it by underlining the scientific elements of it: 
Int19: … defence are not really disputing anything you are 
saying but they want the impact of the jury to hear the 
scientist giving this evidence about we have found this, we 
have done that, we have looked at this, we have looked at 
that and we have got this, this, this and this. And it has got a 
very strong impact these days in the CSI era to know that 
the Crown has gone to some lengths to build a case around 
forensic evidence. 
It was mentioned above that interviewees clearly stated their prime 
responsibility to be presenting their evidence in a way which the jury could 
understand. Despite the pre-supposition that interviewees might have 
perceived juries as ill-equipped to deal with DNA evidence, in fact, they 
generally felt that a typical jury was familiar with the principles of DNA 
evidence: 
Int19: I think properly presented as it is a jury should be able 
to understand the basics of DNA and I know people tend to 
sort of pooh pooh popular television, you know CSI and 
things like that and say it has created false expectations 
about what science can do in criminal things. But what it also 
has done is it has put into people’s awareness these things 
so now most people you don’t have to explain DNA because 
most people get it, they know what it is and they know what 
it can do and they know the basics and it is not some new-
fangled thing that they have never heard of. 
Regarding more complex DNA evidence, however, interviewees started from 
a position of concern that a lay jury may be unable to understand DNA 
evidence, especially given the current technological advances: 
Int25: … some parts of the evidence these days it is … at 
that level where even as simple as you can possibly make it, 
it might not be understood by the greater part of the 
population. 
Int14: When it gets more complicated, I think it becomes 
really, really tough for (the jury). And I do worry that they 
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don’t necessarily have the opportunity in court to have it 
explained at sufficient levels for them to actually understand 
the real issues. Things can happen quite quickly in court 
when you are being questioned and I think the problem is 
that because the barristers are such clever people they can 
grasp a point that you are talking about much quicker than 
the average jury member. 
Many interviewees also started from a point of concern that the jury may be 
prejudicially influenced by the simple fact of a match particularly given the 
large random match probabilities quoted (one in a billion as standard). 
Specifically, interviewees were concerned that, firstly, the jury confused 
weight of evidence with probability of guilt (the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’): 
Int9: It is very very difficult, very difficult. And I think the jury 
don’t understand the concept, I think they immediately do 
what the barrister does and they immediately say well it is 
his blood then. 
Int6: I think everyone takes it as a billion times more likely it 
is from him even though that is not what we are saying. But I 
think however carefully we phrase it, I don’t think people 
hear it any differently. 
Secondly, that they believed that such overwhelming numbers must mean 
something (otherwise why would the prosecution be quoting them?): 
Int7: DNA is still seen as the Holy Grail if you like, because if 
you have got a full DNA profile it is incredibly powerful and 
there is still quite a lot of misunderstanding as to what it 
actually means, so it probably carries a lot more weight than 
it should. 
Int16: So in a courtroom people are putting weight on, you 
know significant weight, certainly jury members, on a 
person’s DNA profile being detected on an item, means they 
must have touched it, means they must have held it, means 
they must have used it as a weapon. 
Thirdly, that the jury did not always understand the specific nature of the 
question being addressed, or at least would be improperly influenced in their 
reasoning upon this due to the prejudicial fact of the match. As a simple 
example of this, interviewees were concerned that the jury may not have 
realised that the fact of a match might not be disputed, despite the 
prosecution’s presentation of a match statistic, and the question at issue 
might be how the defendant’s DNA came to be at the crime scene, or which 
tissue type it originated from (neither of which considerations should be 
associated with the one in a billion match probability). 
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Further, interviewees were also concerned that the jury may not realise that 
questions of transfer and persistence were not usually addressed by 
rigorous scientific database as used for simple DNA matches, and the 
evidence presented to them was simply the opinion of the expert. This is 
explored in detail in Chapter Seven.  
Interviewees did, however, mention counsel strategies that they believed 
were counter-productive to the proper presentation and examination of DNA 
evidence, albeit with the intention of building a stronger case. Some of these 
will be described below. 
Firstly, regarding lines of questioning. It was mentioned above that 
interviewees noted that counsel sometimes pursued apparently pointless 
lines of questioning, ascribing this to misunderstanding or lack of 
preparation. However, in other cases, interviewees stated that sometimes a 
line of questioning was apparently aimed at imparting (or, at least reckless 
as to) a fallacious message: 
Int4: … they want the jury to see it because the jury will 
believe something from it but actually scientifically it doesn’t 
make sense. So for example if drugs wraps are taken from a 
suspect, if the policeman picks the drugs wraps out of the 
pocket the prosecution might still do DNA work to show the 
suspect’s DNA is on it. Well the policeman has pulled it out 
of his pocket, you don’t need that DNA work to be done. 
Int16: (Where drug wraps with Mr X’s DNA were found in Mr 
X’s pocket) you just get ‘it matches … Mr X – and with a 
probability of der der der der de’. So that almost hints that 
there is some evidence against that person. 
Int25: Yeah and I think that is a part that myself and a lot of 
colleagues struggle with a lot of times is the questions that 
they are asking. When we come back with ‘the answer I am 
going to give you doesn’t assist’ or ‘you are asking the 
wrong question’, … they will still use the result and say that it 
indicates one way or the other. And it is up to the defence to 
be sufficiently switched on to (adequately respond). 
These examples return to the concern of the interviewees that the jury may 
not have understood properly how the DNA evidence related to the question 
at issue. In these examples the fact of a DNA match was not at issue 
(indeed it was expected – in the example above, the defendant’s DNA was 
found on an item found in the defendant’s pocket), and interviewees implied 
that counsel’s intention was to imply that the DNA match implied the answer 
to another question, that is, at the level of action or indeed guilt of the crime. 
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In the first example above, the interviewee indicated that not only was this a 
scientifically and evidentially irrelevant line of questioning, but that 
unnecessary forensic work had been done to achieve it, although Int4 went 
on to point out that this was sometimes ‘defensive’ in nature: 
Int4: At the same time if the prosecution hadn’t done work on 
a case the defence might say we want to prove his DNA isn’t 
on it, … scientifically both those two things as far as I am 
concerned aren’t helpful to the case but both sides would 
see the effect of that on the jury and they think the jury could 
make decisions even though scientifically it doesn’t mean 
anything. 
The observation by interviewees that prosecution counsel apparently tried to 
underline the point that there was DNA evidence, however much that 
evidence may not be probative, was of particular concern because of the 
interviewees’ perception of the strength of DNA evidence in the jury’s mind: 
Int17: … you see how heavily the jury can rely… on DNA 
evidence, it can be a bit scary sometimes because it is so 
strong as evidence, it can be seen as so irrefutable, and it is 
such a powerful tool…  if you have a case that is so heavily 
reliant on DNA over everything else, so we have got like a 
single plank kind of case, then that is when problems can 
occur. Not in terms of how it got there, but just the fact you 
have got a DNA profile… . 
A minority of interviewees described what they regarded as illegitimate 
tactics on the part of the opposing counsel. One prosecution expert 
described a situation in which he, as prosecution expert, appeared to be 
being pressurised by the defence counsel into making a mistake in his 
testimony (that is, fallacious reasoning): 
Int7: In that case the defence barrister, he tried every tactic 
in the book just to dislodge me, just to try and get me to say 
something that wasn’t correct… and tried to lead me down 
lots of paths. So ye(s), you do have that quite a lot… . 
On the part of the prosecution, interviewees reported that counsel would 
avoid any explicit fallacious statement, on the basis that it would potentially 
form grounds for appeal. It should be noted, however, that fallacious 
reasoning in the form of over-reliance on DNA evidence (put rather 
simplistically: ‘there is a DNA match, it must mean something or they 
wouldn’t present it’ or, alarmingly, ‘s/he must be guilty’), is not the same 
thing as the explicit ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ and would not give grounds for 
appeal on the same basis. Even so, interviewees did, however, state that 
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prosecution counsel did sometimes still appear to fall into the ‘prosecutor’s 
fallacy’: 
Int10: Yes, they (counsel) very very frequently transpose the 
conditional, and although you try to correct it and say it in the 
correct way, I don’t think they understand the subtlety… . 
Int9: … you are saying it in the right and proper way, 
avoiding the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’, and the barrister will say 
so what you are saying is….and you’ll go no, I am not, what I 
am saying is that the matching results….and they 
immediately fall into the fallacy, and saying so what you are 
saying is that the semen stain is a billion times more likely 
that this semen stain has come from him. No, no I am not 
saying that, I am talking about …the likelihood of the 
matching profiles having originated from someone else other 
than… . 
Indeed, a number of interviewees stated that, in a number of these case, it 
appeared that counsel were deliberately trying to lead the expert into a 
statement close to that of a ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ without it being explicitly so: 
Int9: … and they want you to say something short and 
snappy. I can’t, I have to be… at least two or three 
occasions I have said we have to be very careful how we 
express this because forensic scientists have been criticised 
in the past for misleading the jury… And you can see almost 
like a glint in their eye and it is like is this what you are trying 
to get me to (say)… I do think some barristers are a bit 
naughty trying to trip people up because that is not going to 
assist the jury. 
These quotes are particularly interesting because in these cases it was the 
counsel who had called the expert who was perceived as attempting to lead 
the expert towards the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’, presumably with the intention of 
not stepping right over the line. Interviewees explained that it was possible to 
imply the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ into the jury’s mind, without it being explicitly 
fallacious: 
Int6: Yes, and I think as a scientist you are trained so much 
not to do it, but in the end I don’t think the jury particularly 
hears the difference …  because I think everyone takes it as 
a billion times more likely it is from him even though that is 
not what we are saying. But I think however carefully we 
phrase it I don’t think people hear it any differently. 
Int21: And I think that sometimes the number itself becomes 
the evidence and the juries don’t perceive the difference 
between the probability of the evidence and the probability of 
guilt. 
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Returning to the subject of simple DNA matches, even assuming that the 
jury understood the DNA evidence and the nature of the question which it 
addressed, interviewees expressed concern regarding the influence on the 
jury of the specific words used (for example, ‘could have contributed’ or 
‘cannot be excluded’). In some cases, this may have been agreed by experts 
prior to the case: 
Int17: I remember we literally spent the whole day arguing 
the toss over one word to say that more likely or as likely, 
just that kind of an issue of wording means, to have that 
reported to the jury… . 
However, interviewees still expressed concerns regarding the effect in court 
of whatever specific form of words was eventually presented to the jury. 
Given all these concerns, many interviewees reported that they attempted to 
gauge jury understanding and indeed interpreted body language displayed 
by the jury at face value: 
Int9: So when you talk about your interpretation it is always 
good to see somebody nodding because you think oh 
somebody is with me. … you know that they are following 
you. 
Int1: Yes, it is nice, I always try to sort of make eye contact 
with the jury and occasionally you can sense how well it is 
going because you will see someone in the jury kind of 
nodding and understanding what you are saying. That 
doesn’t happen in every case but I love it when that does 
happen, it is a good feeling because it makes me think that I 
have done a good job in explaining this. But there are some 
cases when it doesn’t happen or you just don’t know, you 
have no concept. 
Int4: I mean it is lovely, you can see juries sitting sometimes 
just looking at you and nodding as you are talking, you know 
it is absolutely fantastic. And other times certainly if you are 
going through a long prosecution statement you can almost 
see them nodding off … frankly you feel like clapping your 
hands and saying come on, stay with me, if I have to do this, 
you do! 
Int17: … you know sometimes you see juries you know you 
can see their eyes and they have completely glazed over 
and you think… . 
Whether or not someone nodding or indeed nodding off is a good indicator 
of comprehension is arguable. Indeed, in many ways, this observation, by a 
number of interviewees, was rather surprising: at an intuitive level, one might 
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assume that in the course of day to day communication, one party might 
gain a grasp of another party’s comprehension of statements made. 
However, the assumptions that would have to be made in order to show that 
this was also true in the course of communicating evidence to a jury at trial 
would seem to be considerable. Further, it would seem surprising that, given 
the interviewees’ significant scientific expertise, that they would think it so. At 
best, a nod from a juror might indicate real comprehension, at worst it could 
signify complete false comprehension, or indeed even be unrelated to the 
testimony at hand. 
Be that as it may many interviewees reported that they actively responded to 
apparent jury comprehension (or lack of) in the way that they presented their 
evidence: 
Int9: Whereas if you see like a puzzled expression you might 
give a longer more enhanced answer to a question that you 
are asked, or you might try and incorporate an answer to 
that question with another question later on. So you have to 
be quite good at sort of reading them. 
Several interviewees mentioned that jurors had the opportunity to ask 
questions of the expert. On pursuing this apparent ‘inquisitorial’ feature of 
the trial, it transpired that such questions were infrequent, passed via the 
judge, and usually concerned minor clarifications or repeats of previously 
given evidence. There were no reports of more substantial questions for 
example, regarding how DNA evidence should logically impact the case. 
To conclude, interviewees reported that, although for less experienced 
witnesses, appearing in the witness box have been nerve-wracking, in 
general, they did not find it a stressful experience. They reported sometimes 
persistent questioning, but not aggressively so. Interestingly, they reported 
that cross-examination was, if anything, easier than examination in chief, 
they felt, because the direction of questioning was clear to them. 
If anything, for prosecution experts, this was the most commonly mentioned 
source of frustration. Despite the fact that questioning may not have been 
‘stressful’ this did not mean that they understood the line of questioning, or 
believed that it allowed them to give clear evidence necessarily. The 
purpose of some lines of questioning remained a mystery to them, and 
others they believed were potentially misleading, sometimes illegitimately so. 
Many interviewees stated that, although they understood that counsel took a 
necessarily partisan stance, some lines of questioning betrayed a lack of 
understanding. They believed that this could have been prevented, and the 
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quality of their evidence improved, if they had had the opportunity to speak 
to counsel before the trial. Indeed, they reported a surprising lack of contact 
before the trial, and in a number of cases stated that the first time they met 
their instructing counsel was when they were answering questions in the 
witness box. Defence experts did not state the same frustrations, 
presumably because they tended to have been more involved in the cases in 
which they appeared. 
Another key contributory factor to interviewees’ frustration at presenting 
evidence was the fact that they could only answer questions that were asked 
of them, and could not state the evidence in the way that they would like. 
They accepted, however, that this was a necessary constraint of the 
adversarial trial. 
Lastly, all interviewees were particularly concerned regarding their ability 
within the adversarial trial to give their testimony accurately, because they 
felt that the complexity of DNA evidence was now such that it had become, 
on occasion, very difficult for the lay person to understand. 
6.8 Interviewees’ Compensatory Behaviour 
Given on the one hand, the interviewees’ clear views on their role and 
responsibilities in court, and on the other, the interviewees’ observations 
regarding the way in which DNA evidence may potentially have been 
misunderstood, or indeed presented in a way that deliberately or otherwise, 
led to misunderstanding, it was not surprising that interviewees described 
strategies that they applied in court in order to correct what they saw as 
erroneous uses of DNA evidence. It should be noted that these perceived 
erroneous uses were described on the part of both prosecution and defence 
counsels, as well as other experts.  Examples of such behaviours are 
described and discussed below. Of particular concern was the observation 
that, although interviewees felt that generally they were able to convey their 
evidence in the way in which they would like, this was only whilst they were 
in the witness box. 
Another important issue was interviewees’ behaviours on encountering 
‘boundary’ conditions, that is to say situations in which they found 
themselves to have no control over the presentation of DNA evidence to the 
court, either because of court procedure, or through the exigencies of the 
adversarial trial. 
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Although generally speaking, it did not appear to interviewees that counsel 
tried to use unfair questioning tactics (that is, ‘trick questions’), and that 
counsel might have appeared more persistent where they wanted to push for 
clarification, interviewees did report that they needed to maintain focus: 
Int11: I think the thing to remember is that barristers are 
trickier than a barrel load of monkeys, they are bright people. 
So if you do say anything that is not quite right they will pick 
you up. But they won’t pick you up straightaway necessarily; 
they will come back to it. 
Int10: Yeah, I think sometimes you would like to know where 
they are going with your evidence because they may take 
what you say and then interpret that in a particular way. 
Whereas if you knew what they were doing with it then you 
might have a chance to say yes, that is right, or no, your 
understanding is wrong. Because they have taken almost 
some sort of factual information from you and then they are 
going to interpret that and then maybe represent it to the jury 
in a particular way, and you haven’t had a chance to know 
quite what they are going to do with it. 
Interviewees also reported that had to remain firm and fall back on their 
training if they felt that they were being pushed into a corner: 
Int11: … he said: ‘Mr Int11 if you just answered yes or no to 
my questions we would get through your evidence a lot 
quicker.’ I said, I am just ensuring that none of my…that my 
answers don’t mislead the jury. And then he said are you 
suggesting I am trying to mislead the jury, and one of the 
jurors said ‘yeah’. 
Interviewees were specifically asked whether they felt constrained within the 
court as to the evidence they would like to give. All interviewees stated that 
they were trained to appeal to the judge where they felt that their evidence 
might have been incorrectly construed, or that they would like to correct a 
previous incorrect statement: 
Int21: Yes, I think that falls under the responsibility of an 
expert witness… you might have to say excuse me, My 
Lord, I think perhaps I can assist the court here. You might 
be told to shut up, but you know. And similarly if you’ve got a 
barrister who says I just want a yes or no answer… you just 
say I am terribly sorry, My Lord, whilst Mr such and such 
might like yes or no I don’t think it is that black and white and 
I really need to explain the background. 
(Regarding the training referred to, although expert witness training was not 
addressed within the interview, a number of interviewees with an FSS 
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background volunteered that they had undergone specific training as 
reporting scientists. This included case management and course 
presentation. Typically this took place after approximately two years’ 
experience as forensic scientist, and was of four weeks’ duration spread 
over one year). 
Furthermore, they stated that, although a judge may rule some of their 
testimony inadmissible for reasons that they disagreed with, they had never 
been in a position or foresaw the position where the judge did not allow 
clarification on their part. 
Similarly, they reported that they were trained not to be hurried into answers 
without due consideration, nor to be forced to answers lying outside of their 
expertise. Furthermore, they were trained not to be forced to compromise 
their evidence in response to a demand for yes/ no answers. They did, 
however, point out that the confidence to take such a stand only arose with 
experience: 
Int6: I think you can feel constrained, it is a very intimidating 
atmosphere, especially the first few times you give evidence, 
your main focus is getting through it rather than how well you 
do it… I think the first few times you do it you are probably 
less likely to (speak up). And I think it is quite an alien 
environment for a scientist to then be expected to be able to 
present which you are not naturally gifted at… . 
Generally, therefore, interviewees stated that they had never been in a 
position where they were not able to correct a misconception whilst they 
were in the witness box, and most stated that in practice there was no 
problem correcting or clarifying their evidence, or claiming lack of expertise. 
An interesting qualification arose, however, in that a significant number of 
interviewees regarded a more significant constraint to be the fact that they 
sometimes felt unable to provide balanced testimony. For example, one 
interviewee reported a case in which the prosecution (who had called him) 
had suggested that the defendant had been involved in a kicking attack, the 
DNA being found matching that of the defendant. Defence failed to present 
alternative scenarios, such as the defendant being a bystander. In this case, 
the interviewee stated that he felt that it was his professional duty to balance 
the evidence accordingly: 
Int19: … if I feel that the prosecution barrister is eliciting from 
me unbalanced testimony I will often rectify it myself rather 
than wait for the defence to pick up on the point because I 
don’t see myself as a puppet to be played to get the 
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prosecution-only story over. And if the defence is inept 
sometimes I will try and rectify the balance myself… . 
His opinion, however, was that not every expert in this position would do 
this: 
Int19: I don’t know how many other experts would have 
the… would step outside it like that. I feel that not many 
would, that they would just go in and answer the questions 
put to them and walk out if that means an unbalanced or 
one-sided view of the world is perpetuated as a result then 
that is a weakness in the system not any responsibility for 
them. 
A second factor qualifying the ability to present a balanced picture arose in 
the fact that this ability to clarify was limited, in that their contribution was 
limited to answering questions that they were asked whilst in the witness 
box. Interviewees typically reported that they attempted to clarify earlier 
parts of their testimony by waiting for a subsequent question that would 
allow this: 
Int7: I have had that and you always do your best to try and 
get the conversation round so that you can answer it. 
An example of the explicit attempt to provide balanced testimony was given 
by an interviewee who indicated that he was actively considering at which 
point he would be able to make the points he wanted: 
Int19: And if they are already on cross you might not get 
another chance to put the balance in… . 
A number of interviewees reported that, if they felt that specific points had 
not been made, then they raised it with their counsel rather than with the 
court: 
Int22: … yes, I suppose it is difficult to know why didn’t they 
ask me that when maybe there is a good reason to. Yeah if 
you have pointed out to them that it is something they could 
ask, then it is up to them. 
Informing counsel of concerns might have been considered to be an 
additional compensatory behaviour, however it might be argued that this was 
less concerned with compensating in the courtroom itself than rationalisation 
of a challenge that the witness felt unable to correct whilst in court. On that 
basis, this observation is examined in more detail in Chapter Seven, in 
discussing various rationalisations voiced by interviewees in the face of 
apparently insurmountable challenges. Needless to say, there were some 
potentially troubling implications. 
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Of course, no witness is able to intervene at any time other than while they 
are giving testimony. However, it will be recalled that expert witnesses are 
permitted to be in court whilst not giving testimony, and it was reported as 
common for defence experts to be in court simply to listen to the prosecution 
expert and to pass questions to defence counsel.  
Int3: And I have seen some evidence given where you know 
writer’s cramp because there is so much that you could 
challenge but of course verbally you can’t say a thing 
although you are listening to these howlers in court. You 
know that is the system. 
Int15: … my blood pressure has been sky high just listening 
to another expert say things that I really believe are not true. 
And to listen to that and not be able to respond in any way is 
extremely frustrating. 
There is no system for the expert to insist that their counsel takes notice or 
raises to the court’s notice any points that the expert raised outside of 
evidence in chief, or cross-examination. 
Int12: I frequently sit behind counsel but it is kind of difficult 
when he is in mid-flow and he has got his strategy and all 
the rest of it. I have learnt that, you have got to usually give 
the post-it to junior counsel and then junior counsel decides 
whether it goes to counsel and so on, and frequently he 
misunderstands what is on the post-it. 
In summary, interviewees reported that, although they felt that they had no 
personal problem in ensuring that the evidence they gave was presented 
accurately, there were certain caveats. Particularly they stated that they 
believed that this came with experience, and that it was necessary to 
overcome the temptation simply to answer questions and no more. A 
significant number of interviewees stated that, in addition to ensuring that 
their evidence was accurate and not misstated, they attempted to ‘balance’ 
the testimony, if they felt that it was not balanced. 
However, interviewees were clear that they were powerless to correct any 
misleading testimony if they were not in the witness box, and, of course, had 
no control over the use that their evidence was put to when they were not in 
court. 
6.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has pursued the second central line of investigation within the 
study, that is, the investigation of a range of reported ‘trial pathologies’. 
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It will be recalled that this term refers specifically to a model, defined by 
Nelken, in which dysfuntions between the law and science in court could be 
reduced to individual ‘trial pathologies’, as opposed to science and law being 
described as ‘competing institutions’ or ‘incompatible discourses’.14 
In Chapter Two, recent commentary was discussed that listed commonly 
quoted ‘pathologies’, but, at the same time, made a case that many 
pathologies may be misunderstood, and may be better understood as 
features of a functioning adversarial system. 
The current chapter sought to describe experts’ perceptions of pathologies 
that may distort their ability to testify as to DNA evidence, strategies that 
they used to attempt to overcome the challenges presented by such 
pathologies, and whether they believed these to be effective. It also sought 
to identify whether DNA testimony presented any exceptions to previously 
reported studies on expert evidence in court. Most significantly it attempts to 
identify potential impacts on justice. 
The finding that experts attended court in only a small proportion of the 
cases in which they were involved, mirrored the findings reported in earlier 
studies.15 Regarding defence experts, previous studies reported that they 
were called in a smaller proportion of times than prosecution. This was 
strictly true in the current study also, however, in the current study, where a 
defence expert was instructed, they actually attended court in a larger 
proportion of times than prosecution, but in only in the capacity of advisors.  
This finding underlined an important qualification of this and similar studies. 
Whilst the findings may contribute to knowledge of the forensic expert’s 
experience in court, it could, only indirectly, generate knowledge regarding 
the use of DNA evidence in court generally. An assumption that, in the 
absence of an expert witness, their written statement was read out, and 
accepted, seemed logical, but the truth of this assumption remained 
unknown. Interviewees reported frustration at witnessing perceived misuse 
of scientific evidence whilst they were in court, however, arguably, they 
should, perhaps, have expressed greater concern regarding why they were 
sometimes not called to court in apparently contentious cases. 
                                            
14 David Nelken, ‘A Just Measure of Science’ in Michael Freeman, Helen 
Reece (eds), Science In Court (Ashgate, 1998) 14-18. 
15 Roberts Study (n 11). 
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The importance of a pre-trial discussion between experts has been 
underlined in case law,16 and by the Law Commission Report on Expert 
Evidence.17 Additionally, it was suggested, in evidence to the House Of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee that the Crown Prosecution 
Service considered that the provision for a court-ordered meeting within the 
Criminal Procedure Rules acted to alleviate many of the problems with 
forensic evidence that the Law Commission Report identified.18 
Previous studies offer no basis for comparison. The Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice Report ‘Role of Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings’19 predated the provision for a ‘part 19.6’ expert discussion,20 
however it did describe informal contact between experts, and counsel-
controlled defence examinations.21 The description of such meetings within 
the Roberts study suggested that they were carried out partly in order to 
comply with disclosure requirements, but also to further perceived 
adversarial advantage. The identification and agreement of issues at dispute 
did not appear to be a primary purpose.22 The study determined that in such 
meetings, most experts felt bound to conform with their adversarial role.23 
The Sallavaci study did not address pre-trial meetings of experts. 
It was evident in the current study that the ‘defence examination’ has now 
apparently become routine. It also now (unlike as reported in the Roberts 
Study) has a clear purpose and content, in that it is not controlled by 
counsel, and that it was purely for disclosure of evidence, and not for 
discussion of points at issue. However, that is not to say that the current 
study uncovered a more ‘collaborative’ approach: mirroring an example in 
the Roberts Study, the current study uncovered an example (detailed in 
Chapter Five) of the prosecution commissioning more work after leakage of 
a defence argument to the prosecution expert. 
The Criminal Procedure Rules state that a ‘part 19.6’ meeting would be 
court-ordered, and between experts. The rules do not state that counsel 
                                            
16 Reed (n 4) [129 – 130]. 
17 Law Commission Report (n 9) para 7.52. 
18 HC Forensic Science Report Evidence (n 5). 
19 Roberts Study (n 11) 141. 
20 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19.6. 
21 Roberts Study (n 11) 108-114. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid 108. 
- 234 - 
should not be present,24 however case law suggests that, preferably, 
counsel did not attend.25 In the current study there were a few examples 
given of counsel-driven and controlled meetings, but, significantly 
interviewees stated that expert alone meetings were rare in the extreme. 
Interestingly, there was still some evidence of informal contacts driven 
through the defence expert. This did not happen for prosecution experts, 
who appeared to remain reactive. Interestingly, most interviewees, when 
asked about pre-trial discussions, described alternative meetings with their 
own counsel, or, occasionally with the opposing expert but with counsel 
present. 
Perhaps of more concern was the fact that only a minority of interviewees 
even understood the provision for such meetings, or, if they were aware, 
how they should be organised and managed. Interestingly, the Forensic 
Regulator’s Information on Legal Obligations itself, (published since the 
empirical part of this study), stated the legal provision for such meetings, but 
gave no guidance as to how these should be organised or managed.26 
Indeed, a significant number of interviewees suggested even that contact 
between opposing experts before trial was somehow ‘illicit’. 
The Criminal Procedure Rules state that the discussion should be court-
ordered, however it was apparent from the preceding paragraphs that this 
was not taking place. As stated in R v Henderson, ‘Generally, it will be 
necessary that the court directs a meeting of experts so that a statement can 
be prepared of areas of agreement and disagreement’.27 Despite the fact 
that in R v Reed,28 the judge decried excuses on the part of experts, that 
they didn’t have time for such a meeting, the judicial will required, as 
reported by interviewees in the current study, appeared equally to be so far 
absent. 
The question remained as to whether the absence of such pre-trial 
discussion was important. This study suggested that it was very important. 
Interviewees described great concern that DNA evidence had not been 
                                            
24 The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015,  pt 19.6 (2). 
25 R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, [2010] 2 Cr App R 24 [210]. 
26 Forensic Science Regulator, Legal Obligations, FSR-I-400, Issue 3, 2015, 
[8.21]. 
27 Henderson (n 25) (italics added). 
28 David Reed, Terence Reed, R v Neil Garmson [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 
WL 4872664, [131] (vi). 
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properly understood in court. Interviewees indicated that, in the absence of 
information regarding the context in which the DNA evidence was being 
adduced, it was impossible for them always to be sure what the issues at 
dispute were, never mind to be able to give accurate evidence probative of 
that. It is hard to imagine a type of expert evidence for which a pre-trial 
discussion of opposing experts would be more useful. As stated in 
Henderson, ‘Absent a careful record of the true issues in the case, it is 
difficult to see how the trial can be properly conducted or the jury properly 
guided as to the rational route to a conclusion.’.29 It may be convincingly 
argued that this was never less important than for DNA matches. 
Previous studies, including Roberts, Wheate, Henderson, Sallavaci, and 
others, have consistently reported limited, or no, contact with counsel prior to 
the trial itself.30 Indeed, first contact has frequently been reported as being 
when under examination. Even in studies of lay witnesses, such as in the 
Franklyn31  and Hamlyn32 studies, contact between witnesses, including 
victims even, and counsel has generally been attenuated or absent. 
Previous studies have concerned themselves, largely, with expert evidence 
in general. It might have been expected that, with the great complexity of 
DNA evidence, counsel may have a need for greater contact with their 
expert, however, the findings reported in this chapter showed that this is far 
from the case. Even in high profile cases, contact between expert and 
counsel appeared minimal. Interviewees reported that contact might typically 
                                            
29 Henderson (n 25). 
30 Roberts Study (n 11) 57 – 63; Rhonda Wheate, ‘Australian Forensic 
Scientists: A View from the Witness Box’ (2008) 40:2 Australian Journal of 
Forensic Sciences 126 (Wheate Study); Emily Henderson and Fred 
Seymour, ‘Expert Witnesses under Examination in the New Zealand 
Criminal and Family Courts’ (The Law Foundation, New Zealand 2013) ch 3 
para 3.1.3 (Henderson Report); Oriola Sallavaci, The Impact of Scientific 
Evidence on the Criminal Trial: The Case of DNA Evidence (Routledge 
2014) 77. 
31 Ramona Franklyn, Satisfaction and Willingness to Engage with the 
Criminal Justice System: Findings from the Witness and Victim Experience 
Survey, 2009–10 (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/12, February 2012) 
para 3.3, 26-27. 
32 Becky Hamlyn and others, ‘Are Special Measures Working?: Evidence 
from Surveys of Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses’ (Home Office 
Research Study 283, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate June 2004) 45. 
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be just for a few minutes outside the court room, and, often, there might be 
no contact at all before the expert was called to testify. 
Interviewees expressed frustration at often not understanding lines of 
questioning that they were subjected to, and not being asked the questions 
that they believed would draw out the ‘right’ evidence. Most interviewees 
stated that they found the experience of examination by their own counsel 
much more difficult than cross-examination, simply because they understood 
the line of questioning that defence presented them with. In the Roberts 
Study, it was reported that experts attempted to gather case information 
through informal channels,33 however there was no evidence of this 
occurring in the current study. From the defence perspective, experts did not 
state such concerns, possibly reflecting the report in the Roberts Study that 
defence teams apparently worked as a more coherent unit.34 One 
prosecution interviewee in the current study reported that they tried to ‘trip 
up’ counsel outside the court, however, this could certainly be described as 
dysfunctional in terms of a reliable expert-counsel discussion method. 
The question arises as to the impact of such poor pre-trial contact between 
counsel and prosecution expert. This study would suggest the potential 
impact to be great. Interviewees pointed out the great and increasing 
complexity of DNA evidence, and the associated challenges of 
communicating this to a lay jury. For reasons of either simply lack of 
comprehension, or, on occasion, reasons of adversarial advantage, they 
reported examples in which, sometimes probative evidence had not been 
adduced, and, perhaps worse, non-probative evidence had been adduced. 
There was no apparent upside to lack of counsel contact. In the Roberts 
Study counsel stated that they might sometimes avoid contact on the basis 
that they did not want to be seen to influence the expert adversely,35 
however interviewees did not identify that as a factor within the current 
study. However, it seems true to say that lack of contact between expert and 
counsel can only detract further from jury understanding of complex DNA 
evidence. 
In considering interviewees’ experiences of appearing in the witness box, it 
should be borne in mind that many of the points raised applied only to the 
prosecution expert. As described above, not only did the defence expert 
                                            
33 Roberts Study (n 11) 138. 
34 ibid 140. 
35 Roberts Study (n 11) 138. 
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enter the witness box less often, but, because the defence team appeared to 
work more consistently as a team, many of the frustrations described, below, 
by prosecution experts, did not apply. Regarding the general experience of 
testifying, interviewees with less experience reported that they found the 
experience to be very stressful, however this did appear to be more in 
connection with their anticipated appearance, rather than their actual 
experience under examination. In the witness box itself, most interviewees 
reported that they were treated respectfully and fairly, and were simply 
asked to read their report or to answer questions. A small number of defence 
experts did report, however, that they had experienced what they felt to be 
unfair questioning, which they perceived was aimed at undermining their 
qualifications and therefore credibility. In any case, all interviewees stated 
that they had never faced aggressive questioning, however some ascribed 
this to the desire of counsel not to appear to be unfair, rather than to any 
ethical consideration! 
Interestingly, reports within the current study were at odds with reports in 
most other previously reported studies. For example, in Wheate, cross-
examination was described as ‘gleeful, rude, sarcastic and offensive’.36 In 
Henderson, experts described the environment as ‘very, very threatening’, 
‘intimidating’, and ‘distressing’,37 with experts unwilling to appear unless 
necessary. Studies of lay witnesses, too, have reported the trial process to 
be difficult for the witness, being described as ‘terrifying’, ‘intimidating’, 
‘confusing’ and ‘stressful’ in the Riding study.38 
DNA evidence is scientifically rigorous, unlike most other forms of expert or 
other evidence. The fact that, on this basis, it presents a ‘harder target’ than 
more subjective (for example, medical), evidence, may be a contributory 
factor in explaining the generally easier experience reported by this study’s 
participants. However the explanation is likely to be multifactorial. 
Most interviewees stated that they found cross-examination to be easier 
than examination in chief, because, they stated, the line of questioning was 
clear to them. In a significant number of cases, interviewees reported that 
lines of questioning were unclear, and it was not always clear how far they 
were expected to go, or, with open questions, what was expected of them. 
                                            
36 Wheate Study (n 30). 
37 Henderson Report (n 30) ch 2 para 2.2.1. 
38 Allison Riding, ‘The Crown Court Witness Service: Little Help in the 
Witness Box’ (1999) 38.4 The Howard Journal 411, 411. 
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Also, they sometimes found that lines of questioning sometimes abruptly 
terminated without apparent resolution. Interviewees presented a number of 
explanations for this impression. There were clear examples, in their opinion, 
of cases in which it had become obvious that counsel did not understand the 
evidence; in other cases, it appeared that counsel was using the DNA 
evidence for adversarial effect, for example, by implying it had greater 
significance than it actually did. Beyond this point, however, interviewees 
simply assumed that the questions must have had a significance to the case, 
for reasons to which the expert was not privy. 
Whether interviewees felt that counsel had not allowed them to present the 
DNA evidence in a clear way; whether they felt that counsel had deliberately 
(and sometimes illegitimately) used the evidence for adversarial gain, or 
whether they felt that defence cross-examination had not adequately 
exposed flaws in the evidence, interviewees shared great concern that DNA 
evidence was not properly presented to, or understood by the jury. 
These findings closely mirrored those from previous studies. In Wheate, it 
will be recalled that forensic scientists suggested that counsel appeared 
incompetent in terms of examination and cross-examination, however 
suggested that sometimes this apparent incompetence appeared deliberate 
(for example, to leave a false impression in the jury’s mind).39 A very similar 
finding was reported in Henderson, in which medical experts reported similar 
apparent incompetence, especially stating that, in their opinion, important 
evidence had not been elicited.40 In the Roberts Study, interviewees 
reported finding themselves drawn into counsel’s adversarial strategies 
against their will. Interestingly, in studies of lay witnesses, similar findings 
were reported. In Hamlyn, for example, 57% of witnesses stated that they 
were unable to say everything that they would have liked.41 
All interviewees stated that they would have (and had had) no hesitation in 
correcting any misunderstandings regarding their evidence, whilst under 
examination, but stated that this confidence came with experience. Again, 
this closely mirrored the findings in previous studies. For example, in both 
the Roberts and Henderson studies, interviewees reported that the 
confidence to challenge came with experience.42 In any case, however, 
                                            
39 Wheate Study (n 30) 131 – 132. 
40 Henderson Report (n 30) ch 3 para 3.1.3. 
41 Hamlyn (n 32) 51. 
42 Roberts Study (n 11) 36; Henderson Report (n 30) para 3.4.2. 
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interviewees within this and previous studies stated that their major 
frustration was the inability to clarify when they were not in the witness box, 
and feared for the use to which their evidence would be put once they were 
not in court. 
The picture that interviewees presented was one of ‘navigating’ their 
presentation of evidence in court, and its examination, attempting to answer 
questions in a way which was helpful to the court. Their tools to do this 
appeared limited in that they could sometimes only guess the reasons for 
the line of questioning, and appeared to place confidence in their reading of 
jury body language as a measure of jury understanding. As similarly 
reported in the Henderson study,43 the current study expresses great caution 
regarding such a measure of comprehension. 
Several interviewees stated that, where they felt that an important point had 
not been made, they considered that their duty had been discharged once 
they informed their counsel of this. Of course, the expert has a duty to their 
instructing counsel, under legal privilege, not to approach the opposing party 
or court with their party’s strategy, but this is hard to reconcile with the 
concept of primary responsibility to the court, also under common law. It 
seems that either the expert genuinely feels that this discharges their 
responsibility, or simply rationalises it in this way as they recognise that they 
are powerless to raise points of their choice with the court. 
Additionally, several interviewees stated that within court they would attempt 
to correct a perceived imbalance, where they felt that the opposing expert 
had not made the best of their case. They may even have waited until cross-
examination, and planned how they would do this. Prima facie this might 
have appeared to be a method of remaining unbiased, in that both sides’ 
cases were presented, however, this was arguably illegitimate in that the 
expert appeared to be usurping the role of the advocate. 
Beyond their best efforts, it was the view of most interviewees that there was 
little they could do, and that the judicial system knew best what to do with 
their evidence. This apparent disengagement from the trial process is 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
This study has described substantial policy considerations concerning the 
admissibility, and reliable use of expert evidence. Procedural rules and case 
law have underlined the importance that legislative, judicial, and review 
                                            
43 Henderson Report (n 30) para 3.1.1. 
- 240 - 
bodies have placed on unbiased and objective expert evidence. DNA 
evidence arguably provides a test case for the effectiveness of such 
provisions, in that it is not only highly complex, but also scientifically 
rigorous. The simple observation within this study, was that, despite these 
policy considerations and procedural rules, DNA evidence remained subject 
to the cut and thrust of adversarialism. The Roberts Study reported that 
experts found themselves caught up in a ‘conflict-confusion’ strategy 
adopted by counsel.44 In the current study, DNA evidence did not appear to 
have presented an exception to this position. Whilst the Roberts Study 
concluded that “whilst some experts play the system, others are played by 
it”,45 unfortunately, the current study found that, whilst experts tried to play 
the system, they could only do so whilst in the witness box, and with limited 
apparent success on their own terms. 
Pursuing the argument, quoted above, that many trial pathologies might be 
better understood as features of a functioning adversarial system, the 
findings in this chapter support a contention that some pathologies might be 
viewed in this way, however others appear genuinely pathological. For 
example, the fact that interviewees reported that they could only answer 
questions that they were asked, and sometimes felt that their evidence had 
been misrepresented, might, arguably, be seen as normal adversarial 
practice. However, if counsel had wilfully (as seemed the case to some 
interviewees) misrepresented the evidence, then this would clearly not be in 
the interests of a functioning adversarial system. 
Similarly, the reported experience that experts did not have the opportunity 
for communication with counsel before the case, whilst apparently commonly 
reported in other studies, would appear to be counter-productive to a 
functioning adversarial system. It should also be recalled that many 
interviewees reported not simply answering the questions they were asked, 
but actively attempted to ‘balance the playing field’, even by looking for 
opportunities later in their evidence to do this. This was distinct from 
correcting a misunderstanding in their evidence, and can only plausibly be 
described as experts attempting to act as advocates, in pursuit of justice as 
they saw it. 
Roberts suggested that, whilst pathologies might be legitimate features of a 
functioning adversarial process, this assumed that procedures were carried 
                                            
44 Roberts Study (n 11) 142. 
45 ibid. 
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out correctly, and individuals understood and carried out their responsibilities 
correctly.46 The findings in this chapter report some difficulties with that. 
It is evident that the procedure for ordering and carrying out a pre-trial 
meeting of experts has not been properly understood by the judiciary, or the 
forensic experts. Regarding pre-trial communication between experts and 
counsel: whilst it might be regarded as inevitable that this communication is 
poor, due to the traditional late appointment of counsel, this is certainly 
counterproductive to the recent drive to streamline cases by early 
identification of issues at dispute. Regarding apparent poor understanding of 
DNA evidence by counsel and judiciary, whilst it might be argued inevitable 
that counsel and judiciary cannot (generally) be expert in DNA profiling, that 
is not to say that extensive training opportunities have not been offered to 
both these groups, but with poor take up.47 Regarding both examination and 
the presumed safeguard of cross-examination, interviewees reported that 
they felt that this was sometimes ineffective in drawing out relevant 
evidence. Whilst counsel may be expected to act in the best interests of their 
clients, the fact that their primary responsibility is as ‘master of justice’ in 
service primarily to the court means that they should not wilfully 
misrepresent evidence. 
The question remains as to whether DNA evidence is different. The 
conclusion that the current research reaches is that it is. There is a strong 
argument that the ‘residual’ pathologies described above (that is, the 
pathologies that cannot be argued to be adversarialism in action) are 
magnified in the case of DNA evidence. The absence of a pre-trial meeting 
between experts means that early identification of facts at issue is not 
carried out, so that complex but irrelevant DNA evidence may be placed in 
front of the jury; poor communication means that counsel may not be able to 
properly elicit relevant testimony; because of general poor understanding of 
DNA evidence, counsel may be able to inculcate misleading conclusions in 
the jury’s mind. For their part the expert may try to compensate for perceived 
misrepresentation of their evidence, despite the fact that acting as advocate  
on their part is not permitted  
                                            
46 Paul Roberts, ‘Paradigms of Forensic Science and Legal Process: a 
Critical Diagnosis’ (2015) 370 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B 1, 9. 
47 Sallavaci (n 30) 134. 
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Not least is the fact that DNA is qualitatively different from any other 
identification evidence in that, somewhat paradoxically, it cannot uniquely 
identify an individual. In being obliged to be rigorously scientific, the expert 
must testify in terms of hierarchies of propositions, and statements of 
strength of evidence expressed in probabilistic terms. The magnification of 
the effect of the pathologies by the immense increase in scientific complexity 
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Chapter 7 
Science and Law – Incompatible Discourses? 
7.1 Introduction 
Whilst much has been written about the philosophical and theoretical 
differences between science and the law, this chapter seeks to describe 
interviewees’ experiences and perceptions of the practical manifestation of 
the interface between the forensic expert with his scientific evidence, and the 
reality of the trial. 
A number of distinct, and, at first sight, disparate, areas are considered in 
this chapter. A common thread binds these together, for, in each area, the 
chapter describes experiences in which either the world of the forensic 
scientist meets the world of the court, or the scientific rigours of forensic 
evidence meet the legal rigours of adversarial examination.  
First, this chapter reports findings regarding observations and opinions on 
the way in which DNA evidence was presented in court. Forensic experts’ 
observations and opinions regarding these developments were of particular 
interest in this regard because of recent rulings that have admitted 
subjective opinion on DNA match evidence. 
Next, the chapter reports findings regarding interviewees’ rationalisation of 
both their relationship with the court, and of events which, to them, 
presented challenges that they felt unable to resolve. 
The chapter moves on to consider findings regarding interviewees’ opinion 
regarding the degree to which forensic experience (as opposed to evidence 
of scientific observation) was, and should be, admissible in court. This was 
of special interest because of recent cases in which prosecution and 
defence experts had taken distinctly polarised positions on this question. 
Lastly the chapter reports rather unexpected findings regarding the degree 
to which forensic experts both found themselves engaged, and engaged 
themselves, with the judicial process as a whole. 
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7.2 Flawed Presentation of DNA Evidence? 
As detailed in Chapter Three, the Court of Appeal in Doheny1 stipulated the 
method by which DNA evidence should be presented in court (the ‘Doheny 
direction’). One might have expected that, because of the significant 
technical development in DNA profiling since this ruling (some seventeen 
years before the current study), the Doheny direction may have become 
superseded. This might have been particularly expected in light of the fact 
that the direction has been widely regarded as being flawed, even 
meaningless, from a scientific perspective, since its inception.2 On that 
basis, expert opinions as to the continued use of the Doheny direction, were 
of great interest. 
Regarding the presentation of simple DNA matches, The Royal Statistical 
Society Guide to Statistical Evidence recently suggested that there had been 
a de facto move towards the use of likelihood ratios (the ‘correct’ method of 
presentation according to scientific commentators) by some experts.3 No 
evidence was found for this within this study. Interviewees reported that 
during examination they were typically led through their written report, which 
was routine and based on accepted formats, compliant with the Doheny 
direction, and standardised within their organisation. The exact format 
suggested by Doheny,4 in which it was suggested the expert may relate the 
statistics to the number of potential perpetrators (‘… probably only four or 
five white males in the United Kingdom… .’5) was no longer given because 
this had been superseded by the large random match probabilities now 
attached to DNA matches. Standard statements for investigative purposes 
still contained bracketed sections containing adjectival statements of 
                                            
1 R v Doheny [1997] Cr App R 369. 
2 For example, IW Evett, 'DNA profiling: a discussion of issues relating to the 
reporting of very small match probabilities', Criminal Law Review, 2000, 355 
Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 71-74; A Semikhodskii, Dealing with DNA Evidence: a Legal 
Guide (Routledge Cavendish, 2007) 135; Roberto Puch-Solis and others, 
‘Assessing the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Guidance for Judges, 
Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnesses’ (Royal Statistical 
Society, 2012) paras 7.1 – 7.3. 
3 Roberto Puch-Solis and others, ‘Assessing the Probative Value of DNA 
Evidence: Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert 
Witnesses’ (Royal Statistical Society, 2012) para 7.4. 
4 Doheny (n 1). 
5 ibid 4. 
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strength of evidence, however, in compliance with Doheny,6 these sections 
remained marked for removal if the statement was to be used at trial. 
Int4: The match probability statement does… within small 
variation, tends to be quite straightforward and everyone 
tends to say pretty much the same thing. I think just 
historically it is just accepted by the courts, why vary from it. 
The simple explanation that presented itself as to why there has been no 
‘practical drift’ from the Doheny7 standard statement, was given by the 
interviewees as due to the fact that simple DNA matches were rarely, if ever, 
challenged: 
Int19: … there are four basic questions in a criminal trial, 
whose DNA is it, what biological material did it come from, 
how did it get there and when did it get there. The first two 
now seem to have almost disappeared in terms of contested 
issues at a trial. 
Int4: I don’t know of many… defence that will try and argue 
(that) a full profile isn’t from that person, … I can’t think of an 
example. 
In the case of DNA mixtures and partial profiles, it is not possible to state a 
random match probability using the Doheny direction, however interviewees 
stated that the generally accepted interpretation of Doheny8 was that where 
a random match probability could be calculated, then this was all that could 
be presented in court, without additional explanation of the meaning of the 
figures (compared with other forms of forensic evidence in which a sliding 
scale of adjectival descriptions was used to indicate strength of evidential 
support for a proposition). They might have given an opinion on other related 
matters (for example, an opinion as to the meaning of a blood spatter pattern 
from which the DNA sample was extracted, or opinion concerning an 
activity), but were prohibited by the Doheny direction from expressly or 
implicitly giving their opinion as to whether the defendant left the crime stain. 
This was generally perceived as being a problem, as interviewees 
expressed concern that juries might be unable to understand the meaning of 
a random match probability in relation to DNA mixtures. This was especially 
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so because the statistical figures for mixtures fell far short of the standard 
one in a billion quoted for straightforward matches. 
Int9: … if it is a poor partial then you may have statistics 
down to… the thousands, tens of thousands… . Yeah, it is 
difficult, and I do feel for the jury because it is a difficult 
concept… . 
Int7: If that result is critical, if you haven’t got any other DNA 
in the case, and that result is critical, then that will become 
an area of contention and debate and you will see that in the 
courtroom. The poor jury must… well, you feel for them 
sometimes. … then it is very dangerous to leave it in the 
court’s hands to try and assess what that means. 
Another concern expressed regarding the Doheny direction was that 
interviewees felt that it was sometimes misapplied. For example, one 
interviewee stated that they had been prevented from evaluating unrelated, 
but in their belief, probative, evidence on that basis: 
Int10: So one of the pieces of evidence there, I was trying to 
do a verbal evaluation, but the prosecuting counsel wouldn’t 
let it be presented because he said it contravened the 
Doheny… ruling. 
(It should be noted that this is not true on the simple stated facts. Although 
the expert may not verbally evaluate the DNA match probability, they may do 
so for other aspects of the evidence. In R v Reed, for example, a verbal 
evaluation of the likelihood of DNA transfer was admitted9). 
It was suggested also that forensic experts erred on the side of caution in 
not verbally evaluating evidence on the basis that it might be disallowed: 
Int7: … the Doheny… ruling said that the scientist isn’t 
allowed to give an opinion of where the DNA comes from… 
and so for that reason scientists generally would not verbally 
evaluate a result because it was felt that it would be thrown 
out, so where is the value in doing that? 
Interviewees generally reflected the well-rehearsed arguments that the 
Doheny direction was flawed, a number stating that in many ways DNA 
experts have been in a limbo ever since: 
Int4: Well, Doheny I think has actually… locked us in for 
years. So in the past people wouldn’t use you know ‘support 
for the assertion’ when it came to DNA evidence because of 
                                            
9 R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698, [2010] 1 Cr App R 23. 
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Doheny, Doheny said you should do match probability and 
nothing else. 
Interviewees reported that they were increasingly asked to testify as to more 
complex DNA analyses: 
Int7: It is when you are dealing with mixtures, it’s when you 
are dealing with low level, low template stuff, you do a lot of 
enhancement techniques, low copy number techniques… 
attribution of a mixture to an individual, and then the 
subsequent… there is layers, so you have your DNA profile, 
you then have your attribution of a DNA profile, for body 
fluid, you then have your interpretation of the DNA profile as 
to how… the DNA or that body fluid could have got there. 
And it is as you get further down the tiers, that is when (there 
is) less understanding. 
Interviewees unanimously expressed concern regarding how they should 
express such increasingly complex DNA evidence. In particular, they 
expressed concern at recent cases, culminating in R v Dlugosz, in which the 
court had accepted subjective evidence regarding the DNA match itself.10 
Int2: And you know there is a certain clash of cultures 
between science and the law I think which is understandable 
you know. … But I think the confusion isn’t being helped by 
what I think are some illogical decisions… . 
The current view of commentators, and of all interviewees regarding the 
meaning of the precedent in Dlugosz,11 was that, where a statistic could not 
be calculated, the expert may be permitted to give their subjective opinion on 
the meaning of the evidence based on their experience and not based on a 
scientific database. One interviewee referred to such evidence as a ‘Dlugosz 
statement’, and it may be surprising if this terminology does not gain wider 
acceptance. 
The decision in Dlugosz12 was highly significant, both in practice and in 
principle: the advent of DNA profiling was hailed as a ‘new paradigm’ in that, 
for the first time, scientific evidence could be presented in a statistically 
significant, quantitative form. Dlugosz13 appeared to erode that principle. 
It has been argued that, the key danger concerning this, is that such 
subjective opinion may be prejudicial in favour of the prosecution. One 
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interviewee with a special interest in this area underlined the dangers of 
relying on subjective experience in the absence of a database: 
Int13: … where scientists are starting to report complex 
mixtures where no statistic can be produced but they are 
giving some sort of subjective view, not based on data… but 
based on their experience. … That to me is we are getting 
into very, very dangerous territory. 
Int4: … but not all scientists have that much experience (of 
complex DNA samples). If you are asking someone that has 
been reporting for two years their opinion on, you know, the 
likelihood of something, they may have seen lots and lots of 
DNA profiles but 95% of them might be clean, full profiles. 
How many of these really difficult complex mixtures have 
they actually seen? 
Many interviewees expressed concerns, in general, as to precedent 
controlling their reporting of DNA evidence, particularly regarding these 
recent developments. These concerns may be summarised as, firstly, the 
limitations placed upon the expert by Doheny in evaluating more complex 
DNA evidence in court (which experts believed meant that the jury did not 
have sufficient information), and, secondly, uncertainty regarding 
implications of new precedent set down in recent cases, which allowed 
expert witnesses to testify beyond the simple match probability statement 
specified in Doheny. It will be recalled that in R v Weller, opinion evidence 
was admitted regarding DNA transfer, in R v Broughton,14, evidence was 
admitted regarding Low Template DNA evidence despite the fact it was 
below the ‘stochastic’ level below which it had been legally accepted as 
reliable,15 and in Dlugosz,16 for the first time, opinion as to whether there was 
a DNA match was admitted, despite the lack of a statistical calculation. 
That the challenge could only get greater was without doubt according to 
interviewees, due to advancing technology. As an example they pointed out 
that new seventeen-marker tests, because they target more DNA loci, are 
more sensitive and theoretically allow greater individualisation. The practical 
result, however, will not be that in practice more individuals could be 
eliminated from a match (because already in practice if an individual 
matches at one in a billion, they usually do not argue that the DNA is not 
theirs), but instead will mean that more samples will be determined as 
                                            
14 R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549. 
15 Reed (n 9). 
16 Dlugosz (n 10). 
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mixtures, rather than simple DNA matches. This means that more analyses 
will be based on statistics revolving around partial profiles, mixtures, and 
inevitably lower amounts of DNA. Thus ‘Dlugosz statements’ are more and 
more likely to become commonplace. 
A question voiced by interviewees was as to when the court may override 
Doheny17 and allow a ‘Dlugosz statement’. In Reed,18 the court determined 
an absolute level (the ‘stochastic’ threshold) below which the quantity of 
DNA present meant that a statistic could not be determined. Interviewees 
were uniformly critical regarding this, pointing out that this level was 
arbitrary, and that it was possible to have a high quality sample below this 
level, and a low quality sample above it. Their concern was therefore that 
high quality DNA evidence that was capable of statistical analysis could 
potentially be presented as a qualitative opinion, and that, conversely, low 
quality evidence could be presented in the form of an unreliable random 
match probability.  
Of concern, three interviewees mentioned situations in which a statistical 
calculation was potentially possible, but was not carried out. The expert was 
thus able to give a qualitative, subjective opinion. These examples will be 
discussed below. They are significant because, whether deliberately or not, 
these point to potential pathways by which the rigorous statistical 
requirement of DNA might be bypassed, and subjective evidence, arguably 
prejudicial in favour of the prosecution, may be introduced. 
The first example was where an interviewee stated that sometimes a 
statistical calculation might not be commissioned: 
Int22: If no calculation is possible, or one is not 
commissioned, then the scientist is now allowed to provide a 
qualitative opinion. 
On being asked for clarification as to why a calculation might not be 
commissioned, Int22 pointed out that although a calculation was routine for 
standard samples, where a specialist calculation was necessary, this would 
not be commissioned by the Forensic Service Provider, but would have to be 
separately commissioned by the Police. They would not do this for financial 
reasons, and because they did not have to, given that a subjective opinion 
was now allowed. The question arose as to where the incentive would be to 
commission an additional analysis, when the one they had was more 
                                            
17 Doheny (n 1). 
18 Reed (n 9). 
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favourable to the prosecution. Int22 stated also that there could be two 
reports: 
Int22: Sometimes two reports are served, one with a 
specialist calculation and another from the original scientist 
with a qualitative opinion under Dlugosz. The CPS 
commission the second report for use in the event that the 
specialist calculation is not admitted, either because of legal 
argument or because of the late submission of evidence. 
… So it is possible that a result would be too complex for the 
standard procedure but that no specialist calculation is 
requested and only a qualitative Dlugosz report is produced. 
I’m not sure whether this would be in an attempt to avoid the 
implications of the Doheny ruling though… . 
When asked to elucidate, Int22 stated that prosecution and defence counsel 
in this case had agreed not to present the statistical evidence on the basis 
that it was too complex and difficult to lead or cross-examine, but instead 
rely on Dlugosz19 to present a subjective opinion. Prima facie this appeared 
to run counter to the Doheny direction. Whether Dlugosz20 did indeed 
supersede the Doheny direction (notably Int22 stated that some lawyers told 
her that it did), it is still to be determined under what distinction it could do 
this. 
The second example is where the defence expert could see no technical 
reason why a statistic could not have been produced by the prosecution 
expert: 
Int13: … just recently in this court … (the expert did not) 
produce a statistic, which she (could) have quite easily, and I 
am really still not sure why she didn’t… . But for whatever 
reason, whether it was a confidence with stats or mixtures or 
whatever she didn’t feel able to do a statistic, well what that 
meant was that you can forget about Doheny… because 
there wasn’t a statistic, and all this more recent case law… 
seemed to allow her to… give… some sort of (subjective) 
description about what the profile was and it has kind of 
opened the door… to us talking in a very dangerous way 
about profiles that are not of a great quality and potentially 
talking them up in a way that is misleading. 
It may be noted that these interviewees did not suggest underhand reasons 
why statistics might not have been produced. This may not have been 
                                            
19 Dlugosz (n 10). 
20 ibid. 
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deliberate in these cases, however with the increasing complexity of DNA 
evidence the potential to deliberately avoid the Doheny direction by 
imagining difficulties with analysing the evidence must not be overlooked. 
Int4 reflected a general sentiment that could be described as the doors being 
opened, but experts not knowing quite what to make of the outside world: 
Int4: So people just didn’t (go outside Doheny) and I think 
that is why now to a certain extent we are so uncomfortable 
about moving from that safe zone, because we have always 
said you can’t because of Doheny. And now it has almost 
opened up a world to us and people go oh we don’t know 
what to do about that. 
A significant qualification applies to the foregoing discussion regarding 
recent case law. It might have appeared that interviewees were expressing 
concern regarding the principles behind recent precedents. This was, 
indeed, true for some interviewees, particularly those with a special interest 
in the area. However, the underlying concern for the majority of interviewees 
was not principle, but rather concern as to how exactly they were supposed 
to present complex DNA evidence. 
Indeed, the strongest view regarding precedent, held by many, was simply 
that someone (the Forensic Science Regulator was commonly suggested) 
needed to take control and tell forensic experts what they should do, 
perhaps issuing guidance in the form of a standard. (After the current study, 
the Forensic Science Regulator produced an ‘Information’ on legal guidance 
for forensic practitioners, however this still constitutes only a summary of 
legal rulings, and not a mandatory, or even advisory approach).21 
A significant number of interviewees also referred positively to the potential 
application of existing mathematical algorithms to complex DNA data: 
Int7: … (with) service providers… we will have different 
statistical models being presented in court, which will then 
mean there is lots of statistical arguments at court which is 
just far too complex for a jury to understand. There should 
be established ways before it gets to court of… how we 
should be presenting it. 
Int7: … what we really need is a package where… it doesn’t 
matter what you are putting in there it will give you statistics. 
                                            
21 Forensic Science Regulator, ‘Legal Obligations’ (FSR-I-400, Issue 3, 
2015). 
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The mathematics works… that is possible, it is just having 
somebody take control of that and standardising it. 
That is to say, the view was that there was always a scientific calculation 
that could be done, albeit highly complex, and this should not be 
compromised by the judiciary. 
Int13: … potentially I suppose if we can get the Regulator to 
issue some sort of edict, a quality statement about some sort 
of standard that ought to be presented and that might be 
helpful… I am thinking particularly about DNA evidence and 
particularly about when you can’t produce a statistic. You 
know because when you can’t, I think we are entering 
dangerous territory… ’ 
Many experts did not believe that, other than for simple matches, DNA 
evidence was well understood: 
Int25: … it will just be a small but very crucial element of 
either your wording or something or about how it is situated 
in the context of the case, and they don’t quite understand 
that overall meaning… because they do admit or agree so 
much evidence beforehand to make sure that what is being 
heard in court is only the parts that in contest, that 
sometimes small errors are made. 
Int2: … when you speak to some of the lawyers… you know 
you start talking about data and they think they’ve grasped it 
and then their eyes glaze and they just sort of switch off you 
know. 
Int14: … another scientist… would completely understand it. 
But to try and get that across to a lay person or a jury or a 
barrister can be really difficult… . 
In summary, perhaps surprisingly, the Doheny direction regarding the 
presentation of DNA evidence, was still applied for simple DNA matches and 
the general opinion was that the situation was satisfactory on the basis that, 
although the expert could not go further in their explanation than the match 
statistic, at least there was a clear instruction as to how they should report 
and testify. 
Regarding the reporting of more complex cases, however, interviewees 
expressed concern, less about scientific principle, but more that they had no 
clear guidelines on how they should report or present evidence. These 
complex cases included complex DNA samples, but also cases in which the 
hypothesis level was unclear. In the light of these factors, and as reported in 
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Chapter Six, there was great concern that DNA evidence was not properly 
understood. 
7.3 Rationalising Conflicts between Science and Law in the 
Court Room 
The previous chapter discussed how forensic experts attempted to resolve 
perceived conflicts between science and adversarial process in the court 
room. It will be recalled, that interviewees reported that there were limits to 
the degree that they believed that this was successful. This section 
investigates the ways in which interviewees rationalised their contact with 
the judicial system in situations in which they felt that they had been unable 
to resolve particular conflicts. 
In practice, conflicts were described principally by prosecution witnesses. It 
will be recalled that prosecution witnesses described their involvement in the 
case as being rather ‘peripheral’ with little explanation to them (other than in 
high profile cases) as to the details of the case: 
Int4: … you are probably sent a warning from witness care 
that says turn up on this day and then you turn up… 
Someone might come and have a chat with you, they might 
not… you tend to go give your evidence then go home… 
literally sometimes just before you are about to go in they 
might say so if I ask you this what are you going to say … 
and then you go in and they ask you and then that is done. 
Int13: But often what happens is you turn up, you don’t 
speak to anybody, they call you up and they ask you a few 
questions and you go home. 
The fact that defence experts did not report conflicts may be because they 
tended to be much more involved in the development of the defence case, 
and would be involved in the case, often sitting behind counsel to give 
advice.  
The conflicts described by prosecution experts could be described as 
ranging from simple to complex, and were generally explicable within the 
context of the adversarial system. However, as described below, 
interviewees’ rationalisations of such conflicts were somewhat surprising. A 
simple example of such a conflict was where the expert did not understand 
the significance of the evidence that they were being asked to give, or were 
asked questions on part of the evidence that they did not feel was important. 
Many interviewees rationalised that their part of the evidence was almost 
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always a small part of the overall evidence in the case, so that the evidence 
they were giving must have meant something to the jurors in the context of 
evidence that was not privy to the interviewees:  
Int22: … the thing is as a scientist you only ever know your 
little bit of the case. You know what seems important to you 
scientifically, you have no idea what has been going on in 
the background, what has been agreed, what the points that 
are important to the prosecution and the defence are. So 
yes, sometimes they focus on something that you think I 
didn’t think that was the important bit, but clearly it is 
because they know what the background is. 
On the same basis, they rationalised that counsel might lead them in a 
direction, whose rationale might not be apparent to them: 
Int6: I think it is also, remember, quite a small part of a big 
case, so whilst what we have looked at has been everything 
to us, that is actually quite tiny, and in some ways you do 
have to be led and guided by the court because we are just 
a small part of the whole picture. 
Int22: … the prosecution they know the background, you 
know scientifically, but they know legally what points they 
are trying to make. 
Such a rationalisation seemed reasonable, as the expert had indeed not 
been involved in the wider case. However, interviewees also reported 
situations in which they felt that their evidence had been misrepresented. 
The previous chapter discussed the behaviours that experts reported in 
order to try to correct such misrepresentations, however, where they felt that 
they had been unable to correct a misrepresentation, they reported various 
methods of rationalising that. Some interviewees stated that in such a 
situation, they felt that their responsibility was discharged by passing their 
concerns to (their) counsel (emphases added): 
Int4: … if there is something that I think needs to go before 
that jury I will tell the barristers, and I will say I think you 
should ask me about this and this is what I am going to say 
to make sure it gets out. 
Int22: … Yes, I suppose it is difficult to know why didn’t they 
ask me that when maybe there is a good reason to. Yeah if 
you have pointed out to them that it is something they 
could ask, then it is up to them. 
Int13: It is not in your hands you see, what I would do is 
once outside of court is to say look we need to talk about 
this and hopefully they will have time to spend five minutes 
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with you… You are a little bit powerless if the barrister 
isn’t really interested in talking to you then there is not a 
lot you can do really… But usually you just respond to the 
questions that you’re asked. But yeah, you are really just at 
the mercy of what you are asked and somebody else is in 
control of it all, the barristers and the judge really. 
The expert clearly has a duty under legal privilege not to disclose ‘their’ 
party’s strategy to the opposing party, or indeed the court.22 However, if the 
expert felt that an important point had not been made, for example an 
exculpatory explanation for evidence that that expert had presented, then it 
is hard to see, at least, how the expert could believe that this discharged 
their ‘over-riding’ obligation to act in the service of the court, over their 
obligation to party by whom they are paid .23 Despite the fact that counsel is 
foremost a ‘minister of justice’ with primary responsibility to the court, they 
also have the responsibility of presenting their client’s case as effectively as 
possible,24 and may not see it as their duty or to their advantage to present 
evidence that weakens their own case. The failure to inform the court of a 
possible exculpatory explanation for the evidence presumably does not 
infringe the rule that counsel must not ‘knowingly or recklessly mislead or 
attempt to mislead the court’.25 
On the other hand, it is hard to see what other action they could take. As one 
interviewee stated, in response to this dilemma: 
Int25: I guess we could write a letter to the judge. 
In summary, forensic experts, particularly for the prosecution, sometimes felt 
concern that the DNA evidence had not been properly understood. As 
described in the previous chapter, they reported specific behaviours on their 
part to try to ensure that their evidence was properly understood. However, 
the findings above describe two methods by which interviewees reported 
that they rationalised situations in which they were not clear that their 
evidence had been presented or used properly. 
                                            
22 Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487, HL. 
23 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19.2. 
24 The Bar Standards Board, ‘Handbook’ 2nd edn, April 2015, 6. 
25 ibid. 
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7.4 Experience versus Experiment or Prosecution versus 
Defence? 
Although DNA may be regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of forensic 
identification techniques, this does not mean that its forensic use may be 
regarded as purely objective. Interpretation of scientific results, such as a 
DNA match, can only take place within a framework of circumstances. The 
expert’s typical role in court has been described as assisting the court with 
an evaluative opinion on the usefulness of scientific observations.26 Int16 
gave an example of a case in which a suspect’s DNA was found on a drug 
wrap, and this evidence was presented in court. On the simple facts the 
DNA evidence had little or no probative value as the wrap was found in the 
defendant’s pocket, however, counsel did not seek to mention this. This may 
not have needed expert opinion to understand, however complex issues, 
such as DNA transfer, certainly need expert evaluative opinion. As an 
example, the question arose in R v Weller as to whether the alleged victim’s 
DNA, found underneath the accused’s fingernails, could have been 
transferred there by digital penetration.27 This is where the challenge arose: 
in the absence of research, and appropriate resulting data, the expert had 
nothing to base their opinion on except ‘experience’. As will be seen below, 
the law had no problem with such subjective evidence, however 
disagreements existed between forensic experts as to the value of such 
expert ‘experience’. Surprisingly, these disagreements appeared to be 
polarised between prosecution and defence. 
It is worth expanding briefly on the distinction between ‘experiment’ and 
‘experience’, by recounting an example given by one interviewee: if one had 
turned on an electric light switch, then one’s experience was that the light 
came on. This was experience, but it could almost certainly be proved 
experimentally, (that is, scientifically, within a statistically significant number 
of trial turnings on). Equally, if one pressed the crossing button at a Pelican 
crossing, experience may suggest that this caused the crossing light to turn 
to green. Scientifically this may not have been true, however, as many 
crossing lights (perhaps surprisingly) are not engaged directly with the 
pedestrian button, and respond at certain times of day solely to a timed 
                                            
26 Charles EH Berger and others, ‘Evidence Evaluation: A Response to the 
Court of Appeal Judgment in R v T’ (2011) 51.2 Science & Justice 43, 44. 
27 R v Weller [2010] EWCA Crim 1085. 
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cycle. ‘Experience’ does not live up to the rigour of scientific method, in other 
words. 
It has been suggested that courts may be unable to tell the difference 
between ‘expert opinion’ and ‘scientific evidence’, even that anything stated 
by a scientific expert is logically ‘scientific’. However, scientific evidence 
requires experimentation to prove a hypothesis. In its absence ‘then the 
‘evidence’ is speculation’.28 
This does not eliminate the value of evaluative opinion, but requires that the 
expert is clear about the assumptions associated with their opinion. This 
study, however, showed a surprising result, in that prosecution experts were 
confident in the value of their ‘experience’, whereas defence experts 
expressed a strong confidence in scientific method over that experience, 
doubting the value of opinion based purely on experience. It is worth pointing 
out that the Court of Appeal has endorsed the evidential superiority of ‘day-
to-day’ ‘practical experience in DNA over ‘scholarship’ and ‘academic 
activity’.29 
Perhaps surprisingly, most prosecution interviewees expressed similar views 
regarding the value of experience versus experiment. Whilst accepting that 
in any specific case no scientific experiment could prove that, for example 
transfer of DNA, could have occurred in a certain way, all believed that their 
experience, and familiarity with the subject area, was sufficient basis for their 
opinion on the likelihood of such transfer, especially when backed up with 
discussion with colleagues: 
Int19: … it is going to be a little bit subjective because it is 
going to be based on your previous casework experience, 
and the more casework experience you have I guess the 
broader view you have, but you are still never going to have 
seen everything. … And there is no getting around the fact 
that people’s experience will vary, different experts’ 
experiences will vary, but what I think is really important is 
have some discussions with your colleagues about it, this is 
what certainly I do when I am interpreting and what my 
colleagues do. And certainly when I am doing work at 
<<private institution>> there are lots of casework 
discussions go on … So rather than deciding in isolation 
                                            
28 Peter Gill, Misleading DNA Evidence: Reasons for Miscarriages of Justice 
(Elsevier, 2014) para 1.4.1. 
29 Weller (n 27) [26 – 27]. 
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what your opinion is, of course you are going to ask your 
colleagues what do they think… . 
Critics may suggest that apparently informal discussion with colleagues did 
not equate with the scientific concept of ‘peer review’: 
Int4: …but it has been peer reviewed by someone that 
comes from the same lab and has often had the same 
training …; whereas if you get scientists from somewhere 
completely different you are more likely to get a different 
opinion. It is also meant to be based on the experience of 
the scientist, which is fine… . 
Interestingly, even interviewees, such as Int4, who had explained the 
concerns regarding the reliability of the data upon which such opinions were 
based, still maintained that experience to be useful to the court, and indeed 
superior to academic counter argument.  
Additionally, and somewhat paradoxically, given the rigorously scientific 
basis of DNA evidence, several interviewees were positive (or believed 
others were) about the new found permission of the Court of Appeal for the 
expert witness to offer opinion under Dlugosz:30 
Int25: I think… the evaluative opinion, I think a lot of people 
were very happy when that ruling came out and thought of it 
as a great opportunity, but I think people are going be reined 
back in. 
Int1: … it is going to be a little bit subjective because it is 
going to be based on your previous casework experience… 
And I think that is fine if you are absolutely transparent in 
your statement and you explain how you have come to that 
conclusion … . 
Int9: … (N)ow there are some forensic scientists out there, 
but I think the tide is turning, that used to think well you can’t 
statistically evaluate it therefore it means nothing. Well, I 
don’t agree with that, and the latest judgment assists us with 
that… . 
Int7 suggested that juries may not be capable of understanding the evidence 
without such opinion: 
Int7: DNA profiling is so sensitive now, the opportunities for 
transfer are greatly increased, and so unless you have 
experience of understanding of what those transfers can be, 
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what they mean, then it is very dangerous to leave it in the 
court’s hands to try and assess what that means. 
Defence interviewees were unanimously doubtful about the reliability of such 
opinion based on experience: 
Int17: I find that even within one firm, like within one 
company, one forensic provider, Crown provider, you can 
have a very similar case and a certain argument put by the 
Crown expert that is supported, and then on another case, 
like you have one case like that, and then very closely sort of 
back to back a completely separate expert but from the 
same company and they are almost arguing exactly the 
opposite, you know from a point of view of transfer and all 
this. That is the trouble, it is very personal, you know to say 
well I have seen these cases and that is my opinion. It is 
very hard to sort of standardise someone’s opinion… . 
Defence experts robustly defended scientific method over experience: 
Int12: … the reason people are doing forensic science is 
because they have seen it on the telly, because they want to 
solve crime. I don’t want to solve crime, I want to do good 
science… it is actually very tedious and the work is done in 
your head, not at the bench and that is another thing you 
know the Crown keep trying to go on ‘so you don’t actually 
do this every (day)?’… no I don’t… what would I learn from 
pipetting liquids from one tube to another? 
You know when I am challenged with this kind of ‘but you 
are not an expert in that area’ I come back with well I am not 
an astrologer but I feel quite competent to tackle the lack of 
any backing for astrology. 
Int2: … a cynical view (is that) those at the top don’t want 
the boat to be rocked in any way even though the science is 
saying it should be rocked. Or alternatively it can just be you 
know they don’t really understand how science can be used 
and how science works. 
On one level, such comments could be argued to support the notion of a 
‘rational’ defence expert and an ‘irrational’ prosecution expert, however, 
such a polarised view was less surprising when viewed from the point of 
view of presenting the most persuasive prosecution and defence cases 
(although it remains hard to reconcile with the notion of the ‘unbiased 
expert’): most cases hinge on how the DNA came to be at the crime scene, 
rather than whose DNA it is, and the only evidence that can support this is 
expert ‘experience’. However, viewed from the defence point of view, 
attacking the scientific basis of the prosecution case is a logical approach: 
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defence experts can generally show defects in science beyond simple DNA 
matches, especially given the lack of scientific data existing on, for example 
DNA transfer. 
Illuminatingly, the experience versus experiment argument has shown itself 
to be more than academic in practice, with prosecution and defence experts 
taking generally strongly polarised views on the subject. In the earlier 
chapter on the relative roles of prosecution and defence experts, examples 
were demonstrated of apparent close identification of experts with their 
instructing ‘side’. It may be recalled, too, that, particularly for the prosecution, 
experts sometimes expressed strong feelings about the ‘other side’. The 
question of (prosecution) experience over (defence) experiment, provided 
further striking examples of this, with prosecution experts, again, conflating 
discussion of the validity of forensic laboratory experience over scientific 
principle with doubts about the competence and motives of defence experts: 
Int15: And it may be that one has just been doing this day in 
and day out for years and is thoroughly up to date with the 
literature, and knows their stuff and so on. And (for the 
defence expert) it is a bit of an academic hobby. 
Int16: It is almost not even scientific in a lot of situations, you 
know, they reel off qualifications that actually when you drill 
down into it mean diddly squat and will say whatever they 
think is a means to an end to muddy the waters, and are 
very defence biased. 
Meanwhile defence experts did not attack prosecution experts on a similar 
level, however expressed frustration at attacks on their competence: 
Int2: And then other cross-examinations have been very 
persistent on you know my expertise or the way I do things 
or have done things as a way of trying to… they may not 
have had the opportunity to question my science but if they 
can undermine my credibility… . 
… the way they justified things was totally wrong but you 
know they didn’t say I was an idiot but they just said that you 
know the other guy he’s been at it for years. 
The defence did not largely criticise the scientific capability of prosecution 
experts, however they did suggest that they were highly susceptible to 
conformation bias, and inflexibly aligned with the prosecution case. 
These findings were curious. On the one hand, prosecution scientists 
demonstrated respect for the scientific approach, and acknowledged the lack 
of solid scientific data, on, for example DNA transfer, but, on the other, they 
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strongly supported the court’s decision that forensic experience should take 
precedence over scientific expertise in the trial. Curious, too, were the 
personal attacks on the competence and motives of defence experts, 
particularly those who had not come from the ‘prosecution school’ of experts. 
In summary, experts took highly partisan stances in regard to recent 
developments in case law, in which the precedence of forensic laboratory 
experience was established over scientific principle. Although a minority of 
prosecution experts expressed reservations over the value of ‘lab-bench 
experience’, the vast majority were confident in its superiority over purely 
scientific arguments. In this regard, however, prosecution experts conflated 
such lack of experience with strongly voiced suspicion of the competence 
and motives of the defence experts themselves, especially those who had 
come from the ‘non-prosecution-school’. For their part, defence experts, 
despite expressing frustration that they believed the courts to have admitted 
unreliable evidence, did not hold such strong views regarding prosecution 
experts. They regarded them as ‘institutional’, inflexible, and over-strongly 
aligned with the single prosecution case, but did not impugn their 
professionalism. 
7.5 Engagement of the Forensic Expert and the Court 
In the previous chapter a ‘trial pathology’ or ‘dysfunction’ was reported in the 
form of a lack of contact between forensic expert witness and instructing 
counsel, and between opposing parties. This could be described simply as a 
‘communication’ problem, however, in addition to this, interviewees 
expressed a lack of involvement, indeed ‘engagement’ with the judicial 
process as a whole. 
Most of the following discussion refers specifically to prosecution witnesses. 
Defence witnesses were (where they had been called) much more closely 
involved with the case, often having provided advisory support for defence 
counsel. Having said that, and as detailed below, certain aspects of their 
behaviour still indicated a surprising detachment from the case. 
Quite apart from mystification on the interviewees’ part as to why they are 
sometimes not called to court even though they believe their evidence to be 
both important and complex, when cases did go to trial, many interviewees 
expressed frustration with the judicial ‘machinery’. In many cases there was 
poor communication, short notice, excessive waiting time with little 
information, and generally a feeling of remaining uninformed: 
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Int1: So we would ring up witness care or whoever it was to 
try and establish which day we would be required … it is 
usually day two or day three depending on the size of the 
trial … So there is lots of ringing up the day before to make 
sure it is the next day that you are required, usually it is get 
there at ten o’clock. Sometimes they then move that so 
they’ll ring you that day we don’t need you tomorrow, could 
you come the day after… . 
The majority of interviewees stated that, very frequently they had no contact 
with counsel before arriving at the court, and might even have had no 
contact before appearing in the witness box. 
Int25: 99% of the time there is little or no communication 
until the day you are at court and they ask for you to get 
there an hour before…most of the time (I meet them for the 
first time) on the day and sometimes you might not even 
(have spoken) to them beforehand at all, when you first walk 
in and start answering questions for them. Yeah, it can be 
really limited actually… . 
Int19: … half the cases I go to you meet them on the 
morning that you are going to do and that is even in serious 
cases…I did a murder trial and … the first time I met the 
barrister you know I had five minutes with him and he said I 
am going to call you in and ask you these questions and 
that’s it. You know be prepared to explain to the jury a little 
bit about DNA profiling blah blah blah… . 
Int7: Other times it is not a very nice experience, it’s like a 
factory line you just go in, give your evidence, leave. 
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, several interviewees went further, 
reporting that they felt sometimes deliberately belittled by the legal system, 
or, at least, not accorded the expected respect: 
Int24: I think… pathologists are seen in a much higher 
regard … I have been sat outside court for two days, you will 
be next on, pathologist turns up:  oh yes come in Dr so and 
so. 
Int5: … an expert is for the most part quite a big deal really 
in a Magistrates’ Court. … in a Crown Court … you are kind 
of like oh he is another expert, in fact you are kind of a figure 
of derision probably. 
Although, as reported in the previous chapter, experts attempted to apply 
certain strategies in court, and, as reported above, rationalised their 
experiences where they felt that they had not been successful, beyond this 
point many interviewees’ views manifested a certain dis-engagement from 
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the judicial process. Put simply, this presented itself in the form of an 
acceptance that the legal system behaved in its own way and that was not 
the experts’ concern, however illogical scientifically: 
Int2: … I hadn’t even had the opportunity to debate the 
meaning of the science because (it was dismissed on a 
technicality)… (but)…you know scientists shouldn’t tell 
lawyers and judges how things should be done because it is 
a legal process… . 
Int3: … you can’t say a thing although you are listening to 
these howlers in court. You know that is the system. 
Very interesting was a comment from an interviewee with many years’ 
experience and court appearances, in response to a question regarding why 
a witness had been called in a certain circumstance: 
Int25: I don't know if this is just how Counsel prefer to 
proceed with evidence in court… or if it is more a matter of 
correct protocol. 
The significance of this was that, prima facie, one might have expected that 
the expert, if not familiar with, was at least curious as to why a certain 
procedure had been followed in court. Arguably the lack of that knowledge or 
curiosity signals that the expert saw that beyond a certain line ‘another 
country’ existed which did not concern them. 
Vivid examples of ‘bafflement’ were given by several interviewees who 
described circumstances in which facts agreed by the court were at odds 
with scientific or common sense reality. 
In one example of this, defence’s argument of self-defence was dependent 
on the identification of an individual. Despite the defence expert’s insistence 
that the court had confused different people with similar names, the case 
proceeded on the basis of mistaken identity agreed by both prosecution and 
defence: 
Int25: But they totally misread the name, it was actually 
someone, a totally different witness that the DNA belonged 
to. It was about three or four times I said in the box I think 
you have got the wrong person, and they said no, no, we 
have agreed this. I think you have made a mistake, I really 
think you are wrong. And it wasn’t until after I’d finished, and 
I even raised it with defence as well because they were 
making the play for self-defence, and no, it was actually 
another witness and a totally different guy who that DNA 
belonged to, and he was in prison at the time of the actual 
offence, so it couldn’t have been. 
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Int25 explained that neither counsel was interested: the misunderstanding 
had been accepted by both parties as fact, and both were seeking to build 
their cases upon this false, but agreed, basis.  
Int7 described a similar example in which a shoe provided scientific 
evidence for a blood spatter and DNA match, however counsel 
demonstrated the wrong trainer: 
Int7: So even when I came out and explained to him you 
have got the wrong trainer… it was just like you’re a 
scientist, I am not interested. And that leaves you feeling like 
you haven’t done your job properly, but it is frustrating 
because it is not your job to stand in the witness box and tell 
somebody how to do their job. It is just your job to answer 
questions and to put the information across, and you tell 
them at every opportunity what you can do, and that can get 
a little frustrating sometimes. 
In another case, the interviewees expressed frustration that prosecution and 
defence had agreed the DNA evidence, but on a misconception, so that the 
expert was not asked to give any further opinion: 
Int25: … we have sort of told them that evidence can’t be 
construed in that way. And then they have gone ahead and 
had that agreed with defence counsel, so why defence 
counsel allowed to be agreed and admissible, and that is it 
we don’t get to comment any further on it. I guess we could 
write a letter to the judge. I have had though where they 
have sort of agreed evidence between the prosecution and 
defence and I don’t think they have quite got the point of the 
evidence. 
Given that the experts were only present for a part of each of these cases, 
they might not have been aware of relevant background context. However, it 
is not hard to understand these interviewees’ puzzlement at such 
misrepresentation of their evidence, especially given that the 
misrepresentation is clearly (to them) nonsensical. Significant, also, is their 
observation that when they have had the opportunity to properly explain to 
counsel the true position, then counsel have not been interested. The 
experts’ figurative ‘shrug of the shoulders’ at the legal system was, therefore, 
altogether understandable. More concerning, though, was interviewees’ 
feelings that such confusions may have applied equally to the DNA evidence 
itself, which they were concerned was sometimes accepted and agreed on a 
basis which was not scientifically true. Despite the fact that Int3 (above) 
reported that on hearing similar misrepresentations they could do nothing, 
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interviewees pointed out that their key concern was how such 
misrepresentations might be argued when they were not in the court room. 
As a clear indication of the degree to which interviewees ultimately 
disengaged themselves from the judicial process, the majority of 
interviewees reported that they did not usually even know what the outcome 
of cases were, in which they had been involved: 
Int25: No, it will be read about it in the paper sometimes. 
The good officers do… let you know, but I would say that is 
a fraction of the time, maybe like 25% of the time that you 
hear…, but definitely for the borough type cases you don’t 
tend to hear. And the murder cases you tend to hear more 
often than not, so maybe 50% of the time, so no, never hear. 
You will literally hear about it in the paper or a colleague will 
come in and say oh did you know that… read it in the Metro 
this morning. 
Int1: I don’t know what the outcome was of that case, we 
often don’t find out what the outcome is. 
Int24: No, despite saying to the officers and things let me 
know, oh yeah we’ll let you know, blah, I get the impression 
we are a small part of a lot of cases. 
Interestingly, this dis-engagement was not necessarily unconscious: 
Int22: No, I find it very easy to detach myself from the case, 
hard to detach myself from the science but easy to detach 
myself from the case because I don’t know the rest of it… . 
… Now I have no problem in thinking that that went well, the 
questions were reasonable, I think I answered them well, 
then that is a success and the verdict is irrelevant to that. 
On the one hand, it may perhaps be understood that where scientific 
analyses had been rather routine, then report of that evidence may be seen 
as equally routine. On the other hand, however, experts may have been 
closely involved with the investigation and progression of a case, and in any 
case it might be supposed that the very reason why experts were called to 
court would have been where the evidence was more complex. 
In view of this argument, this strikingly consistent reported dis-engagement 
from the judicial aspects of the trial was rather surprising. Even from the 
point of view of defence experts, who were brought in late in the process 
(that is, after the investigation and prosecution) to assess any weaknesses 
in the prosecution case, similar dis-engagement was demonstrated: 
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Int23: Sometimes with these cases you don’t know how they 
are going to go, often I send off my report and never hear 
another (thing), don’t know what has happened in the case, 
nothing. Even when they send their payment they don’t tell 
you what has happened in the case. 
In Chapter Five it was reported that, particularly for prosecution experts, 
there was often strong association their side’s case. This being the case, it 
might be seen as paradoxical that experts now seemingly displayed a 
disinterest in the outcome of trials in which they had been involved. 
Two final comments by interviewees were illuminating. The first simply 
defines forensic science, but, crucially, differentiates it from other sciences: 
Int14: … being a forensic scientist is a bit weird, because 
you are master of lots of different sciences, but you are not a 
pure academic scientist, (in that you are not) … producing 
data. 
The second commented on the decision in the courts to admit subjective 
opinion on DNA matches in certain circumstances: 
Int19: … now I thought they would make a special case for 
DNA … In actual fact they followed the other line… which 
say(s) basically well you’re an expert, so even though you 
haven’t got a statistical underpinning to this we are going to 
allow you to give your expert judgement as to the weight that 
this finding attracts, which is very antithetical to the whole 
DNA (principle). I thought they would go now you have 
always set your stall out to say you are going to do this 
statistically and now you are saying you can’t so therefore 
we don’t receive this and I thought they would take that and 
make DNA a special case. That would have driven forward 
the statistical working up the new methodology for statistical 
analysis of mixtures but they haven’t, they have gone, alright 
well we will accept a softer approach. 
Taken together, these comments are significant. Firstly, forensic science 
was clearly described as a purely ‘reactive’ science. The second comment, 
however, seemed to express not only a seemingly passing interest in a 
significant development regarding the use of DNA evidence, but also an 
implication that this was nothing to do with the forensic expert. This, 
perhaps, summarised the findings described above, that is, experts not only 
appeared to accept that judicial machinery used scientific evidence in ways 
that were apparently unscientific, but that forensic experts were happy to let 
them do that. In addition, they appeared to show little interest in the 
machinations of ‘that other country’. Put rather bluntly, given that the only 
purpose of forensic science (within this context) is the investigation and 
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judicial disposal of crime, ensuring that the guilty are convicted and the 
innocent exonerated, forensic experts displayed startlingly little interest in 
ensuring that this was done. 
In summary, any basic knowledge of the reality of the English legal system 
should have led one to the conclusion that the pivotal role of the forensic 
scientist portrayed within popular media (for example, the drama ‘CSI’), did 
not reflect reality. Strikingly, this study showed that the involvement and 
engagement of forensics experts was less than might be even realistically 
supposed. This study uses the word ‘disengagement’ to describe the 
‘withdrawal’ and ‘detachment’ that experts appeared to exhibit towards the 
judicial system. The term disengagement also implies ‘apathy’ and it would 
not be unrealistic to describe some interviewees’ views as apathetic. It is 
important to add that this was not to forensic science, however, but to the 
court and judicial process. 
7.6 Conclusions 
There has been much academic comment regarding the relationship 
between science and the law.  Walsh, in addressing the limited engagement 
of forensic specialists with legal aspects of forensic evidence suggested that 
forensic experts may have disassociated themselves because the law was 
more properly the domain of legal and social specialists.31 Edmond 
suggested, however, that the relationship between law and science had 
failed, primarily because of a failure on the part of judges and lawyers to 
deal with expert evidence, and, that the forensic community, by ‘look(ing) to 
courts (or law) for guidance, leadership, credibility or legitimacy’32 there had 
been ‘serious and endemic problems with many forensic sciences’.33 
This study aimed to investigate experts’ experience of the practical 
manifestations of the relationship between science and the law, and to 
determine the degree to which such academic criticisms might be supported. 
The findings gave some cause for concern. 
                                            
31 Simon J Walsh, 'Legal Perceptions of Forensic DNA Profiling: Part I: A 
Review of the Legal Literature' (2005) 155 Issue 1 Forensic Science 
International 51. 
32 Gary Edmond, Mehera San Roque, ‘Actual Innocents? Legal Limitations 
and their Implications for Forensic Science and Medicine’ (2011) 43 Issue 2-
3 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 177, 178. 
33 ibid 177. 
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Interviewees expressed concern regarding the Doheny direction, not for the 
ideological reasons given by its critics, but because it did not allow them to 
offer additional evidence to the court where they felt it necessary. On the 
other hand, interviewees stated that Doheny offered a practical solution, in 
that its requirements were relatively clear-cut. 
Prosecution experts expressed concern regarding case law developments 
culminating in Dlugosz,34 arguably allowing erosion of the ‘gold-standard’ 
nature of DNA identification. Yet, again, albeit with some exceptions, this 
was not for ideological reasons, but rather because of a lack of clarity 
regarding the way that complex DNA evidence should be reported in court. 
Prosecution experts expressed concern regarding case law that allowed 
expert experience even to take precedence over scientific argument. 
Paradoxically, despite admitting that there were significant scientific 
limitations to subjective evidence of this sort, they suggested, almost 
unanimously, that their opinion should take indeed take precedence over 
scientific counter-argument. 
On this matter, prosecution and defence experts adopted strongly polarised 
views, indeed, from a prosecution view expressing a sometimes strongly 
disparaging view, not only of the defence argument, but the motivation and 
even honesty of the witness themselves. 
Prosecution experts had stated repeatedly that they often had little or no 
information prior to the case, for example details of the defence case, or 
issues at dispute, and were often confused as to the purpose of questions 
they were asked during examination. 
Edmond suggested that the forensic community was passive in the face of 
judicial requirements. The current study, to the degree above, supports that 
assertion. An external observer could be forgiven for questioning why the 
forensic community did not actively seek information regarding cases in 
which they were involved, push back against the widely accepted limitations 
of the Doheny direction, and take a lead in determining how DNA evidence 
should be presented in the face of increasing complexity of evidence, and 
the forensic need to answer more complex questions. 
If the evidence is that the forensic expert has taken a passive role in the trial 
process, then the question arose as to how the forensic expert rationalised 
this situation in practice. In this study, interviewees rationalised simple 
                                            
34 R v Dlugosz (n 10). 
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conflicts (for example, why they had been examined on apparently irrelevant 
DNA evidence) as being because there were, presumably, parts of the case 
to which they were not privy. This seemed reasonable, however, it should be 
recalled, from the previous chapter, that whilst in the witness box, 
interviewees reported attempting to ‘rectify the balance’, where they were 
not sure that a point had been made. Viewed in this light, the rationalisation 
that ‘they were not aware of the whole case’ would seem to reflect simply a 
reaction where they did not feel that they been able to ‘rectify’ a perceived 
inaccuracy. 
Echoing findings reported in the previous chapter, that interviewees found 
themselves to be poorly communicated with, they reported also a lack of 
engagement with them by the legal apparatus bordering, in some interviews, 
on disrespect. Whether or not the judicial process disengaged the forensic 
expert, or vice versa, this study showed, not only that the involvement and 
engagement of forensics experts was less than might be even realistically 
supposed, but, in many respects, showed an active and conscious dis-
engagement. 
It will be recalled from the last chapter that one expert stated that they found 
it easy to detach themselves from the case, but not from the science, stating 
that ‘impartiality’, to them, simply represented good science, and ‘answering 
questions correctly’. Perhaps this rationalisation of the meaning of 
‘impartiality’ solved a number of challenges. That is, finding themselves in a 
confusing environment under examination, this was one method of 
endeavouring to remain unbiased.  
Of interest, too, was the striking ‘disengagement’ from the case itself, with 
most experts, even if they attended court, not knowing the outcome of their 
cases. Indeed, it was striking that interviewees expressed little or no 
curiosity in cases where they had not been called to court. They rationalised 
these cases in terms of an assumed guilty plea, or other resolution, or, 
simply, factors unknown to them. This seemed a weak justification, given 
that many had witnessed misuse of forensic evidence in court. As mentioned 
above, one interpretation of this disengagement was that experts were 
displaying perhaps, a praiseworthy, lack of bias. On one level, this may have 
been true, and on that basis it may have been considered paradoxical that 
the findings reported in Chapter Five described strong apparent association 
by experts with instructing parties. This is not incompatible with the proposal 
made in the preceding paragraph, however, that true impartiality might have 
been an impossible objective, given the exigencies of the adversarial 
- 270 - 
process, with experts’ roles essentially thrust upon them. On that basis, 
again, the objective of delivering objective science may have been 
considered a practical aim in its stead. 




The aim of this study was to examine the presentation and examination of 
DNA evidence in the English Crown Court, from the perspective of the 
forensic experts who provide it. The central objective was to deepen 
understanding of the forensic expert’s role and experience during the course 
of the adversarial criminal trial. 
By using DNA evidence as its focus, this study aimed to focus on the 
interface between the forensic expert, offering scientifically rigorous proof, 
and the court, requiring legal proof of certainty. DNA evidence is the only 
forensic identification test to demonstrate rigorous scientific proof.1 It does 
not offer legally rigorous proof of an offence because all evidence is 
contextual. Previous empirical studies including non-DNA forensic evidence 
have suffered a challenge in that the scientific validity of the evidence itself 
has been potentially at issue, thereby obscuring the true nature of the 
science – law interface. 
Despite the significant intellectual effort devoted to expert scientific 
evidence, the perspective of the forensic expert has been largely ignored. 
This study set out to demonstrate, not only a new perspective upon the 
debate, but also one which was uniquely valuable in that it is required, by 
law, to be unbiased.2 The methodology involved qualitative analysis of the 
perceptions and opinions of forensic experts, with data generated by semi-
structured interview. 
This study was defined by the adversarial nature of the English criminal trial, 
indeed, criticisms of expert evidence in the English courts have commonly 
been described as having their origins in detrimental effects of the 
                                            
1 National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National Academies 
Press, 2009) (NRC Report) 7. 
2 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and 
Wales (Law Com No.325 (2011)) (Law Commission Report) para 2.9; 
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adversarial trial system.3 These effects have been summarised as being, 
first, claims of bias on the part of the expert witness, and, second, the result 
of various ‘trial pathologies’, that is, ‘systems failures’ in the presentation and 
examination of DNA evidence.4 Strong arguments have been made, 
however, that many perceived pathologies may be equally viewed as 
strengths of the adversarial system (for example selective presentation of 
evidence).5 On this basis, any actual pathology might be understood as a 
dysfunction in the correct working of the adversarial system, rather than the 
nature of the system itself.6 
With this in mind, the current study sought to examine the role of DNA 
evidence within the adversarial system, rather than the established nature of 
the adversarial system itself. 
A number of lines of investigation were suggested by the claimed 
detrimental effects mentioned above. First, the study investigated the degree 
to which the environment of the adversarial trial, and the assumedly partisan 
opposing parties, impacted upon the presumed intention of the expert 
witness to remain unbiased. The study also aimed to identify what forensic 
experts understood by their responsibility to remain unbiased; it aimed to 
answer the question of how ‘prosecution’ and ‘defence’ experts perceived 
their duty of giving objective and unbiased opinion to the court, the 
challenges they faced in discharging this duty, and how successfully they 
believed they were in doing this. 
Secondly, the study investigated the forensic experts’ experience and 
perception of the trial itself, specifically looking at individual ‘trial 
pathologies’. This term refers specifically to a model, defined by Nelken, 
which attempts to classify philosophies regarding the inter-relationship 
between law and science.7 The ‘trial pathology’ model suggests that 
challenges of scientific evidence within the legal system may be resolved to 
                                            
3 Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 198-205; Oriola Sallavaci, The Impact of Scientific Evidence on 
the Criminal Trial: The Case of DNA Evidence (Routledge 2014) 33. 
4 ibid. 
5 Paul Roberts, ‘Paradigms of Forensic Science and Legal Process: a 
Critical Diagnosis’ (2015) 370 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B 1 (Paradigms). 
6 ibid. 
7 David Nelken, ‘A Just Measure of Science’ in Michael Freeman, Helen 
Reece (eds), Science In Court (Ashgate, 1998) 14-18. 
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simple and discrete systems failures. Although Nelken suggested that such 
failures might simply represent symptoms, rather than causes, this second 
line of investigation probed practical manifestations of challenges with DNA 
evidence from the expert’s perspective. 
The third line of investigation was suggested by Nelken’s alternative models 
of the relationship between science and law, specifically that science and 
law may represent ‘competing institutions’ or ‘incompatible discourses’. The 
study investigated a number of aspects of the practical interface between 
science and law in the court room, and attempted to draw conclusions as to 
the question of whether, as has recently been suggested, that relationship 
has failed.8 
The study also aimed to draw conclusions as to whether DNA evidence did 
indeed herald a new paradigm in forensic identification, as has been 
claimed.9 
8.2 Importance and Originality of the Research 
Despite the fact that criminal courts are ever more reliant on scientific expert 
evidence, and, particularly, DNA evidence, concerns regarding such 
evidence have been ever increasing. These concerns become manifest in 
significant academic activity,10 governmental reports11 and commissions,12 
chartered body publications,13 proposed14 and actual (if secondary) 
                                            
8 Edmond, Gary and San Roque, Mehera, ‘The Cool Crucible: Forensic 
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11 For example, Science and Technology Committee, Forensic Science on 
Trial Seventh Report (HC 2004-2005) (HC Forensic Science on Trial). 
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legislation,15 developments in common law,16 and, not least, media reports.17 
Paradoxically, concerns regarding DNA evidence have increased as its 
scientific rigour has increased. A particular concern has been that, despite 
the fact that the trial is adversarial, and that expert witnesses are instructed 
by either prosecution or defence to support their case, by common law the 
expert must remain unbiased, with a primary responsibility to the court.18 
The issues are not purely academic. The Runciman Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice, in investigating the causes of a number of miscarriages of 
justice,19 identified many contributory factors, however, many had, at their 
heart, undisclosed, flawed or misrepresented forensic evidence.20  More 
recently, the Law Commission Report into Expert Evidence of 2011,21 took, 
as its start point, four cases in which the jury apparently relied on expert 
testimony which later turned out to be erroneous.22  
On average, approximately 19,000 crimes are solved each year through 
matches on the National DNA database.23 Despite the vast academic 
commentary upon the use of DNA evidence, there have been few empirical 
studies, and, of these, the majority have been of a limited nature (for 
example, mock jury reaction to presentation methods). No previous study 
has specifically canvassed the perceptions and opinions of the forensic 
experts who present, and are examined upon, DNA evidence. Despite the 
claimed ‘paradigmatic’ and ‘gold standard’ nature of forensic DNA evidence, 
it has shown itself capable of error and misuse.24 
                                            
15 For example, Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, pt 19. 
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24 For example, Forensic Science Regulator, ‘Report into the Circumstances 
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DNA technology has advanced significantly since its first forensic use, and 
commentators have suggested that, with such technical advances (both 
biological and statistical), the scope for misuse of DNA evidence can only 
increase.25 Significantly, that misuse does not only include technical aspects, 
such as contamination, but also judicial aspects, such as the realisation that 
juries, as well as other court ‘players’ may be unable to process the true 
meaning of complex evidence correctly in the context of the case. 
Scientifically, it is undisputed that DNA identification evidence heralds a new 
paradigm. However, the law regarding the presentation of simple DNA 
evidence has not changed since its earliest days, despite being widely 
regarded as flawed. Additionally, there has been widespread controversy 
about the implications of new precedents regarding more complex evidence 
in which subjective evidence has been admitted and relied upon (it will be 
recalled that the paradigmatic claims regarding DNA evidence revolve 
around the fact that DNA evidence is presented in the form of an objective 
probability statement, and not a subjective opinion subject to expert 
disagreement). 
It has been suggested that a crossroads has been reached in which the new 
paradigm intersects with established adversarial practice.26 The examination 
of the use of DNA evidence in court has never been more important. 
Although this study is small, it is unique in that it specifically addresses 
forensic experts testifying as to DNA evidence. The scope of the study only 
included experience of experts whilst in court, and in the cases in which they 
were called to court. It should be remembered, however, that trial itself has 
been described as simply the ‘presentational surface’ of the entire underlying 
criminal investigation and prosecution, it being described as a ‘sociological 
truism’ that the evidence presented, and the verdict reached, is heavily 
dependent on myriad contingencies in the pre-trial process,27 both existing 
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within the context of each other.28 On that basis, although the data 
generated within the study cannot be generalised directly to the wider use of 
DNA evidence without further qualification, it might be assumed that valid 
conclusions can still be drawn. This study reported a wide range of 
experience from which these conclusions can be made. 
8.3 The Unbiased Expert 
The statement within the Criminal Procedure Rules that the ‘… expert must 
help the court… by giving opinion which is objective and unbiased… ’29 
might appear disarmingly simple to understand. The observation has been 
made in the current study, however, that, both in academic commentary, and 
official reports and guidelines, not only have the terms ‘unbiased’ and 
‘impartial’ been used synonymously, but they have also been used variously 
in conjunction with the terms ‘independent’, ‘objective’, ‘neutral’,30 and, in 
common law, ‘(acting) in the cause of justice’.31 
The current study would argue that the distinction between these terms is 
important. For example, to be ‘unbiased’ (not improperly influenced) is not 
exactly the same as ‘impartial’ (not favouring one party). Most commentary, 
mentioned above, appears to conflagrate the different terms into a general, 
but unclearly defined, responsibility on the part of the experts. The 
interviewees in this study similarly appeared to have an unclear and abstract 
general idea of what this responsibility meant. Significantly, however, this 
study also showed that different interviewees had different opinions as to 
what this meant in practice and how they applied it. 
A naïve interpretation of the ‘unbiased’ responsibilities of the expert in court 
might have implied that, to an external observer of court proceedings, the 
expert witness for the prosecution would have been indistinguishable from 
the expert witness for the defence. That naïve observer may have gone on 
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to assume that experts were drawn from a central pool of experts, who 
would have been equally willing and competent to testify whether called by 
prosecution or defence counsel. 
This study has shown these assumptions would be far from true, for the 
study demonstrated that prosecution and defence experts are not 
‘prosecution’ and ‘defence’ simply because of which side instructs them, but, 
rather because of the very different organisational origins of each side. For 
the prosecution these origins were institutional, and the forensic expert may 
have been closely associated with the investigation and prosecution team 
from the earliest stages. This very much reflected the comment made by a 
defence barrister in testifying to the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee when he stated that: 
‘I will not use an FSS expert when I am defending because I 
believe—whether I am right or not is not the point— there is 
a corporate spirit that will mean an expert from the FSS will 
not go against the party line.32 
The origins of the defence were diverse, with experts not necessarily coming 
have come from the forensic laboratory. Prosecution an defence roles were 
further distinguished by the fact that the prosecution had to show guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the defence simply had to cast 
reasonable doubt upon that. From a forensic evidence point of view these 
required very different approaches to the evidence. 
In this study, interviews with prosecution experts indicated that they 
understood their responsibility to be unbiased, took the responsibility 
seriously, and claimed to achieve it. Interviewees argued that they simply 
‘appeared to be biased’ because of the questions that they were asked, and, 
specifically because they could only provide evidence regarding the single 
case being argued by the prosecution. They could not qualify their evidence 
beyond that. 
This study provided strong evidence that, to all intents and purpose, true 
‘impartiality’, that is, ‘not favouring one party’ was not achievable in practice, 
simply by the role that the expert was required to play. The prosecution 
expert testifies as to evidence supporting a single case, which the 
prosecution counsel aims to prove beyond reasonable doubt. However the 
defence expert testifies in support of other, innocent, explanations for the 
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same evidence. The aim is not to disprove the prosecution case, but simply 
to show reasonable doubt. 
It is important to note however, that it may be argued that such ‘partiality’ 
may be better understood not in terms of partiality towards the state, or to 
the defendant as an individual, but rather to the prosecution and defence 
cases. 
It would not be expected, as one interviewee stated, that the prosecution 
witness would feed possible exculpatory explanations of the evidence to the 
defence party, or that the defence expert would concede that their evidence 
did not demonstrate reasonable doubt. 
In a similar demonstration of the very different roles of prosecution and 
defence experts, a small but significant number of defence experts indicated 
that they would testify in favour of a defendant that they believed to be guilty. 
As one stated, it was sufficient to discredit the DNA evidence, and ‘… there 
was always something… ’ (for example, the possibility of contamination) to 
challenge. It might be argued that this would not be counter to the expert’s 
duty of service to the court: the defence expert does not need to believe that 
their client is ‘innocent’, but rather that there is reasonable doubt upon their 
guilt. In this way, the viewpoints of prosecution and defence, and the 
objectives for the evidence supporting their cases, does not form a mirror 
image. 
Of course the expert is bound by legal privilege not to disclose their party’s 
strategy regarding the use of evidence, and, of course, cannot volunteer 
information in court, however this further underpins the contention that 
experts cannot remain ‘impartial’, in its technical meaning. 
From an adversarial point of view, prosecution experts were clear that they 
felt pressured by their adversarial role, a situation not helped by the fact that 
they were closely associated with the investigators prior to any detection or 
prosecution of crime. For example, prosecution experts indicated that they 
were cautious about volunteering information of use to the defence at any 
stage (for example during pre-trial disclosure of evidence). 
Defence experts took a very different role. Where they were instructed, they 
gave objective opinion on the evidence, often agreeing with the 
prosecution’s case. It did not surprise them that, in these cases they were 
not asked to testify.  
If all experts declared that they remained professionally unbiased, then the 
question arose as to how they defined this responsibility. Interestingly, 
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although this varied between individuals, it did not apparently vary between 
prosecution and defence. Most indicated that, in practice, they saw their 
responsibility as achieving ‘good, objective science’, and it was up to the 
court to decide what they did with that. Interestingly, one interviewee stated 
that they found it easy to detach themselves from the trial itself, but not the 
science. Although experts did not define their responsibilities in ‘dictionary 
terms’, it was apparent that they also saw their role as remaining ‘honest’, 
perhaps better defined as ‘not misleading’, although, and as particularly 
described in Chapter Six, they felt concern that their evidence was 
sometimes used in a misleading way. 
If the expert offers an objective, unbiased opinion, the question arises as to 
whether it is important that the expert is ‘impartial’. After all, and as 
described above, the way in which experts are involved in the case arguably 
necessitates alignment with one side, and need not be detrimental to 
objective science. 
This study concludes that, in principle, there seems little problem with this 
view. However there was evidence in this study that a simple ‘alignment’ or 
‘partisanship’ with the instructing party sometimes extended to bias (that is, 
undue influence) towards that side. Theoretically this could be manifest as 
exaggeration of evidence or misleading use of evidence. Whilst there was no 
evidence of this in the current study, some interviewees did show a 
partisanship towards their instructing party that appeared to go beyond 
simple alignment, to a desire to win. Comments such, ‘… what you don’t 
want is a case falling apart once you are in court’, ‘I have definitely had 
cases where the wheel has wobbled.’ and ‘whichever side you are batting 
for… .’ clearly, at least, indicate a desire to win for their side. 
Perhaps of concern, some experts indicated that they saw their responsibility 
as ensuring that their client has a fair trial. Of course, a ‘fair trial’ is a worthy 
objective of itself, however a number of interviewees indicated that they 
would actively seek to ‘balance the playing field’ where, for example, they 
felt that counsel had not elicited from them evidence that would support the 
counter case. It might be argued that this was not only illegitimate in that the 
expert is not allowed to act as advocate, but also would have been of 
doubtful effectiveness. 
This study identified different cultures and values separating prosecution and 
defence, with distinct institutional origins. Notable were the disparaging 
comments from prosecution experts regarding some defence experts. These 
not only impugned the defence science, but also the qualifications, 
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motivation, and, indeed, honesty of the expert themselves. The recent 
demise of the FSS has meant that a number of ‘prosecution’ experts now 
work within defence consultancies. It was clear, though, that some of these 
individual experts found discomfort in ‘going against the prosecution’, one 
expert opining that they ‘would do their best for the defendant’, no matter 
how serious the crime they were accused of. 
It is worth considering the degree to which, in agreement with established 
thinking and law, just how important it is that experts themselves are not 
‘adversarial’. On the one hand, Redmayne suggested that criticisms of 
adversarial expertise might be better seen as criticisms of adversarialism in 
general,33 and that, whilst adversarial expertise ‘is bound to’ produce biased 
experts, there are reasons why this may not be a significant problem.34 On 
the other hand, strong arguments have been made that, not only is the 
position of the expert itself anomalous, but that this leads to serious 
difficulties.35 Specifically, the criticism has been that if both experts testify as 
to opposing partisan opinion, then the jury has no way of knowing which is 
right. In fact, they now fail in the essential contribution supposed to be 
provided by the expert, which is assistance to the jury in matters beyond 
their everyday knowledge. In this way, the expert has become useless to the 
trial.36 
In summary, these findings support Redmayne’s proposition that adversarial 
expertise is bound to produce, at least, experts partial to the prosecution or 
defence cases, based on the role dictated for prosecution and defence 
experts by the adversarial process. 
The contention of this study is that the concept of the role of experts as 
‘unbiased servants of the court’, although generally accepted, in fact 
conflagrates a number of abstract concepts. These include lack of bias, 
impartiality, neutrality, objectivity, independence, and ‘acting in the cause of 
justice’. This study has also shown that because experts have differing views 
of exactly what their responsibility in this regard is, there is the danger of 
bias. If left unchecked, such bias might lead to exaggeration or other 
distortion of evidence. These are plainly not in the interests of justice. 
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Despite the significant academic and legislative effort that has been 
expended on the subject of expert evidence, little or no effort has been 
expended on what exactly is meant by the responsibility to remain ‘unbiased’ 
and how this relates to impartiality, neutrality, objectivity and independence. 
Critics might argue that, within the constraints of the adversarial system, all 
that experts have ever been able to do is to is to offer objective testimony 
regarding sound science. However, the law itself states that the 
responsibility extends beyond that. In this a conflict evidently applies. This 
study recommends that examination is made of the desired policy objectives 
of the expert responsibility to remain unbiased. Whilst historical in origin, it is 
not clear that continuing examination has been made of the reasons for this, 
and, assuming for the moment that unbiased expertise is desirable, exactly 
what the nature of that is. From a practical point of view, it might then be 
possible to develop clear guidelines as to how experts can achieve policy 
aims in practice. 
8.4 Experience in Court 
The second line of investigation in this study concerned ‘trial pathologies’. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, strong arguments have been made that many 
perceived trial ‘pathologies’ may be more accurately described as features of 
the adversarial system, and that where true dysfunction occurs, this may be 
because of a fault in the way in which the adversarial system is applied, as 
opposed to a fault of the system itself.37 
Previous studies on witnesses in court, both lay and expert, have been 
consistent in describing lack of communication as a trial pathology. Despite 
many reforms aimed at streamlining communication, such as disclosure 
requirements, streamlined reporting and pre-trial meetings between experts, 
all aimed at early identification of issues and early disposal of cases,38  the 
current study gave cold comfort to those who would claim that these 
provisions have so far been effective. 
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Great institutional emphasis, for example, has been placed upon the 
Criminal Procedure Rules provisions for expert witnesses,39 and reforms 
contained within the Criminal Practice Directions.40 Particular stress has 
been put upon the provision for pre-trial discussion between experts. In this 
study, not only had few interviewees attended pre-trial discussions with the 
opposing expert, but many were not even familiar with the intention or the 
legal provision for them. Indeed, a small, but significant number of 
interviewees indicated that they believed such meetings would be 
illegitimate, in the absence of counsel control, and with a report to counsel. A 
few interviewees described meetings that they had attended, at which 
counsel were present, but vanishingly few stated that they had attended a 
pre-trial discussion conforming with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules. It will be recalled that such a meeting should be court-ordered, 
between experts alone, the output being an agreed statement and no 
more.41 It appeared, from this study, that counsel remained very much in 
control regarding pre-trial contact between experts. 
In common with reports in previous studies, this study showed that 
communication problems extended to lack of contact with the counsel. 
Prosecution experts had little information about the defence case, and had 
little, or no, contact with counsel before appearing in the witness box. They 
stated that they sometimes remained confused under examination as to why 
questions were being asked, or how they should answer. They reported that 
although they could clarify their immediate evidence, they witnessed misuse 
of DNA evidence whilst outside of the witness box, and, in those cases, were 
powerless to correct misunderstandings. 
As discussed in detail below, DNA evidence is uniquely complex.  On the 
one hand, in the adversarial arena, each party is free to adduce only the 
evidence that they choose, and experts may only answer the questions that 
they are asked. However, the working of the adversarial trial must assume 
that both parties (that is, counsel), understand the evidence, and are able to 
examine and cross-examine that evidence effectively. The findings reported 
in the current study indicate that experts believe that, in many cases, they 
are not effectively examined or cross-examined, and, for that reason they do 
not believe that DNA evidence is adequately understood by the jury. Even in 
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cases where they believe the DNA evidence to be clearly presented, experts 
have clear concerns regarding the jury’s ability to understand the 
probabilistic evidence presented to them. 
Previous studies suggested that some experts, with experience, were able to 
‘play the system’, however, in the current study, many forensic experts 
described feelings of powerlessness, and being unable to explain the 
evidence in the way they believed would be most effective. 
Certainly, in the current study, interviewees described strategies to try to 
overcome perceived shortcomings in the way in which their evidence was 
examined, however these strategies did not appear generally effective. For 
example, for many defence experts, counsel simply did not call them to the 
stand, for fear that they would testify that their evidence supported the 
prosecution case. In these cases all they could do is witness proceedings, 
with their contribution restricted to passing notes to counsel. In other cases 
in which interviewees stated that they felt that their evidence had been 
misrepresented, all they could do was inform counsel of that. 
The findings in this study support observations that many apparent failings 
are caused by a failure to apply existing processes, many aimed at 
streamlining existing processes, with the objective of improving 
communication and early identification of contested issues in the case. 
Commentators have pointed out, however, that justice in the adversarial 
process also involves effective examination and cross-examination, and 
adequate resourcing for the defence. This study certainly supports 
observations in previous studies that examination and cross-examination is 
not always effective. Compounding this, experts reported compensatory 
behaviour, aimed at remedying perceived shortcomings in the evidence that 
they presented. Whilst perhaps a worthy objective, it is a distortion of the 
adversarial system for the expert to take the role of advocate. 
This study also, however, makes the proposition that DNA evidence is 
qualitatively different from older forensic identification techniques. It has 
been suggested that one of the major reasons for the use of scientific 
evidence in criminal trials is its assumed ability to determine truth, or at least 
to contribute towards accurate fact finding.42 As Jackson suggested, ‘… 
there is an attraction in the verdict being based on hard evidence and 
models of formal reasoning rather than on frailties of common sense 
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reasoning.’43 However, Sallavaci has suggested that, to a certain degree, 
forensic scientists have ‘nurtured’ that view, for example by declaring a 
fingerprint match.44 Indeed, Sallavaci also pointed out that, in cases resting 
upon the single issue of identity, experts have effectively been able to rule 
upon the ultimate issue, even usurp the role of the jury.45 
Paradoxically, DNA evidence is different because it cannot prove identity. It 
can only provide evidence in probabilistic form. In this way, DNA is different 
because the expert is forced to present their evidence in a scientifically 
rigorous fashion. This point is worthy of emphasis: the expert must present 
the evidence in the form of a random match probability, that is, the 
probability of the DNA match if the sample did not belong to the defendant 
(not, what the probability of this being the defendant’s DNA is). Additionally 
the expert must be careful to address this evidence to the correct level 
according to the hierarchy of propositions (that is, ensure that they are 
addressing the question that is being asked). 
The point is that, not only is the science difficult to understand (demonstrably 
in the cases of judge, jury, counsel and experts themselves), and difficult to 
process (the ‘number-blindness noted as a pathology of scientific evidence), 
but DNA evidence is unique in that it forces experts’ evidence to be 
rigorously scientific. (It might be noted that DNA is not the only evidence that 
is probabilistic in nature, however DNA is the only evidence that, by law, 
must be presented in the form of a random match probability alone. This is, 
arguably, simply because of the undisputed database underlying DNA 
evidence, and the very low random match probabilities presented in court). 
8.5 Science and Law 
Serious concerns have been raised concerning the engagement of forensic 
science with the law, indeed, it has been suggested that the forensic-law 
relationship has failed. Edmond argued that judges were partly to blame, a 
historically ‘cosy’ relationship with the forensic community having led to ‘lax 
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admissibility standards for incriminating expert opinion, … (and a diversion 
of) attention from research and interest in the reliability of evidence’.46 
However, his criticism was aimed predominantly at the forensic science 
profession, who, he suggested: 
…  should not appeal to the law or the courts for social or 
epistemic legitimacy… (and) should be appealing to 
techniques that have been studied and validated rather than 
whether a technically incompetent (legal) profession finds 
their opinions useful in the disposition of busy dockets.47  
That is, as other commentators have suggested: 
… they should move (back) to adopt the characteristics of a 
profession, rather than attempt to simply demonstrate 
independence in a system, compromised by the need to 
provide the judicial system with what it asks for.48  
These are serious accusations: the implications of these statements are that 
forensic science has been passive in the face of the judicial determinations 
regarding scientific evidence. As Edmonds states: 
‘While courts may confer social legitimacy, prior experience 
in trials and appeals and success with previous 
prosecutions, do not constitute forms of validation or credible 
support for the reliability of techniques and opinions’.49 
On the other hand, Roberts suggested that, although there were failures in 
the interface between forensic science and the law, these were largely 
through forensic practitioners’ lack of understanding of adversarial culture.50 
Whilst the commentators, above referred to the forensic profession as a 
whole, this study aimed to identify evidence in support or rejection of these 
arguments by investigating individuals’ experiences of the practical 
manifestations of this engagement between science and law. It also aimed 
to draw conclusions as to whether DNA evidence provided a special case. 
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The forensic community has accepted a presentation method for DNA that 
has always been widely accepted as flawed. On the one hand, this could be 
described as a simple, and practical solution, however, on the other, 
interviewees stated that this had limited their evidence in an unhelpful (to the 
jury) fashion. Reflecting Edmond’s statement above, and that of one 
commentator who stated that ‘Doheny was a lost opportunity’, it was 
surprising that interviewees did not express more concern regarding the 
continuing application of an approach to DNA presentation widely regarded 
as being out of date. This was especially so given that interviewees believed 
that the jury could not always properly understand the DNA evidence without 
further (inadmissible because of Doheny) explanation. 
Interestingly, however, the rationale given by almost all interviewees for their 
continuing support for Doheny was that it provided certainty as to how their 
evidence should be presented. 
Interviewees uniformly expressed concern regarding how more complex 
DNA should be presented. This included low template DNA, DNA mixtures, 
and partial profiles, often in combination. They also expressed concern 
regarding recent precedent on how evidence regarding transfer of DNA 
should be presented (for which there is no statistical database). Concern 
was also raised regarding the recent decision in R v Dlugosz,51 in which 
opinion evidence regarding a DNA match was admitted. 
Interestingly, however, interviewees were not concerned regarding the 
scientific validity of the decisions in these cases. Instead, they expressed 
concern simply on the basis that they had no clarity on how such evidence 
should be presented. It will be recalled that interviewees stated that simple 
DNA matches were rarely, if ever, in dispute. Effectively, therefore, they had 
no clear guidelines on how to present anything other than routine cases. 
Strikingly, one interviewee with a special interest in the area expressed 
surprise at the decision that had been made in Dlugosz,52 stating: 
I thought they would go: now you have always set your stall 
out to say you are going to do this statistically and now you 
are saying you can’t … I thought they would … make DNA a 
special case. That would have driven forward the statistical 
working up the new methodology for statistical analysis of 
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mixtures but they haven’t, they have gone, alright well we 
will accept a softer approach. 
On the one hand, it might be argued that the forensic community were best 
placed to make a judgment on the reliability (at least, scientific) of the DNA 
evidence in such cases, rather than remain passive in the face of a judicial 
determination, although strict proponents of adversarial examination might 
equally argue that the adversarial system should be capable of testing 
reliability for itself. 
Having said this, one ‘adversarial’ split in forensic opinion was observed: 
regarding the recent decision in Dlugosz to admit subjective opinion as to a 
DNA match (when a standard match probability could not be calculated), 
whilst defence experts expressed uniform criticism of such an approach, a 
significant number of prosecution experts stated that they welcomed a 
relaxation in how they could present evidence. A similar split was observed 
regarding recent cases in which subjective opinion given by the prosecution 
expert was countered unsuccessfully by defence arguments that there was 
no validated science to support the opinions. Again, prosecution and 
defence experts differed on party lines regarding whether laboratory 
(subjective) experience should take precedence over experimental rigour. 
Interviewees’ suggestions that discussions with colleagues regarding results 
constituted ‘peer review’, therefore validating their ‘experience’ as science 
seems a weak argument. 
With reference to the conclusions within Chapter Five, it may not be found 
surprising that prosecution and defence experts each supported the view of 
the evidence (for example experience versus validated science) that best 
supported their party’s case, however this ‘polarisation’ did suggest an 
‘adversarialism’ beyond an objective view of the case. 
A number of experts described paradoxical events within the trial, for 
example the acceptance by opposing parties of evidence known by both to 
be false. Their assumption that such events were explicable by factors of 
which they were unaware in the case seemed reasonable, however it was 
noteworthy that such rationalisation seemed to extent to a figurative ‘shrug 
of the shoulders’ at the workings of the legal system. This study has used 
the term ‘disengagement’ to describe such ‘withdrawal’ and ‘detachment’ 
that experts appeared to exhibit in such regard. 
It should be noted that such disengagement seemed to go further for many, 
if not most, interviewees, in terms of the case itself. For example, it was 
striking that the majority of forensic experts did not know the outcome of 
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trials in which they had been involved. Additionally, it was striking that 
interviewees expressed only a passing curiosity in cases where they had not 
been called to court. 
One interpretation of this disengagement was that experts were displaying, 
perhaps a praiseworthy, lack of bias in this regard. On the one hand it may 
be considered paradoxical that this study found strong apparent association 
by experts with instructing parties, and yet lack of interest in the case 
outcome. On the other hand however, it was suggested by this study, that 
any natural ‘partiality’ displayed by expert witnesses might be understood as 
being towards prosecution and defence cases, rather than to the state or the 
defendant individually. 
8.6 Theoretical Implications 
A major line of investigation in this study has concerned the overall 
relationship between science and law in the court room. Nelken’s models 
described this relationship in terms of ‘trial pathologies’, ‘competing 
institutions’ or ‘incompatible discourses’.53 
Trial pathologies similar to those reported in previous studies have 
manifested themselves in this study in relation to DNA evidence. This study 
has generally supported Roberts’s argument that many of these 
‘pathologies’ might be better viewed, and are explicable as, features of a 
working adversarial system.54 Roberts argued that where true ‘pathology’ 
occurred, this indicated not that the adversarial system was at fault, but that 
a process within it was not operating correctly. 
This is reasonable, if it can be assumed that examination in chief and the 
adversarial safeguard of cross-examination are sufficient tests of the 
evidence. 
This study suggests that DNA evidence provides a special case, and indeed 
signifies a ‘crossroads’ in the intersection of law and forensic science. The 
reasons undoubtedly include its complexity, in terms of the science itself, the 
way in which DNA is understood by judge, counsel, jury and expert, and the 
way in which probabilistic evidence many be combined with traditional 
evidence. The implication of this complexity is that relevant ‘pathologies’ 
become magnified. If we consider the recognised pathologies of lawyer 
                                            
53 Nelken (n 7). 
54 Roberts, Paradigms (n 5) 2-3. 
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ignorance, deliberate manipulation, communication failures, testimonial 
silencing, adversarial deficit, and number-blindness,55 the potential for 
distortion of the evidence is significant. 
It might be argued that such complexities might arise in respect of any 
scientific evidence, however, this is not the case. As detailed in this chapter, 
unlike older and more established identification techniques such as 
fingerprinting, DNA profiling is unique in that it is forced to be scientific. The 
very fact that it cannot individualise identification, but instead provide simply 
the ‘strength of the evidence’ brings it firmly down to rigorous scientific 
principles. 
Strong proponents of the adversarial system might argue that the adversarial 
process itself is sufficient to test the evidence, however this has left the 
courts to rule on the validity of scientific argument. As Edmond suggested, 
courts have ‘privileged the wrong type of heuristics in their attempts to 
engage with scientific… knowledge’.56 
Regarding the proposal that science and law are ‘competing institutions’, 
whilst this is might be true in a greater philosophical sense, it seems true to 
say, not only that forensic science is science for the law, but also that it may 
be most clearly described as a legal process. On this basis, it has been 
argued that forensic scientists should serve the adversarial process through 
‘self-understandings of adversarial culture and their commitment to its 
routine reproduction through conscientious performance of their… roles and 
duties’.57 Presumably, however, Edmond would disagree and not accept that 
forensic scientists should be driven by ‘whether a technically incompetent 
(legal) profession finds their opinions useful in the disposition of busy 
dockets.’58 
Roberts asks the (‘doubtless impertinent’) question of whether the forensic 
profession have received and understood the message regarding their 
ethical duties and delegated procedural instruments.59 The answer 
suggested in the current study is that they have received the message that 
they serve the judicial system, but messages regarding the details of their 
                                            
55 ibid. 
56 Edmond G, ‘Legal Versus Non-Legal Approaches to Forensic Science 
Evidence’ (2016) 20.1 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 3, 3-5. 
57 Roberts, Paradigms (n 5) 6. 
58 Edmond, Actual Innocents (n 46) 196. 
59 Roberts, Paradigms (n 5) 6. 
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ethical and procedural duties have only been partially received. Meanwhile 
the generally passive forensic experts are waiting for clarification and 
instructions. They indeed appear to be ‘satisfy(ing) technically incompetent 
legal professionals in their disposition of busy dockets’.60 Certainly, within 
this study, the almost unanimous viewpoint was that the scientist should 
provide what the law has asked for, if only the law would be clear about what 
they want. 
This study supports the position that, whilst adversarialism is a highly 
efficient and effective tool in narrowing down the issues in factual disputes, it 
is not an effective tool in determining scientific issues. It seems self evident 
that issues of scientific complexity such as those involved in DNA profiling 
can only be determined by scientific experts. It is also clear from this study 
that, whilst there has been much academic commentary, this has not 
extended so far to practical activity within the judicial system. 
Importantly, too, this study has described a cultural gap between prosecution 
and defence experts, with institutionally different origins. It determined that 
experts were inevitable thrust into roles which naturally aligned them with 
prosecution and defence cases, however this did not mean that they could 
not offer ‘unbiased’ advice within the constraints of their role. It was noted, 
however, that some experts aligned very closely with their instructing party, 
with a clear interest in winning their case. The most plausible definition of 
expert responsibility derived within this study was that experts were able to 
offer objective, unbiased opinion, but that they were not truly impartial in that 
they were aligned with ‘their’ side. This partiality, however, could best be 
understood as alignment with the ‘prosecution case’ and ‘defence case’ 
rather than with the state and the individual defendant. 
8.7 Policy Implications and Future Direction 
Nothing in this study suggests that the adversarial system does not remain 
the most efficient system to narrow down issues in factual disputes. 
It should be remembered, too, that many ‘trite’ proposals to correct 
perceived trial pathologies often have the side effect of circumventing the 
adversarial system to some degree.61 
                                            
60 Edmond, Actual Innocents (n 46) 196. 
61 Sallavaci (n 3) 33-34. 
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However, that is not to say that this study does suggest significant policy 
implications. 
Regarding the duty of the expert to offer objective and unbiased opinion, this 
study has suggested that the very nature of the adversarial system does not 
allow the expert to be truly neutral. However, in the absence of clarity 
regarding the experts’ neutral responsibility, there are varying interpretations 
and applications of this in practice. This study recommends that there is 
debate regarding the policy considerations regarding this responsibility, and 
clear practical guidance regarding how the responsibility should be 
discharged. Given that the objective of prosecution and defence expert 
evidence are not mirror images, there is not necessarily a need for such 
responsibilities to be identical. 
It is undoubted that all the interviewees in this study attempted to discharge 
this duty conscientiously, however there was clear evidence that some 
experts had an interest in ‘winning’. A clear definition of responsibility would 
assist all experts in aligning their duties according to standards both ethical 
and in line with policy.  
Regarding trial pathologies reported in the study, this study takes little 
exception from the previous recommendations in this area that there should 
be continuing incremental implementation of existing reforms: much 
intellectual effort has been expended on the improvement of expert 
evidence, on both its admissibility and its evaluation in court, and there is 
much empirical work on the way in which complex evidence should be 
presented. Reforms have included consolidation of common law in the form 
of additional provisions within the Criminal Procedure Rules,62 and additions 
to the Criminal Practice Directions,63 as well as the ‘active encouragement’ 
of judges to take a more ‘activist role’ as gatekeepers.64 There have been 
many other recommendations, including, by the Law Commission, training 
for judges and counsel, however it has been observed that the required 
training, would be substantial.65 
These developments and reforms have been described as the start of a 
cultural shift, however there must be significant concerns. Firstly, few, if any, 
                                            
62 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015. 
63 Criminal Practice Directions 2015. 
64 Ian Dennis, 'Tightening the law on expert evidence' (2015) Criminal Law 
Review 1,1-2. 
65 ibid 
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of the reforms are mandatory, and the judiciary has a long tradition of 
resistance to perceived change. Secondly such cultural changes need 
commitment from not only the judiciary itself, but also counsel, the 
government and the forensic community. For the adversarial system to work 
properly, it is insufficient simply to bring in rules regarding admissibility of 
expert evidence. It is necessary for counsel to be sufficiently able to examine 
and cross-examine complex evidence such as DNA, and to do so requires 
some training, but also sufficient communication with the experts that can 
support them. For the government’s part, in supplying the resource to ensure 
operation of the adversarial system in cases involving complex evidence, 
sufficient resources must be made available to the defence to mount a fair 
defence. 
A second ‘plank’ of policy considerations suggested by this study concerns 
the nature of DNA evidence itself. This study has made a strong argument 
that DNA evidence is qualitatively different from older forms of forensic 
identification evidence. Indeed, this study supports the contention that not 
only does DNA represent a new paradigm in forensic identification, but that it 
must inevitably force existing tensions between the law and scientific 
evidence into the open. It is surely unacceptable that future cases will 
depend on assessments of scientific reliability determined and dictated by 
legal precedent. Not least of the concerns must be that the paradigmatic 
nature of DNA evidence may become diluted if it is not subject to scientific 
rigour. In this respect, a clear recommendation of this study is that the 
forensic science community engage with the judicial system in cooperation, 
so that questions of scientific reliability are determined by scientific experts, 
and questions of law, by judicial experts. Although the adversarial system 
must dictate its requirements for scientific evidence, it seems self-evident 
that questions of pure science should be addressed by scientific experts and 
not in an adversarial environment. 
Naturally the questions arise as to who should be responsible for suggested 
reforms, and who will pay. That is to be determined, but there is little doubt 
that it is insufficient to place reliance on individual bodies acting unilaterally. 
Many entities have played a part in the effort to date, including The Law 
Commission, the CPS, the Forensic Science Regulator, the now defunct 
Forensic Science Service, ACPO and various academic bodies, including, 
notably, the Royal Statistical Society. Notably (but not entirely) absent from 
this list are the judiciary themselves, the forensic scientists, and 
representatives of the advocates. The Government must take a lead in co-
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ordinating expert bodies towards an integrated approach to complex 
evidence such as DNA, in the inevitable case that future forensic 
technologies can only be more complex still.  
8.8 Final Reflections 
Whilst the law and science may be competing epistemologies on a 
philosophical level, within the judicial arena it is the judicial system that 
dictates the requirements in terms of evidence. However, this study gives 
support to the contention that DNA evidence is qualitatively different from 
older forms of forensic identification evidence, and offers a particular 
challenge to the judicial system. 
Despite the claim that DNA evidence is ‘just like any other (scientific) 
evidence’ the findings in this study are that because of its explicitly 
probabilistic nature, DNA evidence, and particularly its new technological 
developments, are forcing tensions between scientific evidence and the 
judicial process to the surface. It is hoped that, duly on the surface, they may 
be resolved. 
The stakes are high. On the one hand, the misuse of DNA evidence has not 
only been shown to be the direct cause in cases of miscarriage of justice, 
but, it has been suggested, could represent the tip of an iceberg. With 
rapidly increasing technological advances in DNA, and, no doubt, other, 
future technologies, it is essential that the challenges are addressed as a 
matter of urgency, and it is not left to a conservative judicial system that 
‘knows better’. 
On a practical level, it could easily be argued that these findings have not 
caused a practical problem, because the vast number of cases are decided 
out of court, usually as a result of a decision not to proceed, or a guilty 
verdict on the basis of a routine, admitted, DNA match. As Learned Hand 
stated, however: 
There can be, in my opinion, no legal anomaly which does 
not work evil, because, forming an illogical precedent, it 
becomes the mother of other anomalies and breeds chaos in 
theory and finally litigation.66 
 
                                            
66 Learned Hand, 'Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony' (1901) 15 No. 1 Harvard Law Review 40, 50. 
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Appendix A 
Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
 
School of Law 
  
 
The Presentation and Examination of DNA Evidence Adduced During 
Adversarial Trials 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. This information 
sheet is intended to inform you about why this project is being undertaken 
and what it involves. Please could you read this before deciding whether to 
take part. You can withdraw from the research at any time without giving a 
reason. 
Purpose of Project 
This is a PhD research project looking at the way in which DNA evidence is 
used in the construction of criminal cases and in the prosecution and 
defence of those cases. The approach taken is a qualitative assessment of 
the experience and opinion of expert witnesses involved in such cases, 
gathered through interviews. 
It is expected that the thesis will be completed in early 2015. It is hoped that 
this research will contribute towards the improvement of the judicial process 
regarding the use of expert evidence, specifically involving DNA.  
Format of Interviews 
It is intended to interview approximately 30 experts such as yourself over the 
course of 6 months. Potential participants have been identified by peer 
recommendation. It is anticipated that each interviewee will be participate in 
a single interview lasting up to 1 hour. Most questions are of an open nature, 
allowing you to fully give your opinion within the focus areas. 
To assist in the efficiency of the interview process and accuracy of analysis, 
we request your permission to record the interview. This is optional on your 
part. This recording will be used solely to ensure accuracy and 
completeness of analysis, and will not be used for any other purpose or 
made available to any other party. It would be appreciated also if we may 
contact you after the interview by e-mail to clarify any questions that arise as 
a result of later analysis. 
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Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Your participation in this research will remain confidential and you will not be 
identified in the published results of this research. Opinions quoted in the 
published results will remain anonymous. All data, including written notes, 
recordings and computer data regarding your contribution will be stored 
securely according to the Data Protection Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 
and the University of Leeds Code of Practice on Data Protection. 
Funding 
The research is funded by the researcher as an individual PhD thesis. 
Further Information 
Please ask the researcher, or supervisor (listed below) if you have any 
questions or concerns, or would like further information. 
Contact Details: 
Researcher: 
Rick Graham BSc (Hons.), LLB (Hons.) 
School of Law, University of Leeds 
Phone: 01335 390626 
Mobile: 07801 518370 
E-mail: lwrag@leeds.ac.uk 
Supervisor: 
Professor Louise Ellison 
School of Law, University of Leeds 
Phone: 0113 343 2684 
E-mail: l.e.ellison@leeds.ac.uk
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Consent to take part in the PhD research project: 









agree with  
I confirm that I have read and understand the above 
information sheet dated 2nd January 2014 explaining the 
above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions about the project. 
 
I agree to take part in the above research project.  
I agree that an audio recording may be made of the interview.  
I agree that the data collected from me be analysed and used 
as part of the final research publication, as indicated on the 
attached information form. 
 
 










*To be signed and dated in the presence of both researcher and participant.  
One signed and dated form to be retained securely by the research team 
and another to be provided to the participant. 
 





Thank you for your time today. I’m researching how DNA evidence is 
presented and examined in Crown Court trials, specifically, assessing the 
experience of experts involved with DNA evidence and prosecutions. On this 
basis, I am interviewing experts such as yourself. 
The scope of my research covers the time from the decision to prosecute, 
through to the close of the trial and thus, there are three broad areas that I’d 
like to discuss, as well as gathering some background information. The first 
area is events pre-trial during development of prosecution and defence 
cases; the second is your experience of DNA evidence during the trial itself; 
and the third, your opinions regarding possible improvements to the process. 
 
Interviewee 
1. I’d like to start by asking you about your background experience, if I may, 
and the types of cases involving DNA evidence with which you have been 
involved. Firstly, could you tell me about your background and qualifications, 
as well as your current job title and employer? 
2. Could you tell me approximately how many DNA cases you’ve been 
involved in to date, and what criminal offences these cases have involved? 
3. How recently have you been involved in DNA cases? 
4. How many of these cases have involved a Crown Court appearance on 
your part?  
5. What proportion of the time have you appeared for the defence, as 
opposed to the prosecution in Crown Court cases? 
 
Pre-trial 
I’d like to ask you now about your experiences of the pre-trial process. The 
scope of my research is the use of DNA evidence in Crown Court trials, 
however I want to understand how the cases presented by both prosecution 
and defence counsel have been developed, and the various flows of 
information that lead to this point. 
6. When you appear for the prosecution, at what stage in the pre-trial 
process do you become involved, and how are you involved in the 
development of the prosecution case? 
Prompts if necessary 
Could you tell me about your involvement with other parties 
relevant to the development of the prosecution case? 
For example, Police, CPS 
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7. When you appear for the defence, at what stage in the pre-trial process 
do you become involved, and how are you involved in the development of 
the defence case? 
Prompts if necessary 
Could you tell me about your involvement with other parties 
relevant to the development of the defence case? 
For example, Solicitor 
8. Could you tell me how well DNA evidence, and its limitations, are 
understood by those involved in case development? 
Prompts if necessary: 
What about the police? 
What about the solicitor? 
What about the CPS? 
9. I’d like to move on to ask you about disclosure of evidence between 
prosecution and defence. In your experience, are there any issues or 
concerns when disclosing DNA evidence? 
10. I specifically want to ask you about pre-trial conferences. How often do 
these take place, and what is involved? 
Prompts if necessary: 
Who is involved and exactly what happens in the conference? 
Can you recall any instances where a pre-trial conference 
would have been useful but did not take place and whether this 
had any detrimental consequences in your view? 
11. How effective are pre-trial conferences, in your view? 
12. I’d like to conclude consideration of the pre-trial stage, by asking for your 
opinion on potential improvements that could be made during the pre-trial 
phase, from the point of view of case development. 
Prompts if necessary: 
Which other parties should be involved? 
Are you given sufficient information? 
What additional flows of information should take place? 
How could prosecution and defence case preparation be 
improved? 
What improvements could be made to pre-trial conferences, 
and other communication between prosecution and defence? 
 
Trial 
I’d like to move on to look at the trial itself. I’d like to ask about the way in 
which DNA evidence is presented, and challenged, by both prosecution and 
defence, and the way in which DNA evidence is managed by the Judge. 
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13. As a preliminary question, could I ask you to describe how DNA 
evidence is presented to the court? 
Prompts if necessary: 
For example, is the Doheny direction used to present DNA 
evidence? 
14. Are there exceptions in practice to the guidelines laid down in the 
Doheny direction? 
Prompts if necessary: 
Is the Doheny direction always used? 
Are alternative presentations ever used? 
Are additional presentations ever used? 
What about LTDNA? 
What about where the sample size is below the stochastic 
threshold? 
What about partial/ mixed profiles? 
What about where the expert is being asked to give an opinion 
beyond the source-or sub-source level hypothesis? 
 
15. In the cases in which you’ve appeared, and to your knowledge, how 
central has DNA evidence been to the case? 
16. In your opinion how well have cases been constructed in relation to this 
and the other evidence in the case?   
17. Following on from my earlier question regarding understanding of DNA 
evidence, how well do counsel understand the DNA evidence? 
18. Are you ever constrained in your testimony by the direction of your 
evidence in chief? 
19. I’m interested in the prosecution’s overall strategy in its presentation of 
DNA evidence, and its rebuttal of defence arguments? Could you describe 
how, in your experience, prosecuting counsel present DNA evidence to 
juries? 
How do they manage their case? 
20. In your opinion, could this be improved?  If so, how? 
21. I’d like to move on to consider defence handling of DNA evidence in 
Crown Court trials. How often and under what circumstances do defence 
counsel call their own expert witness? 
22. What strategies do defence counsel use to challenge DNA evidence? 
23. In your opinion could this be improved? If so, how? 
24. I’d like to ask you about your experience of cross-examination of DNA 
evidence. How would you describe you own experience? 
Prompts if necessary: 
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Have you ever found the process challenging or otherwise 
difficult? If so why? 
Have you ever found the process intimidating? 
25. How has your experience varied depending upon whether you were 
appearing for the prosecution or the defence? If so, how? 
26. Thinking about the presentation of DNA evidence as a whole: are you 
always able to give the evidence you want to give or are you sometimes 
interrupted or otherwise prevented from doing so by counsel? 
Prompts if necessary: 
What about during evidence in chief? 
What about during cross-examination? 
Is there any difference between prosecution and defence 
counsel strategy in this area? 
27. How do you respond in these circumstances? Would you turn to the trial 
judge for assistance, for example? 
28. I’d like to ask some questions about the handling of the case by the 
judge in terms of DNA evidence. What is your experience of the trial judge’s 
summing up in this regard? 
Prompts if necessary: 
What about accuracy? 
Do trial judges correctly sum up DNA evidence according to 
legal rules (for example Doheny)? 
What about limitations? 
How well do judges explain how to combine DNA evidence 
with other evidence? 
How well do judges appear to understand DNA evidence? 
29. If DNA evidence has been misrepresented, either explicitly, implicitly, or 
by omission, is this always recognised, and if so, how is this handled by trial 
judges? 
30. As far as you can ascertain, how well do the jury seem to understand the 
DNA evidence? 
 
Improvements to Trial Process 
31. I’d like to move on to ask about the ways in which the presentation and 
examination of DNA evidence as a whole could be improved. There have 
been many suggestions in this area, not least from the forensic science 
community. I'd like to ask you about your opinions regarding possible 
improvements to the process, both during the pre-trial stage and the trial 
itself. Firstly, I’d like to ask you about potential improvements of knowledge 
to the various parties involved regarding DNA evidence. In your opinion, 
should any parties involved receive additional training, and what form should 
this take? 
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The expert witness (for example regarding legal issues? 
32. I’d like to ask you about your opinion regarding potential statutory or 
procedural changes that could improve the presentation and examination of 
DNA evidence in court. Could I first ask your opinion on whether there 
should be an enhanced admissibility test for novel forms of DNA evidence? 
33. In your opinion, should “enhanced” statistical presentations be available 
to the court, such as likelihood ratios, Bayesian calculations, adjectival 
descriptions of evidence strength? 
34. What could be done to improve the usefulness of the expert witness to 
the court in his or her presentation of DNA evidence in court? 
Prompts if necessary: 
Should the expert witness be able to testify beyond the source-
level hypothesis where valid? 
35. Finally in this area, what other improvements should be made, if any? 
 
FSS Closure 
There have been many claims regarding potential wide-reaching effects of 
the closure of the FSS. I’d be interested in your opinion regarding the effects 
of this. 
36. In your opinion, will has the closure of the FSS affected the preparation 
of prosecution and defence cases during the pre-trial stage?? 
37. Has the closure of the FSS affected the trial process itself? 
 
Close of Interview 
Thank you very much for your time and valuable experience. 
 
